JAMES RICHARD SEAY v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: November 22, 2000; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-001849-MR
JAMES RICHARD SEAY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS J. KNOPF, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CR-001758
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, BUCKINGHAM, and MILLER, Judges.
BARBER, JUDGE.
James Richard Seay appeals pro se from an opinion
and order of the Jefferson Circuit Court denying his motion to
vacate, set aside or amend sentence brought pursuant to Kentucky
Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCR) 11.42.
Although the circuit
court erred in its legal analysis of the issues, we hold that
Seay is not entitled to relief and therefore affirm the denial of
the motion on different grounds.
On the morning of July 2, 1996, at approximately 7:00
a.m., Louisville police discovered the dead body of Jimmy
Daugherty on the grassy area at 1229 Breckinridge Street just
outside the fence surrounding the parking lot of a commercial
building.
Daugherty had been stabbed numerous times in the upper
torso and had several abrasions on his left leg and forehead.
Upon surveying the scene, the police noticed a trail of blood
leading from the crime scene to the rear of a residence at 948
Vine Street.
As part of the investigation, the police collected
several samples of blood from the grassy area, a chain link fence
near a side door, inside the bathroom at the Vine Street
location, and several spots along the blood trail.
Several
police officers spoke with Pauline Pitt, who lived at the
residence.
She told them that her brother, James Seay,
occasionally stayed at the residence and had been there the night
before.
While the police were speaking with Ms. Pitt, she
received a telephone call from her sister-in-law, Brenda Seay.
At that time, the police spoke with Brenda, who told them that
James Seay had telephoned her at approximately 4:30 a.m. that
morning and said that he had killed two black guys, had changed
his clothes after killing them, and that he was going to leave
town on a bus.
Approximately four hours after discovering the victim’s
body, the police received a telephone call from, Marty Gilbert,
the son-in-law of Flossie Neff, who stated that Seay had made
threatening telephone calls to Ms. Neff that morning.
Gilbert
said Seay, who had a romantic relationship with Neff, threatened
to kill her if she did not allow him to move back into her
residence.
When the police spoke with Neff, she said Seay called
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her around 6:30 a.m. on July 2, 1996, and threatened her.
She
also indicated that Seay said he had killed two black men, had
changed his clothes and was going to leave town on a bus.
At approximately 1:20 p.m. on July 2, 1996, the police
received another telephone call from Ms. Neff informing them that
Seay was at a public telephone booth at that time speaking with
her.
Upon arriving at the location, the police found Seay and he
consented to an interview.
During the interview, Seay denied any
involvement in the death of Jimmy Daugherty and denied even
knowing him.
He stated that he had spent the night and early
morning in a park drinking with two other persons.
telling anyone that he had killed someone.
He denied
He said that he was
wearing the same clothes he had been wearing since early the day
before.
Upon further examination, the police saw what appeared
to be blood on his shoes, which were then confiscated along with
a pocket knife he had in his possession.
The police later
arrested Seay for violating an Emergency Protective Order taken
out previously by Ms. Neff.
An autopsy of the victim indicated that he had died
from multiple stab wounds, primarily a 3.5 inch stab wound to his
chest.
Toxicology tests revealed that Daugherty had a very high
blood alcohol concentration of .291%.
While several of the blood
samples did not contain a sufficient amount of material for
adequate testing, several other samples tested positive for the
blood of the victim, including the samples from the fence and
near the door of the residence at 948 Vine Street, six samples
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from along the blood trail from the crime scene to 948 Vine
Street, and a sample from Seay’s right shoe.
On July 30, 1996, the Jefferson County Grand Jury
indicted Seay on one felony count for capital murder (KRS
507.020) and one felony count of being a persistent felony
offender in the second degree (PFO II)(KRS 532.080).
He had
previously served fourteen years in prison on a conviction for
murder in 1982, and had been released earlier in 1996.
In
October 1996, the circuit court granted a motion requesting a
mental evaluation of Seay filed by defense counsel.
On April 22, 1997, Seay entered a guilty plea to both
offenses pursuant to a plea agreement with the Commonwealth.
Under the plea agreement, the Commonwealth recommended a sentence
of twenty-four (24) years for murder with no enhancement to the
sentence for the PFO II conviction.
Seay waived preparation of a
presentence investigation report and the circuit court
immediately sentenced him to serve twenty-four (24) years in
prison for murder and being a PFO II consistent with the
Commonwealth’s recommendation.
On April 22, 1999, Seay filed an RCR 11.42 motion to
vacate or set aside the conviction based on ineffective
assistance of counsel.
He also requested an evidentiary hearing
and appointment of counsel.
In the motion, he alleged that
defense counsel failed to investigate the charges adequately, to
advise him that he could have requested funds to have an expert
witness on blood DNA analysis, and to advise him that there was
insufficient evidence to convict him.
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On May 13, 1999, the
circuit court issued an opinion and order denying the motion
without a hearing.
In its opinion, the court stated that Seay’s
guilty plea waived all claims of insufficiency of the evidence
and that his plea was entered voluntarily without coercion by his
attorney.
This appeal followed.
Seay argues on appeal that the trial court should have
conducted an evidentiary hearing on the motion.
He challenges
the trial court’s analysis of the issues related to his claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel.
In its opinion the trial
court construed Seay’s claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel as involving coercion to plead guilty by his attorney.
It stated, “Rarely should there should (sic) be a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel on a guilty plea.
If the plea
was constitutionally ‘voluntary’ under Boykin v. Alabama, 395
U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), ineffective
assistance of counsel should theoretically be waived.
Commonwealth, Ky., 456 S.W.2d 693, 694 (1970).
Quarles v.
Under this
approach, if counsel was somehow deficient, the analysis is
whether the plea was rendered ‘involuntary’ and whether counsel
was ‘effective’.”
The trial court’s recharacterization of an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim as actually an issue solely of
voluntariness with respect to a guilty plea situation is flawed.
First, the Boykin requirement that a plea be voluntary is based
primarily on due process, while the ineffective assistance of
counsel requirement also implicates the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel.
See, e.g., Centers v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 799
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S.W.2d 51, 55 (1990)(noting Sixth Amendment right to counsel with
guilty plea); Taylor v. Commonwealth, Ky., 724 S.W.2d 223, 225226 (1986).
More importantly, analysis of the ineffective
assistance of counsel focuses more on counsel’s conduct based on
the general standards of attorney competence and the effect of
counsel’s action, while voluntariness concerns primarily the
defendant’s knowledge and conduct.1
Boykin established that a
guilty plea must be entered voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently.
The adequacy of counsel’s assistance affects the
requirement that a guilty plea be entered voluntarily and
intelligently.
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57, 106 S.Ct. 366,
369, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985).
(“Where, as here, a defendant is
represented by counsel during the plea process and enters his
plea upon the advise of counsel, the voluntariness of the plea
depends on whether counsel’s advice ‘was within the range of
competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.’); See also
Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1386 (9th Cir. 1996)(a
defendant’s “plea must be not only voluntary but intelligent . .
., and counsel’s advice enters into the determination of
intelligence”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 881, 118 S.Ct. 208, 139
L.Ed.2d 144 (1997).
The United States Supreme Court has clearly
indicated that a guilty plea represents an admission of the legal
and factual elements necessary to sustain a conviction and a
waiver of prior constitutional defects, but a defendant does not
waive the right to ineffective assistance of counsel by pleading
1
Admittedly, the prejudice prong of the ineffective
assistance of counsel analysis looks at the defendant’s knowledge
as conduct in relation to counsel’s deficient actions.
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guilty.
Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508, 104 S.Ct. 2543,
2546-47, 81 L.Ed.2d 437 (1984)(“[i]t is well stated that a
voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty made by an accused
person, who has been advised by competent counsel, may not be
collaterally attacked”); Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 266, 267,
93 S.Ct. 1602, 1608, 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973)(“When a criminal
defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact
guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not
thereafter raise independent claims relating to deprivation of
constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the
guilty plea.
He may only attack the voluntary and intelligent
character of the guilty plea by showing that the advice he
received from counsel was not within the standards set forth in
McMann”).
When a defendant raises a collateral challenge to a
guilty plea, “the inquiry is ordinarily confined to whether the
underlying plea was both counseled and voluntary.”
United States
v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569, 109 S.Ct. 757, 762, 102 L.Ed.2d 927
(1989)(emphasis added).
In Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106
S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d. 203 (1985), the Supreme Court held that
the standards enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), apply to challenges
to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel.
Kentucky courts have repeatedly applied the Strickland standard
to guilty pleas.
See, e.g,, Roberson v. Commonwealth, Ky. App.,
885 S.W.2d 310 (1994); Centers, supra; Taylor, supra.
The
circuit courts reliance on Quarles v. Commonwealth, Ky., 456
S.W.2d 693 (1970), is misplaced because that case was decided
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prior to Strickland and Hill.
We agree with Seay that the trial
court erred by failing to apply the Strickland test to his claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel.
In order to establish ineffective assistance of
counsel, a person must satisfy a two-part test showing that
counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficiency
caused actual prejudice affecting the outcome of the proceeding.
Strickland v. Washington, supra; accord Gall v. Commonwealth, 702
S.W.2d 37 (1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010, 106 S.Ct. 3311, 92
L.Ed.2d 724 (1986); Osborne v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 992 S.W.2d
860 (1998).
Prejudice focuses on whether counsel’s deficient
performance renders the result of the proceeding unreliable or
fundamentally unfair.
Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372,
113 S.Ct. 838, 844, 122 L.Ed.2d. 180 (1993); Casey v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 994 S.W.2d 18 (1999).
Where an appellant
challenges a guilty plea based on ineffective counsel, he must
show both that counsel made serious errors outside the wide range
of professionally competent assistance, McMann v. Richardson, 397
U.S. 759, 771, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 1449, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970), and
that the deficient performance so seriously affected the outcome
of the plea process that, but for the errors of counsel, there is
a reasonable probability that the defendant would not have pled
guilty, but would have insisted on going to trial.
Hill v.
Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 58, 106 S.Ct. at 370; Russell v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 992 S.W.2d 871 (1999).
The burden is on
the movant to overcome a strong presumption that counsel’s
assistance was constitutionally sufficient.
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Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065; Commonwealth v. Pelfrey, Ky., 998
S.W.2d 460, 463 (1999).
A court must be highly deferential in
reviewing defense counsel’s performance and should avoid secondguessing counsel’s actions based on hindsight.
Harper v.
Commonwealth, 978 S.W.2d 311, 315 (1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S.
1056, 119 S.Ct. 1367, 143 L.Ed.2d 537 (1999); Russell, 992 S.W.2d
at 875.
Seay argues that defense counsel rendered ineffective
assistance of counsel for failing to request funds to hire expert
witnesses on blood analysis and stab wounds, failing to request a
hearing on appellant’s mental competence, and failing to conduct
an adequate investigation of the case.
In Ake v. Oklahoma, 470
U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985), the Supreme Court
held in a case involving an insanity defense that the Due Process
Clause of the 14th Amendment required a state to provide an
indigent defendant the basic tools of an adequate defense
including experts to assist in the evaluation, preparation, and
presentation of the defense.
Id. at 83, 105 S.Ct. at 1093, 1096.
See also Binion v. Commonwealth, Ky., 891 S.W.2d 383 (1995).
The
court recognized three factors in determining whether a state
should provide a defendant access to expert assistance: (1) the
private interest that will be affected by the action of the
state; (2) the governmental interest that will be affected if the
safeguard is to be provided; and (3) the probable value of the
additional or substitute procedural safeguards that are sought,
and the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the affected interest
if those safeguards are not provided.
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Ake, 470 U.S. at 77, 105
S.Ct. at 1093.
The state need not provide indigent defendants
with all the assistance that a wealthier person might be able to
buy, Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 602, 94 S.Ct. 2437, 2444-45,
41 L.Ed.2d 341 (1974), rather, fundamental fairness requires that
the state not deny them
“an adequate opportunity to present
their claims fairly within the adversary system.”
Ake, 470 U.S.
at 77, 105 S.Ct. at 1094 (quoting Moffitt, 417 U.S. at 612, 94
S.Ct. at 2444).
The Court did not create a universal rule that
an indigent defendant is entitled to an expert for every
scientific procedure.
See, e.g., Vickers v. Arizona, 497 U.S.
1033, 1035, 110 S.Ct. 3298, 3299, 111 L.Ed.2d 806 (1990).
(Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of writ of certiorari).
Ake recognized a due process right “to the assistance of an
expert if a substantial question exists over an issue requiring
expert testimony for its resolution and the defendant’s position
cannot be fully developed without professional assistance.”
Weeks v. Angelone, 176 F.3d 249, 266 (4th Cir. 1996), aff’d, 528
U.S. 225, 120 S.Ct. 727, 145 L.Ed.2d 727 (2000).
In Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 105 S.Ct.
2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985), the Supreme Court upheld the denial
of an indigent defendant’s request for appointment of a criminal
investigator, a fingerprint-expert, and a ballistics expert
because the defendant failed to make a sufficient particularized
showing of need.
The Court stated that “[t]he defendant’s
request for a ballistics expert included little more than the
‘general statement that the requested expert “would be of great
necessarius witness.”
[P]etitioner offered little more than
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undeveloped assertions that the requested assistance would be
beneficial. . . .”
Id. at 324 n.1, 105 S.Ct. 2637 n.1 (citations
omitted).
Ake and Caldwell, taken together, hold that a
defendant must demonstrate something more
than a mere possibility of assistance from a
requested expert; due process does not
require the government to provide indigent
defendants with expert assistance upon
demand. Rather, a fair reading of these
precedents is that a defendant must show the
trial court that there exists a reasonable
probability both that an expert would be of
assistance to the defense and that denial of
expert assistance would result in a
fundamentally unfair trial.
Moore v. Kemp, 809 F.2d 702, 712 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 481
U.S. 1054, 107 S.Ct. 2192, 95 L.Ed.2d 847 (1987).
Similarly, Kentucky law provides for appointment of
expert witnesses upon a particularized showing that assistance is
“reasonably necessary.”
See Dillingham v. Commonwealth, Ky., 995
S.W.2d 377 (1999), cert. denied sub nom Hicks v. Kentucky, ___
U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 1186, 145 L.Ed.2d 1092 (2000); Simmons v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 746 S.W.2d 393 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S.
1059, 109 S.Ct. 1328, 103 L.Ed.2d 596 (1989); Sommers v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 843 S.W.2d 879 (1992); KRS 31.110; KRS 31.185.
A court need not provide funds for “fishing expeditions.”
Hicks
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 670 S.W.2d 837, 838 (1984), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1040, 105 S.Ct. 521, 83 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984).
Whether to
grant a request for funds for or appointment of an expert is
within the sound discretion of the trial court.
S.W.2d at 381; Sommers, 843 S.W.2d at 888.
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Dillingham, 995
In the current case, Seay contends that his attorney
was ineffective for failing to request funds to hire an expert
witnesses involving the blood evidence and the stab wounds.
However, he offers no specific facts that expert assistance was
necessary to prepare a defense.
He states that the DNA testing
conducted for the prosecution could have been challenged because
a defense expert could have discovered that the blood stains on
his shirt and arm were contaminated or that they did not match
the DNA of the victim.
He also challenges the results of the
blood typing tests because they only narrowed the samples to 7%
of the population, which he extrapolated to constitute 47,112
people within Jefferson County.
Despite the fact that the DNA testing
was conducted on
only one of the blood samples that being on Seay’s right shoe, he
fails to present sufficient facts to support the granting of a
request for expert witnesses on the blood evidence.
He offers no
rationale for how or why the test results would have been invalid
due to contamination, or why further testing would have rendered
different results.
The Kentucky State Police Forensic Laboratory
conducted PCR (polymerase chain reaction) and RFLP (resriction
fragment length polymorphism) DNA testing and an independent
commercial laboratory performed further PCR tests.2
DNA and
blood type analysis have been recognized as reliable and precise
scientific methods of identification.
See, e.g., Johnson v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 12 S.W.3d 258 (1999); Fugate v. Commonwealth,
2
The results of the DNA tests indicated a 1 in 1,649,887
chance that the blood on Seay’s shoe was not that of the victim.
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993 S.W.2d 931 (1999).
Although the credibility of specific test
results can still be attacked at trial, Seay has not presented
facts sufficient to raise a question as to the validity of the
blood tests.
Other courts have required defendants to show a
particularized need for an expert witness involving DNA evidence.
See, e.g., Michigan v. Leonard, 224 Mich App. 569, 569 N.W.2d 663
(1997); Husske v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 203, 476 S.E.2d 920
(1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1154, 117 S.Ct. 1092, 137 L.Ed.2d
225 (1997).
But see Dubose v. State, 662 So.2d 1189 (Ala.
1995)(holding that defendant automatically entitled to
appointment of expert witness to assist in analysis of DNA
testing).
Seay has not shown that his attorney was aware of any
facts that would have placed her on notice that the assistance of
an expert witness on the blood evidence would have been helpful
to the defense.
Even if counsel should have sought appointment
of an expert witness, Seay has not shown a reasonable probability
that the trial court would have granted the request or that an
expert would have developed evidence beneficial to the defense.
As a result, we believe that Seay has not established either
deficient performance or actual prejudice on this issue.
Similarly, Seay has not demonstrated ineffective
assistance of counsel with respect to counsel’s failure to seek a
forensic expert on the stab wounds.
He points out that the
autopsy report indicates that the fatal stab would was 3.5 inches
deep while the knife confiscated from him had only a 2 1/4 inch
blade.
First, it is possible to inflict a wound deeper than the
length of a knife blade based on the force of the blow.
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In any
event, the Commonwealth stated at the guilty plea hearing that it
had not established that Seay’s knife was the actual murder
weapon.
Seay has not shown that the Commonwealth would have
attempted to offer that particular knife into evidence at a
trial.
Therefore, he has not demonstrated either deficient
performance or prejudice with respect to counsel’s failure to
seek funds for an expert witness on the stab wounds.
Seay also argues that defense counsel rendered
ineffective assistance for failing to request an evidentiary
hearing on his competence to stand trial.
He states that he
informed his attorney that he had been treated for mental illness
during his incarceration on the prior murder conviction.
In
fact, defense counsel filed a motion for a psychiatric evaluation
of Seay, which the trial court granted.
Although the report is
not in the appellate record, the parties acknowledged at the
guilty plea hearing that the results of the evaluation indicated
that Seay was mentally competent to stand trial.
During the
guilty plea hearing, Seay stated that he was taking antidepressant medication but that he understood the proceedings.
In Mills v. Commonwealth, Ky., 996 S.W.2d 473 (1999),
cert. denied, ___ U.S. ____, 120 S.Ct. 1182, 145 L.Ed.2d 1088
(2000), the Kentucky Supreme Court held that after a court orders
a psychiatric evaluation of a defendant, a hearing to determine
whether the defendant is competent to stand trial is mandatory
under KRS 504.100(3).
However, it also held that the standard of
review of a trial court’s failure to conduct a competency hearing
is whether a reasonable judge should have experienced doubt about
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the defendant’s competency to stand trial.
Id. at 486.
Factors
relevant to creating a reasonable doubt about a defendant’s
mental competency include his irrational behavior, his demeanor
in court, and any prior medical opinion on his competence to
stand trial.
Id. (citing Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 95
S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975)).
The court in Mills indicated
that although a competency hearing is mandatory under KRS
504.100(3) and cannot be waived by the defendant, a trial court’s
decision to allow waiver by a defendant is subject to a harmless
error analysis.
In the case sub judice, an evaluation of Seay by
psychiatric personnel at the Kentucky Correctional Psychiatric
Center (KCPC)resulted in a report concluding that he was mentally
competent.
Seay told the court at the guilty plea hearing that
he understood the proceedings and the charges.
The judge
indicated that he was aware that Seay had been treated for mental
problems in the past.
Seay was responsive during the hearing and
conferred several times with his attorney.
The mere fact that
Seay had been treated for mental illness in the past is not
sufficient to find that the trial court’s failure to hold a
hearing on his competency was not harmless error.
Concomitantly,
Seay has not alleged facts that support his claim that defense
counsel was deficient in not requesting a competency hearing or
that he was prejudiced by the court’s failure to conduct a
hearing.
Finally, Seay argues that counsel was ineffective for
advising him to plead guilty despite an alleged lack of evidence.
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First, a reviewing court is to presume that counsel rendered
effective assistance and must refrain from second-guessing
counsel’s actions based on hindsight.
The Commonwealth’s
evidence in this case consisted of DNA and blood typing analysis
placing the victim’s blood on Seay’s clothing and at the
residence where Seay was staying, including on the outside wall,
in the bathroom, and on the fence.
There was a trail of the
victim’s blood from the victim’s body to the house .
Seay also
made some incriminating statements about killing someone to
Flossie Neff and Brenda Seay.
Under the circumstances, Seay has
not presented sufficient facts to rebut the presumption that
defense counsel acted within the wide range of competent
assistance in advising him to plead guilty to murder with a
twenty-four year sentence, rather than go to trial with a
potential life sentence.
In conclusion, we believe that the circuit court’s
denial of the RCR 11.42 motion should be affirmed for reasons
different than those stated by the trial court.
See Cooksey
Brothers Disposal Co., Inc. v. Boyd Co., Ky. App., 973 S.W.2d 64,
70 (1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 930, 119 S.Ct. 338, 142 L.Ed.2d
279 (1998); Bd. of Education of McCreary Co. v. Williams, Ky.
App., 806 S.W.2d 649, 650 (1991).
Seay has not shown that he
received ineffective assistance of counsel in entering his guilty
plea.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the
Jefferson Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
James Richard Seay, Pro Se
LaGrange, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Perry T. Ryan
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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