EDWARD MUSSELMAN V. DONALD ALVEY
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RENDERED: JUNE 15, 2001; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-001481-MR
EDWARD MUSSELMAN
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ERNEST A. JASMIN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CI-000745
V.
DONALD ALVEY
APPELLEE
OPINION AND ORDER REVERSING AND REMANDING
* * * * * * * *
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, Chief Judge; BARBER and COMBS, Judges.
GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE:
This is an appeal from a judgment entered
by the Jefferson Circuit Court in a defamation action.
For the
reasons stated hereafter, we are constrained to reverse and
remand the court’s judgment with directions to dismiss appellee’s
complaint.
On June 2, 1999, the Jefferson Circuit Court entered a
final judgment in this action awarding appellee compensatory
damages in a defamation action.
On June 14 appellant, the
defendant below, filed a notice of appeal.
He perfected that
appeal by filing a brief on November 22, 1999.
Thereafter, an
order was entered permitting the Kentucky Press Association to
file an amicus curiae brief in support of appellant’s position.
Subsequently, appellee untimely tendered for filing a
brief which was returned to him by the clerk.
Based upon this
fact, appellant filed a motion seeking the imposition of
sanctions pursuant to CR 76.12(8)(c) and the reversal of the
underlying judgment.
This motion was ordered to be passed to the
panel assigned to hear the appeal on the merits.
More than two
months later, appellee filed a motion seeking the enlargement of
time for filing his brief.
This motion was also passed to the
merits panel for decision.
On November 6, 2000, the merits panel
entered an order denying appellee’s motion for enlargement of
time for filing his brief and granting appellant’s CR 76.12(8)(c)
motion for relief.
The order further indicated that the case
would proceed to a decision without an oral argument.
Noteworthy
is the fact that the order did not specify the exact CR
76.12(8)(c) relief which would be granted, presumably because the
nature of such relief would be addressed in the final decision.
With one judge dissenting, a final opinion was rendered
on December 8.
Although that opinion addressed the merits of the
appeal, it did not impose the CR 76.12(8)(c) sanctions promised
in the November 6 order.
Appellant therefore filed a timely
petition for rehearing, bringing to the court’s attention the
inconsistencies between the November 6 order and the December 8
opinion.
By order and amended order entered February 14 and 15,
2001, this panel granted appellant’s petition for rehearing,
ordered the December 8 opinion withdrawn, and indicated that a
new opinion would be issued.
It is significant that appellee failed to respond to
appellant’s original motion seeking CR 76.12(8)(c) relief.
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Instead, over two months later, after the certified record was
received and the appeal was submitted, appellee for the first
time asked for additional time in which to file a brief.
Moreover, although he was entitled to do so, appellee failed to
file a response to appellant’s petition for rehearing.
Given the fact that appellee filed no response to
appellant’s CR 76.12(8)(c) motion, the fact that appellee made no
effort to ask for an enlargement of time in which to file a brief
until after this appeal was submitted, and the fact that appellee
filed no response to appellant’s petition for rehearing which
partially was based on the inconsistencies between the November 6
order and the December 8 opinion, we conclude that this appeal
should be disposed of consistent with the dictates of CR
76.12(8)(c) and our November 6 order granting such relief.
For
the reasons stated, and due to appellee’s failure to timely file
a brief herein, we elect pursuant to CR 76.12(8)(c) to accept
appellant’s statement of the facts and issues as correct and,
because appellant’s brief reasonably appears to warrant such
action, to reverse the judgment from which this appeal was taken.
For the reasons stated, the court’s judgment of May 25,
1999, which was entered on June 2, 1999, is hereby ORDERED
reversed and remanded with directions on remand to dismiss
appellee’s underlying complaint.
BARBER, J., CONCURS.
COMBS, J., DISSENTS BY SEPARATE OPINION.
ENTERED:
June 15, 2001
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/s/ Paul D. Gudgel
CHIEF JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS
COMBS, JUDGE, DISSENTING: I respectfully but
strenuously dissent in this case.
The majority opinion correctly
notes that Alvey failed to file a proper appellate brief after
several attempts to do so, that oral argument was canceled, and
that we granted appellant’s CR 76.12(8)(c) motion for relief on
November 6, 2000.
In granting that motion, which sought
imposition of sanctions and reversal of the underlying judgment,
we were silent as to what specific relief would be forthcoming
and proceeded to decide the merits of the case based on the
record, the appellant’s brief, and the amicus curiae brief —
without the assistance of the stricken appellee’s brief.
There
was no guarantee, promise, or representation by the panel through
its order that appellant would automatically prevail.
It is
significant that we passed the case for a consideration of the
merits rather than entering an order of dismissal concurrently
with the November 6, 2000, order.
Although the majority opinion recognizes and recites
that "[n]oteworthy is the fact that the order did not specify the
exact CR 76.12(8)(c) relief which would be granted," it later
recites "inconsistencies" between the order of November 6, 2000,
and the final opinion rendered on December 8, 2000.
There is no
inconsistency because there was no assurance — either implied or
procedurally required — that appellant would prevail after we
conscientiously reviewed this case on the record and on its
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merits — regardless of Alvey’s obvious dereliction in failing to
articulate his own position on appeal.
In the Petition for Rehearing, appellant relies on CR
76.12(8)(c) as if mandatorily compelling a reversal of the
decision below solely because of appellee’s failure to file a
proper appellate brief.
Despite the four precedents cited in
appellee’s persuasive petition for rehearing, I do not read CR
76.12(8)(c) as compelling an appellate court to enter what
amounts to a default judgment in favor of the only party filing a
brief on appeal.
Certainly the rule permits — and perhaps even
invites — such an extreme result.
However, it does not require
or dictate that we ignore the findings and conclusions of the
trial court, disregard a jury verdict, and/or punish an appellee
by denying him relief that may have been properly granted in the
court below — solely because of his failure to tender an
appropriate appellate brief.
It is a settled principle that default judgments are
not favored creatures in the law.
Appellant is essentially
demanding that we enter just such a judgment — even if it would
mean that we shackle ourselves with blinders as to the
proceedings below.
While the invitation to be punitive in this
case is a tempting one — and surely one that would have resulted
in far less of a struggle for the panel to review and study the
record below without the assistance of a second brief, we
nonetheless undertook that effort in the overriding interest of
justice.
When this panel granted Musselman’s CR 76.12(8)(c)
motion on November 6, 2000, it did not abdicate its duty to
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examine the record of this case by electing to end the appeal at
that point.
We agreed that the motion was well-taken and that we
would certainly entertain the three avenues of relief available
to us pursuant to that rule.
Appellant will note that we did not
simultaneously enter an order dismissing the appeal.
The result in this case overturning a jury verdict is a
lamentable (and unnecessary) elevation of procedure over
substance.
The heart of this appeal has been forgotten: whether
the trial court and the jury erred in determining that Alvey was
a private figure for purposes of application of the appropriate
standards of the law of defamation.
The original opinion in this
case concluded that there was no substantive error as to the
defamation case.
I believe that it reached the correct result.
As to the issue of damages, I am persuaded by Musselman’s
argument in his Petition for Rehearing that Alvey failed to
establish with reasonable certainty the fact of his loss of
income as well as the amount.
I would, therefore, remand this
case to the trial court for a determination of this troublesome
issue of the damages suffered by Alvey — but on that narrow issue
alone.
However, as to the defamation issue, I submit that the
"inconsistency" urged by appellant between the order of November
6, 2000, and the opinion of December 8, 2000, is a procedural
red-herring that has regrettably been adopted by the new majority
opinion written in response to the Petition for Rehearing.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF FOR
KENTUCKY PRESS ASSOCIATION:
Robert L. Heleringer
Louisville, KY
Jon L. Fleischaker
R. Kenyon Meyer
Louisville, KY
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