GREGORY N. SCHABELL v. LEVI STRAUSS & COMPANY; MICHELLE PRUITT; ROBERT L. WHITAKER, DIRECTOR OF SPECIAL FUND; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED:
NOVEMBER 17, 2000; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-002644-WC
GREGORY N. SCHABELL
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-97-00771
v.
LEVI STRAUSS & COMPANY; MICHELLE
PRUITT; ROBERT L. WHITAKER, DIRECTOR
OF SPECIAL FUND; AND WORKERS'
COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, BUCKINGHAM & MILLER, JUDGES.
BARBER, JUDGE:
This is a workers’ compensation case. The issue
on appeal is whether KRS 342.320(1)(a), as amended effective
December 12, 1996, limiting attorney fees to $2,000.00 applies
where the date of injury was prior to December 12, 1996, and
where the attorney was retained after December 12, 1996.
The facts are not in dispute.
The injury dates are
June 19, 1996 and sometime in September 1996.
The claimant
retained the appellant’s, Gregory N. Schabell (Schabell) services
on February 15, 1997.
The fee awarded was limited to $2,000.00
under KRS 342.320(1)(a), as amended effective December 12, 1996.
Schabell, the claimant’s former attorney, contends that: (1) the
amended version of KRS 342.320(1)(a)1 does not apply because the
law on the date of injury controls; and (2) the statute is
unconstitutional.
The issues raised on this appeal were very recently
resolved by the Kentucky Supreme Court in Daub v. Baker Concrete,
Ky., 25 S.W.3d 124 (2000).
The Court held that the amended
version of the statute applies to attorney fee contracts entered
into and signed after December 12, 1996:
KRS 342.0015 made it clear that the
legislature intended for the changes in the
procedure by which claims were decided to
apply to all claims pending on or after
December 12, 1996, without regard to the date
upon which they arose. KRS 342.0015 also made
it clear that the legislature considered the
amendments to KRS 342.320 to be remedial. In
view of the legislature's express
declaration, we conclude that the amendments
to KRS 342.320 apply to all claims pending on
or after December 12, 1996. KRS 342.320(2)(d)
specifically addresses claims which arose
before December 12, 1996, and, therefore, we
conclude that it takes precedence over the
more general provision of KRS 342.320(3) with
regard to such claims. [citations omitted].
KRS 342.320(2)(d) explicitly provides that
attorney-client employment contracts entered
into and signed before December 12, 1996,
shall not be subject to paragraph (a) of KRS
1
House Bill 992 eliminated the arbitrator level of
adjudication and authorized an attorney fee of up to
$12,000 for representation before an ALJ. Thus, the $
2,000.00 limitation which is presently at issue applied from
December 12, 1996, until the effective date of the 2000
amendments.
-2-
342.320(2). By implication, KRS 342.320(2)(d)
provides that attorney-client employment
contracts entered into and signed after
December 12, 1996, shall be subject to
paragraph (a) of KRS 342.320(2).
The Supreme Court held that the statute did not
impermissibly encroach upon its authority in violation of the
separation of powers doctrine:
The first constitutional argument raised by
claimant and his attorney is that, to the
extent that they regulate attorney fees and
discipline attorneys for charging or
receiving fees in excess of the statutory
limitation, the 1996 amendments to KRS
342.320 represent an unconstitutional attempt
by the legislature to encroach upon the
Supreme Court's exclusive authority to
regulate the practice of law. Ky. Const. §§
28, 116; See also, Foster v. Overstreet, Ky.,
905 S.W.2d 504, 506 (1995); O'Bryan v.
Hedgespeth, Ky., 892 S.W.2d 571, 576 (1995);
Drumm v. Commonwealth, Ky., 783 S.W.2d 380
(1990); Ex Parte Auditor of Public Accounts,
Ky., 609 S.W.2d 682, 684 (1980). Claimant and
his attorney argue that the Court has adopted
SCR 3.130-1.5, a specific rule which controls
the amount and reasonableness of attorney
fees, and has prohibited a third party from
setting maximum attorney fees. They argue
that the fee arrangement imposed by KRS
342.320 creates that same ethical problem as
the set fee arrangements which were proposed
by the insurance industry and declared
unethical and void by this Court in American
Insurance Association v. Kentucky Bar
Association, Ky., 917 S.W.2d 568 (1996).
We begin by noting that the attorney fee
which is presently at issue relates to a
workers' compensation claim and not to a
common law civil action. Workers'
compensation is a legislative, not a common
law remedy. The legislature has set limits on
the type and amount of benefits which a
worker may receive and, likewise, has set
limits on the amount of the attorney's fee
which the worker will be required to pay.
Participation in the legislative remedy
offered by the Workers' Compensation Act is
-3-
voluntary, and those workers who choose to
pursue that remedy must come within the
provisions of the Act. For that reason, to
the extent that they prohibit encroachment by
the legislature on the powers of the Supreme
Court with regard to attorney's fees, the
cases cited by the appellants are
inapplicable to the present facts. We are
not persuaded that KRS 342.320 represents an
unconstitutional interference in the
attorney-client relationship with regard to a
workers' compensation claim.
Schabell also contends that the statute is arbitrary,
capricious and unconstitutional, because it sets the same
$2,000.00 cap for attorneys who take a case on a contingent
basis, as it does for attorneys who is paid hourly, regardless of
outcome; deprives injured workers’ access to “many attorneys”;
and impairs the obligation of contracts.
The Supreme Court
addressed essentially the same arguments in Daub:
[Appellant] . . .
argue[s] that it is
arbitrary and capricious for the same maximum
to apply to the worker's attorney as to the
employer's attorney in view of the fact that
the claimant bears the burden of persuasion
and the fact that his attorney's fee is
contingent in nature. We would point out,
however, that this argument ignores the fact
that the pre-December 12, 1996, law which
they seek to have applied placed no limit
whatsoever on the fee paid to the employer's
attorney and, following their rationale,
would be even more arbitrary and capricious.
. . .
Any right which an attorney has to a fee
accrues from the date upon which the worker
and the attorney enter into a contract for
the representation. It is undisputed that the
attorney undertook the representation of the
claimant . . . after the effective date of
the 1996 amendments; therefore, no vested
right was impaired by applying the
limitations imposed by the 1996 amendments
when determining the maximum attorney's fee.
Although the 1996 amendments create two
-4-
classes of attorneys who represent workers
with regard to claims which arose before
December 12, 1996, the classes are based on
the date upon which the representation
commenced, i.e., the date from which the
attorney's right to a fee vested. Under those
circumstances, we are not persuaded that
applying the amendments to determine the
maximum attorney's fee violated any
constitutional right of this attorney.
. . .
[Appellant] does not explain how . . . [the
client’s] right to competent representation
was impaired by the $ 2,000.00 limitation or
how the limitation deprived him of a remedy,
particularly in view of the fact that he was
able to obtain competent counsel and was
awarded benefits. . . .In return, he was
required to pay a maximum attorney's fee
which was substantially less than the maximum
in effect on the date of injury. Under those
circumstances, we are not persuaded that
applying the amendments in order to determine
the maximum attorney's fee violated any
constitutional right of the claimant.
Therefore, the decision of the Workers’ Compensation
Board is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, LEVI
STRAUSS & COMPANY:
Gregory N. Schabell, Pro Se
Florence, Kentucky
Douglas A. U’Sellis
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, SPECIAL
FUND:
Joel Zakem
Frankfort, Kentucky
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