EVELYNN SCRIVNER STILZ APPEALS v. ROBERT C. STILZ, JR.
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RENDERED:
March 16, 2001; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
NO.
1999-CA-000566-MR
AND
1999-CA-002424-MR
EVELYNN SCRIVNER STILZ
APPELLANT
APPEALS FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE MARY C. NOBLE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 85-CI-01098
v.
ROBERT C. STILZ, JR.
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, McANULTY, AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
TACKETT, JUDGE:
Evelynn Scrivner Stilz appeals, pro se, from two
separate post-decree orders of the Fayette Circuit Court, the
first denying her request for reimbursement from her ex-spouse,
Robert C. Stilz, Jr., for certain medical and dental expenses,
and, the second denying her request to reinstate maintenance.
These two issues represent respectively the two cases filed on
appeal and thus have been consolidated.
We affirm.
The parties were married in 1975 and some ten years
later in 1985, Evelyn filed a petition to dissolve the marriage.
The divorce decree was entered on February 7, 1986, in
conjunction with the parties’ separation agreement which granted
Evelyn custody of the parties’ two children.
The agreement
contained, among other things, terms regarding maintenance, child
support, and payment of medical expenses.
Following the divorce, Evelyn and the children moved to
Minnesota.
Thereafter, frequent litigation transpired primarily
concerning child visitation issues.
In 1989 Robert eventually
filed a motion for change of custody, which the trial court
granted.
In 1990 Evelyn filed a motion relevant to the present
litigation requesting that Robert be required to pay various
arrearages, including arrearages for medical expenses.
The trial
court entered an order on the motion which stated that “[w]ith
respect to medical expenses, counsel for Respondent is directed
to furnish to counsel for Petitioner the necessary insurance
forms.”
Eight years later in 1998, Evelyn filed another motion
titled “Motion for Reimbursement of Medical Expenses.”
The
motion sought reimbursement from Robert in the amount of
$1,117.90, for past medical and dental expenses for the children.
These expenses dated back to 1987.
Following a hearing, the
trial court entered an order requiring Robert to reimburse Evelyn
$208.80 for past medical expenses.
Reimbursement was denied for
the remaining expenses based on the fact that there had already
been a hearing addressing those bills, and because the trial
court would not order them to be paid twice.
Evelyn thereafter
filed an appeal which is the subject matter of case number 1999CA-000566-MR.
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Based upon Robert’s interpretation of the separation
agreement, in January 1997, he discontinued paying maintenance to
Evelyn.
Evelyn then filed a motion for review and payment of
maintenance, reimbursement of child support, and a claim for
damages.
The motion, as later amended, requested $903.30 in
child support arrearages; a continuation of maintenance pursuant
to the separation agreement; and reimbursement “for any
compensatory, punitive, direct, irreparable or prospective
damages incurred by [Robert’s] gross negligence, non-support and
breach of contract.”
The trial court ruled to deny this motion noting that a
hearing on the motion was scheduled, that Evelyn failed to appear
for the hearing, and further that no cause had been given to the
court to excuse her failure to appear.
The trial court at this
time also denied her request to reinstate maintenance because of
her delay in seeking maintenance pursuant to the separation
agreement, and moreover, on the merits because she was not
entitled to a continuation of maintenance.
Evelyn thereafter
filed a motion for a new trial, which following a hearing the
trial court denied.
On appeal this question is the subject
matter of case number 1999-CA-002424-MR.
First, Evelyn contends the trial court erred in failing
to review her maintenance requirements pursuant to the separation
agreement and failing to extend her entitlement to maintenance.
The relevant portions of the separation agreement are paragraphs
5.1 and 5.3.
These paragraphs provide as follows:
5.1 The parties further agree that commencing
on the first day of January, 1986 and
continuing until the earlier of (a) Wife’s
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death; (b) Wife’s remarriage; (or) January 1,
1997, Husband will pay to Wife as maintenance
the sum of Three Thousand Dollars ($3,000.00)
per month, payable one-half on the fifteenth
day of each month and one-half on the last
day of each month.
. . . .
5.3 Husband agrees that Wife’s financial
condition and her anticipated financial needs
will be reviewed on January 1, 1997. With
respect to her then financial condition if it
be determined that Wife’s financial condition
is such that she cannot reasonably provide
for herself then such maintenance will
continue for such periods and in such amounts
as shall provide her with reasonable
maintenance.
On January 1, 1997, Robert discontinued maintenance
payments pursuant to his interpretation of paragraph 5.1;
however, it is uncontested that the provisions of paragraph 5.3
were not complied with in that no formal review of Evelyn’s
“financial condition and her anticipated financial needs”
occurred on January 1, 1997, as alluded to in the agreement.
Evelyn’s motion, in effect, sought to enforce belatedly
paragraph 5.3 for review and payment of maintenance, which was
filed two years after Robert ceased to pay maintenance.
The
trial court denied Evelyn’s motion as both untimely and as
unwarranted on the merits, stating that:
[b]ecause the Court has found that there was
no reasonable justification for the two (2)
year delay in filing her Motion, it does not
need to address the merits of her claim, but,
after considering Petitioner’s intelligence
level and vocational opportunities available
in Central Kentucky, all as verified by the
testimony of Ralph Crystal, Ph.D., a
vocational expert, and finding no reason why
Petitioner could not have completed her
education prior to January 1, 1997, and the
Court recognizing that Petitioner had in
excess of Three Hundred Thousand Dollars
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($300,000) in assets available at the time of
her divorce, with no debt, the Court finds
that there has not been any justification
provided to it to support an award of
maintenance.
We disagree with the trial court’s conclusion that
Evelyn’s motion was untimely.
Her motion sought to enforce a
term included in the separation agreement, a written contract.
Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 413.090(2) provides that actions
concerning a written contract must be commenced within fifteen
years after the cause of action first accrued.
Her cause of
action accrued on January 1, 1997, when Robert discontinued
maintenance, and her motion to enforce paragraph 5.3 was filed
therefore within the limitations period.
Nevertheless,
the
trial court, despite its conclusion that Evelyn’s motion was
untimely, reviewed the issue on the merits, and concluded that
she was not entitled to a continuation of maintenance.
We agree.
Paragraph 5.3 contains no standards under which
Evelyn’s financial condition and needs are to be reviewed.
Therefore, in our review of the trial court’s decision, we have
considered KRS 403.200, the maintenance statute, and have applied
the appropriate appellate standards of review.
The determination of whether to award maintenance is
highly discretionary with the trial court after its consideration
of the dictates of
KRS 403.200.
551 S.W.2d 823 (1977).
Browning v. Browning, Ky. App.,
The amount and duration of maintenance is
within the sound discretion of the trial court. Weldon v. Weldon,
Ky. App., 957 S.W.2d 283, 285-286 (1997); Russell v. Russell, Ky.
App., 878 S.W.2d 24, 26 (1994).
Furthermore, in matters of such
discretion, "unless absolute abuse is shown, the appellate court
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must maintain confidence in the trial court and not disturb the
findings of the trial judge." Id. (emphasis original); See also
Clark v. Clark, Ky. App., 782 S.W.2d 56, 60 (1990); Platt v.
Platt, Ky. App., 728 S.W.2d 542 (1987); and Moss v. Moss, Ky.
App., 639 S.W.2d 370 (1982).
And finally, "In order to reverse
the trial court's decision, a reviewing court must find either
that the findings of fact are clearly erroneous or that the trial
court has abused its discretion." Perrine v. Christine, Ky., 833
S.W.2d 825, 826 (1992).
In support of its conclusion that Evelyn was not
entitled to a continuation of maintenance, the trial court
specifically cited:
(1) Evelyn’s intelligence level; (2) her
vocational opportunities in Central Kentucky; (3) her opportunity
to complete her education; (4) her assets of $300,000 with no
debt following the divorce; and (5) the testimony of a vocational
expert who testified that Evelyn was capable of supporting
herself in a variety of occupations in the area.
These
considerations are in accord with the KRS 403.200 factors, and
further, we conclude, satisfy the review requirements specified
in paragraph 5.3 of the separation agreement.
We conclude the
trial court’s findings of fact were not clearly erroneous, nor
did the trial court abuse its discretion in its determination
that Evelyn was not entitled to a continuation of maintenance.
Evelyn next contends that the trial court erred by
failing to require Robert to reimburse her for child support
arrearages, an issue she raised in a prior motion.
However, the
trial court did not address the child support arrearages in its
earlier order noting Evelyn failed to appear for the hearing.
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In
response, Evelyn’s motions styled “Motion for a New Trial” and
“Memorandum in Support of Motion for a New Trial of the Issues”
did seek a new trial on both the issues of child support
arrearages and maintenance, further requesting the court to amend
its findings, and make additional findings, as well as to amend
the judgement.
In the body of the motion and in her “Memorandum
in Support of Motion for a New Trial,” Evelyn, however, did not
mention the issue of the child support arrearages, nor did she
raise the issue at the hearing on the motion for a new trial.
In summary, the trial court at no time made findings or
ruled on the child support issue.
It is clear that Evelyn did
not properly bring this failure to the trial court’s attention.
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 52.04 requires the
litigant to file a subsequent motion for additional findings of
fact when the trial court has failed to make findings on
essential issues.
Moreover, failure to bring the omission to the
attention of the trial court by means of a written request will
be fatal on appeal.
Cherry v. Cherry, Ky., 634 S.W.2d 423
(1982).
This issue is not preserved for review; moreover,
Evelyn did not address the issue in detail in her brief. However,
we will attempt to address the issue on its merits.
From our
review of the trial court record, we are not persuaded that
Evelyn has met her burden of showing that Robert, in fact, was in
arrears on his child support obligation.
The derivation of the
alleged sum of $903.30 arrearage is in the form of a hand written
calculation on a child support payment printout attached to her
motion, and apparently derives from Evelyn’s computation of a
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cost-of-living adjustment applicable to the period from January
1988 through January 1989.
The validity of this calculation is
not ascertainable from the record before us.
Evelyn failed to
attend the scheduled hearing to offer evidence supporting her
arrearage calculation, and, hence there is a failure of proof.
Finally, Evelyn contends that the trial court erred by
failing to require Robert to reimburse her for the full amount of
medical expenses she had requested.
Evelyn’s second motion
requested reimbursement for medical expenses totaling $1,117.90.
Based upon the canceled checks and receipts attached to the
motion, the expenses were incurred from 1987 through 1992.
In her motion, Evelyn sought reimbursement pursuant to
the separation agreement.
The applicable paragraph of that
agreement states as follows:
7.2 In addition to the monthly support
payments under paragraph 7.1 for the minor
children, Husband shall provide (a)
hospitalization and medical insurance
coverage under the best group policy
available to him for each minor child until
each minor child reaches 18 years of age, (b)
shall pay all reasonable uninsured medical
and dental expenses for Anna and Robert until
each minor child reaches 18 years of age.
Husband’s obligation shall extend only
insofar as such expenses are reasonably
required and are in reasonable amounts having
regard to the station of life of the parties
and especially the financial circumstances of
the Husband. Wife agrees that she will
promptly fill out, execute and deliver to
Husband all forms and provide all information
in connection with any application he may
make for reimbursement of medical and dental
expenses under any insurance policies which
he may have. Husband shall make prompt
reimbursement to Wife if she has advanced any
sums for such expenses. [emphasis added].
-8-
Following a hearing, the trial court entered an order
requiring Robert to reimburse Evelyn $208.80 for past medical
expenses.
These expenses were allowed because they occurred
during a period when a limited power of attorney executed by
Robert was in effect authorizing Evelyn to procure medical care
for their daughter.
With regard to the remaining expenses, the
trial court stated that:
[a]ll other medical expenses incurred by
Petitioner for the parties children that were
provided to the Court at the hearing shall
not be reimbursed to her by the Respondent.
The Court having found that for the expenses
incurred before September, 1990, there had
already been a hearing addressing those
bills, so this Court will take no further
action, and, for those expenses incurred
before July 24, 1992, the Court having
determined that due to their age, it is
inequitable to require Respondent to pay
them.
We agree with the conclusions of the trial court.
The
agreement clearly and specifically required Evelyn to take prompt
action regarding reimbursable medical expenses.
At the hearing,
Evelyn testified that she did not seek recovery earlier because,
variously, (1) she thought it would be futile because at the same
time the expenses were incurred Robert was seeking financial
concessions from her; (2) Robert changed insurance companies; (3)
she did not have an attorney; (4) she was suffering from health
problems; and (5) the medical bills and canceled checks were in
storage.
Despite Evelyn’s excuses, she unquestionably breached
the term of the contract requiring prompt notification to Robert
and thereby lost her entitlement to enforce the reimbursement
provisions of the contract.
Further, it is undoubtedly much too
-9-
late for Robert to seek insurance reimbursement for such past due
medical bills as these.
For the foregoing reasons the Fayette Circuit Court is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Evelynn Scrivner Stilz
Lexington, Kentucky
Thomas W. Miller
Miller, Griffin & Marks,
P.S.C.
Lexington, Kentucky
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