NATHAN ROBERT BOGAN, APPELLANTS by and through his next friends, GRETCHEN BOGAN and DANIEL BOGAN; GRETCHEN BOGAN and DANIEL BOGAN, individually; and CABINET FOR HEALTH SERVICES v. ALTMAN & MCGUIRE, P.S.C.; ALTMAN & MCGUIRE; ALTMAN, MCGUIRE & PIGG, P.S.C.; ALTMAN, MCGUIRE & PIGG; ALTMAN, MCGUIRE & MCCLELLAN, P.S.C.; ALTMAN, MCGUIRE & MCCLELLAN; ALTMAN, MCGUIRE, PIGG & MCCLELLAN, P.S.C.; ALTMAN, MCGUIRE, PIGG & MCCLELLAN; HARRY E. ALTMAN; TOM O. MCGUIRE; JAMES R. PIGG; and RICK A. MCCLELLAN
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RENDERED:
March 2, 2001; 10:00 a.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
MODIFIED: June 22, 2001; 10:00 a.m.
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-000212-MR
NATHAN ROBERT BOGAN,
by and through his next friends,
GRETCHEN BOGAN and DANIEL BOGAN;
GRETCHEN BOGAN and DANIEL BOGAN,
individually; and CABINET FOR
HEALTH SERVICES
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM PIKE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE EDDY COLEMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 94-CI-00434
ALTMAN & MCGUIRE, P.S.C.;
ALTMAN & MCGUIRE; ALTMAN,
MCGUIRE & PIGG, P.S.C.;
ALTMAN, MCGUIRE & PIGG;
ALTMAN, MCGUIRE & MCCLELLAN,
P.S.C.; ALTMAN, MCGUIRE &
MCCLELLAN; ALTMAN, MCGUIRE,
PIGG & MCCLELLAN, P.S.C.;
ALTMAN, MCGUIRE, PIGG & MCCLELLAN;
HARRY E. ALTMAN; TOM O. MCGUIRE;
JAMES R. PIGG; and RICK A. MCCLELLAN
APPELLEES
AND
NO.
1999-CA-000468-MR
AND
NO. 1999-CA-000563-MR (CROSS)
CARLEI NACOLE GRUBBS,
by and through her next friend,
KIMBERLY SUZANE GRUBBS; KIMBERLY
SUZANE GRUBBS, Individually; and
KENNETH CHARLES GRUBBS, Individually
v.
APPELLANTS/CROSS-APPELLEES
APPEAL FROM KNOX CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE RODERICK MESSER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CI-00277
BARBOURVILLE FAMILY HEALTH
CENTER, P.S.C.; B.R. JUNG,
M.D., agent, servant and employee
APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS
of BARBOURVILLE FAMILY HEALTH
CENTER, P.S.C.; and
B.R. JUNG, M.D., Individually
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN
1999-CA-000468-MR
AND 1999-CA-000563-MR
AFFIRMING IN PART,
REVERSING IN PART
AND REMANDING
IN 1999-CA-000212-MR
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, DYCHE, AND McANULTY, JUDGES.
McANULTY, JUDGE: The consolidated appeals before us involve
similar situations in which a woman gave birth to a child with
severe birth defects.
In both instances, the parents maintain
the defects should have been diagnosed by their respective
physicians through prenatal tests.
The parents further allege
that had they been informed of these defects, each would have
chosen to terminate the pregnancy.
These fact situations raise the question of whether
Kentucky law recognizes what are known as birth-related torts.
There are three separate torts in this group.
Wrongful
conception or wrongful pregnancy applies to the situation in
which a negligently performed sterilization procedure results in
the birth of a child.
Wrongful birth is the cause of action
where parents allege that negligence in prenatal testing
prevented them from making an informed decision regarding the
continuation of the pregnancy.
Finally, wrongful life is a cause
of action brought on behalf of the disabled child claiming that
but for the negligence of a physician, the child would not have
been born.
-2-
We will briefly discuss the facts and procedural
histories of each case.
In the case of the Bogans, they allege
their group of physicians failed to perform an amniocentesis test
and failed to interpret the ultrasound which would have revealed
the severe defects possessed by the child, Nathan Bogan.
Nathan
was delivered by cesarean section because a cyst had so enlarged
his head that it was impossible for him to be delivered
vaginally.
Nathan was born with only a brain stem because of the
enormous cyst.
He does not have any eyes in his sockets and he
is unable to speak or to communicate.
Nathan lives at the Home
of the Innocents in Louisville, where he receives around the
clock care.
The Bogans filed suit in Pike Circuit Court alleging
that the failure to perform an amniocentesis test and interpret
the ultrasounds of the fetus deprived the Bogans from making an
informed decision concerning the continuation of the pregnancy.
The Bogans made a similar claim on behalf of Nathan for damages
which resulted from his birth.
The trial court granted partial
summary judgment to the defendants on Nathan’s claim, relying on
Schork v. Huber, Ky., 648 S.W.2d 861 (1983).
The trial court
then appeared to vitiate the Bogans’ claim on the ground that the
physicians did not cause the defects.
Nevertheless, the order
permitted the parents’ cause of action and limited damages to
Mrs. Bogan’s pain and suffering and permanent scars left as a
result of being forced to undergo a cesarean section.
The order
granting partial summary judgment stated it was final and
appealable.
-3-
The Bogans filed this appeal, asserting that they are
entitled to recover for the damages caused by Nathan’s birth.
Essentially, they ask this Court to recognize the claims of
wrongful birth and wrongful life.
The Grubbses allege the physician providing prenatal
care, Dr. Jung, failed to advise them of the availability of
prenatal diagnostic tests to indicate the presence of spina
bifida and hydrocephalus, and failed to interpret an ultrasound
to reveal the presence of these defects.
They argue the
physician’s negligence deprived them of the opportunity to make
an informed decision on whether to continue the pregnancy.
The
Grubbses have also joined the hospital, where Dr. Jung works, as
a defendant.
Carlei Nacole Grubbs suffers from a variety of genetic
defects, including spina bifida and hydrocephalus.
She is
paralyzed from the waist down, and has poor vision and misshaped
kidneys.
The Grubbses instituted the present action in the Knox
Circuit Court on their behalf and a cause of action on behalf of
Carlei.
The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment
alleging that Kentucky law does not recognize the causes of
action filed by the Grubbses.
The trial court analyzed the
issues and determined that the Grubbses’s claim was not a new
tort but merely a claim of medical malpractice.
therefore, denied summary judgment on that issue.
The court,
However, the
trial court opined that to recognize the claim filed on Carlei’s
behalf would be to determine it is better never to have been born
-4-
at all than to have been born disabled.
The Knox Circuit Court,
therefore, concluded it would be against public policy to permit
Carlei’s cause of action and granted summary judgment to the
physician and hospital on this issue.
Subsequently, the defendants in the Grubbs case filed a
second motion for summary judgment on the grounds of violation of
the statute of limitations.
The Grubbses had testified they
first learned their physician had failed to diagnose the defects
when Mrs. Grubbs saw a specialist who reviewed the ultrasounds in
Lexington on June 27, 1996.
The specialist informed her then
that her unborn child suffered from spina bifida and
hydrocephalus.
The trial court granted summary judgment on this
issue, stating the proper time to file suit would have been
within a year from the date the specialist informed them of
Carlei’s condition, not one year after her birth.
The Grubbses appeal the issues concerning the
application of the statute of limitations to bar their claims and
the granting of summary judgment on the causes of action of
wrongful birth and wrongful life.
Their appeal of the wrongful
birth issue is somewhat perplexing, as we interpret the trial
court’s order as recognizing the validity of the claim and
denying summary judgment to the physician and hospital.
Moreover, the physician and hospital have cross-appealed,
asserting that the trial court erred in denying summary judgment
on the wrongful birth issue.
We first address the causes of action for wrongful
birth and wrongful life.
The appellate courts in Kentucky have
-5-
not previously faced the precise issues now before us.
The
decision in Schork v. Huber, supra, upon which the trial courts
relied, concerned the factual scenario in which an impregnated
couple sued the physician who had performed an unsuccessful
sterilization procedure.
wrongful conception.
This cause of action is known as
Schork held that “parents cannot recover
damages based on the costs of raising a healthy but unexpected
child from a doctor following an unsuccessful sterilization
procedure.”
Schork at 862.
In so concluding, the majority
opinion discussed the causes of action known as wrongful birth
and wrongful life and opined as follows:
Wrongful life is a
is contrary to the
State as expressed
interpreted by the
contradiction in terms. It
public policy of this
by the legislature and
courts.
The establishment of a cause of action based
on the matter of wrongful conception,
wrongful life or wrongful birth is clearly
within the purview of the legislature only.
The enunciation of public policy is the
domain of the General Assembly. We do not
propose to invade their jurisdiction in any
respect. The courts interpret the law. They
do not enact legislation.
Id. at 863.
The trial court in the Bogan case determined that
the Schork decision barred the claims of both the parents and the
child.
Conversely, the trial court in the Grubbs case decided
that the above language was simply dicta.
We conclude that we are not bound by the language in
Schork.
The issues of wrongful birth and wrongful life were not
before the Schork court at the time.
of these torts is clearly dicta.
247 S.W.2d 27, 29 (1952).
Therefore, the discussion
Cawood v. Hensley, Ky. App.,
Accordingly, the viability of the
-6-
causes of action known as wrongful birth and wrongful life are
issues of first impression.
While dicta is not controlling, it may be used as a
guide.
However, upon our review of the decisions of many other
jurisdictions, we are more persuaded by the logic employed in the
Schork dissents.
Therein, two justices contended that the
wrongful conception case before the court involved traditional
negligence principles and did not call for the court to create a
new cause of action.
Schork at 865.
(Leibson, J., dissenting).
In that regard, we find that recognizing the claims set forth in
the case at bar requires not the establishment of some new cause
of action, but only a re-examination of the claims under existing
negligence principles.
Relief may come in the form of
traditional damages without introducing a new tort to Kentucky
law.
An examination of the allegations which constitute a
claim for wrongful birth reveals that the cause of action, no
matter by what name it is called, sounds purely in medical
negligence.
This view has been adopted by many courts in
assessing the viability of wrongful birth claims.
For example,
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in applying Alabama law,
concluded that the tort of wrongful birth “involves a failure by
a physician to meet a required standard of care, which resulted
in specific damages to the plaintiffs.”
658 F.2d 471, 476 (7th Cir. 1981).
Robak v. United States,
The Court further opined:
As in any other tort case, the defendant must
bear the burden for injuries resulting from
its own negligence. “Any other ruling would
in effect immunize from liability those in
-7-
the medical field providing inadequate
guidance to persons who would choose to
exercise their constitutional right to abort
fetuses, which, if born, would suffer from
genetic [or other] defects.” (Citation
omitted.)
Id.
In that respect, we believe the legislature in Kentucky has
already spoken by implicitly recognizing actions against
physicians for negligence or malpractice.
KRS 413.140(1)(e).
Further, the Nevada Supreme Court has similarly declared:
“[W]e see no reason for compounding or complicating our medical
malpractice jurisprudence by according this particular form of
professional negligence action some special status apart from
presently recognized medical malpractice or by giving it the new
name of ‘wrongful birth.’"
Greco v. United States, 893 P.2d
345, 348 (Nev. 1995).
Accordingly, we hold parents who allege negligence on
the part of a physician deprived them of information necessary to
make a decision regarding the continuation of pregnancy have
stated a viable cause of action for medical negligence.
Our
Supreme Court has stated:
In any negligence case, it is
necessary to show that the defendant failed
to discharge a legal duty or conform his
conduct to the standard required. W.
Prosser, LAW OF TORTS § 30 (1971). In the
arena of medical negligence, controlling
Kentucky authority imposes upon a physician
the duty to “use that degree of care and
skill which is expected of a reasonably
competent practitioner in the same class to
which [the physician] belongs acting in the
same or similar circumstances.” Blair v.
Eblen, Ky., 461 S.W.2d 370, 373 (1970).
Mitchell v. Hadl, Ky., 816 S.W.2d 183, 185 (1991).
Moreover,
should the plaintiffs prove the elements of medical negligence,
-8-
including duty, breach, injury and causation, they are entitled
to compensation for the damages that flow from the negligence.
We now turn to the issue of wrongful life, the cause of
action brought on behalf of the disabled child.
cause of action sounds in negligence.
Once again this
The gist of the claim is
that the child has suffered harm due to the negligence of the
defendants.
Regardless, there is no question that the courts
have struggled with the issues raised by this claim.
difficulty is found in the type of harm alleged.
The
Inasmuch as the
alleged negligence of the defendants did not cause the actual
defects from which Nathan Bogan and Carlei Grubbs now suffer, we
must determine whether Kentucky law will recognize that the
children have suffered a cognizable injury at law merely by being
born rather than aborted.
Many courts have refused to recognize this action because
the disabled child is effectively asserting it would have been
better not to have been born at all than to be born with
disabilities and the accompanying pain and suffering.
However,
we do not reach the question of weighing human life because we
conclude the claim fails on the first element of negligence —
duty.
While it is without question that the physician owes a
duty to the patient, it is not so clear whether the doctor owes
an independent duty to the unborn child.
Recognizing a cause of
action for wrongful life would require such a duty; the doctor
would become negligent for causing the unborn child to be brought
into life.
Justice Leibson recognizes this in Schork, stating
-9-
the cause of action for wrongful life creates “a new duty to a
new person where none previously existed.”
(Leibson, J., dissenting).
Schork at 865.
We are inclined to agree.
A
physician who undertakes to care for a pregnant woman owes a duty
to the woman to care for her and her unborn child.
We hold that
a child with disabilities does not state a cause of action when
he alleges that but for the negligence of a medical provider he
would not have been born.
Finally, we must address whether the trial court erred
in dismissing the Grubbses’s claim for failure to file within the
statute of limitations.
The parties agree that the appropriate
statute is KRS 413.140(1)(e), which provides that an action
against a physician or hospital for negligence or malpractice
must be brought within one year.
The question in this case is
when the time limitation began to run.
Kentucky has adopted a
discovery rule requiring the limitation period to run from the
date of the discovery of the injury or from the date it should,
in the exercise of ordinary care and diligence, have been
discovered.
Hackworth v. Hart, Ky., 474 S.W.2d 377 (1971).
Mrs. Grubbs testified that Dr. Jung performed several
ultrasound tests throughout her pregnancy with Carlei.
After the
last ultrasound, he referred her to a University of Kentucky
specialist because he observed that the fetus’s head was larger
than it should be.
The specialist, Dr. Milligan, viewed the
ultrasounds and immediately identified Carlei’s disabilities.
fact, Mrs. Grubbs stated that Dr. Milligan remarked that “he
In
couldn’t believe [Dr. Jung] had missed it, right there it was.”
-10-
As such, the trial court determined that the Grubbses discovered
the injury on the date they saw Dr. Milligan in Lexington.
On appeal, the Grubbses insist we should hold that they
could not have discovered the injury until Carlei was born,
because they could not have been aware of the extent of her
physical defects until then.
While we appreciate that argument,
we believe it contradicts the law.
The discovery rule does not
require a person to be aware of the full extent of the injury
before the statute begins to run, only that the person discover,
or should reasonably discover, that he or she has been wronged.
In other words, it was enough that the Grubbses knew Dr. Jung had
missed the diagnosis of the defects.
It was not required that
they knew the full extent of Carlei’s disabilities.
The Grubbses also contend that whether they brought the
action within the statute of limitations is a question for the
jury.
They rely on Hackworth v. Hart, supra, for this
proposition.
However, we believe Hackworth concludes that there
is a jury issue for the discovery rule only when there is a
factual discrepancy regarding whether the plaintiff knew or
should have known.
In this case, Mrs. Grubbs has testified that
Dr. Milligan informed her during the ultrasound that Dr. Jung
should have seen the defects earlier.
There is no such
discrepancy and therefore, no issue for the jury.
Farmer’s Bank
& Trust Co. v. Rice, Ky., 674 S.W.2d 510 (1984).
Accordingly, we
cannot conclude that the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment to the defendants on the grounds that the Grubbses’s
claim was time-barred.
-11-
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Pike
Circuit Court is affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded
for proceedings on Mr. and Mrs. Bogan’s claim.
The orders of the
Knox Circuit Court are affirmed.
DYCHE, JUDGE, CONCURS.
COMBS, JUDGE, CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART.
COMBS, JUDGE, CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN
PART: I concur with the extremely well-reasoned majority opinion
on all issues but one — that of the discovery date/statute of
limitations controversy involving the Grubbses.
Although Dr.
Milligan’s review of Dr. Jung’s ultrasound tests confirmed that
Dr. Jung had mis-diagnosed Carlei’s disabilities, no physician is
omniscient — despite the almost miraculous ability of modern
testing to predict birth defects.
Only the event of birth itself
could reveal for certain the existence and extent of the
predicted defects.
Consequently, I differ from the majority opinion on
this one issue and would set the date of birth as the event
triggering the running of the statute of limitations and would
not hold the Grubbses’ claim to be time-barred.
-12-
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS BOGANS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES ALTMAN,
MCGUIRE & PIGG, ET AL:
Wayne F. Collier
Lexington, KY
Margaret M. Pisacano
Lynn K. Rikhoff
Lexington, KY
George Edward Overbey, Jr.
Frankfort, KY
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANTS
BOGANS:
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEES
ALTMAN, MCGUIRE & PIGG, ET
AL:
Wayne F. Collier
Lexington, Ky
Margaret M. Pisacano
Lexington, KY
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANTS GRUBBS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES
BARBOURVILLE FAMILY HEALTH
CENTER, ET AL:
Barbara Elliot Yeager
Barbourville, KY
Mark E. Nichols
Melanie S. Marrs
Lexington, KY
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEES
BARBOURVILLE FAMILY HEALTH
CENTER, ET AL:
Melanie S. Marrs
Lexington, KY
-13-
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