CONSOL OF KENTUCKY, INC. v. ZACHARY D. AKERS; HON. DONALD G. SMITH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND, WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED: DECEMBER 22, 2000; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-003030-WC
CONSOL OF KENTUCKY, INC.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-97-02162
v.
ZACHARY D. AKERS;
HON. DONALD G. SMITH,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND,
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART,
AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, GUIDUGLI, AND HUDDLESTON, JUDGES.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE:
In its petition for review of a decision of
the Workers' Compensation Board, Consol of Kentucky, Inc.,
alleges the Board erred in affirming the administrative law
judge's (ALJ) determination that the 1996 amendments to KRS1
342.315 and KRS 342.732(1)(a) were inapplicable to Zachary Akers'
claim for retraining incentive benefits (RIB).
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Kentucky Revised Statutes.
In accordance
with the directives of Magic Coal Co. v. Fox, Ky., 19 S.W.3d 88
(2000), we reverse in part and remand.
Akers filed an application for RIB on October 2, 1997.
His last day of exposure to the hazards of pneumoconiosis was
March 29, 1994.
Before the ALJ, Akers presented the x-ray
interpretation of Dr. John Myers which stated that a film taken
on March 26, 1997, evidenced coal workers' pneumoconiosis
category 1/0.
Conversely, Consol presented the opinions of Drs. James
Lockey and T.B. Westerfield, both of whom evaluated films dated
January 3, 1995, and March 26, 1997, as completely negative for
pneumoconiosis.
Additionally, Dr. Lockey performed a complete
pulmonary evaluation of Akers and interpreted his December 12,
1997, x-ray as normal, category 0/0.
Pursuant to KRS 342.315, Dr. Betty Joyce evaluated
Akers.
She interpreted his November 6, 1997, x-ray as completely
negative for coal workers' pneumoconiosis and, therefore, did not
perform any additional tests.
Ultimately, the ALJ determined that the 1996 amendments
to KRS 342.315 were not remedial in nature thus refusing to
afford "presumptive weight" or preferential treatment to the
opinion of Dr. Joyce as the university evaluator.
Likewise, the
ALJ held that the 1996 amendments to KRS 342.732(1)(a) were not
remedial in nature and, therefore, not applicable to Akers' case.
The Board affirmed the ALJ's ruling that neither the presumptive
weight statute nor the 1996 amendments to KRS 342.732(1)(a) were
retroactive to Akers' claim.
The Board reasoned that although
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Akers' claim was filed on October 2, 1997, the date of last
exposure was March 29, 1994, that is, prior to the 1996
amendments.
On appeal, our duty is to determine whether “the Board
has overlooked or misconstrued controlling statutes or precedent,
or committed an error in assessing the evidence so flagrant as to
cause gross injustice.”
Western Baptist Hospital v. Kelly, Ky.,
827 S.W.2d 685, 687-88 (1992).
Our supreme court's recent
decision in the Magic Coal case is dispositive of the issue
concerning the application of KRS 342.315, hence we cite directly
thereto:
[T]he amendments to KRS 342.315 which became
effective on December 12, 1996, apply to all
claims pending before the fact-finder on or
after that date. KRS 342.315(2) creates a
rebuttable presumption which is governed by
KRE 301 and, therefore, does not shift the
burden of persuasion. Pursuant to KRS
342.315(2), the clinical findings and
opinions of the university evaluator
constitute substantial evidence of the
worker's medical condition which may not be
disregarded by the fact-finder unless it is
rebutted. Where the clinical findings and
opinions of the university evaluator are
rebutted, KRS 342.315(2) does not restrict
the authority of the fact-finder to weigh the
conflicting medical evidence. In instances
where a fact-finder chooses to disregard the
testimony of the university evaluator, a
reasonable basis for doing so must be
specifically stated.
Magic Coal, 19 S.W.3d at 97 (emphasis added).
Consol’s second argument is that the ALJ and the Board
erred in failing to retroactively apply the 1996 amendments to
KRS 342.732(1)(a).
If the amendments to the statute are applied
retroactively, then Akers would not be entitled to relief since
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the only physician to diagnosis pneumoconiosis diagnosed only
category 1/0.
See KRS 342.732(1)(a).
We agree with the Board that, because the amendment of
the statute impacted a vested right to benefits, then the law on
the date of the injury rather than the law on the date the claim
was filed is applicable.
Maggard v. International Harvester Co.,
Ky., 508 S.W.2d 777, 783 (1974); Breeding v. Colonial Coal Co.,
Ky., 975 S.W.2d 914, 916 (1998).
Therefore, the Board’s opinion is affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE, CONCURS.
HUDDLESTON, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR ZACHARY D. AKERS:
Natalie D. Brown
Lexington, Kentucky
Thomas G. Polites
Lexington, Kentucky
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