ROSEMARY HOROWITZ v. KENTUCKY EASTER SEALS SOCIETY, INC., A/K/A CARDINAL HILL REHABILITATION HOSPITAL
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
SEPTEMBER 1, 2000; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-002190-MR
ROSEMARY HOROWITZ
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE MARY C. NOBLE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CI-02994
v.
KENTUCKY EASTER SEALS SOCIETY, INC.,
A/K/A CARDINAL HILL REHABILITATION HOSPITAL
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
DYCHE, EMBERTON, AND MILLER, JUDGES.
MILLER, JUDGE:
Rosemary Horowitz brings this appeal from a
judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court entered September 8, 1999,
upon a jury verdict.
We affirm.
In September, 1996, Horowitz brought an action against
the Kentucky Easter Seals Society, Inc., a/k/a Cardinal Hill
Rehabilitation Hospital (Cardinal Hill), alleging that Cardinal
Hill negligently performed a functional capacity evaluation (FCE)
upon her in January, 1996, resulting in personal injuries.
It appears that Horowitz had a history of back
problems.
In 1990, she had a break in her lower spine, which was
repaired through a spinal fusion.
She took leave from her
employment and began receiving continuous disability benefits
from her employer's insurance carrier, CIGNA Insurance Company
(CIGNA).
Her symptoms worsened, and she underwent a second
fusion in 1991.
In 1992, because of continuous pain and
deteriorating condition, she underwent a third spinal surgery
utilizing rods and screws to stabilize her spinal column.
In
1993, she underwent a fourth surgery wherein new rods and screws
were inserted in her back in addition to a solid fusion.
After the foregoing travail, her doctor was of the
opinion that her condition reflected an arachnoiditis picture.
Arachnoiditis is a condition that can develop as a result of
multiple back interventions from surgeries and myelograms.
Her
diagnosis was that of spondylolisthesis and arachnoiditis.
In January, 1996, Horowitz went to Cardinal Hill, a
rehabilitation hospital, for an FCE as requested by CIGNA.
CIGNA
was paying disability benefits and was interested in determining
her ability to return to work.
Linda Freudenberger, a licensed occupational therapist,
and Jennifer Meyers, a licensed physical therapist, conducted the
FCE at Cardinal Hill.
An FCE is designed to determine a person's maximum safe
functional abilities.
Before administering the various physical
tests, Horowitz was interviewed at length concerning her medical
history, physical impairment, and disabilities.
It is through
the physical tests relative to this evaluation that Horowitz
claims to have incurred personal injury.
-2-
She basically claims
that the FCE exceeded her physical limitations thereby causing
additional injury.
Horowitz's action came on for trial before a jury on
July 19, 1999.
The jury returned a verdict for defendant,
Cardinal Hill.
Judgment was entered upon the verdict, thus
precipitating this appeal.
Horowitz presents an assortment of alleged errors
during the course of the trial.
Specifically, she claims:
(1) Error in composing the jury; (2) Error in admission of
evidence; (3) Error in presentation of admissions to the jury;
(4) Error in excluding evidence; (5) Error in permitting appellee
to substitute witnesses; (6) Error in excluding testimony by
appellant's experts; and (7) Error in permitting interruptions
and delay in the trial.
We shall discuss the assignment of errors in the order
presented.
The first allegation of error surrounds of juror number
449 and juror number 517.
Juror 449 stated that he was
romantically involved with an employee of Cardinal Hill.
court refused to strike this juror for cause.
The
Horowitz was
forced to use a peremptory challenge to exclude this juror and
now claims error.
It is fundamental that a juror is qualified to serve
unless there is a showing of actual bias.
See Key v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 840 S.W.2d 827 (1992).
It is incumbent
upon a party claiming bias to prove his point.
See Polk v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 574 S.W.2d 335 (1978).
The ultimate fact
-3-
is that the court has broad discretion in qualifying jurors, and
unless there is a clear abuse, this Court will not interfere.
We
perceive no such abuse.
During the course of trial, juror 517 and other jurors
were apparently speculating as to the identity of a person
sitting in the back of the courtroom with a laptop computer.
They speculated the person was an insurance representative either
of Cardinal Hill or CIGNA.
and asked questions.
Juror 517 approached the individual
The court interviewed this juror and
subsequently discharged her.
verdict.
Thus, juror 517 had no part in the
As a matter of fact, neither of the complained jurors
participated in the decision.
As to other jurors, Horowitz
failed at trial to discover the extent of the alleged misconduct
and failed on appeal to prove that her right to a fair and
impartial trial was impaired.
See Gould v. Charlton Company,
Inc., Ky., 929 S.W.2d 734 (1996).
We thus conclude that no
reversible error resulted.
We turn to the second assignment of error.
In March,
1997, Horowitz served upon Cardinal Hill a set of Requests for
Admissions.
Request No. 12 read as follows:
REQUEST NO. 12: Admit that page 2 of
Exhibit “C” attached hereto, acknowledges
that, on Jan 25, 1996, Plaintiff lifted the
following weights: 23.75 pounds, 18.75
pounds, 11 pounds, and 18.75 pounds.
Cardinal Hill answered as set forth below, and the matter was
admitted.
Ky. R. Civ. P. (CR) 36.01.
RESPONSE NO. 12: Deny that part of page
2 of Exhibit “C” which appears to state “On
January 25, 1996, Plaintiff lifted the
following weights: 23.75 pounds, 18.75
-4-
pounds, 11 pounds, and 18.75 pounds”.
Actually, plaintiff lifted 23.75 pounds from
12 inches to her waist, 18.75 pounds from
knee height to her waist height, 11 pounds
from her waist to overhead and two handed
carried 18.75 pounds 15 feet”.
On June 2, 1997, Horowitz took the deposition of
Meyers.
While reviewing documentation of Horowitz's FCE, Meyers
testified that she had made a mistake, which formed the basis of
the above admission.
She stated that the lifting of 18.75 pounds
was not from knee height to waist height, but was rather from
waist to eye level.
During the course of trial, Cardinal Hill
requested the court to withdraw the admission.
Rather than
allowing withdrawal of the admission, the court permitted
Cardinal Hill to produce evidence contradicting the admission.
Horowitz complains that the trial court committed
reversible error by allowing evidence contradictory to the
parties' above admission.
In support thereof, she cites to CR
36.02 which states, in part, as follows:
Any matter admitted under Rule 36 is
conclusively established unless the court on
motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the
admission. Subject to the provisions of Rule
16 governing amendment of a pretrial order,
the court may permit withdrawal or amendment
when the presentation of the merits of the
action will be subserved thereby and the
party who obtained the admission fails to
satisfy the court that withdrawal or
amendment will prejudice him in maintaining
his action or defense on the merits.
Thus, we observe that ordinarily an admission is conclusive and
may not be contradicted at trial.
However, the court may permit
withdrawal or amendment of such admission subject to the
provisions of CR 16.
That rule provides, in part:
-5-
The court shall make an order which recites .
. . the agreements made by the parties as to
any of the matters considered . . . and such
order when entered controls the subsequent
course of the action, unless modified at or
before the trial to prevent manifest
injustice. (Emphasis added.)
We think it incumbent upon the trial court to ensure that facts
presented by admission are true.
In the case at hand, we believe
that the introduction of contradictory evidence prevented a
“manifest injustice.”
CR 16.
While it appears the trial court
may have erred procedurally in permitting explanatory evidence
rather than simply withdrawing or amending the admission, we
think such error harmless.
CR 61.01.
We now review assignment of error number three.
note that this argument is somewhat vague.
We
Apparently, the
complaint is that the trial court prejudiced the jury against
Horowitz in the manner in which it read certain admissions.
Specifically, the matter surrounds whether Horowitz submitted
herself to Cardinal Hill for the FCE on January 24 and 25, 1996,
with a twenty-five-pound weight limitation.
We do not think the jury was prejudiced by the trial
court's reading of the admissions.
Pursuant to her own request,
the court read the judicial admissions in the manner and format
selected by Horowitz.
The court made it abundantly clear that
these were questions asked by Horowitz and the answers given by
Cardinal Hill.
At the outset, the court advised the jury as
follows:
Plaintiff has posed certain questions to the
Defendant asking that they make certain
admissions which they have made from time to
time throughout the course of the trial. I'm
-6-
going to read to you now those admissions
that have been asked throughout the course of
the trial.
The court was asked by Horowitz's counsel to clarify
the matter, and the following colloquy took place:
Mr. Morris:
Your Honor, I would like to
have the Court explain one
thing. These are admissions
that Cardinal Hill is willing
to admit to.
Judge Noble:
I've already stated to the
jury that these are requests
to admit, they were posed to
the defendant; that the
defendant at various times
throughout the course of the
trial admitted to.
Mr. Morris:
I just wanted the jury to
understand those are not
things that the Court is
saying.
Judge Noble:
I think they understand,
don't you?
Finally, we are not of the opinion the jury was mislead by the
presentation of the admissions.
nature of this law suit.
The jury was well aware of the
The charge was that Cardinal Hill
negligently administered physical tests in performing the FCE.
The basis of the negligence was that certain tests exceeded
physical limitations applicable to Horowitz.
We discern no
prejudice in the manner of presenting the admissions to the jury.
We now turn to asserted error number four.
apparently designated CIGNA as a deponent.
Horowitz
As such, the
testimony of CIGNA's corporate representative, one Paul
Haberstock, was produced.
CR 30.02(6).
The purpose was to
secure information regarding Horowitz's disability claim.
-7-
Horowitz now argues it was prejudicial to allow
Cardinal Hill to attack the representative's credibility upon the
basis of lack of personal knowledge.
contention.
We disagree with this
Certainly any witness who offers evidence is open to
impeachment on the basis of lack of information about which he or
she speaks.
We know of no evidence that is per se unimpeachable.
It was certainly permissible to show that the corporate
representative had no personal knowledge of things about which he
spoke.
We do not think it prejudicial for Cardinal Hill to have
demonstrated such.
As a matter of fact, it is common knowledge
that corporate executives generally do not speak from personal
knowledge, but rather from information compiled by corporate
subordinates.
We conclude it was altogether proper for Cardinal
Hill to call this to the attention of the jury.
It was a useful
element in evaluating the testimony of the corporate
representative.
We now address assignment number five.
During the
course of the trial, Cardinal Hill's expert, one Kate Tuminski,
became incapacitated.
The court allowed Cardinal Hill to
substitute another expert, one Dr. Daniel Wolens.
Horowitz
claims that the substitution was in error and that Wolens was not
a qualified expert.
We reject both arguments.
The substitution
of an expert is well within the discretion of the trial court.
See Ray v. Stone, Ky. App., 952 S.W.2d 220 (1997).
The
competency of Dr. Wolens as a witness was more than adequately
substantiated.
Dr. Wolens was a board certified physician in
occupational medicine.
He had extensive experience in a clinical
-8-
practice focused upon spinal injury and had served as medical
director of a hospital's occupational and environmental medical
program.
In summary, we do not think the trial court abused its
discretion in this matter.
Id.
We now focus upon the sixth assignment of error.
Horowitz maintains that the trial court committed reversible
error by excluding the testimony of certain “experts” and by
refusing to allow evidence of alleged missing and/or destroyed
Cardinal Hill documents.
Horowitz, however, failed to identify
the excluded “experts,” failed to specify what testimony was
excluded, and further failed to demonstrate any prejudicial
effect therefrom.
Moreover, Horowitz does not explain the
significance or content of the mysterious missing and/or
destroyed documents.
Upon the whole, we hold that if any error
occurred it was harmless.
CR 61.01.
Horowitz also argues that the trial court committed
reversible error by its admonition to the jury to disregard
certain testimony of one, Susan Isernhagen.
Isernhagen testified
that it was a physical therapist's duty to monitor the FCE and to
stop same if a patient exhibited pain or discomfort.
court admonished the jury to disregard such testimony.
The trial
The court
informed the jury that it had the ultimate responsibility to
determine whether Cardinal Hill's physical therapists had any
duty to stop testing because of pain.
We are of the opinion that
the court's admonition to disregard Isernhagen's testimony did
not affect a substantial right of Horowitz and thus was not
prejudicial error.
Ky. R. Evid. 103(a); CR 61.01.
-9-
We now dispose of Horowitz's final argument.
Horowitz
generally argues that the trial court did not conduct the trial
in an “orderly process” by allowing forty- to sixty-minute
recesses, seventy- to ninety-five-minute lunch breaks, and fortyfive- to fifty-minute side-bars.
We summarily reject such
argument.
The record demonstrates this case was well tried.
In
sum, we believe Horowitz received a fair and impartial trial.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Fayette
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
James M. Morris
Sharon K. Morris
Jason V. Reed
Lexington, Kentucky
Gregory K. Jenkins
Margaret M. Pisacano
Lynn K. Rikhoff
Lexington, Kentucky
-10-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.