NATHANIEL SIMS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: September 22, 2000; 2:00 p.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-001923-MR
NATHANIEL SIMS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES SHAKE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 78-CR-000226
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND VACATING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE; GUIDUGLI, AND McANULTY, JUDGES.
McANULTY, JUDGE: Nathaniel Sims (hereinafter appellant) appeals
the Order of Sex Offender Risk Determination by the Jefferson
Circuit Court which set forth its determination that appellant is
a “High Risk Sex Offender” pursuant to the Sex Offender
Registration Act.
Appellant challenges the trial court's
application of the Act to him on numerous grounds: (1) violation
of the United States and Kentucky Constitutions' prohibitions
against double jeopardy, bill of attainder, arbitrariness and ex
post facto laws, and the right of privacy; (2) violation of the
Kentucky Constitution's doctrine of separation of powers; (3)
lack of jurisdiction over his person; (4) res judicata; (5) lack
of jurisdiction by the sentencing court to reopen a criminal
conviction; (6) retrospective application of the statute; and (7)
reliance on hearsay information.1
We conclude that appellant has
correctly identified error in the procedure involved in the Sex
Offender Registration Act.
Therefore, we vacate the trial
court's order.
In 1978, appellant pled guilty to one count of sodomy
in the first degree and was sentenced to twenty years
imprisonment.
When it was determined that appellant's projected
release date from prison was July 1999, proceedings for
determining sex offender risk assessment pursuant to the Sex
Offender Registration Act, KRS 17.500 et seq., were begun in June
1999.
A risk determination hearing was held on June 30, 1999,
and July 14, 1999.
Following the hearing, the court entered an
Order of Sex Offender Risk Determination on July 16, 1999, which
stated that “[b]ased on prior criminal record, psychological
evaluation, and sex offender test results and violence risk
appraisal,” the court determined appellant to be a high risk sex
offender.
The Sex Offender Registration Act governs registration
of sex offenders after service of sentence and release from a
penal institution.
Pursuant to KRS 17.570, within 60 days prior
to discharge, release or parole of someone designated a sex
offender by KRS 17.550, the sentencing court shall order a “sex
1
Appellant raised additional claims of error which were
unpreserved and so were not considered in this appeal. Brown v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 780 S.W.2d 627, 630 (1989).
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offender risk assessment” conducted by a certified provider.2
The sentencing court makes the actual determination of the level
of risk by reviewing the recommendations of the certified
provider, victim statements, materials submitted by the sex
offender, and by conducting a hearing at which the offender shall
appear and be heard.
KRS 17.570(3) and (4).
The sentencing
court is required to issue findings of fact and conclusions of
law and enter an order designating the level of risk.
KRS
17.570(6).
Appellant challenges the provisions of 17.570 which
require the sentencing court to conduct the sex offender risk
assessment.
He disputes the basic power of the court to act in
these circumstances.
We are persuaded by appellant's arguments
that the sentencing court has no power to reopen the final
judgment, and that the court's action in making the assessment
violates the separation of powers doctrine.
As stated above, the statute designates the sentencing
court to perform the sex offender risk assessment when the
offender is within 60 days of release, discharge or parole.
This
entails a reopening of the prisoner's earlier criminal judgment
of conviction.
In this case, the risk assessment was done by the
court which sentenced appellant.
In fact, this action carries
the same action number from appellant's indictment 22 years ago.
2
A certified provider is defined in KRS 17.550 as a mental
health professional certified by the Sex Offender Risk Assessment
Advisory Board to conduct sexual offender risk assessments, or
presentence assessments, or assessments related to probation or
conditional discharge.
-3-
Thus, his case has been reopened.
Appellant's contention is that
the General Assembly has no authority, and thus no jurisdiction,
to direct a circuit court to reopen a criminal case.
We agree.
We have found no authority for the sentencing court to reopen a
judgment to perform additional tasks after the defendant has been
committed to the executive branch to serve his sentence.
A judgment becomes final 10 days after its entry, at
which point the court loses jurisdiction over the case.
Bowling
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 964 S.W.2d 803 (1998); Commonwealth v.
Gross, Ky., 936 S.W.2d 85 (1996); Commonwealth v. Marcum, Ky.,
873 S.W.2d 207 (1994); Silverburg v. Commonwealth, Ky., 587
S.W.2d 241 (1979).
A court may be reinvested with jurisdiction
when the prisoner files a motion under RCr 11.42 or CR 60.02.
Bowling, 964 S.W.2d at 804.
Also, a circuit court in the county
in which a prisoner is detained will obtain jurisdiction to
adjudicate a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under KRS
419.020 et seq. to determine the legality of the restraint.
Walters v. Smith, Ky., 599 S.W.2d 164 (1980).
Id.;
In these
instances, the validity or effect of the judgment itself is being
challenged.
In addition, the sentencing court is reinvested with
limited jurisdiction to consider a motion for shock probation
under KRS 439.265 to suspend a sentence which the prisoner has
begun to serve.
Gross, 936 S.W.2d at 87.
The shock probation
statute grants a court a window of time in which to grant
probation after the prisoner has served thirty but no more than
180 days of the sentence.
Gross, 936 S.W.2d at 87.
Notably, the
court obtains jurisdiction in each of the foregoing actions after
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the defendant makes a petition or motion to the court asking for
review of some aspect of the case.
Notwithstanding the above provisions for shock
probation, collateral attack, or review of a judgment for error,
there is no precedent for reopening a judgment in the manner
called for in the Sex Offender Registration Act.
The Act
presents no challenge to the judgment or sentence necessitating
that it be reopened.
However, the Sex Offender Registration Act dictates
that the sentencing court retain jurisdiction over a sex offender
after the prisoner has been committed to the executive branch and
thereafter until just prior to the end of his or her sentence.
Moreover, jurisdiction does not end there.
If the person is
designated a high risk sex offender and required to register for
their lifetime pursuant to KRS 17.520(1), “the designation shall
continue until the sentencing court determines that the
individual is no longer a high risk sex offender.”
17.572(2).
KRS
A high risk sex offender required to register for
life may petition the sentencing court for relief ten years after
the date of discharge from probation, parole or release from
incarceration, and, if denied, every five years thereafter.
17.578(1).
KRS
The sentencing court is required to request a new
report from a certified provider and conduct a second hearing.
KRS 17.578(2) and (3).
Thus the jurisdiction of the court over a
sex offender's case may continue for the lifetime of the
offender.
-5-
Bowling, Gross, Marcum and Silverburg clearly state
that there is no authority for such power over the criminal
defendant after he has been committed to the authority of the
executive branch.
The sentencing court loses its jurisdiction
over the case, and the court has no authority of its own to
reopen a final judgment at the endpoint of a prisoner's sentence.
The Commonwealth argues that the General Assembly has the express
power to determine the original jurisdiction of the courts,
pursuant to Kentucky Constitution Sections 112(5) and 113(6).
However, this issue concerns whether courts may have continuing
jurisdiction over cases once properly before them.
We find no
authority for the General Assembly to assign the courts
continuing jurisdiction over a criminal case.
In finding the shock probation statute constitutional,
the Supreme Court adjudged it to be a limited exception which
“may be considered as establishing a period, not unreasonably
long, during which the court retains a limited control over its
judgments in criminal cases.”
Commonwealth v. Williamson, Ky.,
492 S.W.2d 874, 875 (1973)(emphasis supplied).
The Supreme Court
concluded this did not encroach or invade the executive branch
power of clemency.
Id.
On the contrary, we believe that what is
required of judges under KRS 17.570 does encroach upon and invade
the power of the executive branch.
We agree with appellant that the statutory scheme at
issue violates the separation of powers doctrine by requiring
judges to perform determinations of sex offender risk.
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The
sections of the Kentucky Constitution concerning the doctrine of
Separation of Powers, §§ 27 and 28, provide as follows:
Section 27. The powers of the government of
the Commonwealth of Kentucky shall be divided
into three distinct departments, and each of
them be confined to a separate body of
magistracy, to wit: Those which are
legislative, to one; those which are
executive, to another; and those which are
judicial, to another.
Section 28. No person or collection of
persons, being of one of those departments,
shall exercise any power properly belonging
to either of the others, except in the
instances hereinafter expressly directed or
permitted.
Appellant alleges that the statutes violate the above
constitutional dictates because the job of classification of
prisoners and others subject to governmental supervision is one
that is entrusted to the executive branch of government.
He adds
that the executive branch is also “better situated and equipped”
to make the risk determination than the court of justice.
The statutes at issue violate the separation of powers
doctrine.
Making a determination as to the risk of reoffending
for a sex offender is not a function that a court is empowered to
do.
Rather, we are constrained by the fact that the judicial
branch is only empowered by the constitution to carry out
judicial functions.
In Akers v. Baldwin, Ky., 736 S.W.2d 294, 309 (1987),
the Supreme Court stated that although it is not easy to apply
the separation of powers doctrine, “it is crystal clear that
courts are the proper forums to determine the issues presented in
the interpretation of past transactions.”
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The court cited Rohde
v. City of Newport, 246 Ky. 476, 55 S.W.2d 368 (1932), which
explains that the distinctive nature of judicial power is to
determine rights and obligations with reference to past
transactions or current conditions.
Id. at 370.
A case must
present a justiciable issue in such form that the judicial power
is capable of acting upon it.
Id.
The assessment of the offender's risk to society is not
related to the earlier judgment of conviction.
issue for judicial review.
Nor is there an
Rather, the statutes herein require
the sentencing court to perform additional administrative tasks
related to law enforcement and the classification of prisoners
pending release.
These are tasks traditionally performed by the
executive branch which is charged with implementing the laws
created by the legislative branch concerning law enforcement,
incarceration and release.
The Commonwealth argues that if the
determination of risk was performed by an executive branch
agency, it would be subject to judicial review by the appellate
courts anyway, and so the General Assembly “cut out one of the
levels of the process.”
This begs the question whether the
sentencing court has the power to take on all of the levels of
the process.
We find no basis to conclude that it does.
For all the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the
enactment of the Sex Offender Registration Act both offends the
constitution and cannot be administered by sentencing courts who
have lost jurisdiction over these cases.
Furthermore, we
conclude that the portions of the statutes which are
unconstitutional so pervade the Act that they cannot be merely
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severed from the rest of the Act.
In light of the fact that we
find that the Act cannot be implemented, we find it unnecessary
to review appellant's additional claims of error.3
We therefore
reverse and vacate appellant's Order of Sex Offender Risk
Determination.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Kathleen A. Pakes
Daniel T. Goyette
Louisville, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Tami Allen Stetler
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
3
Since we reverse, we do not address all of the issues
raised by appellant, but we note that this Court has rejected
challenges to the Act based on double jeopardy, ex post facto,
and privacy rights in Hyatt v. Commonwealth, No. 1999-CA-000703MR (rendered July 7, 2000), and double jeopardy, procedural due
process, and hearsay in Hall v. Commonwealth, 1999-CA-000518-MR
(rendered July 7, 2000).
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