MARRIOTT'S GRIFFIN GATE RESORT V. KIMBERLY WORKMAN; HON. J. LANDON OVERFIELD, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED: JULY 14, 2000; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-000302-WC
MARRIOTT'S GRIFFIN GATE RESORT
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-94-08229
v.
KIMBERLY WORKMAN;
HON. J. LANDON OVERFIELD,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, BUCKINGHAM, AND MILLER, JUDGES.
MILLER, JUDGE:
Marriott's Griffin Gate Resort asks us to review
a decision of the Workers' Compensation Board (board) rendered
December 30, 1999.
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 342.290.
We
affirm.
Kimberly Workman suffered a work-related injury to her
lower back on January 25, 1994, while in the employ of Marriott.
She filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits under KRS
Chapter 342.
The administrative law judge (ALJ) awarded Workman
temporary total disability (TTD) benefits for the periods January
28, 1994, through March 3, 1994, and September 1, 1994, through
October 14, 1998.
Workman was also awarded benefits based upon a
finding she was 75% permanently and partially occupationally
disabled.
Marriott appealed to the board, which, in turn,
affirmed the ALJ.
This appeal followed.
Marriott seems to argue that Workman was not entitled
to TTD benefits from September 1, 1994, through June 19, 1996, as
she underwent no medical treatment during such period.
In other
words, it contends that since there was no medical treatment,
there was no disability.
We ascribe no merit to this contention.
Entitlement to TTD benefits is an issue of fact.
W.L. Harper
Construction Co. V. Baker, Ky. App., 858 S.W.2d 202 (1993).
It
is payable until medical evidence establishes the recovery
process is over or until the claimant reaches maximum medical
improvement (MMI).
Id.
We do not view either of these
conditions as requiring medical treatment during the period of
TTD.
We now turn to the issue of whether the ALJ’s finding
of TTD during the aforementioned period was based on substantial
evidence.
See Western Baptist Hospital v. Kelly, Ky., 827 S.W.2d
685 (1992).
Substantial evidence is that evidence having the
fitness to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable persons.
Smyzer v. B. F. Goodrich Chemical Company, Ky., 474 S.W.2d 367
(1971).
Workman testified that after the January, 1994, lower-
back injury she returned to work for Marriott in March or April
of 1994.
She continued to work until August 31, 1994, when her
lower-back problems caused her to quit.
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Workman testified that
between August 31, 1994, and December 4, 1996 she made a few
unsuccessful attempts to work for other employers.
In each case,
her lower-back problems caused her to quit within one week.
Workman’s testimony alone is sufficient to carry the burden of
proof in a workers' compensation claim.
Curling, Ky., 451 S.W.2d 610 (1970).
Ruby Construction Co. v.
Nevertheless, additional
support is found in Dr. John W. Gilbert’s testimony that Workman
did not reach MMI until October 14, 1998.
Upon the whole, we
believe there exists substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s
decision that TTD benefits were payable for the period between
September 1, 1994, and June 19, 1996.
board erred.
Hence, we cannot say the
See Western Baptist Hospital, 827 S.W.2d 685.
For the foregoing reasons, the opinion of the Workers'
Compensation Board is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, KIMBERLY
WORKMAN:
Eric R. Collis
Louisville, Kentucky
Rickey D. Bailey
Manchester, Kentucky
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