CARL PASQUALINI; ANN PASQUALINI; RAINBOW ESTATES, INC. v. THE CITY OF LONDON, KENTUCKY; FARMER (BUD) SHELL, Building Inspector; and FARMER (BUD) SHELL, Individually
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RENDERED: November 3, 2000; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-002151-MR
CARL PASQUALINI; ANN PASQUALINI;
RAINBOW ESTATES, INC.
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM LAUREL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LEWIS B. HOPPER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 95-CI-00076
THE CITY OF LONDON, KENTUCKY;
FARMER (BUD) SHELL, Building Inspector;
and FARMER (BUD) SHELL, Individually
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, Chief Judge; COMBS and McANULTY, Judges.
COMBS, JUDGE: The appellants, Carl Pasqualini, Ann Pasqualini,
and Rainbow Estates, Inc., appeal from the orders of the Laurel
Circuit Court granting summary judgment in favor of the
appellees, the City of London, Kentucky, and Farmer Shell.
Having carefully reviewed the record on appeal, we affirm the
judgment of the circuit court.
This appeal arises out of a negligence action filed by
Carl and Ann Pasqualini (the Pasqualinis) and Rainbow Estates,
Inc., against the City of London, and Farmer Shell, individually.
In 1992, the Pasqualinis initiated
a
project to build
apartments on property which they owned in London, Kentucky.
They developed building plans for the site and applied for a
building permit.
In October 1993, Farmer Shell, the building
inspector for the City of London at that time, issued a building
permit for the project.
Upon receiving the building permit, the Pasqualinis
began construction.
However, shortly after the foundation for
one of the buildings had been poured, the Pasqualinis received a
letter from the Douglas Gilbert (Gilbert), the new building
inspector, notifying them that they were in violation of one of
the city’s zoning ordinances.1
Specifically, Gilbert found that
they had violated Ordinance Number 749, which mandates a setback
of forty (40) feet where the rear yard of a commercially zoned
property abuts a district zoned as residential.
The Pasqualinis’
property was zoned as commercial property, and they had not
provided for a setback of forty (40) feet from the adjacent
residential property.
In response to the letter, the Pasqualinis applied for
a variance.
After conducting a hearing on the matter, the City
of London Board of Zoning Adjustment (the Board of Zoning
Adjustment) denied their application.
They appealed the decision
to the circuit court, and in an order entered December 21, 1994,
the circuit court affirmed the denial of the Board of Adjustment.
1
The incumbent mayor lost his position in the 1994 local
elections. Upon taking office, the newly elected mayor appointed
Douglas Gilbert as the new building inspector.
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It does not appear that the circuit court’s order was appealed by
any of the parties.
In February 1, 1995, the Pasqualinis and Rainbow
Estates, Inc.,2 filed a negligence action against the City of
London, Kentucky, and against Shell, individually.
In their
complaint, the Pasqualinis alleged that as the building
inspector, Shell owed them a duty to accurately review the city’s
zoning ordinances and to inform them of the regulations
accordingly.
duty.
They asserted that Shell failed to perform this
The Pasqualinis stated that they had received assurances
from Shell in a letter dated February 25, 1993, that their
project exceeded all city requirements.
They claim that they
relied upon Shell’s assurances and accordingly commenced
construction based upon the building permit that had been issued
to them. However, the new building inspector found that the
project did not in fact comply with zoning ordinances, and
construction was halted.
The Pasqualinis asserted a claim
against Shell individually and against the City of London by
virtue of the doctrine of respondeat superior.
They sought
compensatory as well as punitive damages.
The parties engaged in discovery, and on November 24,
1998, the City of London filed a motion for summary judgment,
asserting that it had statutory immunity against this type of
action pursuant to
law.
KRS 62.2003 — as well as long-standing case
Shell also filed a motion for summary judgment on February
2
Rainbow Estates, Inc., is a corporation owned by the
Pasqualinis. It was in the name of this corporation that the
Pasqualinis were building the apartment buildings.
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1, 1999.
In an order entered September 1, 1999, the court
granted summary judgment in favor of the City of London.
The
court agreed that the under the plain language of KRS 65.2003,
the City of London could not be held liable for the Pasqualinis’
claim.
On September 8, 1999, the court also granted summary
judgment in favor of Shell.
The Pasqualinis argue on appeal that the court erred in
granting summary judgment in favor of the City of London and
Shell.
They contend that there are material issues of fact as to
whether they had indeed violated a city ordinance and that,
therefore, summary judgment was improper.
We disagree.
In general, municipal corporations are shielded by
immunity from tort liability in very limited circumstances.
Gas
Service Co., Inc. v. City of London, Ky., 687 S.W.2d 144, 148
(1985).
Municipal immunity is restricted to situations in which
the municipality is performing a judicial or legislative function
or a quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative function.
Id.
KRS
65.2003, enacted in 1988, codifies the case law as to municipal
tort liability and provides:
Notwithstanding KRS 65.2001, a local
government shall not be liable for injuries
or losses resulting from:
(1) Any claim by an employee of the local
government which is covered by the
Kentucky workers’ compensation law;
(2) Any claim in connection with the
assessment or collection of taxes;
(3) Any claim arising from the exercise of
judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or
quasi-legislative authority or others,
exercise of judgment or discretion vested in
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the local government, which shall include by
example, but not be limited to:
(a)
The adoption or failure to adopt any
ordinance, resolution, order, regulation, or
rule;
(b)
The failure to enforce any law;
(c) The issuance, denial, suspension,
revocation of, or failure or refusal to
issue, deny, suspend, or revoke any permit,
license, certificate, approval, order or
similar authorization;
(d)
The exercise of discretion when in the
face of competing demands, the local
government determines whether and how to
utilize or apply existing resources; or
(e) Failure to make an inspection.
Nothing contained in this subsection shall be
construed to exempt a local government from
liability for negligence arising out of acts
or omissions of its employees in carrying out
their ministerial duties.
(Emphasis added).
The Pasqualinis’ claim clearly falls within
KRS 65.2003(3)(c), and the City of London is immune from suit as
a matter of law for any claim arising out of the issuance or
revocation of a building permit.
We now turn our attention to the issue of whether
summary judgment was appropriate as to the Pasqualinis’ claim
against Shell personally.
In Kentucky, personal liability for a public
officer’s or public employee’s negligent
performance of duties depends in part on
whether the powers in question were
ministerial or discretionary in nature.
Thompson v. Huecker, Ky. App., 559 S.W.2d 488
(1977). The general rule of thumb in
Kentucky, as stated in Thompson, id. at 495,
is that a public officer or employee “may be
personally liable for negligence or bad faith
in performing ministerial duties” (emphasis
in original), but is not subject to tort
-5-
liability in certain circumstances for
actions taken in the performance of
discretionary duties.
Ashby v. City of Louisville, Ky. App., 841 S.W.2d 184, 188
(1992).
In Upchurch v. Clinton County, Ky., 330 S.W.2d 428, 430
(1959), the Supreme Court adopted the following distinction
between a ministerial duty and a discretionary duty:
The essentials of a ministerial as contrasted
with a discretionary act are thus set forth
in 43 Am.Jur., Public Officers, sec. 258, p.
75: ‘An official duty is ministerial when it
is absolute, certain, and imperative,
involving merely execution of a specific act
arising from fixed and designated facts; that
a necessity may exist for the ascertainment
of those facts does not operate to convert
the act into one discretionary in its nature.
Discretionary or judicial duties are such as
necessarily require the exercise of reason in
the adaption of means to an end, and
discretion in determining how or whether the
act shall be done or the course pursued.
Discretion in the manner of the performance
of an act arises when the act may be
performed in one or two or more ways, either
of which would be lawful, and where it is
left to the will or judgment of the performer
to determine in which way it shall be
performed. However, an act is not
necessarily taken out of the class styled
‘ministerial’ because the officer performing
it is vested with a discretion respecting the
means or method to be employed.’
Shell testified in his deposition that his job as
building inspector involved many different duties.
He was
responsible for taking and investigating applications for permits
— as well as for interpreting and enforcing the zoning
ordinances.
Shell’s duties as building inspector thus involved
both discretionary and ministerial duties.
However, the essence
of the Pasqualinis’ claim relates to Shell’s duty in interpreting
and applying zoning ordinances.
The performance of this duty
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“necessarily require[d] the exercise of reason in the adaption of
means to an end, and discretion in determining how or whether the
act shall be done or the course pursued.”
We agree with the
trial court that Shell was performing a discretionary duty and
that he was entitled to immunity as a matter of law.
The court
did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Shell.
Based upon the foregoing reasons, we affirm the
judgments of the Laurel Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE SHELL:
Stephen W. Cessna
London, KY
John M. Bush
Courtney R. Howell
Louisville, KY
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE CITY OF
LONDON:
Dave Whalin
Sun S. Choy
Louisville, KY
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