DANNY'S INC. D/B/A THOROBRED II AND THOROBRED IV; GOLD COAST, INC. D/B/A THOROBRED III; C & H ENTERTAINMENT, INC. D/B/A BABE'S; AND SHANNA TUTTLE v. JEFFERSON COUNTY FISCAL COURT AND CONNIE AYOTTE; DAVID R. BELL; LILLIAN BLANDFORD; SHANNON BRATCHER; ELIZABETH CASPER; JAMES COX; BARBARA DZAGAN; VICKI LU EATON; TAMMY FARMER; VICKKI FAVORS; AMY FORD; DIVANNA GOMEZ; WENDY GONZALEZ; MICHELLE HARDMAN; ISSHIA HARMON; MARTY HEAVRIN; CHARLOTTE HOLDERMAN; AMY JONES; ANGELLA M. JONES; JANICE LORD; ERIN MARCUM; JENNIFER MORIN; AMANDA MORRIS; TONIA MOURIZAK; MARCY NICHOLSON; JENNIFER OAKLEAF; SHERRY PRIDGEON; MARIA RHYNE; CAROLEEN SADLER; LAURA WALCOTT; VICKY WARDRIP; JAVONDA WEPPLER; SANDRA WILSON; and MELVINIA WOODBERRY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
AUGUST 31, 2001; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
NO.
1998-CA-001805-MR
AND
1999-CA-000200-MR
DANNY'S INC. D/B/A THOROBRED II
AND THOROBRED IV; GOLD COAST, INC.
D/B/A THOROBRED III; C & H ENTERTAINMENT,
INC. D/B/A BABE'S; AND SHANNA TUTTLE
v.
APPELLANTS/APPELLEES
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES M. SHAKE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CI-003235
JEFFERSON COUNTY FISCAL COURT
APPELLEE/APPELLANT
AND
NO.
1998-CA-001880-DG
CONNIE AYOTTE; DAVID R. BELL;
LILLIAN BLANDFORD; SHANNON BRATCHER;
ELIZABETH CASPER; JAMES COX;
BARBARA DZAGAN; VICKI LU EATON;
TAMMY FARMER; VICKKI FAVORS; AMY FORD;
DIVANNA GOMEZ; WENDY GONZALEZ;
MICHELLE HARDMAN; ISSHIA HARMON;
MARTY HEAVRIN; CHARLOTTE HOLDERMAN;
AMY JONES; ANGELLA M. JONES; JANICE
LORD; ERIN MARCUM; JENNIFER MORIN;
AMANDA MORRIS; TONIA MOURIZAK; MARCY
NICHOLSON; JENNIFER OAKLEAF; SHERRY
PRIDGEON; MARIA RHYNE; CAROLEEN SADLER;
LAURA WALCOTT; VICKY WARDRIP; JAVONDA
WEPPLER; SANDRA WILSON; and MELVINIA WOODBERRY
v.
APPELLANTS
ON DISCRETIONARY REVIEW FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES M. SHAKE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-XX-000134
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, COMBS, AND McANULTY, JUDGES.
McANULTY, JUDGE: In the first of these consolidated appeals
(1998-CA-001805-MR), the appellants consist of establishments
which seek to present nude or nearly nude dancing while serving
alcoholic beverages, or are performers at such establishments.
They challenge, on constitutional grounds, Ordinance § 113.17
promulgated by the appellee Jefferson County Fiscal Court which
regulates “Nude or nearly nude performances” in establishments
licensed to sell alcoholic beverages.
In the second case
(1998-CA-001880-DG), the appellants are employed as entertainers
and managers at such establishments in Jefferson County who were
charged with violating Ordinance § 113.17.
We granted
discretionary review of their constitutional arguments.
These
two cases also were heard together in the circuit court.
Appellants argued below that the ordinance violated
their First Amendment right to freedom of expression because it
was overbroad and vague.
The county attorney responded that the
ordinance was fully within the county's authority to regulate the
sale of alcoholic beverages under the Twenty-first Amendment to
the United States Constitution.
The trial court found that the
issues were controlled by a line of cases beginning with
-2-
California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 34 L. Ed. 2d 342, 93 S. Ct.
390 (1972), which employed the Twenty-first Amendment to govern
the issue of regulation of sexually explicit entertainment in
establishments serving liquor.1
The trial court further analyzed
this case pursuant to the test used by the Supreme Court in
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 115 L. Ed. 2d 504,
111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
In Barnes, the Supreme Court applied its
four-pronged test from United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 20
L. Ed. 2d 672, 88 S. Ct. 1673 (1968), which analyzed
encroachments upon the First Amendment, to a case involving a
prohibition on nude dancing.
In the case at bar, the trial court
concluded that all of the prongs of the test were met and
specifically found that the ordinance was not vague or overbroad.
Appellants claim that the trial court's conclusions
were erroneous.
Appellants first claim that the LaRue line of
cases should not have been relied upon by the trial court because
they were “all but overruled” by 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island,
517 U.S. 484, 134 L. Ed. 2d 711, 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996).
Appellants contend that the trial court thus erred in concluding
that LaRue, and the cases which used the same analysis, were
controlling.
Appellees, on the other hand, continue to urge that
this case should be decided solely on the county's Twenty-first
Amendment authority.
The county argues that because of its
1
The other cases in which the United States Supreme Court
followed LaRue were New York State Liquor Authority v. Bellanca,
452 U.S. 714, 69 L. Ed. 2d 357, 101 S. Ct. 2599 (1981), and
Newport v. Iacobucci, 479 U.S. 92, 93 L. Ed. 2d 334, 107 S. Ct.
383 (1986).
-3-
factual similarity this case falls within the ambit of LaRue.
Appellees note that the state possesses extensive power to
regulate the sale of alcohol, citing Alcoholic Beverage Control
Board of Ky v. Woosley, Ky., 367 S.W.2d 127 (1963), and broad
police power to restrict the kind of activities at issue in
LaRue, including nude and nearly nude dancing.
The county
contends that this is not a First Amendment case, so that the
trial court's examination of this case under the First Amendment
was unnecessary and gratuitous.
The Supreme Court had held in LaRue that regulations
prohibiting sexually explicit live entertainment, and which
restricted some forms of expression which were within the First
Amendment's protection of freedom of expression, were valid
pursuant to states' authority under the Twenty-First Amendment to
control intoxicating beverages.
The Court held that the Twenty-
first Amendment required an “added presumption in favor of the
validity of the state regulation in this area.”
119, 34 L. Ed. 2d at 352, 93 S. Ct. 390.
409 U.S. at 188-
However, in 44
Liquormart, the Supreme Court reconsidered this position, and
held that it is clear that the text of the Twenty-first Amendment
grants it no authority over other constitutional provisions.
Court stated:
We are now persuaded that the Court's
analysis in LaRue would have led to precisely
the same result if it had placed no reliance
on the Twenty-first Amendment. Entirely
apart from the Twenty-first Amendment, the
State has ample power to prohibit the sale of
alcoholic beverages in inappropriate
locations. Moreover, in subsequent cases,
the Court has recognized that the States'
inherent police powers provide ample
-4-
The
authority to restrict the kind of
"bacchanalian revelries" described in the
LaRue opinion regardless of whether alcoholic
beverages are involved. (Citations omitted.)
Id. at 515.
The Court added that it did not question its holding
in LaRue, but disavowed its reasoning insofar as it relied on the
Twenty-first Amendment.
Id. at 516.
We find no fault with the trial court's order insofar
as the reference to LaRue and its progeny.
Following the Supreme
Court's construction in 44 Liquormart, the LaRue line of cases
authorizes states to regulate nude and nearly nude dancing in
places serving alcoholic beverages pursuant to their police
powers.
The trial court found that LaRue “involved a simple
time, place and manner restriction supported by a reasonable
relationship between the evil sought to be prevented and a
narrowly tailored regulation to that end.”
We find that the
trial court appropriately construed LaRue and did not incorporate
its position regarding the Twenty-first Amendment which was
disavowed in 44 Liquormart.
We disagree with appellees' contention, however, that
this case does not concern the First Amendment.
The nude dancing
at issue herein is expressive conduct, although it only falls
within the “outer ambit” of First Amendment protection.
Barnes,
501 U.S. at 565-566, 115 L. Ed. 2d 504, 111 S. Ct. 2456; Erie v.
Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 146 L. Ed. 2d 265, 278, 120 S. Ct. 1382
(2000).
44 Liquormart holds that the Twenty-first Amendment does
not have presumptive power over the First Amendment or other
constitutional amendments.
Thus, we do not agree that
legislative bodies have unbridled power to regulate conduct where
-5-
alcoholic beverages are sold.
In the recent case of Pap's A.M.,
the Supreme Court held that government restrictions on public
nudity should be evaluated under the framework established in
O'Brien for content-neutral restrictions on symbolic speech.
U.S. at 289, 146 L. Ed. 2d at 278.
529
In Barnes and Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 49 L. Ed. 2d 310, 96
S. Ct. 2440 (1976), cited in 44 Liquormart as illustrative of the
states' police power to regulate sexually explicit activity, the
Supreme Court went through a First Amendment analysis of the
regulations at issue.
Thus, we believe that the trial court's
examination of the ordinance pursuant to the First Amendment was
necessary.
The O'Brien test is as follows:
This Court has held that when “speech” and
“nonspeech” elements are combined in the same
course of conduct, a sufficiently important
governmental interest in regulating the
nonspeech element can justify incidental
limitations on First Amendment freedoms.
. . . [W]e think it clear that a government
regulation is sufficiently justified if it is
within the constitutional power of the
Government; if it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and if the
incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that
interest.
O'Brien, at 376-377 (footnotes omitted).
The trial court
concluded that the second and third factors above were met.
Appellants have not challenged that ruling specifically.
Appellants quarrel with the trial court's determination of the
fourth factor — whether the regulation is no greater than is
-6-
necessary to the furtherance of the governmental interest.
The
real crux of appellants' arguments on appeal is that the
ordinance's restriction on their freedoms is greater than is
essential to further its purpose because the ordinance required
coverage of more of the body than is minimally necessary.
We are unconvinced that the ordinance at issue is
greater than necessary to achieve the governmental purpose in
this case.
The trial court found that the governmental interest
was focused on the potentially negative impact of the activity in
question, rather than its content.
O'Brien requires only that
the regulation further the interest in combating the secondary
effects which the regulation is aimed at reducing.
Pap's A.M.,
529 U.S. at 301, 146 L. Ed. 2d at 285, 20 S. Ct. 1382.
Presumably, the Fiscal Court did not think the purpose of the
ordinance would be served by a lesser restriction.
The Supreme
Court states that legislative bodies must be given latitude to
experiment with solutions to the problems before them.
Id.
We
will defer to the judgment of the legislative body since
appellants have not shown that the Fiscal Court went too far to
achieve its ends.
Moreover, the Supreme Court of Kentucky has
concluded that the amount of clothing involved does not interfere
with the message sought to be conveyed by dance performances.
Hendricks v. Commonwealth, Ky., 865 S.W.2d 332, 336 (1993).
The
performers at the establishments in question are free to perform
as before, but wearing the coverage called for in the ordinance.
Therefore, we conclude that this ordinance satisfies the fourpart test in O'Brien.
-7-
We do not agree that the ordinance is overbroad by
potentially disallowing performances with serious artistic,
literary or political content, since it does not prohibit all
public nudity.
Cf. Triplett Grille, Inc., v. City of Akron, 40
F.3d 129, 135-136 (6th Cir. 1994).
Therefore, we do not find
that the ordinance is overbroad as it is written.
Appellants' remaining claim is that Barnes established
a minimum level of intrusion on the kind of performance at issue
by requiring “pasties” and “g-strings” as “the bare minimum” of
regulation acceptable, whereas the ordinance at issue required
greater coverage.
Barnes did not establish this as the bare
minimum level of intrusion on public nudity that states may
require.
See Barnes, 501 U.S. at 562, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 515.
Instead, the Court noted that the state of Indiana's regulation
went no further than was necessary to achieve its purpose of
preventing public nudity.
The opinion did not hold that a state
could not go any further than “the bare minimum.”
* * * * *
In the third appeal which was consolidated herein
(1999-CA-000200-MR), the Jefferson County Fiscal Court appeals
the trial court's order which denied a temporary injunction
restraining the establishments, performers and managers herein
from violating Ordinance § 113.17 during the pendency of these
appeals on the basis that such violation constitutes a public
nuisance.
The propriety of issuing a temporary injunction is a
matter addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.
CR
65.04; Cyprus Mountain Coal Corp. v. Brewer, Ky., 828 S.W.2d 642,
-8-
645 (1992).
In order to grant such relief, the trial court must
(1) find that the party seeking relief has shown irreparable
injury, (2) weigh the equities involved, and (3) determine that a
substantial question has been presented.
Id.
The trial court
correctly found that appellants have made no showing of an
irreparable injury in this case.
Furthermore, we find no error
in the trial Court's balancing of equities.
Accordingly, we
affirm the trial Court's denial of a temporary injunction.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS DANNY’S,
INC. D/B/A THOROBRED AND
THOROBRED IV; GOLD COAST, INC.
D/B/A THOROBRED III; C & H
ENTERTAINMENT, INC. D/B/A
BABE’S; AND SHANNA TUTTLE:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES/APPELLANT
JEFFERSON FISCAL COURT:
C. Michael Hatzell
Hatzell & Groves
Louisville, Kentucky
N. Scott Lilly
First Assistant Jefferson
County Attorney
I.G. Spencer, Jr.
Assistant Jefferson County
Attorney
Walker C. Cunningham
Assistant Jefferson County
Attorney
Louisville, Kentucky
-9-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.