ROBERT L. CLARK AND BETTY J. CLARK v. DAVIESS COUNTY, A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY; DAVIESS FISCAL COURT, THE LEGISLATIVE BODY OF DAVIESS COUNTY; REID HAIRE, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS DAVIESS COUNTY JUDGE/EXECUTIVE; BRUCE KUNZE, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER OF THE DAVIESS FISCAL COURT MIKE RINEY, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER OF THE DAVIESS FISCAL COURT; JIM LAMBERT, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER OF THE DAVIESS FISCAL COURT; OWENSBORO METROPOLITAN PLANNING COMMISSION; RICK HOBGOOD, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THE OWENSBORO METROPOLITAN PLANNING COMMISSION; ROBERT HOSKINS, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THE OWENSBORO METROPOLITAN PLANNING COMMISSION; MIKE ARMSTRONG, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THE OWENSBORO METROPOLITAN PLANNING COMMISSION; DREW KIRKLAND, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THE OWENSBORO METROPOLITAN PLANNING COMMISSION; IRVIN ROGERS, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THE OWENSBORO METROPOLITAN PLANNING COMMISSION; NICK CAMBRON, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THE OWENSBORO METROPOLITAN PLANNING COMMISSION; DAVE APPLEBY, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THE OWENSBORO METROPOLITAN PLANNING COMMISSION; JUDY DIXON, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THE OWENSBORO METROPOLITAN PLANNING COMMISSION; C.A. PANTLE, JR., IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THE OWENSBORO METROPOLITAN PLANNING COMMISSION; MARK SCHMIDT, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THE OWENSBORO METROPOLITAN PLANNING COMMISSION; IBOK, LLC; AND JOE A. HARPER, SR.
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RENDERED: June 30, 2000; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-001976-MR
ROBERT L. CLARK
AND BETTY J. CLARK
v.
APPEAL FROM DAVIESS CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS O. CASTELEN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 1999-CI-00070
DAVIESS COUNTY,
A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF
THE COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY;
DAVIESS FISCAL COURT, THE
LEGISLATIVE BODY OF DAVIESS COUNTY;
REID HAIRE, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
DAVIESS COUNTY JUDGE/EXECUTIVE;
BRUCE KUNZE, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
COMMISSIONER OF THE DAVIESS FISCAL COURT
MIKE RINEY, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
COMMISSIONER OF THE DAVIESS FISCAL COURT;
JIM LAMBERT, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
COMMISSIONER OF THE DAVIESS FISCAL COURT;
OWENSBORO METROPOLITAN PLANNING COMMISSION;
RICK HOBGOOD, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
A MEMBER OF THE OWENSBORO METROPOLITAN PLANNING
COMMISSION; ROBERT HOSKINS, IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THE OWENSBORO
METROPOLITAN PLANNING COMMISSION;
MIKE ARMSTRONG, IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THE OWENSBORO METROPOLITAN
PLANNING COMMISSION; DREW KIRKLAND, IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THE OWENSBORO
METROPOLITAN PLANNING COMMISSION;
IRVIN ROGERS, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
A MEMBER OF THE OWENSBORO METROPOLITAN PLANNING
COMMISSION; NICK CAMBRON, IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THE OWENSBORO
METROPOLITAN PLANNING COMMISSION;
DAVE APPLEBY, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
A MEMBER OF THE OWENSBORO METROPOLITAN PLANNING
APPELLANTS
COMMISSION; JUDY DIXON, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY
AS A MEMBER OF THE OWENSBORO METROPOLITAN
PLANNING COMMISSION; C.A. PANTLE, JR.,
IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THE OWENSBORO
METROPOLITAN PLANNING COMMISSION;
MARK SCHMIDT, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
A MEMBER OF THE OWENSBORO METROPOLITAN PLANNING
COMMISSION;
IBOK, LLC;
AND JOE A. HARPER, SR.
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, KNOPF, AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
This is an appeal from a judgment by the Daviess
Circuit Court upholding an ordinance which granted a zoning map
amendment.
The adjoining property owners argue that the decision
to waive the applicable driveway spacing standards for the
applicants’ development plan was arbitrary.
They further contend
that the trial court abused its discretion by denying a motion to
amend their complaint to raise an issue regarding an alleged
conflict of interest by a member of the Planning Commission.
We
find that the decision of the Planning Commission to waive the
driveway spacing standards was within its discretion and was
supported by substantial evidence.
We also find that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to amend
the complaint.
Hence, we affirm.
Joe A. Harper, Sr. owned a 11.833 acre tract of land
located at the intersection of Kentucky Highway 54 and Fairview
Drive in Daviess County, Kentucky (the subject property).
In
1988, he entered into a contract to sell that property to Ibok,
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LLC.
Pursuant to that contract, Harper and Ibok filed an
application with the Owensboro Metropolitan Planning Commission
(the Planning Commission) for a map amendment.
Harper and Ibok
sought to change the subject property’s zoning classification
from A-U (Urban Agricultural) and B-4 (General Business), so that
all of the property would be zoned B-4.
The only real objection to the proposed zoning
amendment concerned access to the subject property.
The planning
staff objected to the rezoning because the access points
requested by Harper and Ibok did not comply with the guidelines
set out in the Comprehensive Plan.
The Access Management Manual,
adopted by the Comprehensive Plan, requires that street
intersections and driveways on minor arterial roadways be spaced
a minimum of 500 feet apart.
The subject property’s frontage on
Highway 54 was not sufficient to meet this standard.
The
planning staff recommended that access to the subject property be
limited to Fairview Drive.
The planning staff also noted that
the proposed access from Fairview Drive was less than 500 feet
from the intersection with Highway 54.
The planning staff
recommended that this access point be located at least 500 feet
from the intersection.
In response, Harper and Ibok modified
their request for an access point from Highway 54, eventually
agreeing that it be limited to a “right-turn-in-only” access.
They further requested that the spacing requirements for the
access points on Highway 54 and Fairview Drive be waived
accordingly.
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On November 12, 1998, the Planning Commission held a
public hearing on the application.
Various adjoining landowners,
including the appellants, Robert L. and Betty J. Clark, spoke at
the hearing.
The Planning Commission heard testimony from its
planning staff regarding its concerns about access to the
development.
In addition, Frank Gianotti, an expert witness who
specializes in traffic and site engineering, testified on behalf
of Harper and Ibok.
Mr. Gianotti complimented the Planning
Commission on adopting access management guidelines, but he
recommended that strict compliance is not always appropriate.
He
stated that adhering to the minimum standards would actually
result in greater safety hazards and disturbances in the flow of
traffic.
In the case of the proposed “right-turn-in-only” access
from Highway 54, he stated that the spacing requirements in the
Access Manual did not adequately address such special entrances,
and that this limited entrance would improve traffic flow.
With
regard to the entrance on Fairview Drive, Mr. Gianotti testified
that strict compliance with the spacing requirements would
necessitate an inordinate curvature of the access road within the
development.
Following the hearing, the Planning Commission voted 53 to recommend approval of the map amendment.
The Planning
Commission set forth 9 conditions which would have to be met by
the applicants.
Two of the conditions, No. 8 and No. 9, are at
issue:
8.
Access to Fairview Drive shall be
limited to a single access point located
a minimum of 413 feet from KY 54; and
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9.
Access to KY 54 shall be limited to a
single access point located a minimum of
300 feet from Fairview Drive. This
access point shall be designated with a
deceleration/storage lane, and
designated for right-turn ingress only.
On December 16, 1998, the Daviess County Fiscal Court
introduced and held a first reading on an ordinance adopting the
Planning Commission’s recommendations.
On December 23, 1998, the
Fiscal Court held a second reading on the ordinance, and formally
approved the map amendment.
Pursuant to KRS 100.347, on January
19, 1999, the Clarks filed an action in the Daviess Circuit Court
challenging the ordinance, arguing that the decision by the
Planning Commission and the Fiscal Court to waive the spacing
requirements was arbitrary, and was not supported by substantial
evidence.
The matter was submitted to the circuit court on briefs
and oral arguments by counsel, and upon the Planning Commission’s
record.
In a footnote to their April 16, 1999, brief to the
trial court, the Clarks alleged that Mike Armstrong, a Planning
Commission member who moved for approval of the rezoning, had
significant financial dealings with Independence Bank of
Kentucky.
The Bank is owned by the same persons who own or
control Ibok.
Thus, the Clarks suggested that Commissioner
Armstrong’s conflict of interest tainted the proceedings before
the Planning Commission.
However, the text of the Clark’s brief
primarily focused on their argument that the Planning
Commission’s waiver of the access standards was arbitrary, and it
did not further raise the alleged conflict of interest issue.
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The Clark’s filed a motion to amend their complaint on June 10,
seeking to raise the conflict of interest issue.
On June 23, the trial court entered an order upholding
the rezoning.
The court found that the Planning Commission and
the Fiscal Court’s decision to waive the spacing requirements was
supported by adequate findings of fact based upon substantial
evidence.1
The trial court further found that the standards set
out in the Access Management Manual are guidelines, and the
Planning Commission acted within its discretion by departing from
those standards in this case.
In a separate order entered on
August 10, 1999, the trial court denied the Clark’s motion to
amend their complaint, concluding that the conflict of interest
issue was not raised in a timely manner.
This appeal followed.
In most cases involving an appeal from a zoning map
amendment proceeding, the appellate court is presented with the
question of whether the decision to grant the rezoning of the
property was arbitrary.
In this case, however, the Clarks do not
challenge the validity of the map amendment.
Rather, they first
argue that the decisions by the Fiscal Court and by the Planning
Commission to waive the applicable access standards were
arbitrary.
They assert that the driveway and spacing standards
set out in the Access Management Manual are mandatory.
The trial
court rejected this interpretation, noting that the Manual had
been incorporated into the Comprehensive Plan.
Although a zoning
agency is required to consider the Comprehensive Plan, its
1
The trial court also found that the Clarks’ appeal was timely under KRS 100.347(2).
This issue has not been raised in the current appeal.
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elements and requirements when deciding whether to approve a
zoning map amendment, the zoning agency is not bound to follow
every detail of that plan.
Ward v. Knippenberg, Ky., 416 S.W.2d
746 (1967).
The Access Management Manual was developed in 1991
through the joint efforts of the Kentucky Department of Highways,
the Green River Area Development District, and the Planning
Commission.
In 1991, the Planning Commission incorporated the
Access Management Manual into the Comprehensive Plan for Daviess
County.
The Manual states that it is intended to serve as a
policy guideline for directing highway and street development in
the Owensboro and Daviess County Area.
There is a dispute between the parties concerning
whether the Access Management Manual has been formally adopted by
the City of Owensboro and Daviess County as part of the Zoning
Ordinance.
It appears from the record before the trial court
that in 1996, Owensboro and Daviess County incorporated the
standards set out in the Access Management Manual into its Zoning
Ordinance.2
Nevertheless, the Access Management Manual itself
allows for discretionary application of the standards.
By
implication, the Zoning Ordinance’s reference to the Manual also
incorporates this discretion.
2
Section 13.21 of the Amended Zoning Ordinance provides:
Access to building developments located along arterial or major
collector streets in the Owensboro Urban Service Area shall be
subject to the driveway spacing standards and the policies for
applying those standards, as specified in the adopted “Access
Management Manual for the Owensboro-Daviess County Urban
Area.”
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Nonetheless, the Clarks argue that compliance with the
spacing standards set out in the Access Manual are ministerial in
nature.
We disagree.
subdivision plat.
ministerial act.
(1975).
This is not a case involving approval of a
Approval of a subdivision plat is a
Snyder v. Owensboro,
Ky., 528 S.W.2d 663, 664
The function of the planning commission in such cases is
to determine whether the proposed use is permitted under the
existing zoning classification, and if the proposed plat complies
with the zoning and subdivision regulations.
In contrast, KRS
100.211(1) places the decision to grant a map amendment within
the discretion of the local legislative body.
McKinstry v. Wells,
See also,
Ky. App., 548 S.W.2d 169, 175 (1977).
The primary issues presented by the Clarks are whether
the Planning Commission’s decision to waive the standard set out
in the Access Manual was supported by substantial evidence, and
whether the Planning Commission made sufficient factual findings
to support that decision.
KRS 100.213 sets out the findings of
fact which the Planning Commission must make to grant a map
amendment.
The Planning Commission must find that the map
amendment is in agreement with the adopted comprehensive plan,
or, in the absence of such a finding, that one or more of the
following apply:
(a) That the existing zoning classification
given to the property is inappropriate and
that the proposed zoning classification is
appropriate; or
(b) That there have been major changes of an
economic, physical, or social nature within
the area involved which were not anticipated
in the adopted comprehensive plan and which
have substantially altered the basic
character of such area.
-8-
In the present case there is no dispute that the change
in the zoning classification for the subject property is in
agreement with the Comprehensive Plan.
The only question is
whether the decision to waive the driveway spacing standards was
in agreement with the Comprehensive Plan.
The Clarks concede
that there was evidence presented at the public hearing which
could have supported such a finding.
In particular, the
testimony from Mr. Gianotti would justify the Planning
Commission’s decision to waive strict compliance with the minimum
spacing standards set forth in the Access Manual. However, the
Clarks contend that the Planning Commission’s failure to make an
adjudicative factual finding on this issue renders the decision
invalid.
The Planning Commission found that the proposed zone
change and development plan were in conformance with all
applicable guidelines of the Comprehensive plan.
Consequently,
there was no need to make any findings concerning the
inappropriateness of the existing zoning classification or
whether there had been major economic, physical, or social
changes which altered the basic character of the area and
justified reclassification.
Minton v. Fiscal Court of Jefferson
County, Ky. App., 850 S.W.2d 52, 56 (1992).
Yet because the
driveway spacing guidelines have been adopted as part of the
Comprehensive Plan, KRS 100.213 requires the Planning Commission
to make a factual finding either that the proposed development is
in conformity with those standards, or that the circumstances
justify a waiver of those standards.
-9-
In Findings Number 3 and 4, the Planning Commission
found that:
3. The applicant’s proposal is a logical
zoning expansion because the subject property
is contiguous to and includes existing B-4
General Business zones, would not
significantly increase the extent of the B-4
General business zone within the area, and
would not overburden roadway capacity or
other necessary urban services that are
available or planned in the affected area, if
previously cited improvements to traffic
capacity are provided; and
4. Submission of a development plan
reflecting the conditions cited above will
achieve compliance with the Comprehensive
Plan, Zoning Ordinance and Subdivision
Regulations. Without said plan, the proposal
would not comply with the Comprehensive Plan,
Zoning Ordinance, and Subdivision
Regulations.
The Clarks take issue with the sufficiency of these
findings, asserting that they are merely general and conclusory
statements which do not directly support the decision to waive
the access spacing standards.
In Caller v. Ison, Ky., 508 S.W.2d
776 (1974), it was held that a mere parroting of the words of the
statute was not a sufficient finding of fact in a zoning matter
to justify a map amendment zoning change.
The finding of an
ultimate fact which is unaccompanied by a finding of any basic
facts which support the ultimate finding often renders appellate
review impossible.
The reviewing court has no way to determine
whether the ultimate finding was made arbitrarily if it does not
have before it the facts upon which the finding was based.
of Beechwood Village v. Council of and City of St. Matthews,
City
App.,
574 S.W.2d 322, 324 (1978).
-10-
Ky.
The Planning Commission’s factual findings in this case
were rudimentary.3
However, they do more than merely parrot the
language of the statute or state an ultimate conclusion.
The
Planning Commission found that the access conditions attached to
approval of the development plan would not overburden roadway
capacity or other necessary urban services, and they will achieve
compliance with the guidelines set out in the Comprehensive Plan,
the Zoning Ordinance and the Subdivision Regulations.
Although
greater specificity might be preferable, these findings are
adequate to afford meaningful appellate review.
Furthermore, the
record before the Planning Commission is sufficient to reflect
the elements necessary for judicial review to determine whether
the ultimate action was arbitrary.
City of Louisville v.
McDonald, Ky., 470 S.W.2d 173, 179 (1971).
Based upon the record
as a whole, we believe the Planning Commission’s findings were
supported by substantial evidence, and therefore are not
arbitrary.
Lastly, the Clarks contend that the trial court erred
in denying their motion to file the amended complaint, which
raised the issue of Commissioner Armstrong’s alleged conflict of
interest. Harper and Ibok argue that the circuit court lacked
jurisdiction to review the conflict of interest issue.
The trial
court agreed, finding that the conflict of interest issue raised
3
It should be noted that the document containing the Planning Commission’s findings of
fact is not the minutes of the November 12, 1998 hearing. Rather, it is the formal
recommendation which was forwarded to the Fiscal Court. The Recommendation includes the
“applicable excerpts of minutes of above meeting”, which is actually just the transcript of the
hearing. Although this seems procedurally irregular, that issue has not been raised in this appeal.
-11-
by the Clarks in their amended complaint is beyond the scope of
the court’s review under KRS 100.347.
The trial court stated
that it is limited to determining whether the Planning Commission
and the Fiscal Court acted arbitrarily, and it has no power to
conduct a de novo hearing.
Although we agree with the trial
court’s statement of law, we believe that the court below
interpreted the issue of arbitrariness too narrowly.
The action of an administrative body will be considered
arbitrary if: (1) the proceedings before the body did not afford
procedural due process: or (2) the action of the body was not
supported by substantial evidence heard by it.
Catlettsburg,
Ky., 437 S.W.2d 753, 755
Morris v. City of
(1969).
Due process
includes the right to have the matter considered by an unbiased
decision-maker.
Hart County Board of Education v. Broady,
App., 577 S.W.2d 423, 426 (1979).
We agree with the circuit
court that it has no power to conduct a de novo trial.
City of Catlettsburg,
Ky.
Ky., 437 S.W.2d 753, 755 (1969).
Morris v.
However,
the purpose of this rule is to prevent the court from
substituting its judgment in discretionary, legislative matters.
American Beauty Homes Corp. v. Louisville and Jefferson County
Planning and Zoning Commission,
(1964).
Ky.,
379 S.W.2d 450, 455
The Clarks are not asking the courts to conduct a de
novo review of the propriety of the map amendment.
Rather, the
Clarks seek a review of whether the procedure by which the map
amendment was granted comported with due process.
This is a
matter which is within the jurisdiction of the courts.
-12-
The trial court also noted that had Commissioner
Armstrong recused himself from the proceedings, the measure would
have passed nevertheless by a vote of 4-3.
However, given the
due process considerations at issue, this fact is not necessarily
controlling.
In the recent case of LaGrange City Council v. Hall
Brothers Co. of Oldham County, Inc.,
Ky.
App., 3 S.W.3d 765
(1999), this Court invalidated the vote of a person who was
statutorily not qualified to sit on the local legislative body.
In that case, the actual bias or conflict of interest of that
member was not at issue.
Thus, the votes of the remaining
members of the planning commission were not tainted.
However,
where there was an alleged failure to disclose a direct conflict
of interest, we believe that the interests of due process require
closer scrutiny.
Ultimately, this matter comes down to the trial court’s
determination that the Clarks did not bring their motion to amend
the complaint in a timely manner.
At the time they filed their
motion, the Clarks could only amend their complaint by leave of
the court.
CR 15.01.
After a motion for summary judgment has
been made, a motion to amend a pleading rests in the sound
discretion of the trial court, and its ruling will not be
disturbed unless an abuse of discretion is clearly shown.
Johnston v. Staples, Ky., 408 S.W.2d 206, 207 (1966).
The
timeliness of their cause of action was a legitimate
consideration.
The Clarks alleged that Commissioner Armstrong failed
to disclose his financial dealings with Independence Bank.
-13-
We
agree that their failure to raise the issue before the Planning
Commission or in their original complaint did not preclude
consideration of the issue.
Yet as the trial court pointed out,
the Clarks were aware of the issue at least as early as April 16,
1999, as evidenced by their reference to the issue in a footnote
of their brief.
However, they did not file a motion to amend
their complaint until June 10 - some eight weeks later.
By that
time, the case had been briefed, argued and submitted to the
trial court for a decision.
Given these circumstances, we cannot
say that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that
the issue was not timely raised.
Moreover, even assuming that the Clarks were diligent
in bringing this issue to the attention of the trial court, the
factual basis for their claim that Commissioner Armstrong was
biased is inadequate. KRS 100.171 requires that “[a]ny member of
a planning commission who has a direct or indirect financial
interest in the outcome of any question before the body shall
disclose the nature of the interest and shall disqualify himself
from voting on the question,. . .”
The purpose of this section
is to prevent direct and indirect financial enrichment to a
planning commission member or his business associates who have
property or matters for consideration by the commission.
City-
County Planning Commission of Warren County v. Jackson, Ky. App.
610 S.W.2d 930, 932 (1981).
The Clarks allege that Armstrong had sold a tract of
land to Independence Bank six weeks before the Planning
Commission hearing, and that he had borrowed substantial sums of
-14-
money from Independence Bank.
It is conceded that Independence
Bank is a separately held entity from Ibok. There is no
allegation that Commissioner Armstrong stood to benefit
personally from approval of the map amendment.
The Clarks do not
allege that the real property which Commissioner Armstrong sold
to Independence Bank would be affected by the map amendment.
Furthermore, the loans at issue consist of several real estate
mortgages taken out by Commissioner Armstrong and his wife
between June 1998 and February 1999.
There is nothing in the
record to suggest that Commissioner Armstrong’s relationship with
Independence Bank was any more than that of a customer of the
bank.
The mere fact that Commissioner Armstrong had a
business relationship with an entity related to the zoning
applicant is not sufficient to raise an inference of bias.
There
is no allegation that Commissioner Armstrong’s relationship with
Independence Bank would be affected by his decision to approve
Ibok’s application for a map amendment.
Even accepting all of
the facts alleged by the Clarks as true, we cannot find that
justice required the trial court to grant their motion to amend
the complaint raising the additional cause of action.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Daviess Circuit Court
is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANTS ROBERT L. CLARK,
ET AL.:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEES DAVIESS COUNTY,
ET AL:
Frank Stainback
Sullivan, Mountjoy, Stainback
& Miller, P.S.C.
Owensboro, Kentucky
Charles J. Kamuf
Kamuf, Yewell & Pace
Owensboro, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENTS FOR APPELLEE
OWENSBORO METROPOLITAN
PLANNING COMMISSION:
Stewart B. Elliott
Owensboro, Kentucky
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