WALKER MECHANICAL v. STEVEN G. BRAY; KEVIN T. PAVELONIS, D.C.; HON. DONNA H. TERRY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED:
DECEMBER 22, 2000; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2000-CA-000208-WC
WALKER MECHANICAL
v.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-98-92236
STEVEN G. BRAY; KEVIN T. PAVELONIS, D.C.;
HON. DONNA H. TERRY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
DYCHE, KNOPF AND McANULTY, JUDGES.
McANULTY, JUDGE: In this petition for review of a decision of the
Workers’ Compensation Board (“Board”) Walker Mechanical asserts
that the Board erred in affirming the opinion and award of the
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”).
Specifically, Appellant
asserts that the ALJ’s finding of a five (5) percent impairment
rating is not supported by the evidence.
In addition, Appellant
contends that the ALJ erred in concluding that the benefit amount
should be enhanced by the 1.5 multiplier in KRS 342.730(1)(c)(1).
Instead, it contends that the ALJ should have applied the .5
modifier in KRS 342.730 (1)(c)(2).
Steven Bray worked as an apprentice plumber for Walker
Mechanical.
On February 24, 1998, he injured his back when a
wall of dirt collapsed in the trench in which he was working and
buried him to his waist.
He first visited Dr. Podoll and then
changed to Dr. Ballard at his supervisor’s suggestion.
Bray
eventually resigned his position with Walker Mechanical and found
other work which he stated is less physically demanding.
The ALJ relied on the independent medical examination
report from Dr. Hurt in which he assessed a 5% impairment rating.
The ALJ then concluded that Bray was entitled to a 1.5
enhancement of the permanent partial disability award under KRS
342.730(1)(c)(1) due to his lack of physical capacity to return
to the type of work performed at the time of injury.
Walker
Mechanical filed a petition for reconsideration of these
determinations and also raised the issue that the ALJ should have
invoked the .5 modifier because Bray earned a greater weekly wage
with his new employer. The ALJ declined to reconsider.
Walker
Mechanical appealed these issues and the Board affirmed.
On appeal to this Court, Walker Mechanical presents two
issues for review.
First, it asserts that the ALJ’s finding of a
5% impairment rating is not supported by substantial evidence.
Second, it contends that the ALJ erred in applying the 1.5
multiplier and that the evidence mandates a .5 modifier instead.
The Board correctly recognized that the question before
them was whether the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial
evidence.
(1984).
Wolf Creek Colleries v. Crum, Ky. App., 673 S.W.2d 735
The Supreme Court defines substantial evidence as
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evidence of relevant consequence, having the fitness to induce
conviction in the minds of reasonable people.
Francis, Ky., 708 S.W.2d 641 (1986).
Special Fund v.
As long as any evidence of
substance supports the ALJ’s findings, the Board must affirm.
Id.
Walker Mechanical argues that the ALJ’s finding of 5%
impairment is not supported by any evidence whatsoever.
argument is simply incorrect.
This
In the report from the independent
medical examination, Dr. Hurt clearly states:
Mr. Bray does have an impairment. I would
rate his impairment at 5 percent to the whole
person. This is using the AMA Guidelines
Fourth Edition, Table 72 Page 110.
While Dr. Hurt’s report continues, finding that 40% of the
impairment is attributable to a pre-existing condition, the ALJ
is under no duty to accept all the conclusions of Dr. Hurt merely
because she accepts one of them.
Rather, as fact-finder she may
reject any testimony and believe or disbelieve various parts of
the evidence, regardless of whether it comes from the same
witness.
Caudill v. Maloney’s Discount Stores, Ky., 560 S.W.2d
15, 16 (1977).
The ALJ outlined her reasons for the finding that
Bray’s condition was a separate injury and not an exacerbation of
the previous injury.
The Board did not err in affirming on this
issue.
In regards to the issue of whether the ALJ erred in
applying the 1.5 multiplier we again turn to the evidence.
The
ALJ acknowledged the parties stipulation that Bray’s average
weekly wage had been $402.98.
She then relied on testimony that
Bray had asked Dr. Ballard to release him to return to full duty
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because there was no light duty work available.
The ALJ also
noted that Bray felt his position with Walker Mechanical was too
physically demanding, therefore he sought lighter work.
Finally,
the ALJ indicated that Bray’s physical ability was best detailed
in the restriction noted by Dr. Hurt.
Accordingly, the ALJ
determined that the award should be multiplied by 1.5 as required
in KRS 342.730(1)(c)(1).
Although there was conflicting evidence
on this matter, the ALJ is free to choose what evidence to
believe.
Pruitt v. Bugg Brothers, Ky., 547 S.W.2d 123 (1977). We
therefore affirm on this issue.
We now turn to the remaining question, whether the
Board correctly determined that Walker Mechanical is not entitled
to the .5 reduction for weeks in which Bray’s wage exceeds his
average weekly wage at Walker Mechanical.
We first note that
Bray testified that his new employer compensates him at the rate
of $9.09 per hour, less than his hourly wage at Walker Mechanic.
However, the records of his weekly earnings with the new employer
reveal that in some weeks when he works overtime, he receives
compensation in excess of the average weekly wage at Walker
Mechanical.
The pertinent part of KRS 342.730(1)(c)(2) provides as
follows:
If an employee returns to work at a weekly
wage equal to or greater than the average
weekly wage at the time of injury, the weekly
benefit for permanent partial disability
otherwise payable under paragraph (b) of this
subsection shall be reduced by one-half (1/2)
for each week during which that employment is
sustained. During any period of cessation of
that employment, temporary or permanent, for
any reason, with or without cause, payment of
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weekly benefits for permanent partial
disability during the period of cessation
shall be restored to the rate prescribed in
paragraph (b) of this subsection.
The Board concluded that in deciding not to invoke the .5
modifier, the ALJ properly relied on Bray’s testimony that he
earned less per hour at his new job and did not frequently work
overtime.
The Board continued its analysis of KRS
342.730(1)(c)(2), rationalizing that the legislature did not
intend to require a weekly accounting and determination of
whether the wage each week exceeds the pre-injury average weekly
wage.
We can find no error in the Board’s decision that the
ALJ did not err on this issue.
The ALJ accepted Bray’s testimony
that he was earning less at his new job.
Although Walker
Mechanical presented conflicting evidence, the ALJ is entitled to
choose which evidence to believe. Pruitt v. Bugg Brothers, supra.
Because we believe that the Board correctly determined that the
ALJ’s decision not to invoke the modifier was supported by
substantial evidence, the inquiry ends here.
The ALJ did not err
in failing to apply the modifier, therefore we do not delve into
the specifics of how the modifier is to be applied.
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Workers’
Compensation Board is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Timothy P. O’Mara
Middleton & Reutlinger
Louisville, KY
Ched Jennings
Louisville, KY
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