COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY v. DOMINI JERMAYLE BLINCOE
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RENDERED:
DECEMBER 1, 2000; 2:00 p.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-002143-MR
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN POTTER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CR-002340
v.
DOMINI JERMAYLE BLINCOE
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, BUCKINGHAM AND MILLER, JUDGES.
BARBER, JUDGE:
The appellant, Commonwealth of Kentucky,
(Commonwealth) appeals the dismissal by the trial court of an
indictment against the appellee (Blincoe).
A witness had invoked
his Fifth Amendment rights when asked to testify at trial.
The
Commonwealth claims that the witness is the only individual who
can link Blincoe to the charged offense.
An appeal of the
interlocutory order entered by the trial court is pending before
this Court.
The appeal of the interlocutory order was filed on May
10, 1999.
On May 21, 1999, the trial court issued an order
stating that the case would be dismissed in sixty days if the
Commonwealth did not proceed to trial.
The Commonwealth failed
to seek intermediate relief from the Court of Appeals pursuant to
CR 76.33 following entry of the trial court’s order.
The record
shows that the Commonwealth took no steps to avoid dismissal of
the action.
As the Commonwealth refused to try Blincoe until the
appeal of the interlocutory order was final, the trial court
dismissed the criminal action without prejudice on August 5,
1999.
The Commonwealth appeals this order of dismissal.
The Commonwealth asserts that the trial court did not
have jurisdiction to dismiss the case without prejudice.
At the
time the case was dismissed, the Commonwealth was appealing the
interlocutory order in Commonwealth v. Domini Jermayle Blincoe,
1999-CA-1257-MR.
The Commonwealth claims that the pendency of
that appeal transferred jurisdiction over the entire case from
the circuit court to the appellate court, pursuant to Hoy v.
Newburg Homes, Inc., Ky., 325 S.W.2d 301, 302 (1959).
The
general rule is that the taking of an appeal divests the trial
court of jurisdiction to proceed further.
Ky., 734 S.W.2d 467 (1987).
Commonwealth v. Hayes,
A circuit court, however, is vested
with some continuing jurisdiction over a criminal matter, and
retains “inherent jurisdiction to do all things reasonably
necessary to the administration of justice in the case before
it.”
Smothers v. Lewis, Ky., 672 S.W.2d 62, 65 (1984).
It is
true that the trial court’s jurisdiction over matters on appeal
is necessarily divested when an appeal is perfected.
Commonwealth v. Bailey, Ky., 259 S.W.2d 49 (1953).
See
However, an
appeal from a particular order or judgment does not bring the
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entire case into the appellate court.
S.W.2d 815, 816 (1931).
Garnett v. Oliver, Ky., 45
The earlier appeal in this matter was an
appeal from an interlocutory order, and brought only one issue of
a multi-faceted action before this Court.
For this reason, the
trial court still had jurisdiction over trial of the matter, but
not over the specific single issue raised before the Court of
Appeals.
KRS 22A.020(4) states that:
An appeal may be taken to the Court of
Appeals by the state in criminal cases from
an adverse decision or ruling of the Circuit
Court, but only under the following
conditions:
(a) Such appeal shall not suspend the
proceedings in the case.
Id. (emphasis supplied).
Based upon this statute, the trial
court ruled that in the present case delaying trial of this
matter until after the Court of Appeals issued a final ruling
would suspend the proceedings, and it therefore held that the
trial could not be delayed.
This ruling was logical, in that
awaiting a Court of Appeals decision could take as long as a
year, during which time Blincoe would presumably have to sit in
jail or be out on bail and under indictment, with no
determination of his guilt or innocence being made.
That result
would clearly be unjust if he is innocent, a possibility not
noted by the Commonwealth.
The Commonwealth cannot delay trials
at will, requiring citizens to remain imprisoned or at least
under indictment until such time as the Commonwealth consents to
trial.
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Blincoe asserts that KRS 22A.020 specifically provides
that an interlocutory appeal “shall not suspend the proceedings
in the case”.
This statute was cited and relied upon by the
trial court in dismissing the action without prejudice for
failure by the Commonwealth to proceed to trial in a timely
fashion.
This statute specifically refers to suspension of a
trial, but Blincoe argues that it should apply to pretrial
proceedings as well.
The Commonwealth argues that pursuant to Eaton v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 562 S.W.2d 637 (1978), the term “proceedings”
should only refer to proceedings after attachment of jeopardy.
It asserts that as the case was still prior to trial, the pretrial proceedings should have been continued until the appeal of
the interlocutory order was final.
The basis for this argument
is the assertion that the trial had not begun at the time the
appeal was taken from the earlier order, so that there was
nothing to “suspend” while awaiting the appellate court
determination.
This argument overlooks the fact that Blincoe was under
indictment and awaiting trial at the time the appeal was taken.
We do not find that Eaton v. Commonwealth, supra, permits pretrial proceedings to be held in abeyance until a ruling is made
on the interlocutory order.
Eaton holds that unless the
defendant’s “constitutional right to a speedy trial were unduly
threatened, we see no reason why an interlocutory ‘ruling’
entered prior to trial . . . could not be reviewed by appeal.”
Id. at 639.
The Eaton court indicated that where a defendant’s
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right to a speedy trial was threatened by the requested delay,
the prosecution might wish to request a writ of prohibition.
The
proper avenue for the prosecution when aggrieved by an
interlocutory order of the trial court is an appeal of the
ruling.
Commonwealth v. Williams, Ky. App., 995 S.W.2d 400, 402
(1999).
The Commonwealth, through its inaction, violated the
trial court’s order, thereby justifying dismissal of the case.
A
delay of even a few months has been found to violate a
defendant’s right to a speedy trial.
App., 561 S.W.2d 335, 337 (1978).
Mann v. Commonwealth, Ky.
Forcing Blincoe to wait for
trial until after this Court, and possibly the Kentucky Supreme
Court, rendered a final opinion on the appeal of the
interlocutory order would be improper.
The Commonwealth argues
that it will now be forced to reindict the defendant, which it
claims would be a waste of judicial economy.
This argument is
not sufficient to support delaying a trial for months or years
while an issue is on appeal.
KRS 22A.020(4)(c) specifically grants the Court of
Appeals the right to reverse a trial court’s decision in an
interlocutory order, and to order a new trial of the defendant
where no double jeopardy provisions apply.
In the present case,
the action was dismissed without prejudice by the trial court.
A new indictment may properly be obtained should the Commonwealth
prevail in its appeal of the interlocutory order.
Filing of an
appeal of an interlocutory order in a criminal matter is
permitted, but such filing does not suspend applicable time
limits for the taking of other steps in the action.
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See
Commonwealth v. Cobb, Ky. App., 728 S.W.2d 540, 543 (1987).
For
this reason, the trial court’s dismissal of the action is hereby
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Albert B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
J. David Niehaus
Daniel T. Goyette
Louisville, Kentucky
Teresa Young
Special Assistant Attorney
General
Louisville, Kentucky
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