JEFFREY C. PETERSON v. ARAMARK UNIFORM SERVICES; RILEY WALSH; AND TED WIXOM
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RENDERED: MARCH 2, 2001; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-001579-MR
JEFFREY C. PETERSON
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE SHEILA ISAAC, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CI-00205
v.
ARAMARK UNIFORM SERVICES;
RILEY WALSH; AND TED WIXOM
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE; BARBER AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
The appellant, Jeffrey C. Peterson, appeals from
summary judgment orders by the Fayette Circuit Court which
dismissed his racial discrimination and retaliation claims which
he brought against his former employer, Aramark Uniform Services
(Aramark) and individually against his supervisors.
We agree
with the trial court that Peterson failed to establish a prima
facie claim for a hostile work environment.
Furthermore, we find
that Peterson failed to present sufficient evidence to rebut
Aramark’s legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for its
employment decisions with regard to his disparate treatment and
retaliation claims.
Hence, we affirm.
On August 14, 1994, Peterson became employed as a wash
floor supervisor by Aramark at its services facility in
Lexington, Kentucky.
Previously, Peterson was employed at
Aramark’s Cincinnati, Ohio facility as a non-management (union)
employee.
In Lexington, he worked under the supervision of the
plant manager, Riley Walsh, and the general manager, Ted Wixom.
In November 1995, Peterson filed a complaint with Aramark’s
corporate office, alleging that he was being harassed and treated
differently than other supervisors because of his race.
Thereafter, Peterson concluded that Aramark’s response was
inadequate, and he filed a formal complaint with the Lexington
and Fayette County Human Rights Commission.
On August 15, 1996,
Aramark terminated Peterson’s employment allegedly based upon a
series of verbal confrontations between Peterson and other
supervisors.
On January 16, 1997, Peterson filed this action against
Aramark, Walsh, and Wixom, alleging violations of the Kentucky
Civil Rights Act1 and retaliatory discharge.2
Specifically,
Peterson alleges that he was subjected to disparate treatment and
harassment because he is African-American.
He asserts that: (1)
he was required to work full shifts of “union” work when the
facility was short-handed, although white supervisors were not so
required; (2) he was given other additional work assignments
1
KRS 344.040.
2
KRS 344.280.
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which were not given to white supervisors; (3) complaints about
him were sent to the corporate office, while complaints about
other supervisors remained at the Lexington office; (3) Walsh and
Wixom accepted the word of other supervisors who complained about
Peterson, and refused to ask Peterson for his side; (4) Walsh and
Wixom yelled and cursed at him, whereas white supervisors were
not treated that way; (5) Wixom once referred to Peterson as “our
own little Farrakhan”;3
(6) Walsh often took Peterson’s
paperwork before he completed it; and (6) Aramark, Walsh, and
Wixom retaliated against him for filing a complaint with the
Human Rights Commission.
Walsh and Wixom filed a motion for summary judgment,
arguing that individual employees cannot be held liable for
discrimination or retaliation under the Kentucky Civil Rights
Act.
The trial court agreed and dismissed Peterson’s claims
against Walsh and Wixom.
Following a period of discovery,
Aramark filed its own motion for summary judgment.
Aramark
pointed to documents showing that Peterson had been warned about
his altercations with supervisors at both the Lexington and the
Cincinnati facilities.
Aramark also pointed to deposition
testimony by Peterson, Walsh, Wixom and other supervisors which
disputed Peterson’s claims of disparate treatment and harassment.
3
In October, 1995, Peterson attended the “Million Man March”, a gathering of AfricanAmerican men held in Washington, D.C. The event was organized by Nation of Islam leader
Louis Farrakhan, whose public statements sometimes generate controversy. During the event,
Peterson was interviewed and appeared on a local television station. In the interview, Peterson
discussed his thoughts about the event, Farrakhan, and race relations. When Peterson returned to
work, several of his co-workers mentioned to him that they had seen him on television. During a
discussion with Wixom and other employees, Wixom commented that Peterson was “our own
little Farrakhan.”
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The trial court granted Aramark’s motion for summary judgment,
finding that Peterson had failed to present specific evidence
supporting his claims of a racially hostile work environment,
disparate treatment or retaliatory discharge.
In the absence of
specific evidence, the trial court concluded that Aramark was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Peterson failed
to rebut the evidence of non-discriminatory reasons for its
employment decisions.
This appeal followed.
Among other reasons, the Kentucky Civil Rights Act was
enacted to provide for execution within the state of the policies
embodied in the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e.4
Accordingly, KRS 344.040 provides, in pertinent part:
It is an unlawful practice for an employer
to:
(1) To . . . discriminate against an
individual with respect to compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of the individual’s race,
. . .
(2) To limit, segregate, or classify
employees in any way which would deprive or
tend to deprive an individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
status as an employee because of the
individual’s race, . . .
Furthermore, KRS 344.200 et seq. sets out an
administrative procedure for filing complaints alleging unlawful
discrimination.
Since an employee who has filed a complaint
alleging discrimination may continue to work for the same
employer, KRS 344.280 provides that:
It shall be an unlawful practice for a
person, or for two (2) or more persons to
conspire:
4
KRS 344.020.
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(1) To retaliate or discriminate in any
manner against a person because he has
opposed a practice declared unlawful by this
chapter, or because he has made a charge,
filed a complaint, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in any
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under
this chapter; . . .
An employment discrimination action unfolds in a
different manner than most civil actions.
In Harker v. Federal
Land Bank of Louisville,5 the Kentucky Supreme Court adopted a
three-stage test set out by the United States Supreme Court.
First, the plaintiff must make a prima facie case of
discrimination by offering proof that, 1) he is a member of a
protected class, 2) he is qualified for and applied for an
available position, 3) he did not receive the job, and 4) the
position remained open and the employer sought other applicants.6
Second, the employer must then articulate a "legitimate
nondiscriminatory" reason for its action.7
Third, once such a
reason is given, it is incumbent on the employee to demonstrate
that the stated reason is merely a pretext to cover the actual
discrimination.8
The establishment of a prima facie case is a
threshold, but, if left unrefuted, judgment must be entered in
5
Ky., 679 S.W.2d 226 (1984).
6
McDonnell-Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 36 L.Ed.2d 668, 93 S.Ct. 1817
(1973).
7
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 67 L.Ed.2d 207, 101
S.Ct. 1089 (1981).
8
Id. at 256, 67 L.Ed.2d at 217.
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the plaintiff's favor.9
However, the burden of refuting the
prima facie case need not be met by persuasion; the employer need
only articulate with clarity and reasonable specificity a reason
unrelated to a discriminatory motive; the employer is not
required to persuade the trier of fact that the action was
lawful.10
It is the third stage of the McDonnell-Douglas scheme
which has proven most troublesome.
In Harker, the Kentucky
Supreme Court stated that “the special rule for age
discrimination summary judgments is whether the plaintiff has
proof of ‘cold hard facts creating an inference showing age
discrimination was a determining factor’ in the discharge.”11
However, this variation on the McDonnell-Douglas test is
specifically limited to age discrimination summary judgments.12
Therefore, we agree with Peterson that the trial court erred by
directly applying the “cold hard facts” standard set out in
Harker.
Nevertheless, it is not precisely clear how the “cold
hard facts” test of Harker differs from the general rule that an
employee alleging discrimination must present specific evidence
establishing pretext.
In all discrimination cases which follow
the McDonnell-Douglas model, the burden returns to the plaintiff
9
Id. at 254, 67 L.Ed.2d at 216.
10
Id. at 258, 67 L.Ed.2d at 218.
11
Harker, 679 S.W.2d at 229.
12
See also Hardaway Management Co. v. Southerland, Ky., 977 S.W.2d 910, 916
(1998).
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to produce specific evidence showing that the employer's
articulated reason for the employment decision was a pretext for
discrimination.
This burden merges with the ultimate burden of
persuading the fact-finder that the plaintiff has been the victim
of intentional discrimination.
The plaintiff may succeed in this
either by directly persuading the court that a discriminatory
reason more likely motivated the employer, or indirectly by
showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of
credence.13
Courts should take care not to apply the McDonnellDouglas test mechanically.
The plaintiff at all times bears the
ultimate burden of proof.14
The prima facie case creates an
inference of discrimination only because these acts, if otherwise
unexplained, are more likely than not based on the consideration
of impermissible factors.
Establishment of the prima facie case
creates a presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated
against the employee.15
The burden that shifts to the employer is to rebut the
presumption of discrimination by producing evidence that the
employment decision was based on a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason.16
However, once the employer presents evidence of a
legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the employment decision,
13
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 67 L.Ed.2d at 217.
14
St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 512, 125 L.Ed.2d 407, 419, 113 S.Ct.
2742 (1993).
15
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-54, 67 L.Ed.2d at 215-16 (1981).
16
Id.
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the employee cannot simply repeat the evidence of satisfactory
job performance previously offered to prove that the employer's
given reasons for discharge are pretextual.
Furthermore, a
showing that the employer’s proffered reason was false does not
compel a judgment for the plaintiff unless the fact-finder also
believes from the evidence that discrimination was the real
reason for the employment decision.17
This is not to say that in
all cases circumstantial evidence is insufficient to establish a
factual issue on pretext.18
Nevertheless, the plaintiff must
still produce some evidence warranting a reasonable inference of
pretext.19
Where the employer has advanced specific reasons for
the employment decision, the employee's rebuttal evidence should
be focused on them.20
"The ultimate question in every employment
discrimination case involving a claim of disparate treatment is
whether the plaintiff was the victim of intentional
discrimination."21
As a preliminary matter, Peterson argues that summary
judgment was inappropriate because the depositions,
interrogatories, admissions and documents produced pursuant to
17
St Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 515-16, 125 L.Ed.2d at 421-22. See also
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, 530 U.S. ---, 147 L. Ed. 2d 105 119, 120 S. Ct. 2097
(2000), holding that a plaintiff's prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that
the employer's asserted justification was false, may permit fact finder to conclude that the
employer unlawfully discriminated.
18
Handley, 827 S.W.2d at 700-701.
19
Harker, 679 S.W.2d at 231.
20
LaMontagne v. American Convenience Products, Inc., 750 F.2d 1405, 1414 (7th Cir.,
21
Reeves, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 123.
1984).
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discovery in this case were not part of the trial court’s record.
Under the local rules of procedure for the Fayette Circuit Court
then in effect, answers to interrogatories, responses to requests
for production of documents and depositions are not filed in the
record.22
Peterson notes that CR 56.03 permits summary judgment
to be granted only “if the pleadings, answers to interrogatories,
stipulations, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.”
As of the date on which the trial court
granted Aramark’s motion for summary judgment, none of the
evidence produced during the discovery phase was part of the
record.
Rather, these materials were added to the court’s record
by agreed order after Peterson filed his notice of appeal.
Peterson maintains that the trial court could not have
considered all of the evidence of record because the record was
incomplete at the time summary judgment was entered.
Aramark
responds that Peterson did not raise this issue previously, nor
did he contradict any of the evidence which Aramark presented to
rebut Peterson’s prima facie case.
As a result, Aramark asserts
that this action was ripe for summary judgment.
We emphasize that local rules of procedure cannot
modify the standards for granting summary judgment pursuant to CR
56.
On a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must draw
all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, as
22
Rules of Fayette Circuit Court 19 & 20.
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they may be gleaned from the pretrial record.23
Clearly, the
trial court cannot do this if the record is not complete.
However, we find no prejudice to Peterson as a result
of the application of the local rules.
First, it is conceded
that Peterson did not complain about the status of the record
while he was before the trial court.
he may have was waived.
Thus, any objection which
Furthermore, a party opposing a properly
supported summary judgment motion cannot defeat it without
presenting at least some affirmative evidence showing that there
is a genuine issue of material fact for trial.24
Once Aramark
presented evidence to establish legitimate non-discriminatory
reasons for its employment decisions, the burden shifted to
Peterson to present evidence to establish that Aramark’s stated
reasons were pretexts for unlawful discrimination.
Even though
the discovery was not formally part of the record, Peterson still
had the opportunity to present evidence to attempt to meet this
burden of going forward.
The trial court was not obligated to
find the evidence which supported Peterson’s claims.
Lastly, because summary judgments involve no fact
finding, this Court reviews them de novo, in the sense that we
owe no deference to the conclusions of the trial court.
As did
the trial court, we ask whether material facts are in dispute and
whether the party moving for judgment is clearly entitled thereto
23
Perkins v. Hausladen, Ky., 828 S.W.2d 652, 654 (1992).
24
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., Ky., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (1991).
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as a matter of law.25
Since all discovery is now part of the
record, we may proceed to the merits of the appeal.
Basically, Peterson’s Civil Rights Act claim rests on
three separate, albeit related, grounds.
First, he alleges that
he was subjected to a racially hostile work environment.
Second,
he alleges that he was treated differently than similarly
situated supervisors on account of his race.
And third, he
asserts that he was subjected to retaliatory treatment because he
filed a complaint alleging racial discrimination.
The McDonnell-
Douglas framework applies to each of these grounds, although the
analysis must be modified accordingly.
Hostile Work Environment
For Peterson to make a prima facie case of hostile work
environment, he must show: (1) he belonged to a protected group;
(2) he was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment
was based upon race; (4) the harassment affected a term,
condition, or privilege of his employment; and (5) the employer
knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take
proper remedial action.26
The United States Supreme Court
instructs that hostile work environment harassment occurs when
"the workplace is permeated with 'discriminatory intimidation,
ridicule, and insult' . . . that is 'sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and
25
Scifres v. Kraft, Ky.App., 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (1996).
26
Hafford v. Seidner, 167 F.3d 1074, 1080 (6th Cir., 1999).
-11-
create an abusive working environment.'"27 Factors to consider
when determining whether harassment is sufficiently severe or
pervasive include: "the frequency of the discriminatory conduct;
its severity; whether it is physically threatening or
humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it
unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance."28
The conduct must be severe or pervasive enough to create an
environment that a reasonable person would find hostile, and the
victim must subjectively regard that environment as hostile.29
With the exception of the “Farrakhan” comment, Peterson
does not allege that he was subjected to severe or pervasive
harassment which was racial in tone or content.30
Rather, he
contends that he was subject to a racially hostile work
environment primarily because he was treated differently than
similarly situated white supervisors.
Although this conduct may
be sufficient to establish a prima facie case on the disparate
treatment claim, the allegations are not sufficient to establish
a pervasively and severely hostile work environment.31
27
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 126 L. Ed. 2d 295, 301, 114 S. Ct. 367
(1993), (quoting Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67, 91 L. Ed. 2d 49, 106
S.Ct. 2399 (1986)).
28
Harris, 510 U.S. at 23, 126 L. Ed. 2d at 302-03.
29
Jackson v. Quanex Corp, 191 F.3d 647, 658 (6th Cir., 1999) (citing Harris, 510 U.S. at
21-22, 126 L.Ed.2d at 302).
30
Wixom stated that his comment referring to Peterson as a “Farrakhan” was intended as
a compliment. However, for purposes of this appeal, we shall assume that it was intended as a
pejorative.
31
See Allen v. Michigan Department of Corrections, 165 F.3d 405 (6th Cir., 1999).
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Furthermore, the Civil Rights Act does not impose a general
civility code in the workplace.32
Thus, the fact that Walsh and
Wixom may have screamed and cursed at Peterson does not, by
itself, rise to the level of a hostile work environment.
Disparate Treatment
We agree with the trial court that Peterson has stated
a prima facie case for race-based disparate treatment.
Aramark
responds by denying that Peterson was treated differently from
similarly situated white supervisors.
Specifically, Aramark
states that all supervisors were occasionally required to do
“union” work, and Peterson was not singled out in this regard.
Based upon Peterson’s allegations and the evidence in the record,
it appears that there was a perennial problem with staffing in
Peterson’s area of supervision, the soil and wash room.33
Consequently, Peterson was often required to perform full shifts
of “union” work in addition to his supervisory duties.
However,
Aramark presented evidence, and Peterson admitted, that white
supervisors were required to fill in on “union” work when the
other areas of the facility was short-staffed.
While Peterson complains that no other supervisors were
required to put in full shifts of “union” work, he points to no
documentary evidence or testimony (other than his own assertions)
which support this claim.
In the absence of such evidence,
32
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788, 141 L.Ed.2d 662, 677, 118 S.Ct.
2275 (1998).
33
In addition, the soil and wash rooms had significant problems with equipment
breakdowns and maintaining sufficient hot water. As supervisor of the area, Peterson was
responsible for dealing with these issues even though he could not always control their causes.
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Peterson cannot establish that he was required to perform more
work than similarly situated white supervisors.
Furthermore, the
Civil Rights Act was not intended as a vehicle for judicial
review of the wisdom or efficiency of general business
practices.34
There is no evidence that Aramark’s staffing
difficulties and equipment problems were manipulated to affect
Peterson’s area of supervision in any greater degree than other
areas of the facility.
Aramark does not directly address several of Peterson’s
allegations, including his assertions that Walsh often took
Peterson’s paperwork before Peterson was able to complete it, and
that Walsh required Peterson to get supplies for an older, white
supervisor, although other supervisors were not required to do
so.
However, these are very general allegations, and Peterson
presented no direct or circumstantial evidence which would
justify an inference that Walsh or Wixom’s conduct toward him was
motivated by a discriminatory intent.
Peterson next alleges that complaints about other
supervisors were kept within the Lexington facility, but
complaints about him were sent to Aramark’s corporate office.
Aramark asserts that its handling of complaints about Peterson
was not based upon his race, but was due to Peterson’s repeated
verbal confrontations with employees and supervisors.
Aramark
also points to its documentary evidence showing that Peterson was
warned about his confrontational attitude toward supervisors.
Peterson did not point to any specific evidence showing that
34
Harker, 679 S.W.2d at 231.
-14-
Aramark treated a similarly situated employee or supervisor
differently than he was treated.
Accordingly, Peterson failed to
establish that Aramark’s stated reasons for these actions were
pretexts for unlawful discrimination.
By far, Peterson’s strongest claim rests on his
allegation that Walsh and Wixom “yelled and cursed” at him over
problems which were occurring in Peterson’s area of supervision.
However, Aramark presented significant documentary evidence that
Peterson was involved in verbal confrontations with other
supervisors and employees.
Peterson was warned about his
confrontational attitude while he was still working at the
Cincinnati facility, and he received several warnings about his
conduct toward other supervisors at the Lexington facility.
On
July 2, 1996, Peterson received a “Final Warning” regarding a
verbal confrontation with Walsh.35
The warning advised him that
any further conduct of that nature could result in his
termination.
Nevertheless, on August 8, 1996, Peterson engaged
in another verbal confrontation with a supervisor, Mike Bentley,
which resulted in Peterson’s termination.
When viewed as a whole, all of Peterson’s allegations
raise a reasonable inference that he had conflicts with his
immediate supervisors.
These conflicts, together with other
problems in the workplace, led to friction between Peterson and
Walsh, Wixom, and other supervisors.
Yet apart from Peterson’s
general speculation, he presented no evidence, direct or
35
Incidentally, the record also shows that on June 20, 1996, Walsh received a written
warning about his verbal confrontation with Peterson on June 17. Record on Appeal [ROA] at p.
290.
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circumstantial, that he was treated differently than similarly
situated non-minority employees.36
Moreover, Peterson has
presented no specific evidence, either direct or circumstantial,
to establish that Aramark’s proffered reasons are unworthy of
credence, or that Aramark was more likely motivated by
discriminatory reasons in taking their actions.37
As a result,
the trial court properly granted summary judgment on his claim.
Retaliatory discharge
The McDonnell-Douglas scheme is, in a modified version,
applicable to retaliation claims.
In order to support a claim of
retaliation, Peterson must show: (1) he filed a charge of
harassment; (2) subsequent adverse action by the employer; and
(3) the adverse action was causally linked to the protected
activity.38
We agree with the trial court that, arguably,
Peterson stated a prima facie case establishing a claim that he
was discharged because he filed a complaint alleging racial
discrimination.
However, Aramark put forth a specific, non-
discriminatory basis for its decision to discharge Peterson.
Peterson had the burden of showing specific evidence which would
justify an inference that Aramark’s stated reason for the
discharge is false or unworthy of credence, and that the actual
reason for his discharge was because he filed the complaint.
36
Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1563 (11th Cir., 1997). See also Kirkwood v. Courier
Journal, Ky. App., 858 S.W.2d 194 (1993).
37
38
Id. at 1567.
Allen v. Michigan Dep’t of Corrections, 165 F.3d at 412.
-16-
Peterson points to statements made by Walsh and Wixom
after he filed a discrimination complaint with Aramark’s
corporate office.39
Taken on their own, these statements might
raise a stronger implication that Walsh and Wixom were attempting
to create a pretext for retaliation.
Yet as previously noted,
Aramark presented significant documentary evidence that Peterson
was involved in verbal confrontations with other supervisors and
employees.
In determining pretext, the question is not whether the
employer can, after the fact, find a legitimate
non-discriminatory justification for its employment decision.
There are few employees who have a work-history so spotless as to
survive a microscopic examination.
Yet while post hoc
explanations made after the initiation of a lawsuit may be
suspect, they do not automatically prove pretext.
The plaintiff
still has the burden of proof that there is reason to disbelieve
the explanation.40
Even viewing the record in the light most
favorable to Peterson, he has failed to present evidence which
would justify an inference that Aramark’s stated reasons for
firing him were false, or that these reasons were merely a
39
In an answer to Aramark’s Interrogatory No. 2(e), (ROA at p. 413), Peterson alleges
Wixom said I should not have told corporate what I did because
they go back to California and we stay here in Kentucky. Walsh
told me I better watch what I say about him or he would “get my
ass.” This happened the day after corporate went home.
40
Billet v. Cigna Corp., 940 F.2d 812, 828 (3d Cir., 1991).
-17-
pretext for retaliation.41
Therefore, summary judgment was
appropriate on this claim as well.
Lastly, Peterson argues that the trial court erred in
dismissing his discrimination claims against Walsh and Wixom in
their individual capacities.
He points out that KRS 344.280
prohibits a “person” from retaliating against an employee for
filing a discrimination complaint.
In contrast, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-3(a) merely prohibits retaliation by an “employer.”
Nevertheless, because we have already found that Peterson failed
to present sufficient evidence which would justify an inference
that Aramark’s stated reasons for discharging him were a pretext
for retaliation, we conclude that this issue is now moot.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court
is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
William C. Jacobs
Lexington, Kentucky
Douglas L. Hoots
Shannon M. Naish
Landrum & Shouse
Lexington, Kentucky
41
Allen v. Michigan Dep’t of Corrections, 165 F.3d at 413.
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