AERO ENERGY v. EDDIE BOYD; HON. LLOYD R. EDENS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; SPECIAL FUND; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED:
AUGUST 25, 2000; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-002536-WC
AERO ENERGY
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-97-00413
v.
EDDIE BOYD;
HON. LLOYD R. EDENS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE;
SPECIAL FUND; AND
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
DYCHE, EMBERTON, AND MILLER, JUDGES.
MILLER, JUDGE:
Aero Energy asks us to review an opinion of the
Workers’ Compensation Board (board) rendered September 24, 1999.
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 342.290.
We affirm.
Eddie Boyd worked in the coal mining industry from 1978
until 1988 and then again from 1993 until 1995.
1995, he was laid off by Aero Energy.
On August 31,
Since that time, Boyd has
not returned to work in the coal mining industry.
On February
12, 1997, Boyd filed for retraining incentive benefits under the
Workers’ Compensation Act.
KRS Chapter 342.
The Department of
Workers’ Claims referred Boyd to university evaluator, Dr. A.
Lieber, for an independent evaluation.
The case was submitted to
an administrative law judge (ALJ) who entered an opinion, order
and award on September 18, 1997.
In same, the ALJ first held
that KRS 342.315(2), as amended on December 12, 1996 (the 1996
amendment), should be applied to this claim.
The ALJ then went
on to state the following:
In view of [Boyd’s] 12 year work history as a
roof bolter and the category 1/2 diagnosis of
Dr. Baker, I am persuaded that the
presumption accorded the category 0/1
diagnosis by Dr. Lieber has been overcome and
that the Plaintiff has category 1 coal
workers pneumoconiosis.
On appeal, the board affirmed the ALJ’s decision on
different grounds.
It opined that the 1996 amendment was not to
be applied retroactively.
However, it stated, when it does
apply, the presumptive weight accorded the university evaluator’s
conclusions by the amendment are not overcome by mere
contradictory medical evidence.
The board concluded that:
[A]lthough the ALJ reached his conclusion for
the wrong reasons, he was well within his
authority in not according presumptive weight
to the evaluation of [the university
evaluator]. Once the presumptive weight of
that report is removed, [the university
evaluator’s] report merely becomes another
piece of medical evidence to be considered by
the ALJ. The ALJ, prior to December 12,
1996, was clothed with the discretion to
determine that which he believed to be more
credible and so long as there was substantial
evidence of probative value to support his
conclusion, it could not be altered on
appeal.
This appeal followed.
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The issues of retroactivity and presumptive weight
accorded by the 1996 amendment were finally decided by the
Kentucky Supreme Court in Magic Coal Company v. Fox, Ky., 19
S.W.3d 88 (2000).
board’s opinion.
Magic Coal was decided subsequent to the
In Magic Coal, the Supreme Court stated that:
[T]he amendments to KRS 342.315 which became
effective on December 12, 1996, apply to all
claims pending before the fact-finder on or
after that date. KRS 342.315(2) creates a
rebuttable presumption which is governed by
KRE 301 and, therefore, does not shift the
burden of persuasion. Pursuant to KRS
342.315(2), the clinical findings and
opinions of the university evaluator
constitute substantial evidence of the
worker’s medical condition which may not be
disregarded by the fact-finder unless it is
rebutted. Where the clinical findings and
opinions of the university evaluator are
rebutted, KRS 342.315(2) does not restrict
the authority of the fact-finder to weigh the
conflicting medical evidence. In instances
where a fact-finder chooses to disregard the
testimony of the university evaluator, a
reasonable basis for doing so must be
specifically stated.
Id. at 97.
Our review proceeds under the precepts of Magic Coal.
The ALJ determined that the 1996 amendment applied retroactively
to Boyd’s claim.
Magic Coal specifically holds that the
amendment is to apply to all cases pending on or after December
12, 1996.
Boyd’s claim was filed after that date.
Hence, we
conclude the ALJ correctly applied the 1996 amendment to Boyd’s
claim.
The ALJ next held there was sufficient evidence to
overcome the presumptive weight accorded the university
evaluator’s conclusion under the 1996 amendment.
-3-
In his opinion,
the ALJ specifically stated that said presumption was overcome by
Boyd’s 12-year work history in the coal mines and Dr. Glen
Baker’s diagnosis of category 1/2 coal worker’s pneumoconiosis.
It is our opinion the ALJ specified a reasonable basis for
disregarding the university evaluator’s conclusion that Boyd did
not suffer from pneumoconiosis.
Furthermore, we believe the
ALJ’s decision was based upon substantial evidence.
See Western
Baptist Hospital v. Kelly, Ky., 827 S.W.2d 685 (1992).
Aero
Energy argues that the ALJ did not comply with the 1996 amendment
because he did not specifically state the reasons for rejecting
the university evaluator’s report.
It claims it is not enough to
merely explain the reasons benefits were awarded.
argument.
We reject this
The ALJ made it clear he rejected the university
evaluator’s diagnosis because he found Dr. Baker’s diagnosis more
credible under the circumstances.
We conclude the ALJ’s award
was proper.
The board disagreed with the ALJ’s ratiocination but
affirmed the ALJ upon a different basis.
with the ALJ’s analysis.
We perceive no error
We, therefore, affirm the board,
albeit, upon different reasoning.
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Workers’
Compensation Board is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, EDDIE
BOYD:
Natalie D. Brown
Lexington, Kentucky
Thomas G. Polites
Lexington, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, SPECIAL
FUND:
John Burrell
Frankfort, Kentucky
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