DAVID LYNN MURPHY v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: AUGUST 11, 2000; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-001810-MR
DAVID LYNN MURPHY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN D. MINTON, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 94-CR-00346
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, KNOPF, AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
David Murphy appeals the Warren Circuit Court's
denial of his motion for Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42
relief.
The trial court denied Murphy's motion for an
evidentiary hearing because the motion was untimely filed.
Murphy contends, however, that the motion was timely filed and
that he should have been granted an evidentiary hearing.
In
particular, Murphy points to a pro se motion to modify his
sentence as his request for relief pursuant to RCr 11.42.
In the
alternative, Murphy requests this Court to find the three-year
time limit of RCr 11.42(10) was tolled during the period of
Murphy's parole.
Murphy also maintains the Commonwealth did not
properly assert the defense of timeliness and that defense should
therefore be deemed waived.
We disagree with each of these
contentions and affirm.
On September 15, 1994, Murphy entered a plea of guilty
to an amended charge of burglary in the second degree and was
sentenced to six years in prison.
On January 18, 1996, Murphy
filed a pro se motion for modification of his sentence which was
denied without a hearing on January 19, 1996.
On January 17, 1997, Murphy was released on parole.
Although the record does not reflect the exact date of Murphy's
return to prison, on November 19, 1998, he filed an amended pro
se motion seeking RCr 11.42 relief.
The Department of Public
Advocacy was appointed to represent Murphy and filed a supplement
to Murphy's motion on January 25, 1999.
The Commonwealth
responded to this supplement on March 16, 1999.
It argued the
RCr 11.42 motion was meritless and requested the trial court to
overrule the motion without a hearing.
The trial court, however,
granted Murphy's motion for an evidentiary hearing which was
originally scheduled for April 28, 1999, and then rescheduled for
June 23, 1999.
On June 22, 1999, the Commonwealth filed a motion to
strike Murphy's RCr 11.42 motion because it had not been filed
within three years of the final judgment.
The trial court
sustained the Commonwealth's motion and dismissed the RCr 11.42
motion without a hearing.
This appeal follows.
Murphy maintains his motion for sentence modification
of January 18, 1996, was actually a motion for RCr 11.42 relief.
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This may well be so, but the timeliness of Murphy's prior motion,
the denial of which was not appealed, does not excuse the
untimeliness of his present motion.
On the contrary, if the
prior motion was brought pursuant to RCr 11.42, then it provides
an additional ground for rejecting the subsequent motion, because
successive motions for RCr 11.42 relief are not allowed.
Gross
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 648 S.W.2d 853 (1983).
Anticipating this finding, Murphy urges us, in the
alternative, to hold that his present motion is not successive
and that the three-year limitation period was tolled while he was
paroled.
The rule's plain terms preclude our doing so, however.
RCr 11.42 (1) provides in pertinent part that "[a] prisoner in
custody under sentence or a defendant on probation, parole or,
conditional discharge who claims a right to be released . . . may
at any time proceed directly by motion in the court that imposed
the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct it" (emphasis
added).
Because relief continues to be available during
probation, parole, and conditional discharge, the limitations
clock likewise continues to run during these periods.
Although
not addressing the precise issue, the Kentucky Supreme Court has
stated, "that a defendant is required to avail himself of RCr
11.42 while in custody under sentence or on probation, parole or
conditional discharge, as to any ground of which he is aware,
during the period when this remedy is available to him" Gross 648
S.W.2d at 857 (emphasis added).
We are persuaded that the period
of availability is now three years from the finality of the
-3-
judgment and that it is not extended by periods of probation or
parole.
Finally, we are unpersuaded by Murphy's claim that the
Commonwealth waived its defense of timeliness because its answer
and motion to strike were filed "at the eleventh hour."
RCr
11.42 provides that an answer may be filed to a motion to vacate
a judgment, but it does not require one.
Polsgrove v.
Commonwealth, Ky.App., 439 S.W.2d 776 (1969).
Thus regardless of
the timeliness of the Commonwealth's answer and motion to strike,
the trial court was authorized to dismiss Murphy's RCr 11.42 if
on its face the record clearly established that Murphy was not
entitled to relief.
Commonwealth v. Stamps, Ky., 672 S.W.2d 336
(1984); Robbins v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 719 S.W.2d 742 (1986).
RCr 11.42 (10) unequivocally states that any RCr 11.42 motion
must be filed within three years of the final judgment.
The
record clearly establishes that Murphy's RCr 11.42 motion fell
outside the three year window.
The trial court's ruling was
appropriate.
For the aforementioned reasons we hereby affirm the
ruling of the Warren Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Tera M. Rehmel
Louisville, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
John E. Zak
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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