GARY MASTERSON; ROSZELLE MOORE; ANN WILSON; GENE SNAWDER; DAVID DOBBS; CLIFFORD AND CLARA TOLES; DAN GIBSON; JUNE FIELDS; AND CONCERNED CITIZENS UNITED, INC., NOT FOR PROFIT CORPORATION v. CITY OF WEST POINT
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RENDERED:
December 22, 2000; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
MODIFIED: April 27, 2001; 10:00 a.m.
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-000262-MR
GARY MASTERSON; ROSZELLE MOORE;
ANN WILSON; GENE SNAWDER;
DAVID DOBBS; CLIFFORD AND
CLARA TOLES; DAN GIBSON;
JUNE FIELDS; AND
CONCERNED CITIZENS UNITED,
INC., NOT FOR PROFIT
CORPORATION
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE HUGH ROARK, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CI-01242
v.
CITY OF WEST POINT
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, MCANULTY AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE.
Gary Masterson, Roszella Moore, Ann Wilson,
Gene Snawder, David Dobbs, Clifford and Clara Toles, Dan Gibson,
June Fields, and Concerned Citizens United, Inc. (collectively
the Appellants) appeal from orders of the Hardin Circuit Court
entered November 16, 1999, and December 29, 1999, which dismissed
their complaint against the City of West Point (the City).
affirm.
We
At all times relevant hereto, the City was involved in
litigation with Rogers Group, Inc., Holloway & Son Construction,
Inc., over the construction and operation of a rock quarry within
city limits.
In an effort to resolve the dispute, the City began
investigating the possibility of settlement.
To that end, a
regularly scheduled meeting of the West Point City Council (the
City Council) was held in a local school gymnasium to better
allow members of the public to express their concerns regarding
settlement.
It appears that informal notice was given that the City
Council would consider a proposed settlement agreement at its
regularly scheduled business meeting on June 14, 1999 (the June
meeting).
On June 11, 1999, Tom Fitzgerald, Director of Kentucky
Resources Council, Inc., wrote to Mayor Larry Hall (Mayor Hall)
and the City Council and requested that the June meeting “be
moved to a larger meeting room, in order to accommodate the many
individuals who have expressed an interest in the proposed
settlement.”
Fitzgerald further expressed his opinion that
denial of the request to move the June meeting would result in
violation of provisions of Kentucky’s Open Meetings Act (KRS 61.
805 et seq.)(the Open Meetings Act).
On the same date, Mayor
Hall received a petition signed by 29 individuals requesting
relocation of the June meeting to the school gymnasium.
Despite requests to move the location of the June
meeting, it was held at its usual room in City Hall.
As a
result, everyone who sought to attend the meeting could not fit
into the meeting room, and those who could not get into the room
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were unable to speak.
Additionally, not everyone in the meeting
room was permitted to speak, and those who did speak were only
given a certain amount of time in which to express their views on
the proposed settlement.
The City Council voted to approve the
proposed settlement at the June meeting, and further ratified the
actions taken at the June meeting at its regular meeting on
September 13, 1999.
On June 25, 1999, counsel for the Appellants wrote to
Mayor Hall pursuant to KRS 61.8461 “to complain that the . . .
City Council acted in a manner that violates the requirements of
Kentucky’s Open Meeting statutes in the conduct of the City
Council meeting on June 14, 1999,” and to ask for a declaration
that the action taken during the June meeting was void.
Counsel
for the City responded by letter dated June 29, 1999, and stated
his belief that the June meeting was “entirely proper.”
Pursuant
to KRS 61.848(2), the Appellants had sixty days from the date of
receipt of the City’s written response to file suit.
It appears
that counsel for the Appellants received the City’s response on
June 30, 1999.
On August 24, 1999, the Appellants filed a “complaint
and petition for declaration of rights” in which they alleged
jurisdiction “pursuant to KRS 418.040 and KRS 418.045, where
Plaintiffs seek a declaration of rights against the City[.]” The
1
Under KRS 61.846(1), a person complaining of violations of
the Open Meetings Act “shall submit a written complaint to the
presiding officer of the public agency suspected of the
violation” which states the basis of the complaint. The public
agency then has three days after receipt of the written complaint
to decide whether to remedy the alleged violation and respond in
writing to the person making the complaint.
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City was the only named defendant, and the complaint was served
on Mayor Hall.
In the complaint, the Appellants set forth the
requests to move the location of the June meeting and alleged:
14. The Mayor and the City Council failed
and refused to conduct the meeting in a
meeting room large enough to accommodate
those citizens who sought to attend and
observe and failed to make arrangements to
broadcast the meeting to other locations to
permit those who could not get into the room
a reasonable opportunity to hear the
proceedings and failed to afford those
present a fair and reasonable opportunity to
address the City Council.
15. The above described actions and failures
to act on June 14, 1999, were intended to and
did in fact violate the letter and the
purpose of the Kentucky Open Meetings Act.
16. The above described actions and failures
to act on June 14, 1999, were preceded by
other similar knowing violations of the
Kentucky Open Meetings Act and have been
followed by additional knowing violations of
the Kentucky Open Meetings Act, including the
pattern of holding City Council meetings at
irregular and unpredictable times, the
failure to give proper public notice of City
Council meetings that are called
specifically, regular and consistent
violations of the executive session
requirements, on one occasion the removal of
all chairs available to the public from the
meeting room, on another occasion locking one
of the doors to the meeting room while the
meeting was in progress, and on another
occasion the Mayor attempted to require that
only those people who took a number from him
would be allowed in the meeting room to
observe the City Council. These and other
similar knowing and purposeful actions were
done in violation of the Kentucky Open
Meetings Act, KRS 61.800-850.
The Appellants requested, among other relief, that the trial
court:
a. Enter a declaratory judgment that the
actions of the City Council of West Point on
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June 14, 1999, violated the Open Meetings
Act;
b. Enter a declaratory judgment that the
actions of the City Council before and since
the June 14, 1999 [sic] establish a pattern
of knowing and willful violations of that
Act; [and]
c. Enter a judgment declaring the action of
the City Council of West Point on June 14,
1999 to be null and void[.]
On September 14, 1999, the City filed a motion to
dismiss pursuant to CR 12 in which it maintained that dismissal
was proper because the Appellants failed “to sue the relevant
public agency - the West Point City Council - in this statutory
action in which the 60 day limitation period has expired, thus
leaving no opportunity to amend the Complaint.”
Specifically,
the City maintained:
Since the June 14, 1999, public meeting
complained of was a meeting of the West Point
City Council, and since Plaintiffs failed to
sue the West Point City Council in the sixty
day period expressly set forth in KRS 61.848
. . . the Hardin Circuit Court lacks
jurisdiction to proceed.
The City also argued that (1) the Appellants’ requested remedy
was unavailable based on the allegations of the Complaint; (2)
Concerned Citizens United, Inc., (the Corporation) lacked
standing to maintain its claims; and (3) the complaint is moot
because the actions taken in the June meeting were ratified
during the City Council’s meeting of September 13, 1999.
In
their response, the Appellants argued that the City was the
proper party defendant because the decision to hold a city
council meeting in a different location is the Mayor’s to make
and that the City Council “has little ability or power to control
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the arrangements made to conduct city council meetings, other
than to adopt a resolution to direct the mayor concerning the
conduct of future meetings.”
The Appellants also stated that
they “had the right to sue the West Point City Council if
Plaintiffs determine that it was the City Council that acted or
failed to act to afford the Plaintiffs their rights[.]”
In an order entered November 16, 1999 (the November
order), the trial court granted the City’s motion to dismiss.
so ruling, the trial court stated:
KRS 61.848 enables any person to bring a
court challenge to the validity of a council
meeting. It is set out as follows:
(1) The Circuit Court of the
county where the public agency has
its principal place of business or
where the alleged violation
occurred shall have jurisdiction to
enforce the provisions of KRS
61.805 to 61.850, as they pertain
to that public agency, by
injunction or other appropriate
order on application of any person.
The definition of “public agency” in KRS
61.805(2)(c) includes a city council. This
framework forms the basis of the City’s
argument that Plaintiffs named the wrong
party in their suit. Furthermore, a suit
against the City is not the same as a suit
against the city council. See, City of
Danville v. Wilson, Ky., 394 S.W.2d 583
(1965); City of Madisonville v. Sisk, Ky.
App., 783 S.W.2d 885 (1990).
Plaintiffs counter that the City Council did
not violate the Open Meetings Act, the Mayor
did. The Mayor had been requested to move
the meeting to a larger venue because of the
high public interest in the proposed
settlement. Plaintiffs claim that the
Mayor’s refusal to do so violated KRS 61.840,
which in relevant part provides that “All
agencies shall provide meeting room
conditions which insofar as is feasible allow
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In
effective public observation of the public
meetings.” Since it is the Mayor who the
Plaintiffs claim violated the Act, the City
is the proper party to this suit.
The Plaintiffs claim that the City, through
the Mayor, was the wrongdoer here, not the
City Council. The City argues that the
statute makes the City Council the proper
defendant. There is no Kentucky case law
dealing with this issue under the Kentucky
Open Meetings Act, and the statute itself is
not crystal clear. The Court finds that the
City Council is the proper defendant.
The trial court also dismissed the Corporation, finding that it
lacked standing.
The trial court ended the November order by
observing:
The Court is very familiar with the City of
West Point. West Point is a small town
hemmed in by the Ohio River, Salt River, the
boundaries of the Fort Knox Military
Reservation, and Muldraugh Hill. It is a
small town and with most small towns everyone
knows each other and everyone’s business.
The controversy over the operation of a rock
quarry had gone on for many months. The
debate was well publicized by the news media.
This Court is satisfied that the Mayor and
City Council knew everyone who was for it and
knew everyone who was against it. As set
forth in the letter of June 11, 1999 of the
Kentucky Resources Council, Inc. Tom
Fitzgerald, the City Council held its prior
meeting in the school gym where all the
residents had the opportunity to observe and
participate.
The follow up meeting after the meeting in
the school gym was a regular meeting in the
City Council Chambers at City Hall. As set
forth in his complaint, the Plaintiff in this
action, Gary Masterson, President of the now
formed Concerned Citizens United, Inc., was
present and made his presentation to the City
Council as did other residents of West Point.
The complaint alleges that the City Council
meeting on June 14, 1999 was part of a
consistent pattern of knowing violations of
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the Kentucky Open Meetings Act. However, the
complaint ignores the meeting held in the
school gym as set forth in the letter of Tom
Fitzgerald. It appears to this Court that
the residents of the City of West Point were
given every opportunity by the City Council
to express their opinions as to the rock
quarry at the meeting at the school gym and
later at the regular City Council meeting at
City Hall.
In summary, the Court finds that the City
Council would be the appropriate defendant
and the corporation . . . has no standing to
bring this action. The City Council complied
with the Kentucky Open Meetings Act by
holding its meeting prior to the June 14
meeting at the school gym to accommodate any
and all residents interested in the rock
quarry issue. The President of [the
Corporation] spoke for the group at the June
14 meeting. The Court does not find a
violation of the Open Meetings Act. Any
violation, if such, was removed by the City
Council ratifying its action on September 13,
1999, after the filing of this law suit[.]
Following entry of the November order, the Appellants
filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate pursuant to CR 59,
arguing that the trial court considered matters outside the
pleadings and then erred by failing to treat the City’s motion as
one for summary judgment under CR 56 pursuant to CR 12.03.
In an
order entered December 29, 1999 (the December order), the trial
court stated:
Civil Rule 12.02(f) allows a case to be
dismissed on motion for failure to state a
claim on which relief can be granted. In its
prior order of November 16, 1999, the Court
found that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted by failing
to name the proper party as Defendant. The
Court ruled that under KRS 61.848(1), the
City Council was the proper Defendant in this
action. The Court made this ruling because
the Plaintiffs complained that the City
Council’s actions violated the Kentucky Open
Meetings Act, and the Plaintiffs sought
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relief against the City Council. The Court
sees no reason to alter its interpretation of
the statute.
The Plaintiffs’ failure to name the West
Point City Council as Defendant is a
sufficient ground for the Court to grant the
motion to dismiss on the pleadings.
This appeal followed.
The Appellants maintain that the trial court erred in
dismissing their complaint on the ground that they failed to name
the City Council as a defendant.
The Appellants argued that they
were not required to include the City Council as a defendant
because “public agency” as defined for purposes of the Open
Meetings Act includes “[e]very county and city governing body,
council, school district board, special district board, and
municipal corporation.”
KRS 61.805(2)(c).
Under the Appellants’
reasoning, the inclusion of municipal corporations in the
definition of “public agency” should allow their claim to proceed
despite the fact that they failed to include the City Council as
a party defendant.
We disagree.
Under KRS 61.848(1), circuit courts are given
“jurisdiction to enforce the provisions of [the Open Meetings
Act], as they pertain to that public agency, by injunction or
appropriate order[.]” Although the Appellants are correct in
arguing that the definition of “public agency” for purposes of
the Open Meetings Act includes cities as well as city councils,
they lose sight of the fact that the entity they seek to charge
with wrongdoing under the terms of their complaint is the City
Council, not the City.
It is this flaw which requires dismissal
of the Appellants’ complaint.
It has been recognized that a suit
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against a city council is not the same as a suit against a city.
City of Danville v. Wilson, Ky., 395 S.W.2d 583, 585 (1965).
We
see no reason to fail to recognize the converse of that holding,
and find that a suit against a city is not the same as a suit
against a city council.
The Appellants’ citation to E.W. Scripps Company v.
City of Maysville, Ky. App., 790 S.W.2d 450 (1990), Blair v. City
of Winchester, Ky.App., 743 S.W.2d 28 (1987); and Reed v. City of
Richmond, Ky.App., 582 S.W.2d 651 (1979) in support of their
argument that the City is the proper defendant to their complaint
is misguided.
While a review of those cases indicates that the
cases were allowed to proceed despite the fact that the cities
were the named defendants, we agree with the City that “[a] close
examination of these opinions shows no evidence that the proper
parties issue was raised or that the appellate courts ruled on
the issue of whether the respective legislative body was the
proper party.
As a result, they do not support reversal.”
Alternatively, we agree with the City that the trial
court’s dismissal of the Appellants’ complaint is also proper
under statutes pertaining to declaratory judgments.
Under KRS
418.075, “all persons shall be made parties who have or claim any
interest which would be affected by the declaration [of rights],
and no declaration shall prejudice the rights of persons not
parties to the proceeding.”
Once again, we note that the
Appellants claimed that the City Council, not the City, violated
the Open Meetings Act but failed to include it as a defendant.
Since the City Council was not named as a defendant, “[t]he
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Circuit Court’s judgment could not be binding upon it.”
Eitel v.
John N. Norton Memorial Infirmary, Ky., 441 S.W.2d 438 (1969).
The Appellants maintain that the trial court erred in
deciding the City’s CR 12 motion to dismiss on the pleadings by
considering evidence outside the pleadings without treating the
motion as one for summary judgment under CR 56, and by making
findings on the merits of their claims.
Specifically, the
Appellants argue that the trial court erred by:
accepting as true the unproven assertions
made in the motion to dismiss, relying on his
own knowledge to find certain facts not in
evidence and contrary to the Appellants [sic]
verified complaint, making findings regarding
a meeting in the “school gym” that were
clearly wrong, yet leaving the finding
unchanged when confronted with verified
evidence of the error, and finding the
ultimate fact in an Open Meetings Act claim
by finding, in effect, that in this small
town, everybody already knew what everybody
was going to say.
The trial court specifically found in its December
order that the Appellants’ failure to include the City Council as
a named defendant “is a sufficient ground for the Court to grant
the motion to dismiss on the pleadings.”
It is apparent that the
trial court only considered the complaint itself in ruling on
this issue.
While the trial court may have alluded to facts
outside the pleading in dicta and while the trial court may have
improperly ruled that the meeting was not violative of the Open
Meetings Act in ruling on the City’s CR 12 motion, the December
order makes it clear that it based its decision only on the
Appellants’ failure to name the City Council as a defendant.
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Having considered the parties’ arguments on appeal, the
orders of the Hardin Circuit Court are affirmed.2
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANTS:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE:
W. Henry Graddy, IV
Midway, KY
Thomas E. Cooper
Elizabethtown, KY
2
Because we have affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the
entirety of the Appellants’ complaint, we need not address the
Appellants’ arguments pertaining to the dismissal of the
Corporation.
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