JAMES CRESSWELL V. SANDVIK SEAMCO COMPANY; SPECIAL FUND; HON. VONNELL C. TINGLE, ARBITRATOR; HON. THOMAS NANNEY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED: JUNE 30, 2000; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-003026-WC
JAMES CRESSWELL
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-93-47304
v.
SANDVIK SEAMCO COMPANY; SPECIAL FUND;
HON. VONNELL C. TINGLE, ARBITRATOR;
HON. THOMAS NANNEY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE;
AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, BUCKINGHAM, AND MILLER, JUDGES.
MILLER, JUDGE:
James Cresswell appeals from an Opinion of the
Workers’ Compensation Board rendered November 12, 1999.
Revised Statutes (KRS) 342.290.
Kentucky
We affirm.
In June, 1993, Cresswell suffered a work-related injury
to his lower back.
In October, 1993, he suffered another work-
related injury to his neck.
Sandvik Seamco Company.
On both occasions he was employed by
In February 1994, Cresswell filed a Form
101 to initiate a claim seeking income benefits under the
Kentucky Workers’ Compensation Act.
KRS Chapter 342.
Said claim
was based upon the aforementioned injuries.
On November 3, 1995,
the administrative law judge (ALJ) rendered an Opinion and Award
holding Cresswell failed to give due and timely notice of the
June injury.
KRS 342.185(1).
As to the October injury, however,
the ALJ awarded Cresswell benefits based upon a 40% occupational
disability.
In June 1996, Sandvik filed a motion to reopen in order
to challenge certain medical bills submitted by Cresswell.
On
July 19, 1996, Cresswell, in turn, filed a motion to reopen based
upon a worsening of his condition -- namely, the onset of a
psychiatric problem.
On September 6, 1996, the Chief ALJ granted
Sandvik’s motion to reopen and denied Cresswell’s motion to
reopen stating he failed to present a prima facie case of a
change in occupational disability.
order.1
Cresswell appealed the
On November 6, 1996, Cresswell filed a second Form 101
asserting a claim for psychiatric problems arising from the
October 1993 injury.
On January 17, 1997, Cresswell filed
another motion to reopen claiming a worsening of his condition
based upon psychiatric problems.
On September 24, 1998, the ALJ
rendered an opinion in which he stated, in relevant part, as
follows:
After careful review, I find that there is no
legal basis for preventing the plaintiff from
filing a new Form 101 from a procedural
standpoint. The new Form 101 could not be
acted upon during the pendency of the appeal
but essentially was held in abeyance until
the appeal was final. Nevertheless, having
found that the plaintiff was entitled to file
1
The Court of Appeals ultimately affirmed the circuit
court’s order.
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the second Form 101, it is not necessary to
address the propriety of the January 1997
Motion to Reopen. . . .
. . . It is my finding that the
plaintiff had sufficient knowledge of the
existence of the psychiatric condition at the
time of the original Hearing, and that the
psychiatric claim should have been litigated
with plaintiff’s neck injury. In reaching
this conclusion, I rely upon the case of
Slone v. Jason Coal Company, Ky., 902 S.W.2d
820 (1995).
. . . .
. . . It is further ORDERED that plaintiff’s claim for
impairment due to a psychiatric condition is
OVERRULED. . . . (Emphases added.)
No appeal was taken from the September 24, 1998,
Opinion.
On November 30, 1998, Cresswell filed a motion to set a
proofing schedule for his psychiatric claim or to remand the
claim to the commissioner for reassignment to a different ALJ.
The motion, heard by an arbitrator in Frankfort, was overruled on
the basis that the psychiatric claim had been fully and
completely litigated as all issues were disposed of in the
September 24, 1998, Opinion.
Cresswell then filed a request for
a de novo review by an ALJ of the order overruling his request to
set a proofing schedule.
Same was denied.
Cresswell appealed
that decision to the board, which, in turn, affirmed.
This
appeal followed.
Generally, Cresswell argues that it was error to deny
his motion for a proofing schedule on his psychiatric claim.
Specifically, he alleges that the September 24, 1998, order only
disposed of the January 1997 motion to reopen but did not dispose
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of his psychiatric claim.
claim should proceed.
Hence, he asserts, the psychiatric
We disagree.
The language of the September 24, 1998, order is clear
and unambiguous.
Therein, the ALJ specifically concluded that
Cresswell’s psychiatric claim was properly filed and, therefore,
the “propriety” of the January, 1997, motion to reopen was moot.
The ALJ thereupon proceeded to overrule Cresswell’s psychiatric
“claim” on the merits.
we deem it final.
As no appeal was taken from this order,
We agree with the arbitrator who held, in
part, the following:
[Cresswell’s psychiatric] claim under the
second Form 101 has been fully and completely
litigated; and all parties were afforded the
opportunity to present evidence in support of
their respective positions; [and,] that all
issues were addressed in the Opinion dated
September 24, 1998.
We note the board affirmed the ALJ because it believed
Cresswell did not timely file the second Form 101 wherein he
asserted the psychiatric claim.
We shall not address that issue
as we affirm for the reasons stated herein.
See Daily v. Kelly,
304 Ky. 229, 200 S.W.2d 114 (1947).
For the foregoing reasons, the Opinion of the Workers’
Compensation Board is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, SPECIAL
FUND:
Wayne C. Daub
Louisville, Kentucky
Joel D. Zakem
Frankfort, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, SANDVIK
SEAMCO COMPANY:
Robert W. Dickey
Louisville, Kentucky
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