LEE COCHRAN v. LOUISVILLE AND JEFFERSON COUNTY PLANNING COMMISSION; MAIN STREET REALTY, INC.; DAVID A. JONES; AND BETTY A. JONES
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RENDERED: JULY 7, 2000; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-002063-MR
LEE COCHRAN
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ERNEST JASMIN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CI-001824
v.
LOUISVILLE AND JEFFERSON COUNTY
PLANNING COMMISSION;
MAIN STREET REALTY, INC.;
DAVID A. JONES; AND
BETTY A. JONES
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, BUCKINGHAM, AND MILLER, JUDGES.
MILLER, JUDGE:
Lee Cochran brings this appeal from a July 8,
1999, opinion and order of the Jefferson Circuit Court.
We
affirm.
In April, 1997, a golf driving range was proposed in
the River Road area of Jefferson County.
An application for a
change of zoning on the subject property from residential
district R-4 to residential district R-1 was filed.
A
conditional use permit application was also filed with the
Louisville and Jefferson County Planning Commission.
The
Planning Commission voted unanimously to approve the conditional
use permit and recommended approval of the zoning application.
Subsequently, the Jefferson County Fiscal Court voted to approve
the zone change.
On February 4, 1999, over a year and a half later,
Cochran submitted a “Plan Review Application”, “motion”, and
“request” asking the Planning Commission to modify the approved
conditional use permit and amend the binding elements upon the
subject property.
Cochran did not own a legal interest in the
subject property; rather, her residence was approximately one and
a half miles from same.
Cochran claimed to be “concerned and
aggrieved” because the binding elements did not adequately
address the hours of operation and lighting and because the
conditional use permit did not contain any limitation on the
hours of operation or lighting.
On March 18, 1999, the Assistant
Jefferson County Attorney, Deborah A. Bilitski, notified Cochran
by letter that her “Plan Review Application”, “motion” and
“request” would not be docketed.
Her reasoning was as follows:
While a property owner has the right to
request modification of a conditional use
permit and amendments to binding elements on
his or her own property, I can find no legal
basis upon which to allow parties other than
the property owner to reopen a case and
disturb a final action of the Planning
Commission or Fiscal Court.
On March 30, 1999, Cochran filed a complaint and appeal
in the Jefferson Circuit Court under Kentucky Revised Statutes
-2-
(KRS) 100.347(2).
In an opinion and order, the circuit court
concluded that Cochran lacked standing and it (the court) lacked
subject matter jurisdiction.
The circuit court dismissed the
action, thus precipitating this appeal.
Cochran contends the circuit court committed error by
dismissing her complaint.
We disagree.
Section 8.1(A)(4)(b) of
the Jefferson County Development Code deals with amendment of the
Zoning District Map and states:
All applications for amendment to the Zoning
District Map shall be signed by the owner(s)
of the affected property. Leaseholders,
option-holders, developers, and agents should
also be identified.
Section 8.1(B)(1) provides that “the Zoning District Map shall
include a general district development plan. . . .”
elements are found in the district development plan.
Binding
We observe
there exists no specific provision concerning amendment of the
development plan or binding elements.
As the Zoning District Map
must include a development plan, we view Section 8.1(A)(4)(b),
amendment of Zoning District Map, as an appropriate criterion to
amend binding elements.
Hence, we think that only affected
property owners may file an application to amend binding
elements.
We do not perceive Cochran to be an affected property
owner; thus, we do not believe Cochran may file an application to
amend the binding elements under the Jefferson County Development
Code.
Moreover, we do not think Cochran may file an application
to modify a conditional use permit.
KRS 100.237 deals with the
filing and consideration of a conditional use permit.
While that
statute does not specifically state the applicant must possess a
-3-
legal interest in the property, we are inclined to interpret the
statute as implicitly requiring same.
Indeed, subsection 2 of
KRS 100.237 states:
Granting of a conditional use permit does not
exempt the applicant from complying with all
of the requirements of building, housing and
other regulations.
If the applicant need not be a property owner, subsection 2 is
rendered meaningless.
As Cochran has no legal interest in the
subject property, we are of the opinion the circuit court did not
commit reversible error by dismissing the instant action.
We perceive Cochran's remaining issues as moot.
For the foregoing reasons, the opinion and order of the
Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, MAIN
STREET REALTY, INC., DAVID A.
JONES, AND BETTY A. JONES:
Kyle T. Hubbard
Louisville, Kentucky
Margaret E. Keane
Glenn A. Price, Jr.
Ann Toni Kereiakes
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, LOUISVILLE
AND JEFFERSON COUNTY PLANNING
COMMISSION:
Deborah Bilitski
Assistant County Attorney
Louisville, Kentucky
-4-
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