CATHY KELLEY v. JENNIFER GRUBBS; DAVID MARSHALL, ESQ.; AND RANDALL GRUBBS
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RENDERED: July 13, 2001; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-001676-MR
CATHY KELLEY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM GARRARD CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROBERT J. JACKSON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CI-00157
JENNIFER GRUBBS; DAVID MARSHALL, ESQ.;
AND RANDALL GRUBBS
APPELLEES
OPINION
VACATING and REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE; McANULTY, AND EMBERTON, JUDGES.
McANULTY, JUDGE: This is an appeal from the imposition of CR 11
sanctions against Appellant.
We vacate and remand for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Appellant Cathy Kelley represented Appellee Randall
Grubbs (Mr. Grubbs) in a modification of child support case.
During the proceedings, Appellant and her client were unable to
attend two particular hearings at which visitation schedules were
set, causing Mr. Grubbs to miss visitation with his son.
Both
times, Appellant claimed Appellee David Marshall, (Appellee),
counsel for Appellee Jennifer Grubbs, (Ms. Grubbs), promised to
cancel the hearings in light of the absence of Appellant and her
client but did not do so.
After the disputes regarding the missed hearings and
visits arose, Appellant filed a motion and supporting affidavit
of counsel for the court to recuse, grant a change of venue, find
Ms. Grubbs in contempt for violating the court’s visitation
orders and to award attorney’s fees to Mr. Grubbs.
The affidavit
accused Ms. Grubbs and her counsel of different types of
“unethical and contemptuous behavior,” including agreeing to
cancel hearings without actually doing so and failing to notify
Appellant or Mr. Grubbs about visitation schedules.
It was this motion and affidavit that spurred Appellee
to ask the court for CR 11 sanctions against Appellant.
However,
Appellant withdrew as Mr. Grubbs’s attorney before the court
considered Appellee’s CR 11 motion.
Appellant alleges that not
long after her withdrawal from the case, she also severed all
ties with her former firm and all its attorneys, including the
attorney who took her place as Mr. Grubbs’s counsel.
In April of 1999, more than a year after Appellant
withdrew as Mr. Grubbs’s counsel, an evidentiary hearing was held
in the case.
At this hearing, the judge heard arguments on
Appellee’s CR 11 claim.
Appellant.
No one represented or spoke on behalf of
Appellant was not present at the hearing herself, and
she claims she was never informed this hearing was to occur.
Appellant alleges she first had notice about Appellee’s CR 11
motion and affidavit on May 4, 1999, the day before the Garrard
Circuit Court handed down the order imposing sanctions.
appeal followed.
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This
First, we need to clear up a matter of dispute
regarding the standard of review applied to evaluate CR 11 cases
in Kentucky.
Appellant asks us to apply the multi-tiered
standard of review found in Clark Equipment Co., Inc. v. Bowman,
Ky. App., 762 S.W.2d 417, 421 (1988).
This multi-tiered standard
has been recognized as the appropriate one for CR 11 review in
Kentucky for more than a decade.
Though Appellee agrees this multi-tiered standard is
the approach taken currently by Kentucky law, he would have us
apply a single abuse of discretion standard, pursuant to the more
recent U.S. Supreme Court Case involving the Federal Rule 11,
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405; 110 S.Ct.
2241, 2261, 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990).
Appellee argues that
overturning the standard in Clark is sensible because Kentucky’s
CR 11 is so similar to the Federal Rule 11.
Louisville Rent-A-
Space v. Akai, Ky. App. 746 S.W.2d 85, 87 (1988).
However, we
are not persuaded by this argument.
This court considered — and summarily rejected — the
across-the-board abuse of discretion approach in Clark.
762 S.W.2d at 421.
Clark,
Appellee has shown us no new reason why we
should reconsider that decision or the use of the multi-tiered
standard other than the contention that Kentucky’s CR 11 is so
similar to the Federal Rule 11.
S.W.2d at 86.
Louisville Rent-A-Space, 746
But incongruously, Appellee also bases a good
portion of his argument supporting the sanctions imposed on
Appellant on the vast differences between our CR 11 and the
corresponding federal rule.
Therefore, we find this argument to
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be without merit, and we maintain that Kentucky courts should
apply the multi-tiered standard to CR 11 review.
Though Appellant submits several issues for our review
in this appeal, we will address only her claim that the CR 11
sanctions were imposed in violation of her right to procedural
due process.
Appellant alleges that since she was not aware of
the April 1999 evidentiary hearing in which these sanctions were
discussed, her due process rights have been violated.
We agree.
Appellee contends, and the Garrard Circuit Court
agreed, that no violation of due process occurs for lack of an
evidentiary hearing if a defendant is notified in advance that
sanctions may be impending, relying on a federal case, Union
Planters Bank v. L & J Dev. Co., 115 F.3d 378 (6th Cir. 1997).
However, we feel the case at bar is distinguishable from the
Union Planters case.
There, the discussion about sanctions
apparently took place during a planned hearing in the course of
the trial at which defendants and their counsel were presumably
present.
The defendants in that case had the opportunity to
discuss the sanctions before the court with the movants, even
though they were not given the benefit of a full evidentiary
hearing.
In the case before us, the sanctions were discussed at
a hearing occurring long after Appellant had withdrawn as counsel
from the case.
Another attorney had assumed representation of
Mr. Grubbs, and as such, Appellant was not in attendance at the
hearing.
She was therefore unable to discuss the sanctions with
the court or the movants.
Appellant claims she had no idea the
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sanctions were to be discussed, and indeed she had no idea any
hearing was to occur at all.
Furthermore, her response was
seemingly limited to a memorandum of law filed with the court
after the sanctions had already been imposed.
Since this case is
distinguishable from the Union Planters case, we feel its holding
is not applicable here.
Instead, we find the imposition of sanctions under CR
11 to be analogous to court-ordered punishment for indirect
contempt.
This court recently said that indirect contempt
charges “may be punished only in proceedings that comport with
due process.”
395.
Commonwealth v. Pace, Ky. App., 15 S.W.3d 393,
In Pace, the court agreed that a show cause hearing where
the charged attorney was given an opportunity to explain his or
her behavior was necessary before a trial court could decide
whether that attorney was guilty of contemptuous behavior.
feel the same applies here.
We
Thus, since Appellant was not given
an opportunity before the sanctions were imposed to respond to
the CR 11 charges, we believe her right of due process was
violated.
Appellee next argues that even if Appellant was not
properly notified before the original court hearing, she still
received a full hearing after the sanctions were imposed that
should satisfy Appellant’s right to due process.
Again, we
disagree.
The U.S. Supreme Court has set forth a balancing test
of sorts to determine whether processes provided before a party
is deprived of his or her liberty or property are adequate under
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the Constitution.
This “due process calculus” was set forth in
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18
(1976), and Kentucky courts have accepted the Mathews analysis.
Shaw v. Seward, Ky. App., 689 S.W.2d 37, 39 (1985). The Mathews
test evaluates the importance of the following factors in
determining what process is due:
First, the private interest that will be
affected by the official action; second, the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and
finally, the Government's interest, including
the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would
entail.
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18
(1976).
We believe in light of these factors, Appellant’s due
process right was not satisfied by a post-sanction hearing.
Obviously, Appellant’s private interest in the court’s action was
great; her job and her livelihood would clearly be affected by
the imposition of monetary sanctions against her based on a rule
created to curb abusive conduct in litigation.
Also, without a
hearing, Appellant had no opportunity to offer explanations or
defenses for the motion and affidavit she filed, so the risk of
an erroneous deprivation resulting therein is high.
Finally, it
would not have worked a financial or administrative hardship on
the court to make sure that Appellant had notice of the sanctions
to be discussed and to have requested her appearance at the April
8, 1999 hearing.
In fact, it might have even saved the court
time and money by possibly eliminating this appeal.
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As such, we
believe that to satisfy due process, Appellant should have been
given notice of the hearing and an opportunity to appear before
the sanctions were decided on and imposed by the court.
Additionally, though federal courts have recognized
that a full hearing may not be necessary to impose Federal CR 11
sanctions, Kentucky courts have not held similarly.
In Clark,
this court said, “Considering the punitive nature of sanctions
and ‘the impact sanctions may have on a party or an attorney’s
career and personal well-being,’ a trial court should not impose
sanctions without a hearing and without rendering findings of
fact.”
Clark, supra, at 421.
Finally, Appellee also alleges that even if Appellant
was unaware of the April hearing, she was aware of the fact that
a motion for sanctions had been filed, and as a reasonable
attorney, she would have made an inquiry as to the status of that
motion.
We disagree.
Imposing sanctions on an attorney that may affect his
or her professional and financial status is a very serious
outcome to very serious charges.
The determination of that
outcome should not be left to whether an attorney is reasonable
enough to check on the motion’s status long after it is filed,
after the attorney is no longer associated with the case, or
after the attorney is no longer associated with anyone who is.
Additionally, we feel providing notice serves an entirely
different purpose than just making it easier for a defendant in a
sanctions case to show up in court.
As recently as 1999, one
federal court has decided that notice works to, “put counsel ‘on
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notice as to the particular factors he must address if he is to
avoid sanctions.’”
Ping He Co. Ltd. v. Nonferrous Metals, Inc.,
187 F.R.D. 121, 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
We agree with that court’s
analysis, and believe it applies here.
Because the imposition of sanctions by the Garrard
Circuit Court is found to be in violation of Appellant’s due
process, we need not consider the other arguments brought before
the court on appeal.
Therefore, we vacate the judgment of the
circuit court and remand this case for proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES JENNIFER
GRUBBS AND DAVID RUSSELL
MARSHALL:
James L. Thomerson
Lexington, Kentucky
Jennifer O. True
David Russell Marshall
Nicholasville, Kentucky
NO BRIEF FILED FOR APPELLEE
RANDALL GRUBBS
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