ANGELA PENROD v. CARHARTT, INC.; SPECIAL FUND; HON. MARK C. WEBSTER; WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED: April 14, 2000; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-001799-WC
ANGELA PENROD
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-96-71093
v.
CARHARTT, INC.;
SPECIAL FUND;
HON. MARK C. WEBSTER;
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, GUIDUGLI AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE: Angela Penrod (Penrod) has appealed the opinion
of the Workers’ Compensation Board which affirmed the opinion and
order of the arbitrator appointed to her claim pursuant to 803
KAR 25:150, the Workers’ Compensation Alternative Resolution
System (ADR).
Penrod alleges that the arbitrator’s decision was
incomplete, ambiguous or so contradictory as to make implication
impracticable.
803 KAR 25:150 (2)(b).
This is a case involving
an appeal by a party to an ADR proceeding.
We have thoroughly reviewed the record, the arguments
of the parties, and the applicable authorities.
Based upon that
review, we are satisfied that the board’s decision is “neither
patently unreasonable nor flagrantly implausible.”
Western
Baptist Hosp. v. Kelly, Ky., 827 S.W.2d 685, 688 (1992).
Likewise, we are satisfied that the board “neither overlooked nor
misconstrued a controlling statute or precedent in determining
that there was substantial evidence to support the
ALJ’s decision.”
Whittaker v. Perry, Ky., 988 S.W.2d 497, 498
(1999) (citing Western Baptist Hosp., supra).
Accordingly, we
adopt that board’s well-written opinion as the opinion of this
court as follows:
This appeal is one of first impression involving an appeal
by a party to an Alternative Dispute Resolution (“ADR”)
proceeding enacted by the General Assembly, effective April 4,
1994.
Pursuant to KRS 342.277 and 803 KAR 25:150, Carhartt, Inc.
and a recognized or certified exclusive bargaining representative
submitted to an ADR system which was subsequently approved by
order of the Commissioner, Department of Workers Claims, by his
issuance of a certification.
The ADR system, so approved,
adopted a plan for resolution of workers’ compensation disputes
and selection of mediators or arbitrators to hear and decide
disputes.
Pursuant to regulation, 803 KAR 25:150, Section 5, a
party to an ADR proceeding may appeal a final order of an ADR
arbitrator directly to the Workers’ Compensation Board in the
same manner and in the same time frame as prescribed for an
appeal from a decision of an Administrative Law Judge.
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However,
the standard for review by the Workers’ Compensation Board of a
party appealing from an ADR Arbitrator order is prescribed by
regulations.
803 KAR 25:150, Section 5(2) and (3).
This
standard of review is substantially different than from an ALJ to
the Workers’ Compensation Board which is established in KRS
342.285.
Here, the standard of review is set forth as follows:
(1)
A party to an ADR proceeding may
appeal a final order to the
Workers’ Compensation Board in the
same manner and in the same time
frame as prescribed for an appeal
from the decision of an
administrative law judge. A copy
of the notice of appeal shall be
served by the appealing party on
the plan administrator, who shall
within twenty (20) days file with
the commissioner a copy of the
record of the proceedings before
the mediator or arbitrator.
(2)
The final order of the mediator or
arbitrator shall be affirmed upon
review unless the Workers’
Compensation Board determines:
The mediator or arbitrator exceeded
the authority vested by applicable
law;
(a)
(b)
The final order is incomplete,
ambiguous or so contradictory as to
make implementation impracticable;
(c)
The mediator or arbitrator was
patently biased or partial;
(d)
The mediator or arbitrator refused
to admit reliable material or
probative, but not redundant
evidence, which if accepted would
tend to change the outcome of the
proceedings; or
(e)
The final order of the mediator or
arbitrator was procured by fraud.
(3)
No issue or point of error shall be
raised before the board which was
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known or should have been known
below, but was not raised before
the arbitrator.
Angela Penrod appeals from an Opinion and Order
rendered by Hon. Mark C. Webster, ADR Arbitrator (“Arbitrator”),
dismissing her claim for permanent occupational disability
benefits against Carhartt, Inc. (“Carhartt”).
Arbitrator Webster
was appointed pursuant to 803 KAR 25:150, workers’ compensation
alternative resolution systems.
The Arbitrator determined that
Penrod did not sustain any work-related permanent occupational
disability as a result of her right upper extremity and cervical
spine problems.
On appeal, Penrod argues the Arbitrator exceeded
his authority vested by the applicable law and his decision is
incomplete, ambiguous or so contradictory as to make
implementation impracticable.
Penrod, born September 28, 1975, has an eighth grade
education and no vocational training.
Her employment history
consists of working as a cashier at a fast food restaurant and
service station and housekeeper at a state park.
She began
working for Carhartt on May 5, 1995 as a sewing machine operator.
Her job “set fly facing” required repetitive hand and arm
movement in lifting and manipulating heavy fabric.
She testified
that after a three month training period, she was then paid
production rate based upon eight and one-half bundles per day.
According to Penrod, on April 11, 1996, while handling
a bundle of material, she felt her right wrist pop and
experienced pain from her elbow to her shoulder.
She sought
medical attention that day and then came under the care of Dr.
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Robert B. Lee on April 13, 1996.
She has also been treated by
Dr. Robert Reid, and Dr. Steven A. Rupert.
Penrod testified she
participated in Carhartt’s “Rossiter” program which apparently is
a plant sponsored physical therapy program aimed at reducing
injuries.
Penrod was taken off work periodically for medical
reasons and was also laid off for periods of time by Carhartt due
to lack of work.
She last worked for Carhartt on October 1, 1998
when she was laid off permanently.
By the time of her hearing,
she had obtained employment as a cashier at a service station.
At the time of her hearing, she was not treating with any doctor
and was taking medication prescribed by Dr. Rupert.
She
complained of pain at the base of her neck near her right
shoulder which ran down the shoulder, the back of the right arm
through the elbow over the top part of her forearm and into her
wrist.
She described the pain was worse with activity.
The medical evidence in the record consists of the
records and deposition of Dr. Rupert, and the medical records of
Drs. Reid and Lee.
Dr. Lee first saw Penrod on April 13, 1996 and
diagnosed right wrist sprain with extensor tendinitis.
He kept
her off work until April 22, 1996 by which time her condition was
much improved.
Dr. Lee apparently did not see Penrod again until
February 6, 1997 when she presented with complaints of recurrent
pain in her right shoulder, right elbow, and right wrist.
She
gave a history of symptoms worsening over the past two weeks.
rays of the cervical spine revealed no fractures, dislocations,
X-
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nor degenerative changes.
She had tenderness on the right side
of her neck and right shoulder with diminished grip strength on
the right.
Dr. Lee diagnosed repetitive strain injury of the
right upper extremity with cervical sprain, right lateral
epicondylitis and tenosynovitis.
Penrod was temporarily excused
from the production rate standard.
When re-examined on February 12, 1997, she complained
her symptoms had worsened.
Dr. Lee diagnosed cervical and right
scapular sprain, strain, and excused her from work pending an
evaluation on February 12, 1997.
Apparently Dr. Lee ordered a
cervical MRI which was performed on February 28, 1997.
The
results of the MRI are not contained in Dr. Lee’s records but are
contained in Dr. Rupert’s records.
Penrod began treating with Dr. Reid on March 17, 1997,
at which time she complained of pain in her entire arm and
numbness from the wrist to the shoulder.
work until July 1997.
right median nerve.
Dr. Reid kept her off
Dr. Reid ordered an EMG and NCV of the
The test ruled out carpal tunnel but
indicated possible tendinitis.
Dr. Naimoli, the neurologist who
conducted the test, noted the findings do not correlate with
Penrod’s complaints of pain.
Dr. Reid opined that the condition
was non-surgical and recommended she sleep in a night splint and
return to her regular duties on July 7, 1997.
In a letter report
dated August 12, 1997, Dr. Reid noted that Penrod had been
performing her regular work and had multiple complaints, the most
severe being a “headache”.
trapezius.
She also has “knots” in the
Dr. Reid opined that Penrod was not putting forth
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maximum effort in a grip strength test.
He continued to advise
that her condition was non-surgical but that she sleep in a night
splint if that gave her comfort.
He would not recommend any
restriction of work and felt that if she had trouble tolerating
her job, she may need to change her occupation.
Thereafter, Penrod began to treat with Dr. Rupert who
she first saw on November 20, 1997.
On physical examination, Dr.
Rupert found the hand and wrist to be normal except for
tenderness and also found tenderness of the elbow, forearm, and
shoulder.
His diagnosis was: (1) sprain/strain; (2) right ulnar
nerve neuritis; and (3) cervical strain with tenderness along the
shoulder musculature.
found to be normal.
pain decreased.
Nerve conduction studies were repeated and
By December 11, 1997, her headaches and neck
Dr. Rupert ordered an MRI of the cervical spine
which was performed on January 13, 1998.
It revealed mild
degenerative disc narrowing at C5-6 but was otherwise
unremarkable.
Penrod continued to treat with Dr. Rupert through
early 1998 and the physician last saw her on March 20, 1998.
At
that time, she complained of cervical strain, right elbow strain,
and lingering headaches which were 50% better.
Dr. Rupert opined
she had reached maximum medical improvement as of this date.
He
suggested retraining and ordered a functional capacity
evaluation.
Dr. Rupert performed a functional capacity evaluation
in May 1998.
restrictions.
He felt she could be placed on light duty with
He felt she could lift approximately 20 pounds
occasionally, 10 pounds frequently, and 5 pounds constantly.
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She
would be restricted to occasional reaching with the right arm and
was to avoid all overhead reaching on a frequent basis.
He
assessed a 4% impairment rating according to the AMA Guidelines.
At his deposition, Dr. Rupert opined that Penrod’s
problems were work-related due to trauma from the repetitive
lifting nature of her job.
candidate.
He did not believe she was a surgical
He also opined that she was not a malingerer because
her complaints were consistent and injections into the facet of
the joints helped.
Also appearing in the record were the “Rossiter”
records from Carhartt.
The “Rossiter” program is a form of
physical therapy offered within the plant to help workers in the
stretching and physical therapy type of movements to prevent
injury.
Penrod apparently participated in the “Rossiter” program
from June 15, 1995 to November 18, 1997.
Over this period of
time, she complained of pain in her left shoulder, both
shoulders, right shoulder, neck, right wrist, both wrists, left
wrist, lower left arm, both wrists and hands, right arm, chest,
head, and back.
The Arbitrator reviewed the law and medical testimony
in the record in considerable detail and determined that the case
involved two injuries.
The first which occurred on April 11,
1996 resulted in a sprained right wrist with extensor tendinitis.
He found that this injury had resolved and Penrod was able to
return to work and actually became more productive.
The Arbitrator found the injury involving Penrod’s
entire right upper extremity to be more complex.
-8-
He found no
objective evidence to support the injury, though there was
subjective evidence of tenderness and pain.
He further found
that “[s]he established a pattern whereby she switches doctors
once the doctor finds her condition improved.”
He pointed out
her changing doctors from Lee to Reid to Rupert.
He further
reviewed the lack of objective evidence of her physical problems.
He found that the repetitive use of her right upper extremity
during the course of her employment as a sewing machine operator
aggravated her right upper extremity periodically and ultimately
manifested itself on April 11, 1996, causing her to miss work.
He, however, did not make an award of occupational disability
benefits based on the 4% rating given by Dr. Rupert.
The
Arbitrator stated: “This rating is not based upon any type of
objective evidence and indicates a very minimal amount of
functional disability.”
Therefore, he concluded that Penrod did
not sustain a permanent injury of substantial proportions or
permanent injury of significant consequence.
While the soreness
in her right upper extremity may have caused her some temporary
discomfort, he found it did not inhibit her ability to do her
work at Carhartt or with any other employer.
The Arbitrator did rule in Penrod’s favor as to
causation and further found that all complaints manifested
themselves by 1996.
On appeal, Penrod argues that the Arbitrator exceeded
his authority vested by the applicable law and his opinion is
incomplete, ambiguous, and so contradictory as to make
implementation impracticable.
Contrary to Carhartt’s arguments
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that the standard of review on appeal is the same as from the
Administrative Law Judge, the applicable regulation requires an
infinitely more difficult burden on a party appealing from an ADR
Arbitrator determination.
Under ADRs, a formal claim is not filed with the
Department of Workers Claims for a work-related injury.
Rather,
with ADR, an employer and the recognized or certified exclusive
bargaining representative enter into a binding collective
bargaining agreement adopting an ADR plan.
803 KAR 25:150.
Claims for benefits are filed with an ADR plan administrator
rather than with the Department of Workers Claims.
If claims are
not settled then mediators or Arbitrators render final orders
containing essential findings of fact, rulings of law, and rule
on other pertinent issues.
While the filing of a notice appeal and briefs before
this Board are the same as in taking an appeal from an
Administrative Law Judge, Penrod’s burden on appeal requires her
to reach a higher threshold before the ADR Arbitrator’s decision
can be altered, modified or reversed.
In this case, Penrod
charges error under Section 5(2)(a) and (b).
She argues that the
Arbitrator improperly refused to translate Dr. Rupert’s 4%
impairment rating into occupational disability.
She submits that
since her injury was pre-December 12, 1996, Osborne v. Johnson,
Ky., 432 S.W.2d 700 (1968) requires the Arbitrator to take into
consideration her age, education, and work experience and her
restriction to determine whether or not she suffered any
occupational disability as a result of a work injury.
-10-
In
essence, she argues the Arbitrator should have taken into
consideration Dr. Rupert’s restrictions and applied them to
factors of Osborne v. Johnson to find she sustained permanent
occupational disability.
A decision by an Arbitrator is a different animal than one
reached by a judicial or administrative court.
The Supreme
Court, in Taylor v. Fitz Coal Company, Inc., Ky., 618 S.W.2d 432
(1981) explained the great deference given an Arbitrator’s
decision.
Generally, an arbitrator’s award is not
reviewable by a court. See M. Domke, The Law
and Practice of Commercial Arbitration Secs.
33.01-3402 (1968 & Cum.Supp. 1979); 5
Am.Jur.2d, Arbitration and Award Sec. 145
(1962 & Cum.Supp. 1980); G. Friedman,
Correcting Arbitrator Error: The Limited
Scope of Judicial Review, 33 Arb. J. 9 (No. 4
1978); J. Yarowsky, Judicial Deference to
Arbitral Determinations: Continuing Problems
of Power and Finality, 23 U.C.L.A. L. Rev.
936 (1976). The rationale for this principle
is inherent in the concept of arbitration.
‘The decision by the arbitrator is considered
an extension of the parties’ voluntary
agreement to arbitrate, and is final and
binding.’ M. Domke, supra at 304. In fact,
the finality of decision has long been
recognized as one of the objects of
arbitration. Park Const. Co. v. Independent
School Dist. No. 32, Carver County, 216 Minn.
27, 11 N.W.2d 649 (1943).
Logically included in this limitation on
a court’s scope of review is the
nonreviewabiltiy of the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting the award. Torano v.
Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp.,
19 App. Div.2d 356, 243 N.Y.S.2d 434 aff’d 15
N.Y.2d 822, 258 N.Y.S.2d 418, 206 N.E.2d 353
(1963); Pacific Vegetable Oil Corp. V.
C.S.T., Ltd., 29 Cal.2d 228, 174, P.2d 441
(1946). This is so because when a court
examines the evidence and imposes its view of
the case it substitutes the decision of
another tribunal for the arbitration upon
which parties have agreed, and in effect sets
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aside their contract. Fireman’s Fund Ins.
Co. v. Flint Hosiery Mills, Inc., C.A. 4, 74
F.2d 533, cert. den. 295 U.S. 748, 55 S.Ct.
826, 79 L.Ed. 1692 (1935). As early as 1855
the Supreme Court of the United States,
assuming the absence of statutory or
contractual provisions to the contrary, put
it this way in Burchell v. March, 17 How.
344, 58 U.S. 344, 349, 15 L.Ed.96 (1855),
If the award is within the
submission, and contains the
honest decision of the arbitrators,
after a full and fair hearing
of the parties, a court of equity
will not set aside for error, either
in law or fact. A contrary course
would be a substitution of the
judgment of the chancellor in place
of the judges chosen by the parties,
and would make an award the
commencement, not the end, of
litigation.
The scope of review by a court of an
arbitrator’s award is similarly strictly
limited in this Commonwealth. Our expression
of the rule is that an award may be set aside
if there has been a ‘gross mistake of law or
fact constituting evidence of misconduct
amounting to fraud or undue partiality.’
Smith v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., Inc., Ky.,
253 S.W.2d 629 (1952). See also First
Baptist Church (Colored) v. Hall, Ky., 246
S.W.2d 464 (1952). Neither party here
suggests fraud or undue partiality on the
part of the arbitrators. An arbitrator’s
award in absence of such misconduct is not
reviewable by our judiciary, and a fortiori,
the evidence supporting that award may not be
evaluated by our courts. The Court of
Appeals exceeded its authority when it sifted
the evidence presented during the arbitration
hearings. Consequently, its decision to
increase the amount of the award based on
insufficiency of the evidence cannot stand.
Here, the standard of review is established by
regulation promulgated by the Commissioner, Department of Workers
Claims, but the deference afforded the Arbitrator’s decision
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cannot be over emphasized.
An Arbitrator’s decision will not be
disturbed “merely because it was unjust, inadequate, excessive or
contrary to law.”
Carrs Fork Corp. v. Kodak Mining Co., Ky., 809
S.W.2d 699 at 702 (1991).
The Supreme Court has consistently
held that an arbitration award is to be considered the end of the
controversy-not the beginning.
Id.
Penrod specifically charges error under Subsections (a)
and (b) of 803 KAR 25:150, Section 5(2).
To be reversed, the
Arbitrator must exceed authority vested by applicable law.
KAR 25:010, Section 5(2)(a).
803
If an Arbitrator determines a
matter not within the terms of the arbitration agreement or
grants relief not requested by the submission, then he has
exceeded his duty and the award may be set aside.
Arbitration, Section 153.
6 C.J.S.,
Clearly, that is not the case herein.
The Arbitrator decided the matter submitted to him pursuant to
the ADR plan.
Penrod also argues the Arbitrator’s award must be set
aside under Subsection (b).
An Arbitrator’s decision is
incomplete if it makes a partial award and does not decide all
the matters entrusted to him.
117.
6 C.J.S., Arbitration, Section
Again, the Arbitrator herein clearly decided the issues
submitted to him and therefore this Board is without authority to
set aside his decision.
Likewise, the Board finds the
Arbitrator’s decision was neither ambiguous nor so contradictory
as to make implementation impracticable.
In fact, Penrod, in her
brief before this Board, does not point to anything in the
Arbitrator’s decision which she considers ambiguous or
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contradictory.
We conclude that the Arbitrator’s decision is
clear and his decision is not susceptible to inconsistent
reasonable interpretations so as to render it ambiguous.
In
other words, it is not subject to more than one interpretation.
Furthermore, we find it is not contradictory.
The Arbitrator
simply relied on the evidence contained in the record to reach
his result.
While Penrod would have rather had the Arbitrator
rely on Dr. Rupert’s 4% impairment and translate that rating into
occupational disability, that does not render the decision
ambiguous and contradictory.
Finally, we conclude that Penrod did not sustain her
burden of proof on appeal in showing that the Arbitrator exceeded
his authority vested by applicable law, nor was his final order
incomplete, ambiguous, nor so contradictory as to make
implantation impracticable.
Accordingly, the decision by Hon. Mark C. Webster,
Arbitrator, is hereby AFFIRMED and the appeal of Angela Penrod is
DISMISSED.
The opinion of the Workers’ Compensation Board is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, SPECIAL
FUND:
Richard Kip Cameron
Hopkinsville, KY
David R. Allen
Frankfort, KY
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, CARHARTT,
INC.:
John C. Morton
Samuel J. Bach
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Henderson, KY
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