TENNESSEE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., now known as White Oak Mining & Construction, Inc. v. KENNETH ROWE and LEVISA COAL, INC. S & L COAL SALES, INC., BRANHAM & BAKER COAL COMPANY, INC., QUAKER COAL COMPANY, INC., and SCOTT KISCADEN v. KENNETH ROWE, LEVISA COAL, INC. and TENNESSEE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., Construction, Inc. KENNETH ROWE and LEVISA COAL, INC.
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RENDERED:
AUGUST 24, 2001; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO. 1999-CA-000646-MR
TENNESSEE CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, INC., now known as
White Oak Mining & Construction, Inc.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM PIKE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE EDDY COLEMAN, JUDGE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 96-CI-00429
KENNETH ROWE and LEVISA COAL, INC.
APPELLEES
****
1999-CA-000683-MR
S & L COAL SALES, INC., BRANHAM &
BAKER COAL COMPANY, INC., QUAKER COAL
COMPANY, INC., and SCOTT KISCADEN
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM PIKE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE EDDY COLEMAN, JUDGE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 96-CI-00429
KENNETH ROWE, LEVISA COAL, INC. and
TENNESSEE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC.,
now known as White Oak Mining &
Construction, Inc.
APPELLEES
****
1999-CA-000849-MR
KENNETH ROWE and LEVISA COAL, INC.
v.
CROSS-APPELLANTS
CROSS-APPEAL FROM PIKE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE EDDY COLEMAN, JUDGE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 96-CI-00429
S & L COAL SALES, INC., SCOTT KISCADEN,
BRANHAM & BAKER COAL CO., INC., QUAKER
COAL, INC. and TENNESSEE CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, INC., now known as White Oak
Mining & Construction, Inc.
CROSS-APPELLEES
****
1999-CA-002057-MR
THOMAS E. BULLEIT, JR.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM PIKE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE EDDY COLEMAN, JUDGE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 96-CI-00429
GETTY, KEYSER & MAYO, L.L.P and
S & L COAL SALES, INC.
APPELLEES
****
1999-CA-002058-MR
BOWLES, RICE, McDAVID, GRAFF &
LOVE, P.L.L.C.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM PIKE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE EDDY COLEMAN, JUDGE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 96-CI-00429
GETTY, KEYSER, & MAYO, L.L.P. and
S & L COAL SALES, INC.
APPELLEES
****
1999-CA-002352-MR
GETTY, KEYSER & MAYO, L.L.P.
v.
CROSS-APPELLANT
CROSS-APPEAL FROM PIKE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE EDDY COLEMAN, JUDGE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 96-CI-00429
-2-
BOWLES, RICE, McDAVID, GRAFF & LOVE, P.L.L.C.
CROSS-APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART,
REVERSING IN PART AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
HUDDLESTON and BARBER, Judges; and MARY COREY, Special
Judge.1
HUDDLESTON, Judge:
Three of these consolidated appeals involve
multiple oral and written contracts entered into by various parties
involved in the extraction of coal from a mine in Pike County and
the processing of that coal. The remaining three appeals stem from
a dispute over attorneys’ fees from the original litigation.
1999-CA-000646-MR, 1999-CA-000683-MR and 1999-CA-000849-MR
In December 1992, Branham & Baker Coal Company (B & B)
leased a tract of land located in Pike County to Kenneth Rowe,
whose company was incorporated as Levisa Coal, Inc., upon which
Rowe developed a mine and began production of coal.
Apparently
unsatisfied with the reject percentages of the coal mined at this
site, Rowe moved his equipment, in March 1994, to another mine
owned by B & B and operated it as a contract mine.
$17.00 per ton of coal produced.
Rowe received
This venture, however, was not
profitable, and Rowe began looking for a buyer for the coal from
the mine leased from B & B.
1
Senior Status Judge Mary Corey sitting as Special Judge
by assignment of the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of
the Kentucky Constitution.
-3-
Rowe met with Ira J. Lewis, president of S & L Coal
Sales, Inc., to discuss leasing the coal rights to S & L.
would, in turn, sell the coal to another buyer.
S & L
Rowe and Lewis
agreed that the coal produced at the site would have to be washed
to remove any rock or reject from the coal.
Rowe and Lewis, on
behalf of their corporations, entered into a written contract on
October 17, 1994.
The contract was for a term of three years with
a minimum production requirement of 20,000 tons per month.
S & L
had the obligation of obtaining a contract miner, a washing plant
contract and a contract for the sale of the coal.
Prior
to
signing
the
contract,
an
agent
of
S
&
L
contacted Scott Kiscaden2 to negotiate an agreement to have the
coal washed, preferably at Tennessee Construction Company, Inc.
(TCC),
which
was
owned
by
Todd
Kiscaden,
Scott’s
brother.3
Allegedly, the agent for S & L reached an oral agreement with
Kiscaden relating to the washing of the coal.
Rowe also met with
Kiscaden in order to confirm the washing contract and to get B &
B’s consent to sell the coal from the mine.
Rowe testified that he
personally spoke with Kiscaden to confirm that the latter had
agreed to wash the coal after S & L bought the coal from Rowe.
Testimony from Rowe and Kiscaden conflicted as to whether the
agreement to wash the coal was conditioned on the reject content of
the coal.
2
All
further
references
to
“Kiscaden”
are to Scott
Kiscaden.
3
Scott Kiscaden was the president of Branham & Baker Coal
Company and Quaker Coal Company, Inc.
-4-
In the meantime, Lewis was negotiating the sale of the
coal, after it was washed, from Lewis and S & L to American Metals
& Coal International (AMCI).
A representative of AMCI testified
that either Lewis or Rowe indicated that a contract to wash the
coal had been procured.
By October 30, 1994, however, a contract
had not been signed by Lewis or S & L with AMCI to purchase the
coal, nor had a written agreement been reached with TCC or Kiscaden
to wash the coal, nor had S & L reached an agreement with a mining
company to actually extract the coal.
Although S & L had breached
the terms of the original contract, Rowe and Lewis agreed to extend
the dates recited in the 1994 contract.
Lewis testified that he
did not believe the extension altered any of the provisions of the
contract.
Although AMCI did subsequently enter into a contract with
S & L to purchase the coal, the agreement to mine the coal was
entered into between S & L and Levisa Coal, Inc., Rowe’s mining
company.
A written agreement was signed in January 1995.
The
agreement required Rowe/Levisa to mine and produce 20,000 clean
tons of coal per month and also provided that either party could
terminate the agreement upon 120 days’ written notice. Once mined,
the coal would go to S & L, which had contracted to sell the coal
to AMCI.
An agent of S & L contacted Kiscaden in February 1995 to
ensure that TCC would be capable of washing shipments of coal that
AMCI
wanted
delivered
in
early
and
mid-February.
Kiscaden
responded by stating that he was “blocked off” at TCC, that is,
that coal to be washed could not be accepted.
-5-
Rowe testified that
production of the coal began on February 23, 1995, and continued
through February 24, 1995.
Levisa mined approximately 2,950 tons
of coal but was forced to cease mining when the stockpiles at the
site had reached capacity because none of the coal was being
shipped to the washing facility.
Rowe contacted Kiscaden to
inquire about TCC washing the coal. Testimony conflicted as to the
reasons why Kiscaden refused to wash the coal. Rowe testified that
Kiscaden stated that he was not going to do the deal unless Rowe
got the “clowns (referring to the S & L agents) out of the
picture.” Kiscaden testified, however, that he refused to wash the
coal because the percentage of reject in the coal had tested too
high.
Because Kiscaden refused to wash the coal, S & L refused
to purchase the coal because washing the coal was a condition
precedent to its obligation to purchase the coal from Rowe/Levisa.
In
March
1995,
Rowe
and
Kiscaden
agreed
that
Kiscaden
purchase the 2,950 tons of coal that had been produced.
would
Rowe paid
to have the coal trucked to another coal washing facility.
Rowe
testified that, after washing, only 800 tons of coal remained, with
2,100 tons being reject.
Subsequently, the purchase agreement
between S & L and AMCI was terminated.
Lewis filed suit on behalf of S & L against B & B,
Quaker, TCC and Kiscaden alleging, inter alia, a breach of an oral
agreement to wash the coal, fraud, negligent misrepresentation and
promissory estoppel.
Rowe, doing business as R & M Mining Company
(R & M) and Levisa intervened against S & L alleging breach of
contract.
Rowe and Levisa subsequently amended their complaint to
-6-
include a cause of action against Kiscaden, B & B, Quaker and TCC
alleging that each had knowingly and intentionally interfered with
Rowe/Levisa’s contract with S & L by not accepting the coal for
washing.
Before trial, Kiscaden, B & B, Quaker and TCC reached a
confidential settlement with S & L. However, Rowe’s claims against
S & L, Kiscaden, B & B, Quaker and TCC proceeded to trial.
A jury
returned a verdict awarding Rowe d/b/a R & M Mining $878,500.00
against S & L, Kiscaden and TCC under a promissory estoppel
theory.4
The jury also awarded Levisa $2,065,000.00 against S & L
for breach of contract and against Kiscaden and TCC under a
promissory estoppel theory.
Separately, the jury found that
Kiscaden was at all times acting as the agent of TCC.
On December
29, 1998, a judgment consistent with the jury verdict was entered.
On March 1, 1999, an amended judgment containing supplemental
findings and conclusions was entered.
It is from this judgment
that all parties appeal.
S & L, B & B, Quaker and Kiscaden argue on appeal that:
(1) a reference in opening statement by counsel for Levisa and R &
M that a settlement had been reached between S & L and the other
defendants was prejudicial; (2) a condition precedent to the
October
1994
contract
between
S
&
L
and
Rowe
and
the
oral
modification of January 1994 was not satisfied, thereby warranting
a directed verdict; (3) Lewis and Rowe agreed to a recission of the
4
As part of the original settlement between S & L and
Kiscaden, TCC, B & B and Quaker, S & L was to be indemnified by
these parties for any damages awarded against S & L on the
Rowe/Levisa/R & B claim.
-7-
October
1994
contract
and
the
January
1995
agreement,
thus
entitling S & L to a directed verdict; (4) the jury instruction
regarding promissory estoppel as between S & L and Rowe/R & M was
defective; (5) the instructions were too voluminous, contained
factual misrepresentations, and were inconsistent with the proof;
(6) the jury’s verdict was not supported by the evidence; (7) Rowe
and R & M are precluded from recovery of damages under a promissory
estoppel theory; (8) Rowe and Levisa failed to establish that the
coal to be mined would have met the specifications of the AMCI
purchase order; (9) Levisa’s damages are limited to a 120 day
period of performance, which was the length of the contract; and
(10) the judgment against Kiscaden individually on the theory of
promissory estoppel should be set aside.
TCC raises the following issues on appeal: (1) the
judgment against TCC should be set aside as no evidence was
presented to support a jury finding that Kiscaden had the apparent
authority to bind TCC to the coal washing contract; (2) the jury
instructions as to TCC were hopelessly confusing; and (3) the
judgment should be set aside because counsel informed the jury of
the settlement agreement between TCC and S & L.
Finally, Rowe, R & M and Levisa cross-appeal claiming
that the court abused its discretion in failing to award them prejudgment interest.
1999-CA-002057-MR, 1999-CA-002058-MR and 1999-CA-002352-MR
These appeals revolve around the representation of the
parties in the initial action and the division of attorneys’ fees.
The parties involved are attorney Thomas E. Bulleit, Jr. and the
-8-
law firms of Bowles, Rice, McDavid, Graff & Love, P.L.L.C. and
Getty, Keyser & Mayo, L.L.P.
Apparently, Ira J. Lewis, president of S & L, contacted
Bulleit, who had historically represented S & L and Lewis, to seek
his assistance in bringing the breach of contract claim that
initiated this litigation. In April 1996, Bulleit brought the case
to
Bowles
Rice,
practicing.5
for trial.
which
is
where
all
attorneys
involved
were
Bowles Rice accepted the case and began to prepare
An agreement was reached with S & L whereby Bowles Rice
was to receive a 40% contingency fee. Richard Getty was designated
as lead counsel, although other attorneys at Bowles Rice were
involved in the preparation of the case for trial.
In March 1998, Getty left Bowles Rice and formed a new
firm, Getty, Keyser & Mayo.
Lewis made the decision to retain
Getty as lead counsel.
The case was settled in August 1998, and the defendants
agreed to pay damages totaling $1.4 million to S & L, Getty’s
client. Bulleit and Bowles Rice filed liens on the award, claiming
that an oral agreement between all parties had been reached and
that they were entitled to a portion of the fee.
motion to avoid liens, and the case was tried.
Getty filed a
The circuit court
entered a judgment containing findings of fact and conclusions of
law on August 20, 1999, awarding Bowles Rice $68,256.75 for its
expenses and hourly fees associated with the case.
Bulleit was
awarded nothing, and Getty was awarded the balance of the fee then
5
Before Bulleit became associated with Bowles Rice in an
“of counsel” capacity in April 1996 he was a member of the firm of
Brown, Kinkead & Bulleit.
-9-
being held by the circuit court clerk and by Getty in a special
escrow account.6
Bulleit claims to have reached an oral agreement with
Getty and Bowles Rice that the fee would be divided three ways.
The agreement was not reduced to writing, and Getty denied ever
making such an agreement.
Bulleit appeals claiming that the
circuit court erred in failing to award him a reasonable fee for
his efforts in bringing the case to Bowles Rice.
Bulleit also
argues on appeal that: (1) the division of fees upon the departure
of attorneys from a firm should be treated as a division of assets
on the dissolution of a business; (2) the division of fees between
members of the same firm or attorneys disassociating from one
another is not prohibited; and (3) the circuit court erred in
presuming that Bowles Rice was terminated by S & L and Lewis “for
cause.”
Bowles Rice appeals insisting that: (1) it was discharged
without cause and is entitled to recover on its contingent fee
contract less a deduction for the reasonable value of the services
rendered by Getty Keyser;
and (2) the fee award is not consistent
with this Court’s decision in LaBach v. Hampton.7
Finally, Getty cross-appeals claiming that the circuit
court erred in awarding Bowles Rice the fee that was awarded.
Preservation of Error
6
The court held that the “reasonable cost of services of
the Getty firm required to complete the contract was the 40%
contingent fee less the actual time and expenses incurred by Bowles
Rice.”
Forty percent of the $1.4 million settlement is
$560,000.00.
7
Ky. App., 585 S.W.2d 434 (1979).
-10-
S & L, B & B, Quaker and Kiscaden filed a jointly
prepared brief and a reply brief as appellants in 1999-CA-000683.
In the reply brief for 1999-CA-000683 and 1999-CA-000849, S & L, B
& B, Quaker and Kiscaden also argue as appellees with respect to
1999-CA-000849.
The brief filed for these parties in 1999-CA-
000683 contains no references to the record showing whether any of
the issues raised were properly preserved for appellate review and,
if so, in what manner, as required by Kentucky Rule of Civil
Procedure (CR) 76.12(4)(c)(iv).8
In the combined reply brief, in response to the argument
raised by Rowe and Levisa that S & L, B & B, Quaker and Kiscaden
failed to object to the jury instructions, we are referred to the
8
Amendments to the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR)
effective February 1, 2001 include the addition of a new section,
76.12(4)(c)(ii), entitled “STATEMENT CONCERNING ORAL ARGUMENT”, so
that CR 76.12(4)(c)(iv) is now CR 76.12(4)(c)(v). With regard to
the preservation of errors for appellate review, CR 46 provides
that:
Formal exceptions to rulings or orders of the court
are unnecessary; but for all purposes for which an
exception has heretofore been necessary it is sufficient
that a party, at the time the ruling or order of the
court is made or sought, makes known to the court the
action which he desires the court to take or his
objection to the action of the court, and on request of
the court, his grounds therefor; and, if a party has no
opportunity to object to a ruling or order at the time it
is made, the absence of an objection does not thereafter
prejudice him.
And with regard to the preservation of error in the giving of or
refusal to give instructions, CR 51(3) provides that:
No party may assign as error the giving or the
failure to give an instruction unless he has fairly and
adequately presented his position by an offered
instruction or by motion, or unless he makes objection
before the court instructs the jury, stating specifically
the matter to which he objects and the ground or grounds
of his objection.
-11-
record where it is alleged objections to the jury instruction were
raised.
This is the only reference made by S & L, B & B, Quaker
and Kiscaden to the record concerning whether any of the issues
raised on appeal were properly preserved for review.
CR 76.12(4)(c)(iv) provides that a brief must contain:
An “ARGUMENT” conforming to the Statement of Points
and Authorities, with ample supportive references to the
record and citations of authority pertinent to each issue
of law and which shall contain at the beginning of the
argument a statement with reference to the record showing
whether the issue was properly preserved for review and,
if so, in what manner.9
We
have
in
the
76.12(4)(c)(iv).10
past
been
disturbed
by
disregard
of
CR
CR 76.12(4)(c)(iv) “makes it mandatory that an
attorney cite to the record where the claimed assignment of error
was properly objected to or brought to the attention of the trial
judge.”11
CR 76.12(4)(c)(iv) “is designed to save the appellate
court the time of canvassing the record in order to determine if
the claimed error was properly preserved for appeal.”12
9
Emphasis supplied.
10
See Elwell v. Stone, Ky. App., 799 S.W.2d 46 (1990).
11
Id. at 47, quoting Bertelsman and Philipps, Kentucky
Practice, CR 76.12(4)(c)(iv), Cmt. 4 (4th ed. 1989PP)[Emphasis
supplied].
12
Id.
The record in this case consists of fourteen
videotapes. We have neither the time nor the inclination to review
all of them.
-12-
As this Court has said, pursuant to “CR 76.12(4)(c)(iv)
[] an appellate brief’s contents must contain at the beginning of
each argument a reference to the record showing whether the issue
was preserved for review and in what manner[.]”13
appellant
fails
to
comply
with
the
However, if an
requirements
of
CR
76.12(4)(c)(iv) in its initial brief, but does insert the necessary
references in a reply brief to correct the omission, this Court
may, in its discretion, consider the merits of an alleged error if
it is properly preserved.14
S & L, B & B, Quaker and Kiscaden have failed to comply
with CR 76.12(4)(c)(iv) with respect to all alleged errors except
the one concerning the court’s failure to adopt their proposed jury
instructions.
The only reason we may begin to consider this error
for review is that references to the record showing whether the
issue was properly preserved for review were supplied in the reply
brief.15
We are told in what manner this error was preserved, but
only in the most general way.
We are merely informed that
objections were made and alternative instructions were tendered.
S & L, B & B, Quaker and Kiscaden do not direct our attention to
the particular objections they claim to have made, but we are
referred to the alternative instructions tendered.
Jury Instructions
13
Massie v. Persson, Ky. App., 729 S.W.2d 448, 452
(1987)(citations omitted)[Emphasis supplied], overruled on other
grounds by Conner v. George W. Whitesides Co., Ky., 834 S.W.2d 652
(1992).
14
See Hollingsworth v. Hollingsworth, Ky. App., 798 S.W.2d
145 (1990).
15
Id.
-13-
S & L argues that the instructions contain erroneous
assumptions of fact, thereby warranting the grant of a new trial.
Although S & L contends that this common error was present in
several of the instructions tendered to the jury, S & L only
directs this Court’s attentions to Instruction No. 1, wherein the
jury was instructed to find for Levisa on its claim of breach of
contract against S & L if it was satisfied that Levisa and S & L
orally agreed [that] . . .
1.) Levisa would . . . open up, prepare, and be ready to
produce, 20,000 tons of clean coal per month from the R
& M properties . . . sufficient to ship, after washing,
on the A.M.C.I. coal sales agreement; and
2.) For which the Plaintiffs, LEVISA, was to be paid
Fifteen ($15.00) Dollars for each ton of washed coal
produced by LEVISA from said properties;
3.) On the condition that S & L could secure an agreement
for a washing plant to wash and process the coal to be
mined therefrom.
S & L alleges that the agreement was, in fact, not oral,
but rather was memorialized in a written agreement.
Further, S &
L contends that the written agreement was contingent on whether S
& L was successful in securing “an executed and valid contract
agreement,” not, as the instructions to the jury recited, whether
S & L was successful in securing “an agreement for washing coal.”
First and foremost, a review of S & L’s citation to the
point in the record where this particular error was preserved does
not support its claim of error.
Although S & L did tender proposed
-14-
jury instructions, its tendered instruction regarding the agreement
between S & L and Rowe/Levisa makes no distinction as to whether
the contract was oral or written.
S & L’s tendered instruction
simply refers to the “contract.”
Further, a review of the
videotaped objections to the jury instructions does not reveal that
the issue of whether the contract was oral or written was ever
raised.
In short, the trial court was never given an opportunity
to rule on this issue.
Although we are aware that under CR 51(3)
a specific objection is not necessary in order to preserve the
right
to
appeal
a
jury
instruction,
the
tender
of
proposed
instructions is not enough if they do not clearly present a party’s
position.16
S & L’s tendered instruction does not support the
argument that S & L makes on appeal, nor did S & L raise a specific
objection at trial.
Even if the error had been properly preserved, whether
the contract was oral or written is of no significance in this
case. In the absence of a statutory requirement, such as contained
in the Statute of Frauds,17 a contract need not be in writing.18
No
party has raised the Statute of Frauds as a defense, and there is
no other statutory requirement that the contract be in writing.
Even if the instruction was erroneous in referring to an “oral
16
See Surber v. Wallace, Ky. App., 831 S.W.2d 918, 920
(1992); see also Cobb v. Hoskins, Ky. App., 554 S.W.2d 886, 888
(1977); Fields v. Rutledge, Ky., 284 S.W.2d 659, 662 (1955).
17
KRS 371.010.
18
See Skaggs v. Wood Mosaic Corp., Ky., 428 S.W.2d 617
(1968).
-15-
agreement” rather than a “written agreement,” the error, under the
facts of this case, was harmless and must be disregarded.19
Next, S & L argues that the jury instructions were so
voluminous that they confused the jury and they contained factual
misrepresentations. Although S & L directs us to specific examples
of such misrepresentations and confusion, S & L does not tell us
where in the record it specifically preserved this error for
review. Again, we call attention to the rule that the tendering of
jury instructions is not enough if the proposed instructions do not
clearly present a party’s position.20
Although S & L’s tendered
instructions were shorter than those given by the court, that alone
is not sufficient to have raised S & L’s concerns regarding the
voluminous nature of the instructions.
Inasmuch as S & L did not
object to the voluminous nature of the jury instructions or to
possible misrepresentations of fact, the circuit court was not
afforded an opportunity to consider the merits of this argument.
A trial court must first be given the opportunity to rule on
objections to instructions before they are submitted for appellate
review.21
This issue was not properly preserved for appellate
review.
Finally, S & L contends that it was given inadequate time
to review the court’s instructions, as if to explain why so few
specific objections were made.
S & L fails to explain why more
time was not given or whether it objected and asked for additional
19
Ky. R. Civ. P. (CR) 61.01.
20
See Surber, supra, n. 16, at 920.
21
See Massey, supra, n. 13, at 452.
-16-
time to consider the instructions the court proposed to give.
In
the absence of adequate references to the record, we decline to
address this claim of error.
Apparent Authority of Agent for TCC
The jury returned a verdict holding both Scott Kiscaden,
individually, and TCC liable for not following through with their
obligation to wash the coal in accordance with the purported
contract with S & L.
The jury found that Kiscaden was an apparent
agent for TCC and that he led Rowe and Levisa to believe that TCC
had agreed to a contract to wash the coal.
TCC argues that the circuit court erred in denying its
motion for a directed verdict because no evidence was offered to
establish that Kiscaden was acting as an agent for TCC when
Kiscaden was negotiating the coal washing contract.
Kiscaden, on
the other hand, argues that if, in past, he was the agent of TCC,
he could not be held liable individually under the facts of this
case; only TCC, the principal, Kiscaden insists, can be held
liable.
Kentucky’s
highest
court
discussed
the
principle
of
apparent authority of an agent to bind a principal in Aeroplane Oil
& Refining Co. v. Disch:22
“The liability of the principal is not limited to such
acts
of
the
agent
as
are
expressly
authorized
necessarily implied from express authority.
or
All such
acts of the agent as are within the apparent scope of the
authority conferred on him are also binding upon the
22
203 Ky. 561, 262 S.W. 939 (1924).
-17-
principal, apparent authority being that which, though
actually not granted, the principal knowingly permits the
agent
to
exercise,
or
which
he
holds
him
out
as
possessing.”23
Apparent authority is defined as “not actual authority
but [] the authority the agent is held out by the principal as
possessing.
It is a matter of appearances on which third parties
come to rely.”24
The criteria for deciding whether an agency relationship
exists
“Agency
have
and
been
scope
set
of
forth
repeatedly
authority,
actual
in
Kentucky
or
established by circumstances and practices.”25
case
apparent,
law.
may
be
Agency must be
proven by the person alleging agency and the resulting authority.26
Finally, “[a]gency cannot be proven by a mere statement, but it can
be established by circumstantial evidence including the acts and
conduct of the parties such as the continuous course of conduct of
the parties covering a number of successive transactions.”27
A finding of apparent authority must be based upon the
representation
23
or
conduct
of
the
principal,
not
the
agent.28
Id. at 960, quoting 21 R.C.L. 854.
24
Mill Street Church of Christ v. Hogan, Ky. App., 785
S.W.2d 263, 267 (1990).
25
People’s Nat. Bank v. Citizens’ Sav. Bank, 239 Ky. 30, 38
S.W.2d 959, 960 (1931).
26
See Mill Street Church, supra, n. 24, at 267.
27
Id. at 267.
28
See Enzweiler v. Peoples Deposit Bank, Ky. App., 742
(continued...)
-18-
Therefore, it is the actions of TCC, not Kiscaden, that must be
examined in order to determine if sufficient evidence was proferred
to bind TCC as a principal of Kiscaden under an apparent agency
analysis.
Evidence to establish an apparent agency relationship
between Kiscaden and TCC is lacking.
The evidence presented at trial that tends to show an
apparent agency relationship between Kiscaden and TCC revolves
around the actions of Kiscaden, not TCC.
that
Kiscaden
became
the
co-owner
Rowe and Levisa point out
of
White
Oak
Mining
&
Construction, a company formed by the merging of all of Todd
Kiscaden’s (Scott’s brother) companies, which included TCC, into
one conglomerate.29
Also, there was evidence that Scott telephoned
TCC in late January or early February 1995 and told TCC to be
looking for shipments of S & L’s coal.
Finally, Kiscaden told Rowe
that he would take care of washing the coal at TCC.
Testimony that
Kiscaden negotiated as if he owned TCC or had the authority to act
on TCC’s behalf is irrelevant as to whether Kiscaden was an
apparent agent of TCC.
No evidence was presented to prove that TCC
did anything to hold Kiscaden out as its agent under an apparent
agency theory and there was a lack of proof to establish that
Kiscaden was an apparent agent of TCC.
In ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the trial
court is to consider the evidence in the strongest possible light
28
(...continued)
S.W.2d 569, 570 (1987).
29
This merger, however, took place after the events that
led to the initiation of this lawsuit.
-19-
in favor of the party opposing the motion.30
A directed verdict
must not be entered unless there is “a complete absence of proof on
a material issue in the action, or if no disputed issue of fact
exists upon which reasonable [people] could differ."31
Actual Implied Authority
Despite the lack of evidence to support a finding that
Kiscaden was an apparent agent for TCC, we must also evaluate the
evidence under a theory of actual implied authority.
“Implied
authority is actual authority, circumstantially proven, which the
principal is deemed to have actually intended the agent to possess,
and includes only such powers as are practically necessary to carry
out the duties actually delegated.”32
In examining whether implied authority exists, it is
important to focus upon the agent’s understanding of his
authority.
It must be determined whether the agent
reasonably believes because of present or past conduct of
the principal that the principal wishes him to act in a
certain way or to have certain authority.33
30
See Everley v. Wright, Ky. App., 872 S.W.2d 95, 96
(1993).
31
Taylor v. Kennedy, Ky. App., 700 S.W.2d 415, 416 (1985).
32
Estell v. Barrickman, Ky. App., 571 S.W.2d 650, 652
(1978); see also Armour v. Haskins, Ky., 275 S.W.2d 580, 582
(1955).
33
Mill Street Church, supra, n. 24, at 267.
-20-
Actual implied authority under an implied agency can be deduced
from the surrounding facts of a case.34
Rowe directs us to numerous examples of evidence in the
record which tends to circumstantially support a finding that
Kiscaden possessed actual implied authority to bind TCC.
First,
Kiscaden signed a document faxed to Randy May, the president of
Pike County Coal Corporation, on April 14, 1994.
The fax reads as
follows: “Attached are the new proposed fee schedules for the
Processing Agreement at Tennessee Construction Company, as well as
a proposed lease.
Please review them at your leisure and contact
me when you wish to discuss them.
I should be available this
evening as well as most of the day Friday.
Thanks for your
indulgence.
INC.
Sincerely,
QUAKER
COAL
COMPANY,
/s/
Scott
Kiscaden, ds, President.”
The second document to which Rowe directs our attention
is another fax sent from Kiscaden to Randy May on May 10, which
reads as follows: “Randy, the draft Processing Agreement looks ok.
Please forward execution copies to Todd in Utah.
Thanks. /s/
Scott.”
Kiscaden testified that he was merely a “conduit” between
Pike County Coal and Todd Kiscaden, with Kiscaden’s role limited to
passing the contracting information between Todd Kiscaden and Pike
County
Coal.
necessary
Kiscaden
because
Todd
testified
was
in
that
either
this
Utah
arrangement
or
South
was
America
throughout the negotiations between Todd and Pike County Coal, and
34
See CSX Transp., Inc. v. First National Bank of Grayson,
Ky. App., 14 S.W.3d 563, 567 (2000).
-21-
that communicating through Kiscaden was the only way that Pike
County Coal could contact Todd.
Our
review
of
the
record
indicates
that
there
was
sufficient evidence presented at trial from which the jury could
find
that
Kiscaden
was
acting
as
an
actual
agent
for
TCC.
Consequently, TCC’s motion for a directed verdict was properly
denied.
The only question to be determined by the court on a
motion for directed verdict is whether the plaintiff has introduced
"evidence of probative value having fitness to induce conviction in
the minds of reasonable [persons]?"35 "The court must draw all fair
and rational inferences from the evidence in favor of the party
opposing the motion, and a verdict should not be directed unless
the evidence is insufficient to sustain the verdict. The evidence
of
such
party's
Circumstantial
witnesses
evidence
"will
must
be
authorize
accepted
a
as
submission
true."36
of
the
contested issue to the jury," and is capable of sustaining the
jury’s verdict.37
The jury could reasonably have inferred from the faxes
sent to May and other evidence summarized above that Kiscaden was
acting as an agent for TCC and that TCC intended Kiscaden to have
authority to act on its behalf.
It was further reasonable for the
jury to believe that Kiscaden was acting on TCC’s behalf, with the
35
See James v. England, Ky., 349 S.W.2d 359, 361 (1961); see
also Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Chambers, 165 Ky. 703, 178 S.W. 1041
(1915).
36
Grant v. Wrona, Ky. App., 662 S.W.2d 227, 229 (1983),
quoting 7 Clay, Kentucky Practice, CR 50.01, (3rd Ed. 1974).
37
See Kelly v. Walgreen Drug Stores, 293 Ky. 691, 170 S.W.2d
34, 37 (1943)
-22-
acquiescence of TCC, when he negotiated the deal to wash the coal
for S & L.
Further, Kiscaden testified that his actions toward
Pike County Coal in this earlier transaction could be considered
“negotiating a contract” and that he was a “conduit” between Pike
County and Todd.
The totality of this evidence was sufficient for
a jury to believe that Kiscaden had actual authority under an
implied agency theory to bind TCC, despite the fact that Kiscaden
testified that he was not an agent for TCC.
It has long been held that the trier of fact has the
right
to
believe
the
evidence
presented
by
one
litigant
in
preference to another.38
The trier of fact may believe any witness
in whole or in part.39
And the trier of fact may take into
consideration all the circumstances of the case, including the
credibility of the witness.40
The circuit court did not err in denying TCC’s motion for
a directed verdict because sufficient evidence was presented to
support a finding that Kiscaden was an agent of TCC.
Because it is
a fundamental tenet in Kentucky that the law “generally protects an
agent from liability for lawful acts done within the scope of [the
agent’s] agency on behalf of a disclosed principal,” we hold that
38
See King v. McMillan, Ky., 293 Ky. 399, 169 S.W.2d 10, 14
(1943).
39
See Webb Transfer Lines, Inc. v. Taylor, Ky., 439 S.W.2d
88, 95 (1968).
40
See Hayes v. Hayes, Ky., 357 S.W.2d 863, 866 (1962).
-23-
the circuit court did err in denying Kiscaden’s motion for a
directed verdict or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.41
Prejudgment Interest
On December 28, 1998, Kenneth Rowe, d/b/a R & M Mining,
and
Levisa
Coal,
Inc.,
filed
a
motion
seeking
an
award
of
prejudgment interest on the judgment award from and after April 1,
1995.
The court entered judgment on December 28, 1998.
In an
amended judgment entered on March, 4, 1999, the court denied Rowe
and Levisa’s motion for prejudgment interest.
“[T]he
responsibility
for
deciding
whether
interest [is] one for the court, not the jury.”42
to
award
“The trial court
has the discretion to weigh the equitable considerations and
determine
whether
prejudgment
interest
should
be
awarded.”43
“Prejudgment interest is awarded as a matter of course where
damages are liquidated.”44
“In order for damages to be deemed
liquidated, there must be some certainty as to the amounts.”45
41
American’s Collectors Exchange, Inc. v. Kentucky State
Cent.Executive Committee, Ky. App., 566 S.W.2d 759, 761 (1978),
citing Potter v. Chaney, Ky., 290 S.W.2d 44, 46 (1956).
42
Nucor Corp. v. General Electric Co., Ky., 812 S.W.2d 136,
144 (1991).
43
Murray v. McCoy, Ky. App., 949 S.W.2d 613, 615 (1996),
citing Nucor, supra, n. 42., see also Church and Mullins Corp. v.
Bethlehem Minerals Co., Ky. App., 887 S.W.2d 321 (1992).
44
Faulkner Drilling Co., Inc. v. Gross, Ky. App., 943
S.W.2d 634, 638 (1997), citing Nucor, supra, n. 42.
45
Id.
-24-
However, a “trial court is not bound to make such an award upon
unliquidated claims.”46
Liquidated damages are those damages that are “[m]ade
certain or fixed by agreement of parties or by operation of law.”47
Unliquidated damages are those “[d]amages which have not been
determined or calculated, . . . not yet reduced to certainty in
respect to amount.”48
The damages in the case under consideration were disputed
and are properly characterized as unliquidated. Therefore, we must
decide whether the circuit court abused its discretion in failing
to award Rowe and Levisa prejudgment interest in light of the facts
and equities involved in the case under consideration.
The equitable principles involved in evaluating whether
the trial court should award prejudgment interest on unliquidated
damages are thus explained:
“Interest is charged not only because of the value to the
one who uses money, but also as compensation to the one
who has been deprived of the use of money.
Interest is
not recovered according to a rigid theory of compensation
for
money
withheld,
considerations
of
but
is
fairness;
given
it
is
in
response
denied
when
to
its
exaction would be inequitable . . . . [t]he tendency of
46
North Ridge Farms, Inc. v. Stathatos, Ky. App., 760
S.W.2d 89, 91 (1988)(citations omitted).
47
Nucor, supra, n. 42,
Dictionary 930 (6th ed. 1990).
48
at
141,
quoting Black’s Law
Nucor, supra, n. 42, at 141, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary
1537 (6th ed. 1990).
-25-
the courts is to charge and allow interest in accordance
with the principals of equity, to accomplish justice in
each particular case.”49
Scott Kiscaden made clear to Rowe on February 24, 1995,
that the coal washing would have been accomplished had Rowe been
able to get the “clowns”50 out of the picture.
agent of TCC.
Kiscaden was an
Taking into account considerations of fairness, in
light of the facts of this case, it was an abuse of discretion for
the circuit court to deny Rowe prejudgment interest.
The failure
to award prejudgment interest to Rowe is inequitable.
On remand, the court shall award interest from April 1,
1995, to March 4, 1999, the date of the final judgment, at the rate
of eight percent per annum.51
The interest on the total judgment
shall accrue at twelve percent per annum compounded annually.52
Attorneys’ Fees
Bowles, Rice, McDavid, Graff & Love, P.L.L.C. agreed to
represent S & L Coal on April 19, 1996, upon a referral from Thomas
E.
Bulleit,
Jr.
The
circuit
court
found
that
Bulleit
was
associated with another law firm at the time of the referral but
that Bulleit anticipated joining Bowles Rice in an “of counsel”
49
Newcor, supra, n. 42, at 143 (quoting 47 C.J.S. Interest
and Usury §6 (1982).
50
The “clowns” to which Kiscaden refers are apparently the
agents of S & L Coal.
51
See KRS 360.010; see also Finucane v. Prichard, Ky. App.,
811 S.W.2d 348 (1991), Borden v. Martin, Ky. App., 765 S.W.2d 34
(1989).
52
See Finucane, supra, n. 51; Borden, supra, n. 51; KRS
360.040.
-26-
capacity, and this occurred later in the same month.
The original
agreement between Bowles Rice and S & L Coal was based on an hourly
charge arrangement, but this was subsequently converted to a
contingent fee arrangement.
Richard A. Getty was associated with Bowles Rice when S
& L Coal entered into this representation agreement.
Getty was
named as the “Responsible Partner” in the S & L Coal case, which
meant Getty would provide initial guidance concerning strategy
while other lawyers associated with Bowles Rice would conduct
discovery and handle pretrial matters.
On February 28, 1998, Getty, and two other attorneys
associated with Bowles Rice, withdrew from the firm and formed a
new law firm.
Shortly thereafter, Bowles Rice advised S & L Coal
of Getty’s departure from the firm.
Bowles Rice directed S & L
Coal to choose whether it would commit to continued representation
by Bowles Rice or to representation by Getty’s firm.
Lewis had retained Bowles Rice to secure the services of
Getty.
Therefore, on March 17, 1998, Lewis, in response to Bowles
Rice’s request concerning representation, directed that S & L
Coal’s representation be continued with the Getty firm.
The
circuit court found that S & L Coal had good cause to terminate
Bowles Rice’s representation of S & L Coal because Getty’s services
were essential to S & L Coal since Lewis wanted Getty to try the
case.
When Getty accepted the case, S & L Coal entered into a new
contingent fee arrangement.
According to the circuit court’s findings, Bowles Rice
had devoted $64,909.00 worth of time to the case as of April 8,
-27-
1998, the mediation date, and had expended another $4,531.75 as of
that date.
The court deducted from the out-of-pocket expenses
$800.00 in copying charges and an additional $384.00 due to an
admitted overcharge and awarded Bowles Rice $68,256.75 as a fee and
and for expenses associated with its representation of S & L Coal.
The court also found that the contingent fee arrangement
entered into between Getty and S & L Coal was reasonable and
awarded Getty its contingent fee according to the arrangement it
made with S & L Coal, less the fee and expenses awarded Bowles
Rice.
The court dismissed Bulleit’s claim, concluding that
Rules of the Supreme Court (SCR) 3.130(1.5)(c) require that a
contingency fee contract be in writing and that enforcement of
Bulleit’s oral fee contract would be in violation of public policy.
Bowles Rice appeals (1999-CA-002058) and Getty crossappeals (1999-CA-002352) the court’s distribution of attorney fees
between the two firms.
Bulleit also appeals (1999-CA-002057) from
the court’s denial of his claim to a division of a fee with Getty.
1999-CA-002058 and 1999-CA-002352
Bowles Rice argues that it and S & L Coal were parties to
a valid and enforceable contingent fee agreement on March 17, 1998.
Getty argues that S & L Coal’s discharge of Bowles Rice rendered
that contingent fee agreement an unenforceable nullity.
Without
great elaboration, it is clear from the evidence and under law that
-28-
Bowles Rice held a valid and enforceable contingent fee agreement
with S & L Coal.53
Bowles Rice also argues that the circuit court’s finding
that S & L Coal’s
error.
discharge of Bowles Rice was for cause was plain
Getty argues that there was sufficient evidence to support
the conclusion that S & L Coal had cause to discharge Bowles Rice
and that even if Bowles Rice is correct, Bowles Rice would still
not be entitled a fee greater than that which the court awarded.
The initial question presented is whether a discharge of
a law firm by a client who chooses to retain the services of an
attorney who leaves the originally retained law firm and forms a
new law firm and whose service the client considered an essential
factor in hiring the originally retained law firm, is a discharge
for cause.
We present this question in this way because the court
found that S & L Coal had retained Bowles Rice because it wanted
Getty, who was then associated with Bowles Rice, to try the case
and that this desire was an essential consideration in its decision
to retain Bowles Rice.54
The circuit court was asked to decide whether Bowles Rice
was discharged for cause.
It determined that S & L’s decision to
switch its representation from Bowles Rice to Getty was a “for
cause” discharge because Getty’s services were essential to its
53
See Gordon v. Morrow, 186 Ky. 713, 218 S.W. 258 (1920).
54
Ky. R. Civ. P. (CR) 52.01 provides that “[f]indings of
fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due
regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to
judge the credibility of the witnesses.”
We do not set aside the court’s finding on this point in
the case under consideration as that finding was supported by
substantial evidence.
-29-
choice of representation.
The focus on whether the discharge of
Bowles Rice was for cause was due to the circuit court’s concern
with the applicability of the rule, concerning the proper measure
of the fee to be paid to an attorney employed under a contingent
fee agreement when that attorney is discharged before completion of
the contract, that was announced by this Court in Labach v.
Hampton.55
In Labach, the attorney who was seeking payment was
discharged without cause.
Since the circuit court decided Bowles
Rice had been discharged for cause, it held that Labach was
inapplicable to the case under consideration.
This was error.
The general rule as to what constitutes the basis for a
discharge of an attorney for cause is as follows:
when there is
exhibited conduct on the part of the attorney that puts to an end
the existence of a relationship based on mutual trust, confidence
and
good
will,
then
the
discharge
is
for
cause.56
This
determination is critical as it has a direct bearing “on the right
of the attorney to compensation and the amount thereof[.]”57
Here, the court concluded that S & L Coal’s desire to
have Getty try the case was good cause for discharging Bowles Rice.
All S & L Coal had was a good reason to discharge Bowles Rice, not
a basis for making a discharge for cause.
engaged
in
conduct
that
put
to
an
end
Bowles Rice had not
the
existence
of
a
relationship based on mutual trust, confidence and good will.
55
Ky. App., 585 S.W.2d 434 (1979).
56
Gordon, supra, n. 53.
57
Id. at 265 (citation omitted).
-30-
Therefore, the court’s conclusion that S & L Coal had good cause to
discharge Bowles Rice was clear error.
Based on the circuit court’s erroneous conclusion, we
remand this case for a hearing to fix the fee due Bowles Rice.
That firm is “entitled to a fee [equal to the contingent fee
portion of the settlement recovery] less the value of the services
reasonably required of [Getty] to complete the contract.”58
In
its
cross-appeal,
Getty
argues
that
Bowles
Rice
introduced no proof of the real value of its services and that the
proof of the value of the services rendered by Bowles Rice to S &
L Coal does not support the court’s finding concerning the value of
services rendered by Bowles Rice.
Getty concedes that Bowles Rice
did put on evidence of its hourly rate, but this evidence, Getty
says, does not prove the value of Bowles Rice’s services.
Bowles
Rice contends that sufficient evidence of record supports the
court’s finding concerning the value of the legal services it
provided to S & L Coal.
In light of our decision in the Bowles Rice appeal, the
question presented by Getty’s cross-appeal is moot since it will
not be necessary for Bowles Rice to present proof of the value of
legal services it provideed to S & L Coal.
Under the Labach
analysis we are requiring the circuit court to apply on remand, it
will be necessary only for evidence to be presented concerning the
value of the services reasonably required of Getty to complete the
contract.
58
Labach, supra, n. 55, at 436.
-31-
1999-CA-002057
Bulleit appeals from the circuit court’s refusal to award
him a fee.
Bulleit argues that he is owed a fee from Getty and
that Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 3.130(1.5) does not prohibit oral
agreements between attorneys to divide a fee.59
SCR 3.130(1.5)(c) provides, in relevant part, that:
A contingent fee agreement shall be in writing and should
state the method by which the fee is to be determined .
. . [and] [u]pon recovery of any amount in a contingent
fee matter, the lawyer shall provide the client with a
written statement stating the outcome of the matter and
showing the remittance to the client and the method of
its determination.60
Clearly the requirement that contingent fee agreements shall be in
writing applies to agreements made between a lawyer and his client.
SCR 3.130(1.5)(e) provides two methods for accomplishing
the division of a fee between lawyers.
One method, as provided in
SCR 3.130(1.5)(e)(1)(b), allows a division of a fee between lawyers
to be made if “[b]y written agreement with the client, each lawyer
assumes joint responsibility for the representation; and [t]he
client is advised of and does not object to the participation of
all the lawyers involved; and [t]he total fee is reasonable.”
SCR
3.130(1.5)(e)(1)(a) allows for a division of a fee between lawyers
who are not in the same firm if the division “is in proportion to
59
Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 3.130 incorporates the Kentucky
Rules of Professional Conduct.
60
Emphasis supplied.
-32-
the services performed by each lawyer.”
SCR 3.130(1.5)(e)(1)(a)
does not require that an agreement for the division of fees be in
writing.
The circuit court relied on an erroneous legal conclusion
in dismissing Bulleit’s claim.
Bulleit makes several arguments to
this Court in an attempt to explain why he is entitled to an
attorney fee, and Getty makes several arguments to explain why
Bulleit is not entitled to an attorney fee. Getty correctly points
out that Bulleit has not directed our attention “to the record
showing whether this issue was properly preserved for review and,
if so, in what manner.”61
However, due to the erroneous legal
conclusion reached by the circuit court none of these specific
issues have been adjudicated; therefore, these issues are not yet
ripe for our review.62
Conclusion
As
to
appeal
number
1999-CA-000646-MR,
the
circuit
court’s order denying TCC’s motion for a directed verdict is
affirmed as evidence was presented to establish that Kiscaden was
acting as an agent for TCC when Kiscaden negotiated the coal
washing contract.
The court’s denial of Kiscaden’s motion for a
directed verdict or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, is
reversed.
The circuit court’s order denying prejudgment interest
is reversed and this case is remanded for an award of prejudgment
interest as set forth in this opinion.
61
As to all other issues
CR 76.12(4)(c)(v).
62
See Eaton Asphalt Paving Co., Inc. v. CSX Transportation,
Inc., Ky. App., 8 S.W.3d 878 (1999).
-33-
presented in appeals numbers 1999-CA-000646-MR, 1999-CA-000683-MR
and 1999-CA-000849-MR, the judgment is affirmed.
The order which awarded attorneys’ fees is reversed and
this case is remanded to award atorneys’ fees consistent with this
opinion.
This case is also remanded for a hearing to determine the
sufficiency of Bulleit’s claim.
Finally, Getty’s cross-appeal is
dismissed as moot.
ALL CONCUR.
-34-
APPEAL NO. 1999-CA-000646-MR
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT TENNESSEE
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC.:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEES KENNETH ROWE AND
LEVISA COAL, INC.:
Billy R. Shelton
BAIRD, BAIRD, BAIRD & JONES,
P.S.C.
Lexington, Kentucky
Phillip D. Damron
Will T. Scott
Pikeville, Kentucky
APPEAL NO. 1999-CA-000683-MR
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEES KENNETH ROWE AND
LEVISA COAL, INC.:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANTS S & L COAL SALES,
INC., BRANHAM & BAKER COAL
COMPANY, INC., QUAKER COAL
COMPANY, AND SCOTT KISCADEN:
Phillip D. Damron
Will T. Scott
Pikeville, Kentucky
Mitchell D. Kinner
Robert J. Patton
D.B. Kazee
KAZEE, KINNER, CHAFIN,
HEABERLIN & PATTON
Prestongsburg, Kentucky
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE TENNESSEE
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC.:
Billy R. Shelton
BAIRD, BAIRD, BAIRD & JONES,
P.S.C.
Lexington, Kentucky
APPEAL NO. 1999-CA-000849-MR
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEES S & L COAL SALES,
INC., BRANHAM & BAKER COAL
COMPANY, INC., QUAKER COAL
COMPANY, AND SCOTT KISCADEN:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANTS KENNETH ROWE AND
LEVISA COAL, INC.:
Phillip D. Damron
Will T. Scott
Pikeville, Kentucky
Mitchell D. Kinner
Robert J. Patton
D.B. Kazee
KAZEE, KINNER, CHAFIN,
HEABERLIN & PATTON
Prestongsburg, Kentucky
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE TENNESSEE
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC.:
Billy R. Shelton
BAIRD, BAIRD, BAIRD & JONES,
P.S.C.
Lexington, Kentucky
-35-
APPEAL NO. 1999-CA-002057-MR
BRIEF
FOR
APPELLEE
KEYSER & MAYO, L.L.P.:
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
GETTY,
Marrs Allen May
Pikville, Kentucky
Thomas E. Bulleit
Pierre Michael DeBourbon
Mark A. Swartz
James P. Pruitt, Jr.
PRUITT & DEBOURBON
Pikeville, Kentucky
C. Thomas Ezzell
GETTY, KEYSER & MAYO, L.L.P.
Lexington, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES GETTY,
KEYSER & MAYO, L.L.P.
APPEAL NO. 1999-CA-002058-MR
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
Marrs Allen May
Pikville, Kentucky
P. Michael de Bourbon
Pikeville, Kentucky
Mark A. Swartz
Charleston, West Virginia
C. Thomas Ezzell
GETTY, KEYSER & MAYO, L.L.P.
Lexington, Kentucky
APPEAL NO. 1999-CA-002352-MR
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
P. Michael de Bourbon
Pikeville, Kentucky
Marrs Allen May
Pikville, Kentucky
Mark A. Swartz
Charleston, West Virginia
C. Thomas Ezzell
GETTY, KEYSER & MAYO, L.L.P.
Lexington, Kentucky
-36-
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