CAROL FECK, EXECUTRIX ESTATE OF CHARLES E. FECK v. LEXINGTON FAYETTE URBAN COUNTY GOVERNMENT; SPECIAL FUND AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD,
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RENDERED: December 15, 2000; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-000522-WC
CAROL FECK,
EXECUTRIX ESTATE OF CHARLES E. FECK
v.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-88-13072
LEXINGTON FAYETTE URBAN COUNTY GOVERNMENT;
SPECIAL FUND AND WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD,
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BEFORE: BARBER, KNOPF, AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
BARBER, JUDGE: Carol Feck, executrix of the estate of
Charles Feck (Mrs. Feck) appeals from a Workers’
Compensation Board Opinion affirming the ALJ’s dismissal on
the ground that her late husband, Charles Feck, had not
proven an injurious exposure to asbestos.
We affirm.
Charles Feck was a firefighter for Lexington Fayette Urban
County Government (LFUCG), from 1959 until his retirement on
January 5, 1986.
Before that, he was a mechanic for
Greyhound from 1947 through 1959. Mrs. Feck filed a workers’
compensation claim on April 27, 1988, alleging that her
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husband had contracted mesothelioma from asbestos exposure at
Greyhound and LFUCG.
Charles Feck died on July 1, 1987.
The
claim against Greyhound was ultimately dismissed as untimely
filed under KRS 342.316.
In an Opinion entered July 12,
1999, the ALJ found that:
Dr. Frank testified during a second deposition on
October 12, 1998, at which time he said there was a
growing body of literature on the subject of
occupational exposure to asbestos. Based upon more
recent studies it was his opinion that Mr. Feck had
been occupationally exposed to asbestos as a fireman or
fire fighter. He agreed that he had no definitive
evidence of any asbestos exposure to Mr. Feck as a
fireman but in settings where asbestos would have
existed and where many other individuals doing the same
occupation get exposure and get the disease it is
reasonable to conclude that this occurred to Mr. Feck.
There would be no reason to think that Mr. Feck was
different from other mechanics or other fire fighters
and somehow miraculously escaped an occupational
exposure to asbestos.
Sanford W. Horstman, CIH, Ph.D., industrial hygienist .
. . stated that Mr. Feck’s opportunity for exposure to
asbestos as a fireman would have been while engaged in
overhaul or clean up of a site after a fire. It was
Dr. Horstman’s opinion that the vast majority of his
exposure probably came while working for Greyhound but
none-the-less his probable exposure to asbestos while
working as a fire fighter for the City of Lexington was
a contributing factor in causing his mesothelioma.
The ALJ concluded that “plaintiff went to great lengths
to establish that there well may have been occasions when Charles
Feck was exposed [to asbestos] as a firefighter but no proof was
presented as to the ‘conditions’ which ‘may’ have existed.
evidence herein presented falls short of the mark.”
The
The ALJ
explained that although Dr. Horstman stated that Charles Feck’s
probable exposure as a firefighter was a “contributing factor”;
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there was “no evidence presented that Mr. Feck was ever actually
exposed [while employed by LFUCG]. . . .”
Mrs. Feck petitioned for reconsideration, contending
that under Begley v. Mountain Top Inc., Ky., 968 S.W.2d 91
(1998), she had proven an injurious exposure.
The ALJ denied the
petition, finding Begley distinguishable upon its facts.
Feck appealed on behalf of her husband’s estate.
Mrs.
The Board
affirmed, because the evidence failed to prove any asbestos
exposure at LFUCG would have caused the disease independently of
any other cause if continued for an indefinite period.
This
appeal followed.
Mrs. Feck relies upon Begley, in support of her
argument on appeal.
We agree with the ALJ that Begley is
distinguishable on its facts.
underground.
Begley worked 20 years
After he was diagnosed with pneumoconiosis and had
filed a claim against a previous employer, Begley was hired by
Mountain Top.
He was laid off a month later.
claim to add Mountain Top as a defendant.
Begley amended his
Begley’s exposure to
coal dust was consistent throughout his mining career.
Mountain
Top did not contend that Begley’s exposure there was not
injurious.
At issue was the employer responsible for the payment
of benefits.
The Supreme Court held that:
The clear and unambiguous language of KRS
342.316(1)(a) and KRS 342.316(10) places
liability for the payment of compensation for
occupational disease on the employer in whose
employment the employee was last exposed to
the hazard of the occupational disease.
[citation omitted].
The exposure incurred
during a particular employment need not have
been the actual cause of the disease in order
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for a causal connection to be established.
Rather, all that is required is that the
worker present evidence which proves that the
type of exposure received during the subject
employment would have eventually resulted in
contraction of the disease, in other words,
that it was injurious. See KRS 342.0011(4)
(emphasis added).
Id. at p. 95.
Mrs. Feck submits that the case law is “somewhat
ambiguous” as to whether or not it must be proven that an
exposure “would have” resulted in the disease rather than the
exposure “could have” resulted in the disease.
We cannot agree.
Under the statutory scheme in effect at the time of Mr. Feck’s
alleged last exposure, injurious exposure is defined as one that
would, independently of any other cause whatsoever, produce or
cause the disease for which the claim is made.
now KRS 342.0011(4).
KRS 342.620(4),
Our Supreme Court discussed the evidence
necessary to prove an exposure (in the context of single vs. a
multiple exposure for apportioning liability between the employer
and Special Fund) in Island Creek Coal Co. v. Beale, Ky., 804
S.W.2d 1, 3 (1990):
There is some dispute as to whether the last
employer must show a previous "injurious
exposure," KRS 342.620(4), or merely an
exposure. . . . Evidence to sustain the issue
of exposure to hazards of disease must be of
substance and of consequence carrying the
quality of proof and having fitness to
produce conviction."
Rowe v. King-Darby
Coals, Inc., Ky., 463 S.W.2d 342, 344 (1971).
In Rowe the Court specifically addressed the
argument that KRS 342.316(10) (a) [then KRS
342.316 (13)(a)] requires a showing of an
"exposure" rather than an "injurious
exposure." The Court noted that an injurious
exposure is defined by statute as an exposure
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to an occupational hazard which would,
independently of any other cause whatsoever,
produce or cause the disease. KRS 342.620(4)
[now KRS 342.0011(4)] specifically makes
applicable that definition to KRS 342.316.
Regardless of the fact that the word
"injurious" is not included in KRS
342.316(10) (a) "no less showing of exposure
is contemplated by KRS 342.316(13)(a) [now
(10) (a)] because in each instance there is
required to be shown an exposure to the
hazard of a disease. [citation omitted]
Mrs. Feck also submits that the ALJ, as fact finder,
had to rely on expert testimony to determine causation; further,
that Dr. Frank was the only expert qualified to give such an
opinion. Thus, Mrs. Feck attempts to persuade us that evidence of
an injurious exposure at LFUCG was uncontradicted and binding
upon the ALJ.
Mrs. Feck’s reasoning ignores the fact that the
expert opinion was based upon an assumption of an exposure there
was no evidence presented that Mr. Feck was ever actually exposed
to asbestos fibers while employed by the LFUCG.
In Stovall v. Mullen, Ky. App., 674 S.W.2d 526 (1984),
the court reversed a determination that the claimant had had an
injurious exposure to the hazard of silicosis while working at a
brickyard, despite testimony from two physicians that the
claimant’s exposure to sand and silica dusts could have
contributed to his condition.
The court held that there was no
evidence in the record to support the assumption that the
claimant was so exposed.
The ALJ, as fact-finder, has the sole authority to determine any
inferences to be drawn from the evidence.
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Paramount Foods, Inc.
v. Burkhardt, Ky., 695 S.W.2d 418 (1985).
Here, the ALJ was not
persuaded that the evidence was sufficient to establish an
injurious exposure.
Mrs. Feck notes that there was no proof her
husband was not exposed to asbestos while working at LFCUG;
however, no evidence is required to support a negative finding.
Workman v. Wesley Manor, Ky., 462 S.W.2d 898 (1971).
The standard of review where the ALJ finds against the
party with the burden of proof is whether the evidence would have
compelled a contrary finding.
Wolf Creek Collieries v. Crum,
Ky. App., 673 S.W.2d 735 (1984).
“The WCB is suppose to decide
whether the evidence is sufficient to support a particular
finding made by the ALJ, or whether such evidence as there was
before the ALJ should be viewed as uncontradicted and compelling
a different result. These are judgment calls.
No purpose is
served by second-guessing such judgment calls,. . . .”
Baptist v. Kelly, Ky., 827 S.W.2d 685, 687 (1992).
Western
The Opinion
of the Workers’ Compensation Board is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Robert E. Reeves
Lexington, Kentucky
Barbara A. Kriz
Lexington, Kentucky
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