RAY HART v. GREGORY MCDOWELL
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RENDERED:
August 3, 2001; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-000264-MR
RAY HART
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM GRANT CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CHARLES F. SATTERWHITE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CI-00293
v.
GREGORY MCDOWELL
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE; COMBS AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
Ray Hart appeals from a January 22, 1998, judgment
of the Grant Circuit Court dismissing his tort-based complaint
for damages against Gregory McDowell.
Hart contends that the
trial court misapplied the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity.
We find no such error and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Ray and Kristina Hart married in 1991.
Sometime before
March 5, 1996, when Kristina bore the couple’s son, they
separated.
On or about March 25, 1996, Kristina executed a
criminal complaint against Ray, charging him with non-support of
their child in violation of KRS 530.050.
McDowell, at that time
the Grant County Attorney, procured Ray’s arrest and prosecuted
him for the alleged offense.
Following a hearing on October 1,
1996, the Grant District Court acquitted Ray of the charge.
About a year later, in September 1997, Ray filed the
instant complaint.
He alleged that McDowell had initiated and
maintained the criminal-non-support charge maliciously and
without probable cause.1
He noted that the child had been only
about three-weeks old at the time of the charge and that at that
point no child-support order had yet come into effect.
Twice
during those three weeks, he claimed, he had offered Kristina
support.
McDowell either knew or should have known of these
circumstances, Ray argued, and so should further have known that
the criminal charge was baseless.
McDowell denied Ray’s allegations and asserted an
absolute immunity defense.
Agreeing with McDowell that absolute
immunity applied, the trial court summarily dismissed the
complaint.
Ray contends that a prosecutor sued in his or her
individual capacity is not entitled to absolute immunity.
We
disagree.
In McCollum v. Garrett,2 our Supreme Court held that
so long as a prosecutor acts within the scope
of the duties imposed by law, quasi-judicial
immunity is available, but otherwise it is
not.
. . . .
1
Ray also accused Kristina of participating in the malicious prosecution. Kristina filed a
cross-claim against McDowell. In its January 1998 judgment, the trial court did not rule on
Ray’s claim against Kristina, but it dismissed her cross-claim. Kristina has not appealed from
that ruling. She is thus a purely nominal party to this appeal.
2
Ky., 880 S.W.2d 530 (1994).
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A prosecutor acting as such and in accordance
with the duties of office as defined by
Kentucky law should have absolute immunity.3
The prosecutor in that case had been sued in his individual
capacity.
In reconfirming what is a standard and widespread
rule4 conferring on prosecutors a greater immunity than the
qualified immunity enjoyed by most government officials sued as
individuals, the Court explained “that a public prosecutor must
have immunity when he is acting within the scope of his authority
for without it, the prosecutorial function would suffer.”5
The
immunity is extended because of the function it protects rather
than the title of the person who claims it.
Chief among the reasons most often cited for
granting absolute prosecutorial immunity are
concern that constant fear of later civil
suits for damages may chill the vigorous
prosecution of those charged with violating
state statutes; that such fears may deter
competent people from seeking office; and
that defense of claims for malicious
prosecution may drain valuable time and
effort. Balancing the interests of the
plaintiff in a malicious prosecution action
against the interests of the system of
justice as a whole, Judge Learned Hand early
observed:
As is so often the case, the answer
must be found in a balance between the
evils inevitable in either alternative.
In this instance it has been thought in
the end better to leave unredressed the
wrongs done by dishonest officers than
to subject those who try to do their
3
Id. at 534 and 535.
4
See Knapper v. Connick, 681 So. 2d 944 (La. 1996) (collecting cases). See also The
Restatement of Torts (2nd) § 656 (1977).
5
880 S.W.2d at 534.
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duties to the constant dread of
retaliation.6
It is true that no immunity extends to acts by a
prosecutor that exceed the scope of his or her authority7 and
that qualified rather than absolute immunity applies to
prosecutorial functions remote from the judicial phase of the
criminal process.8
Neither of these limitations on absolute
prosecutorial immunity applies here, however, for the charging
and prosecuting functions Ray claims that McDowell abused are at
the core of a prosecutor’s authority and are intimately related
to judicial proceedings.
We conclude that McDowell is not
subject to suit on the grounds that Hart has alleged.
The trial
court did not err, therefore, when it dismissed Hart’s complaint.
Accordingly, we affirm the January 22, 1998, judgment of the
Grant Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
John F. Rampulla, III
Lexington, Kentucky
Stuart W. Cobb
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
6
Knapper v. Connick, 681 So. 2d 944, 947 (La. 1996) (citing Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d
579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949, 94 L. Ed. 1363, 70 S. Ct. 803 (1950)).
7
McCollum v. Garrett, n.2, (citing Dugger v. Off 2nd, Inc., Ky. App., 612 S.W.2d 756
(1981)).
8
McCollum v. Garrett, n.2 (citing Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 125 L. Ed. 2d
209, 113 S. Ct. 2606 (1993)).
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