KIAH CREEK MINING V. ALLEN KEITH STEWART; HONORABLE RICHARD H. CAMPBELL, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND, WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED: AUGUST 18, 2000; 10:00 a.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-002023-WC
KIAH CREEK MINING
v.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-97-76965
ALLEN KEITH STEWART; HONORABLE
RICHARD H. CAMPBELL, JR.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND,
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
AND
NO. 1999-CA-002239-WC
ALLEN KEITH STEWART
v.
APPELLEES
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTON NO. WC-97-76965
KIAH CREEK MINING; HONORABLE
RICHARD H. CAMPBELL, JR.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND,
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
OPINION AND ORDER
AFFIRMING IN 1999-CA-002239-WC
&
DISMISSING IN 1999-CA-002023-WC
** ** ** ** **
APPELLEES
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, JOHNSON AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE: Allen Keith Stewart, and his employer, Kiah Creek
Mining, seek our review of two opinions of the Workers’
Compensation Board, one rendered July 30, 1999, and a modified
opinion rendered September 3, 1999.
Both of these appeals
address the issue of the proper construction of the statutory
provisions outlining the method for computing benefits for
permanent partial disability for a claimant who lacks the
physical capacity to return to his previous work, KRS1
342.730(1)(b)-(d), as amended in 1996.
Stewart’s petition for
review raises the additional issue of the Board’s authority to
withdraw an opinion once it has been entered.
The facts necessary for an understanding of the issues
in these appeals are not in dispute.
Stewart, an underground
mine foreman, sustained an injury to his lower back in February
1997.
Although Stewart claimed to be totally disabled, the ALJ
determined that Stewart had sustained only a 15% functional
impairment.
However, the ALJ agreed with Stewart’s contention
that he did not retain the physical capacity to return to the
sort of work he had been performing at the time of his back
injury.
In his opinion and award of March 29, 1999, the ALJ
calculated the amount of Stewart’s award in the following manner:
It having been determined that the work
injuries of February[] 1997, rendered
[Stewart] substantially, but not totally,
disabled, his compensable permanent
disability must be assessed in accordance
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
-2-
with the table set forth in KRS
342.730(1)(b); and, because [Stewart] is
precluded from returning to the type work in
which he was engaged when injured,
application of the enhancement factor
provided in KRS 342.730(1)(c) is warranted as
well. Therefore, utilizing the various
multiplication components, [Stewart] is
deemed entitled to benefits for a permanent
partial disability rating of 28.125% (15% x
1.25 = 18.75 x 1.5). Such benefits amount to
$125.73 per week [662/3% of [Stewart’s]
average weekly age, $784.00, reduced to the
maximum of $447.032 x 28.125% per KRS
342.730(1)(d)].
Kiah appealed to the Board and argued that the ALJ
erred in calculating Stewart’s award by using the maximum
permanent total disability rate (100% of the state average weekly
wage, $447.03), instead of the maximum permanent partial
disability rate (75% of the state average weekly wage, $335.27).
On July 30, 1999, the Board, in a split decision, rendered its
opinion affirming the ALJ’s award.
On August 13, 1999, the Board entered an order
withdrawing its July 30 opinion.
In a separate order of the same
date, the Board consolidated the case sub judice with another
pending case which also contained the issue of the proper
construction of KRS 342.730(1)(b)-(d), and scheduled both cases
for oral argument.
Stewart filed a petition for reconsideration
and a motion to set aside the order withdrawing the opinion on
the grounds that there is no statute or regulation allowing the
Board to withdraw an opinion once it has been entered.
Kiah did not object to the withdrawal of the Board’s
opinion.
2
Nevertheless, the employer filed a timely petition for
$447.03 was the state average weekly wage for 1997.
-3-
review of the original opinion in this Court3 as a protective
measure in the event it was later determined that the Board was
acting without authority in the withdrawal of its opinion.
On
September 3, 1999, the Board entered an order denying Stewart’s
motion to reconsider.
The Board recognized that its action was
“unusual,” and agreed that there was no express statute or
regulation authorizing the withdrawal of its opinion.
However,
the Board concluded that
because of its statutory and judicially
defined nature, [it] retains certain implied
powers inherent in any court to exercise
authority to manage its own affairs so as to
achieve the orderly and expeditious, accurate
and truthful disposition of causes and cases.
As such, these powers are governed not by
statute or rule, but by the control vested in
the Workers’ Compensation Board to so manage
its own affairs. Clearly, the Workers’
Compensation Board retains the inherent
authority to enter orders protecting the
integrity of its own proceedings. Our
actions in withdrawing the initial opinion in
the instant action, and subsequently
scheduling oral arguments, is an implied
power inherent in the Workers’ Compensation
Board’s appellate function. Our present
adjudication system depends on the
adversarial presentation of evidence and
arguments of law. The purpose of our actions
is to secure additional information by way of
argument on the subject matter at hand and to
thoroughly address a significant issue that
will affect a multitude of cases decided
after December 12, 1996.
On the same day, the Board rendered its modified
opinion on the merits and concluded that the ALJ’s interpretation
3
Kiah’s appeal, No. 1999-CA-002023-WC, was placed in
abeyance by order of this Court on November 17, 1999, pending the
disposition of Stewart’s appeal. Because we have concluded that
the Board was empowered to withdraw its original opinion, Kiah’s
appeal is now moot.
-4-
of KRS 342.730(1)(b)-(d) was erroneous and that Stewart’s award
should have been computed by applying his disability rating
against 75%, and not 100%, of the state average weekly wage.
Stewart’s petition for review questions both the Board’s
authority to withdraw its original opinion and its interpretation
of KRS 342.730(1)(b)-(d).
With respect to the procedural issue, Stewart
criticizes the Board for comparing itself to an appellate court,
and points out that the authority of this Court and the Supreme
Court to withdraw opinions is specifically addressed by CR4
76.30(2).
He further argues that since 803 KAR5 25:010 §23
specifically prohibits motions for reconsideration, then “[b]y
implication” the Board cannot itself reconsider an opinion “once
it has been entered.”
Finally, Stewart points out that KRS
342.285, the statute which sets out the Board’s appellate
authority, does not make any provisions for the action of the
Board in withdrawing its opinion.
Stewart contends that the
Board simply exceeded its authority in withdrawing its original
opinion and that the opinion rendered on September 3, 1999, “is a
complete nullity.”
The Board chose to file a brief in this matter and
states that its “essential purpose” is “to define, narrow, and
illuminate the issues raised by the parties on appeal,” and “to
allow for thoughtful deliberation of legal issues unburdened by
the responsibility to simultaneously make findings of fact.”
4
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
5
Kentucky Administrative Regulations.
-5-
It
points to the deference to which the Supreme Court of Kentucky
has held its opinions are entitled6 and suggests that “to be
worthy” of this deference, it “must be empowered with the
appropriate tools to reach the ‘right result’.”7
The Board has cited numerous cases from other state and
federal jurisdictions which hold that administrative agencies
acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, have “an inherent or implied
power to reconsider decisions still under their control.”
However, we do not believe it is necessary to look beyond the
established precedents in our own jurisdiction to resolve this
issue.
It is axiomatic that the Board, an administrative agency
created by statute, has no inherent powers.
The Board has only
those powers expressly granted or necessarily implied from the
statute.8
It has long been recognized that statutes defining the
powers of administrative agencies “seldom, if ever, define with
precise accuracy the full scope of such powers and duties,” thus
6
See Western Baptist Hospital v. Kelly, Ky., 827 S.W.2d 685,
687 (1992). In the seminal case concerning the standard of
review to be utilized in appellate review of the Board’s
decisions, the Supreme Court of Kentucky stated that the Board
“is entitled to the same deference for its appellate decisions as
we intend when we exercise discretionary review of Kentucky Court
of Appeals decisions in cases that originate in circuit court”.
7
The Board’s reference to the “right result” is taken from
Bookman v. United States, 453 F.2d 1263, 1265 (Ct.Cl. 1972)(“the
public’s interest in a ‘right result’ is consonant with the
expanding application of the decision either in terms of the
number of individuals directly or presently affected, or its
future precedent value”).
8
Ashland-Boyd County City-County Health Dept v. Riggs, Ky.,
252 S.W.2d 922, 923 (1952).
-6-
requiring some powers to “arise by implication.”9
“It is a
general principle of law that where the end is required, the
appropriate means are implied.”10
Stewart is correct in stating
that KRS 342.285 does not expressly give the Board authority to
withdraw and/or reconsider its opinions.
However, the Board
makes a compelling argument that such authority is necessarily
implied by the nature of the work it was created to perform and
in order to protect the integrity of its decisions.
Fortunately, we are guided by case law in this
jurisdiction which specifically addresses an agency’s power to
change its decisions made in a quasi-judicial capacity.
In Union
Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Public Service Commission,11 our
highest court stated:
[W]e know of no rule of law that denies to a
court the right to revoke an order and
substitute in lieu thereof a new and
different one, provided that court has not
lost jurisdiction over the case involved. An
administrative agency unquestionably has the
authority, just as has a court, to reconsider
9
Board of Education of Boyd County v. Trustees of Buena
Vista School, 256 Ky. 432, 76 S.W.2d 267, 268 (1934).
10
Ashland-Boyd, supra.
11
Ky., 271 S.W.2d 361, 365-66 (1954). See also, Travelodge
International, Inc. v. Kentucky Unemployment Insurance
Commission, Ky.App., 710 S.W.2d 232, 234 (1986) (commission had
authority to reconsider original decision until decision became
final twenty days after rendition, although “controlling
regulations did not provide for reconsideration at that time”);
but cf. Phelps v. Sallee, Ky., 529 S.W.2d 361, 365 (1975) (“an
administrative agency does not have any inherent or implied power
to reopen or reconsider a final decision”). We do not believe
the holding in Phelps to be controlling in the instant case as
the agency action involved in that case was not quasi-judicial in
nature, but purely ministerial, a distinction recognized in
Western Kraft Paper Group v. Department for Natural Resources and
Environmental Protection, Ky.App., 632 S.W.2d 454 (1982).
-7-
and change its orders during the time it
retains control over any question under
submission to it.
Accordingly, we agree with the Board that it “retains
control” over an opinion it has rendered, and thus may withdraw
that opinion, until such time as a party has filed a petition for
review in this Court, or until the time for seeking review in
this Court has expired, that is, within thirty days of the entry
of the Board’s opinion.12
In the case sub judice, neither of
those events had occurred on the date the Board withdrew its
original opinion.
Accordingly, we hold that the Board acted
appropriately and well within the authority implied by KRS
342.285 when it further reviewed the ALJ’s decision.
Thus, we will now address the substantive controversy
in this appeal, which concerns the proper application and
interplay of KRS 342.730(1)(b),(c) and (d).
There statutes read
in relevant parts as follows:
(1) Except as provided in KRS 342.732, income
benefits for disability shall be paid to the
employee as follows:
(a) [this portion of the statute concerns
temporary or permanent total disability]
(b) For permanent partial disability, sixtysix and two-thirds percent (66-2/3%) of the
employee’s average weekly wage but not more
than seventy-five percent (75%) of the state
average weekly wage as determined by KRS
342.740, multiplied by the permanent
impairment rating caused by the injury or
occupational disease as determined by “Guides
to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment,”
American Medical Association, latest edition
available, times the factor set forth in the
12
See KRS 342.290; CR 76.25; and Staton v. Poly Weave Bag
Co. Inc./Poly Weave Packaging, Inc., Ky., 930 S.W.2d 397 (1996).
-8-
table that follows:
AMA Impairment
0 to 5%
6 to 10%
11 to 15%
16 to 20%
21 to 25%
26 to 30%
31 to 35%
36% and above
Factor13
0.75 [0.65]
1.00 [0.85]
1.25 [1.00]
1.50 [1.00]
1.75 [1.15]
2.00 [1.35]
2.25 [1.50]
2.50 [1.70]
. . . .
(c)
1. If, due to an injury, an employee
does not retain the physical capacity to
return to the type of work that the
employee performed at the time of
injury, the benefit for permanent
partial disability shall be one and onehalf (1-1/2) times the amount otherwise
determined under paragraph (b) of this
subsection, but this provision shall not
be construed so as to extend the
duration of payments.
2. If an employee returns to work at a
weekly wage equal to or greater than the
average weekly wage at the time of
injury, the weekly benefit for permanent
partial disability otherwise payable
under paragraph (b) of this subsection
shall be reduced by one-half (½) for
each week during which that employment
is sustained.
. . .
(d)
For permanent partial disability, if an
employee has a permanent disability
rating of fifty percent (50%) or less as
a result of a work-related injury, the
compensable permanent partial disability
period shall be four hundred twenty-five
(425) weeks, and if the permanent
disability rating is greater than fifty
percent (50%), the compensable permanent
partial disability period shall be five
hundred twenty (520) weeks from the date
the impairment or disability exceeding
13
The figure in the bracket represents changes made by the
2000 Legislature, effective April 21, 2000.
-9-
fifty percent (50%) arises. Benefits
payable for permanent partial disability
shall not exceed ninety-nine percent
(99%) of sixty-six and two-thirds
percent (66-2/3%) of the employee’s
average weekly wage as determined under
KRS 342.740 and shall not exceed
seventy-five percent (75%) of the state
average weekly wage, except for benefits
payable pursuant to paragraph (c)1. of
this subsection, which shall not exceed
one hundred percent (100%) of the state
average weekly wage, nor shall benefits
for permanent partial disability be
payable for a period exceeding five
hundred twenty (520) weeks,
notwithstanding that multiplication of
impairment times the factor set forth in
paragraph (b) of this subsection would
yield a greater percentage of
disability.14
In applying these subsections to determine Stewart’s
award for permanent partial disability, the ALJ first multiplied
the degree of permanent partial impairment, 15%, by a factor of
1.25, the factor contained in the table in KRS 342.730(1)(b),
which resulted in an 18.75% disability rating.
Then, because
Stewart was not able to return to his former work, the ALJ
multiplied the disability rating by the 1.5 multiplier contained
in subsection (c) 1.
Next, the ALJ applied the result of the
former calculation, 28.125%, against $447.03, 100% of the state
average weekly wage, which resulted in a weekly benefit awarded
of $125.73.
The ALJ was convinced that his use of 100% of the
state average weekly wage was required by the language in KRS
14
Although the Legislature further refined this statue in
the 2000 session by reducing the (1)(b) factors, increasing the
1.5 multiplier in (1)(c) 1. to 3.0, eliminating the .5 multiplier
in (1)(c)(2)., and adding an education and age factor, (1)(c)3.,
the methodology for computing income benefits for permanent
partial disability was unchanged.
-10-
342.730(1)(d) that benefits “shall not exceed seventy-five
percent (75%) of the state average weekly wage, except for
benefits payable pursuant to paragraph (c)1. of this subsection,
which shall not exceed one hundred percent (100%) of the state
average weekly wage . . .”[emphasis added].
In its review, the Board agreed with the ALJ’s use of
the factor in subsection (1)(b).
However, it viewed the process
designed by the statute’s remaining subsections somewhat
differently.
It concluded that after the 18.75% “impairment
rating” was determined, the ALJ should have multiplied that
amount by 66 2/3% of the employee’s average weekly wage but not
more than 75% of the state average weekly wage.
“At this point
the base ‘benefit’ [would have] been established.”
The Board
further concluded:
Once the dollar figure for the benefit
has been found, it is incumbent upon the
adjudicator to factually determine first
whether or not an individual retains the
physical capacity to return to the same type
of work. If the worker has not, then (c)1.
is applicable. The adjudicator must then
determine whether the individual has returned
to work at an average weekly wage equal to or
greater than the average weekly wage being
earned at the time of the injury. If so,
then (c) 2. will be applicable. If neither
of these apply, then the benefits equate to
the amount found under subsection (b).
Otherwise, the benefit is multiplied times
either 1.5 or .5, or conceivably both, to
determine the benefit available. None of the
multipliers contained in subsection (c) alter
the permanent disability rating. While the
reality is that using these multipliers as
against the “percentage of disability” might
lead to the same dollar figure, it is
important to understand that these
multipliers do not alter the disability
rating but simply alter the benefits
available on a weekly basis. It is, we
-11-
believe, this step in the process that has
caused some confusion. We have in the past
through concurring opinions noted the
significance of the understanding that the
subsection (c) multipliers do not change the
percentage of the “permanent disability
rating.” The focus of these concurring
opinions was primarily concerned with whether
an individual receives 425 weeks of benefits
or 520 weeks. When it is recognized that
subsection (d) addresses the issue of the
payment of benefits for permanent partial
disability, it can be seen that only after
the multiplication of the 1.5 factor in (c)
1. is 100% of the state average weekly wage
an issue. It is no different from the fact
that an individual who, for instance, has an
impairment rating of 26 to 30% multiplied
times the 2 grid factor is entitled to 520
weeks of benefits. That individual is
entitled to 520 weeks even if he returns to
work at a weekly wage equal to or greater
than the average weekly wage at the time of
the injury. The “permanent disability
rating” has not changed but the weekly
benefits have changed. They may be reduced
to .5 of the dollars available but would
still be payable for 520 weeks. For
computation purposes and as a formula to be
followed, we would offer the following:
(1) Permanent impairment rating x .730(1)(b)
factor = permanent partial disability rating
(payable for 425 weeks if 50% or less or 520
weeks if greater than 50%).
(2) Permanent partial disability rating x 66
2/3% of employee’s average weekly wage or 75%
of the state average weekly wage (whichever
is less) = weekly benefit.
(3) Weekly benefit x 1.5 (if (1)(c) 1. is
applicable) and/or .5 (if (1) (c)2. Is
applicable).
(4) If (1)(c)1. is applicable, weekly award
may not exceed 99% of 66 2/3% of employee’s
average weekly or 100% of the state average
weekly wage (whichever is less).
As a practical matter, the “exception”
at issue in subsection (1)(d) only impacts
high wage earners with an impairment rating
greater than 30% (or disability rating
-12-
greater than 66.67%) [emphases added].
Applying this formula to the case sub judice would result in
weekly benefits of $94.29.15
To discern the legislative intent of the 1996
amendments to KRS 342.730(1), we are guided by familiar and
settled principles of statutory construction.
Our primary task
in construing a statute is to give effect to the intent of the
General Assembly by looking first at the language it employed.16
We must construe a statute as a whole to give it and its
subsections consistent and harmonious effect.17
When the plain
language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no need
to resort to interpretive rules of statutory construction.18
We have quoted at length from the Board’s opinion as we
believe that the Board correctly interprets the statute and the
Legislature’s intent in its formula for calculating permanent
partial disability benefits.
KRS 342.730(1)(b) clearly and
plainly provides that the percentage of permanent partial
15
This figure was arrived by using the Board’s
interpretation as follows: 15% x 1.75 [(1)(b) factor] = 18.75 x
$335.27 (75% of state average weekly wage of $447.03) = 62.86 x
1.5 [(1)(c) 1. factor to be applied to the benefit] = $94.29.
Stewart’s average weekly wage was $784. Thus, his benefit
comports with the limits in subsection (1)(d) as it does not
exceed 99% of 66 2/3% of Stewart’s average weekly wage ($517.46),
or 100% of the state average weekly wage ($447.03).
16
Gurnee v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government,
Ky.App., 6 S.W.3d 852, 856 (1999).
17
Commonwealth ex rel. Morris v. Morris, Ky., 984 S.W.2d
840, 841 (1998).
18
Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission v. Kaco
Unemployment Ins. Fund, Inc., Ky.App., 793 S.W.2d 845, 847
(1990).
-13-
disability arrived at by multiplying the degree of impairment by
the listed factor should be applied against the lesser of 66-2/3%
of the claimant’s average weekly wage, or 75% of the state
average weekly wage.
Just as plainly, the multipliers contained
in subsection (1)(c) are to be applied against the “benefits,”
not the disability rating.
It is the Board’s interpretation of subsection(1)(d) as
providing a mere cap, and not comprising an alternate method for
computing benefits, which most concerns Stewart.
He insists that
the Legislature intended to use a multiplier in cases of
permanent partial disability of 75% of the state average weekly
wage except where (1)(c) 1. applies, in which event, he insists
the Legislature intended the multiplier to be 100% of the state
average weekly wage, the same as for temporary and permanent
total disability.
We believe the Board rejected this reasoning
because the plain language of KRS 342.730(1)(b) provides that the
benefits for permanent partial disability “shall be paid” at
either 66 2/3% of the worker’s average weekly wage, or 75% of the
state average weekly wage, whichever is lower.
From this point,
subsection (1)(c) of the statutory scheme either enhances the
benefit, depending on the worker’s current physical capacity to
return to the same type of work, and/or reduces the benefit
depending on his current wages.
We agree with Stewart’s argument
that the Legislature intended to further enhance the benefits of
those workers who sustain high levels of impairment and/or
injuries that prevent them from returning to their former work by
its enactment of (1)(d), albeit not in the way Stewart envisions.
-14-
There is nothing in the language employed in subsection
(1)(d) to support the ALJ’s interpretation of the statute, that
is to alter the initial formula contained in (1)(b) by replacing
75% of the state average weekly wage with 100% of the state
average weekly wage for all workers entitled to the (1)(c) 1.
enhancements.
Rather, this subsection extends the benefit for a
greater number of weeks for injured workers whose permanent
partial disability exceeds 50%.
Next, the statute’s language
that the benefits “shall not exceed” certain percentages of the
state average weekly wage plainly provides caps for all permanent
partial disability awards.
The Board’s interpretation of these
words as a cap is logical and achieves harmony with KRS
342.730(1)(a), as otherwise a worker with a high degree of
permanent partial impairment could, by virtue of the application
of the factor in (1)(b) and/or the (1)(c) 1. multiplier, obtain
an award in excess of that for permanent total disability, a
result obviously not intended by the Legislature.
However, the statute further provides that the worker
who cannot return to his former job can pierce the maximum limit
for permanent partial disability (75% of the state average weekly
wage) and obtain an award up to 100% of the state average weekly
wage, the limit for permanent total disability.19
19
Although the
For example, a worker who earns $500 per week with a
permanent impairment under the AMA Guides of 35%, would be
entitled to weekly income benefits of $264.03 (35 x 2.25 [the
(1)(b) factor] x $335.27 [75% of the 1997 state average weekly
wage]). If that worker is not able to return to his former type
of work, the benefit is then multiplied by 1.5, enhancing the
benefit to $396.05 per week. If not for the language in (1)(d)
that allows such a worker to be awarded benefits up to 100% of
(continued...)
-15-
Board’s interpretation of (1)(d) as providing two caps, but not
as impacting the (1)(b) computations does not enure to Stewart’s
benefit, it does further the goals Stewart argues the Legislature
intended.
Seriously impaired workers who are not able to return
to the same type of work they performed when injured can receive
awards that approach, or equal, those awarded to totally disabled
workers.
In summary, the interpretation articulated by the Board
is the one which best respects the words employed and the
sequence of the subsections as enacted by the Legislature in its
scheme to compensate permanently impaired workers.
Accordingly, the September 3, 1999, opinion of the
Workers’ Compensation Board from which appeal No. 1999-CA-002239WC, has been taken, is affirmed.
Appeal No. 1999-CA-002023-WC is
hereby DISMISSED as MOOT.
ALL CONCUR.
Entered:
AUGUST 18, 2000
/s/
Rick A. Johnson
Judge, Court of Appeals
19
(...continued)
the state average weekly wage of $447.03 the $396.05 would
exceed, and would be capped by, the maximum for permanent partial
disability of $335.27.
-16-
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT, ALLEN KEITH
STEWART:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE, KIAH CREEK MINING:
Terri Smith Walters
Pikeville, KY
Robert J. Greene
Pikeville, KY
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, WORKERS’
COMPENSATION BOARD:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT, KIAH CREEK MINING:
Larry M. Greathouse
Frankfort, KY
Terri Smith Walters
Pikeville, KY
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE,
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD:
Carl M. Brashear
Frankfort, KY
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE, ALLEN KEITH STEWART:
Robert J. Greene
Pikeville, KY
-17-
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