MURRIEL-DON COAL CO., INC. v. CHAD ERIC SANDLIN; THOMAS A. DOCKTER, Administrative Law Judge; and WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED: September 22, 2000; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-002589-WC
MURRIEL-DON COAL CO., INC.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-98-08736
v.
CHAD ERIC SANDLIN; THOMAS A. DOCKTER,
Administrative Law Judge; and
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, Chief Judge; COMBS and McANULTY, Judges.
COMBS, JUDGE:
Murriel-Don Coal Co., Inc. (Murriel-Don) appeals
from an opinion of the Workers' Compensation Board (the Board)
which reversed and remanded a decision of an administrative law
judge (ALJ) dismissing Chad Eric Sandlin's claim for retraining
incentive benefits (RIB).
We reverse.
Sandlin worked for multiple employers as a coal miner
for approximately five years.
On December 9, 1996, Sandlin filed
a claim for benefits with the last date of exposure to the
hazards of respirable coal dust having occurred on January 2,
1995, while he was employed by Murriel-Don.
In proceedings
before the ALJ, Sandlin relied upon reports from Dr. Emery Lane
and Dr. Ballard Wright, both of whom found that Sandlin suffered
from Category 1 coal workers' pneumoconiosis.
Murriel-Don relied
upon reports from Dr. B.T. Westerfield and Dr. John E. Myers,
Jr., both of whom found no evidence of pneumoconiosis.
Pursuant
to Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 342.315(2) and 803 Kentucky
Administrative Regulation (KAR) 25:010 § 9(1), Sandlin was
referred to Dr. John Woodring at the University of Kentucky for
an independent medical evaluation.
Dr. Woodring was of the
opinion that Sandlin did not suffer from pneumoconiosis.
The ALJ concluded that Sandlin's claim was governed by
the version of KRS 342.315(2) which became effective in December
1996 and that Sandlin had failed to sustain his burden of proving
the existence of pneumoconiosis.
In dismissing the claim, the
ALJ found as follows:
In reviewing the medical evidence in the within claim,
this Administrative Law Judge is most persuaded by the
proof provided by Drs. Woodring, Myers and Westerfield,
who have all interpreted x-rays as showing Category 0
pneumoconiosis. It is noted that Dr. Woodring's
interpretation is given presumptive weight statutorily.
Since the Plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion
under Roark v. Alva Coal Corporation, Ky., 371 S.W.2d
856 (1963), Young v. Burgett, Ky., 389 S.W.2d 926
(1965) and Wells v. Hamilton, Ky., App., 645 S.W.2d 353
(1983), it is ultimately concluded that based upon the
negative findings of the cited doctors, this claim must
be DISMISSED.
On Sandlin's appeal to the Board, the Board held that
the ALJ erroneously determined that the December 1996 version of
KRS 342.315(2) was applicable and that the ALJ had also erred in
affording presumptive weight to the report of the university
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evaluator.
The Board issued an opinion reversing and remanding
the claim to the ALJ for additional proceedings.
Murriel-Don's
petition for review to this court followed.
The sole issue involved in this case is the
interpretation of KRS 342.315(2), as amended effective December
12, 1996, which provides as follows:
The physicians and institutions performing evaluations
pursuant to this section shall render reports
encompassing their findings and opinions in the form
prescribed by the commissioner. The clinical findings
and opinions of the designated evaluator shall be
afforded presumptive weight by arbitrators and
administrative law judges and the burden to overcome
such findings and opinions shall fall on the opponent
of that evidence. When arbitrators or administrative
law judges reject the clinical findings and opinions of
the designated evaluator, they shall specifically state
in the order the reasons for rejecting that evidence.
In Magic Coal Co. v. Fox, Ky., 19 S.W.3d 88(2000), the
Kentucky Supreme Court held that the 1996 amendments to KRS
342.315 apply to all claims pending before the fact-finder on or
after the amendments' effective date and that KRS 342.315(2)
creates a rebuttable presumption which is governed by Kentucky
Rules of Evidence (KRE) 301 and does not shift the burden of
persuasion.
As we have noted, Sandlin's claim for benefits was
pending before the ALJ after the effective date of the 1996
amendment.
Therefore, the ALJ did not err by applying the 1996
amendment of KRS 342.315(2) to the case or by affording
presumptive weight to the opinion of the university evaluator -especially where the ALJ cited his reliance upon the evaluations
of the physicians who had found no evidence of pneumoconiosis.
Sandlin presented no evidence to rebut the presumption.
Coal precludes us from granting relief:
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Magic
... the clinical findings and evidence of the
university evaluator constitute substantial
evidence with regard to medical questions
which, if uncontradicted, may not be
disregarded by the fact-finder.
Id. at 35.
Pursuant to the direction of Magic Coal, we reverse the
opinion of the Board and affirm the decision of the ALJ.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE SANDLIN:
David H. Neeley
Prestonsburg, KY
James D. Holliday
Hazard, KY
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