ROBERT WAYNE BAKER v. RUTH ANN BAKER (SEARCY)
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
SEPTEMBER 1, 2000; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-001769-MR
ROBERT WAYNE BAKER
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LEWIS G. PAISLEY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 86-CI-00642
v.
RUTH ANN BAKER (SEARCY)
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, KNOPF, and TACKETT, Judges.
TACKETT, JUDGE:
Robert Wayne Baker (Robert) appeals pro se from
an opinion and order of the Fayette Circuit Court requiring him
to pay an arrearage and make future payments from his retirement
pension in accordance with the parties’ property settlement
agreement.
Finding no error, we affirm.
Robert and Ruth Baker (Ruth) were married in 1969 and
separated in 1985.
marriage.
They adopted two children during the
In February 1986, Ruth filed a divorce petition in
which she requested, inter alia, an award of maintenance.
The
parties reached a settlement on property rights, maintenance,
child custody, and child support.
Robert was employed at IBM
throughout the marriage and had earned certain retirement
benefits.
Paragraph 12 of their settlement agreement, which
dealt with division and distribution of Robert’s retirement
benefits, stated in pertinent part as follows:
Retirement. Husband agrees that Wife shall
receive one-half (½) of that portion of his
retirement and pension benefits paid to him
through IBM, his place of employment, which
represents the percentage of years during
which Husband and Wife were married to the
total number of years worked. He agrees
that, upon receipt of all such payments, he
shall immediately forward to wife her pro
rata portion. For example, if Husband works
for IBM for forty years, Wife is entitled to
one-half of 16/40 of each payment, or 20%,
for so long as he receives said payments.
A decree of dissolution of marriage was entered incorporating the
parties’ settlement agreement.
On April 6, 1999, Ruth filed a motion seeking an order
from the court requiring Robert to show cause why he should not
be held in contempt for failing to pay her $10,378.29 as her
share of his retirement benefits.
In an accompanying affidavit,
Ruth stated that Robert began working at IBM in 1966 and retired
in 1991, but that under the terms of his retirement he started
receiving retirement pension payments in December 1996.
She
alleged that from December 1996 through December 1997, Robert
received monthly payments of $1,638.64, which were increased to
$1,751.95 as of January 1998.
Ruth further asserted that under
paragraph 12 of the settlement agreement, she was entitled to
receive 23% of the retirement payments, that she had received
-2-
only $162.52 leaving an amount due of $10,378.29 as of February
1999.
On April 22, 1999, Robert filed a response to the motion
in which he stated there was a dispute concerning the
interpretation of paragraph 12 of the settlement agreement and
contending that Ruth was only entitled to $81.26 per month.
On April 26, 1999, the trial court conducted a show
cause hearing and allowed the parties to submit any documents
relevant to determining the amount of the retirement payments
owed Ruth.
Ruth submitted the deposition of the manager of
employee benefits at IBM (now Lexmark) with the accompanying
exhibits consisting of Robert’s retirement file.
Robert filed a
letter from IBM personnel indicating that his retirement benefit
attributable to the period from October 1969 through May 1986 was
$533.93 per month.
On June 4, 1999, the trial court conducted a
hearing during which the parties argued their positions on the
interpretation of the settlement agreement.
On July 13, 1999, an
opinion and order was entered requiring Robert to pay Ruth onehalf of the total monthly retirement payments he received based
on the trial court’s interpretation of the settlement agreement.
This appeal followed.
Robert contends the trial court incorrectly required
him to pay his former wife a portion of his retirement benefits
based on the total number of years he was employed by IBM, rather
than based on the number of years he worked at IBM during the
marriage.
He asserts that pension benefits are considered
deferred compensation, so a former spouse is entitled to receive
-3-
credit only for an amount earned during the marriage.
See Colley
v. Colley, Ky., 460 S.W.2d 821 (1970).
Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 403.180 authorizes
parties to enter into separation agreements in order to promote
the amicable settlement of disputes.
Except for issues
concerning custody, child support and visitation, the terms of
the separation agreement are binding on the trial court unless it
finds the agreement unconscionable.
KRS 403.180(2).
Schraberg v. Schraberg, Ky., 939 S.W.2d 330 (1997).
See also
The parties’
rights under a separation agreement depend on its terms, and the
parties may waive or modify their statutory rights or
obligations.
See, e.g., Adkins v. Jones, Ky., 264 S.W.2d 265
(1954); Goodaker v. Littell, Ky., 314 S.W.2d 539 (1958).
A
separation agreement incorporated in a divorce decree is
enforceable by all the remedies available for enforcement of a
judgment and as a contract.
KRS 403.180(5); Pegler v. Pegler,
Ky. App., 895 S.W.2d 580 (1995).
Robert argues on appeal that the trial court’s judgment
awarded Ruth an excessive portion of his retirement benefits by
including in its calculation benefits that he earned outside of
the marriage.
While he does not contest the coverture fraction1
or dispute that Ruth is entitled to 23% (50% of 16/35) of his
retirement payments, he argues that the base amount from which
the percentage is taken should include only the amount he earned
during the sixteen years of the marriage.
1
While we have serious
The coverture fraction is defined as the number of years of
the marriage divided by the number of years of work. See Pa.
Super. Ct. Braderman v. Braderman, 488 A.2d 613 (1985).
-4-
questions about Robert’s mathematical calculation,2 the central
issue in this case is interpretation of the terms of the
separation agreement.
Although paragraph 12 of the separation agreement is
not a paradigm of clarity, it does contain language supporting
the trial court’s interpretation.
It states that Ruth shall
receive that portion of Robert’s pension benefits “paid to him
through IBM. . . .“
It also states that Robert would forward a
portion of the retirement payments “upon receipt of all such
payments.”
This language suggests that the parties intended that
Ruth would receive her pro rata portion based on the actual
amount of the retirement payment Robert received rather than the
fictional amount he would have received at the time of the
divorce.
The example included in the agreement clearly indicates
that the parties contemplated Robert’s continued employment at
IBM and intended that Ruth would receive her portion based on the
actual retirement payments, including his earnings subsequent to
the date of the divorce.
This interpretation is consistent with
the use of the total number of years that Robert actually worked
at IBM as the denominator in the coverture fraction.
In
addition, the parties did not prepare a qualified domestic
2
Robert fails to provide clear documentary evidence
explaining how he arrived at his calculation. For instance,
Appendix 8 of his appellate brief appears to indicate he merely
combined his total earnings for the sixteen year period, rather
than determine his retirement payment as of 1986 based on the
employer’s pension formula. See, e.g., Louise E. Graham and
James E. Keller, 15 Kentucky Practice, Domestic Relations Law §
15.29 (2nd ed. 1997); Poe v. Poe, Ky. App., 711 S.W.2d 849
(1986); Light v. Light, Ky. App., 599 S.W.2d 476 (1980).
-5-
relations order (QDRO), which is typically used to authorize
direct payment by the employer to the non-employed spouse for her
share of retirement payments, and is calculated based on the
value of the pension plan as of the date of the dissolution.
See, e.g., Clark v. Clark, Ky. App., 782 S.W.2d 56 (1990).
Consequently, we hold that the trial court did not err
in its interpretation of the settlement agreement.
Thus, we
affirm the order of the Fayette Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Robert Wayne Baker, Pro Se
Lawrenceburg, Kentucky
Charles V. Boarman
Lexington, Kentucky
-6-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.