JERRY S. CRITCHELOE v. FISCHBACH USA INC.; AND JEFFREY M. BREWER
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RENDERED:
DECEMBER 1, 2000; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-001752-MR
JERRY S. CRITCHELOE
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE T. BLAND, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CI-00649
v.
FISCHBACH USA INC.; AND
JEFFREY M. BREWER
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART AND REVERSING AND REMANDING IN PART
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, MILLER AND BUCKINGHAM, JUDGES.
BARBER, JUDGE:
Appellant, Jerry Critcheloe (“Critcheloe”), seeks
review of an order of the Hardin Circuit Court dismissing his
complaint.
The trial court determined that it lacked subject
matter jurisdiction, and that Critcheloe’s discrimination lawsuit
was barred by election of remedies. The trial court also determined
that
Critcheloe
had
failed
to
state
a
claim
for
intentional
infliction of emotional distress, regardless that any such claim
would be pre-empted by KRS Chapter 344 and KRS Chapter 342.
For
the reasons outlined below, we reverse in part, and affirm in part,
and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Critcheloe, a printer, initially injured his back while
working for the Appellee, Fischbach U.S.A. (“Fischbach”), in March
1995.
Critcheloe continued to work at Fischbach.
According to
the complaint, there were other incidents at work involving his
back in 1997 and 1998.
Critcheloe alleged that in March 1998, the
Appellee plant manager, Jeff Brewer (“Brewer”), requested that he
postpone scheduled back surgery, due to an
officers of Fischbach’s parent company.
upcoming visit from
Critcheloe complied, and
the surgery was rescheduled; however, Critcheloe was discharged on
March 9, 1998 before the rescheduled surgery took place.
Criticheloe
filed
an
EEOC
Form
5,
Charge
of
Discrimination, with the United States Equal Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”) on April 15, 1998, alleging that he was discriminated
against in violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990
(“ADA”).
The EEOC deferred the charge to the Kentucky Commission
on Human Rights for investigation.
In his brief, Critcheloe
contends that he did not pursue a “KCHR administrative remedy
because he never filed a complaint with the KCHR, nor did he ask
the EEOC to refer his charge of an ADA violation to the KCHR.
An administrative charge of discrimination must be timely
filed with the EEOC before a plaintiff can bring a Title VII action
in federal court. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). The ADA has incorporated
the same administrative procedures set forth in Title VII. 42
U.S.C. § 12117(a). Where charges arise in jurisdictions which have
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state or local laws prohibiting the unlawful employment practice,
and establishing a state or local authority authorized to grant
relief, the EEOC must “defer” the charge to the state or local
authority for sixty days.
authority
has
discrimination.
the
During this time, the state or local
exclusive
right
to
process
allegations
of
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c); 29 CFR 1601.13(a)(3).
Kentucky is a deferral state.
After the EEOC deferred Critcheloe’s charge to the
KCHR, the KCHR set a hearing date.
The hearing was continued
because the KCHR had not completed its investigation.
Critcheloe
alleges that he was contacted by an enforcement officer at KCHR,
Doug Lanier, who advised him that he had to make a choice –
either allow a KCHR staff attorney to prosecute his claim or ask
the KCHR to withdraw and hire a private attorney to pursue a
private civil action.
Critcheloe chose to withdraw.
The KCHR’s
withdrawal order, dated December 18, 1998, states that the
“complaint is hereby withdrawn, without prejudice, to the rights
of the Complainant.
The complainant may again file with the
Commission this complaint subject to the provision of KRS
344.200(1).”
Critcheloe received a “Notice of Right to Sue”
from the EEOC, dated January 21, 1998.
The Notice states:
This is your notice of Right to Sue. It is
issued under Title VII and/or the ADA based
on the above-numbered charge. It has been
issued at your request. Your lawsuit under
Title VII or the ADA must be filed in federal
court WITHIN 90 DAYS of your receipt of this
Notice. Otherwise, your right to sue based
on this charge will be lost. (The time limit
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for filing suit based on a state claim may be
different.).
On May 4, 1999, Critcheloe filed a complaint in Hardin
Circuit Court alleging that: (1) Fischbach improperly terminated
his employment in violation of KRS 344.040(1) which prohibits
discrimination on the basis of disability; and, (2) Brewer’s
conduct, as agent and employee of Fischbach, constituted the tort
of outrage and/or intentional infliction of emotional distress.
On May 24, 1999 Fischbach and Brewer filed a motion to dismiss on
grounds that:
(1) the trial court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction, because Critcheloe had elected to pursue an
administrative remedy before the Kentucky Commission on Human
Rights (“KCHR”) and had failed to exhaust that remedy; (2) the
facts alleged in the complaint, even if accepted as true, fail to
state a claim for the tort of outrage against either Fischbach or
Brewer; (3) the common law claim for the tort of outrage is
preempted by KRS Chapter 344; and, (4) the common law claim for
the tort of outrage is preempted by KRS Chapter 342.
On July 13,
1999, the trial court entered an order granting the motion.
Critcheloe appeals from that order.
On appeal, Critcheloe contends that the trial court
erred in determining that it was deprived of subject matter
jurisdiction over his KRS Chapter 344 discrimination claim
pursuant to the election of remedies doctrine.
Critcheloe argues
that the trial court misinterpreted Vaezkoroni v. Domino’s Pizza,
Inc., Ky., 914 S.W.2d 341 (1996).
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In Vaezkoroni, the claimant
filed three separate charges with the Lexington-Fayette Urban
County Human Rights Commission.
a determination of
Each charge was dismissed with
“No Probable Cause.”
The claimant
subsequently filed a complaint in circuit court alleging the same
charges of discrimination and retaliation as had been filed with
the local commission.
The employer moved for summary judgment on
the grounds that KRS 344.270 barred the circuit court action,
because of the previous determination of the local commission.
The Kentucky Supreme Court held that KRS Chapter 344
applied equally to the Kentucky Human Rights Commission and to
the local commissions.
The Court explained that it would be
absurd to assume an individual could choose between local and
state administrative agencies and still have the option of
judicial relief.
The Court concluded:
KRS Chapter 344 authorizes alternative
avenues of relief, one administrative, and
one judicial. The administrative avenue also
includes alternatives; the individual may
bring a complaint of discrimination before
either the Ky. Commission or the local
commission. Once any avenue of relief is
chosen, then complainant must follow that
avenue to its final conclusion. This
interpretation is necessary ‘to give meaning
to and carry out the obvious purposes of the
act as a whole.’ Monmouth Street Merchants’
Business Association v. Ryan, Ky., 247 Ky.
162, 56 S.W.2d 963, 964 (1933).
The issue decided in Vaezkoroni was simply whether the
provisions of KRS Chapter 344 applied equally to the Kentucky
Human Rights Commission and to the local human rights
commissions.
Vaezkoroni is not dispositive of the issue before
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us, because Critcheloe did not file a charge with either the
Kentucky Commission or a local human rights commission.
Vaezkoroni was addressed in a recent decision of the
court, Founder v. Cabinet for Human Resources, Ky. App., 23
S.W.3d 221 (2000), which became final after the submission of
appellant’s reply brief.
Founder filed a charge of racial
discrimination with the EEOC on February 13, 1993.
He also filed
a sworn complaint of racial discrimination with the Kentucky
Commission on Human Rights pursuant to KRS 344.200 on February
18, 1994.
At Founder’s request, that complaint was withdrawn by
order dated December 8, 1994.
On October 26, 1994 prior to the
issuance of the Kentucky Commission’s withdrawal order, Founder
filed an action in Franklin Circuit Court alleging racial
discrimination and retaliation.
The EEOC issued its right to sue
letter on December 5, 1996, providing that the claimant had
ninety days to filed his Title VII action in federal court.
The court, in Founder, explained that KRS 344.450
specifically provides a cause of action in circuit court for
civil rights violations prohibited by KRS Chapter 344.
KRS
344.200 provides for relief from civil rights violations by the
filing of a sworn complaint with the Kentucky Commission on Human
Rights. KRS 344.270 provides:
The provisions of KRS 13B.140
notwithstanding, commission shall not take
jurisdiction over any claim of an unlawful
practice under this chapter while a claim of
the same person seeking relief for the same
grievance under KRS 344.450 is pending. A
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state court shall not take jurisdiction over
any claim of an unlawful practice under this
chapter while a claim of the same person
seeking relief for the same grievance is
pending before the commission. A final
determination by a state court or a final
order of the commission of a claim alleging
an unlawful practice under KRS 344.450 shall
exclude any other administrative action or
proceeding brought in accordance with KRS
Chapter 13B by the same person based on the
same grievance.
The Court concluded that:
Although Vaezkoroni does not explicitly
address this situation, we believe that to
follow its holding to its logical conclusion,
Founder’s circuit court claim must be barred
since he had already filed the administrative
complaint. From our reading of the language
in KRS 344.270 and Vaezkoroni, once a
complaint is filed with the Commission, a
subsequent action in circuit court based on
the same civil rights violation(s) is barred.
Further, as we shall discuss below, we
believe Clifton v. Midway College, Ky., 702
S.W.2d 835 (1986), is consistent with our
view.
. . .
In Clifton, the appellant filed a complaint
alleging discrimination with the EEOC, which
deferred her claim to the Kentucky Human
Rights Commission. However, unlike Founder,
the appellant did not file a sworn complaint
with the Commission. The Commission
thereafter relinquished jurisdiction back to
the EEOC. Subsequently, the appellant filed
an action in circuit court under KRS 344.450.
The Court held that since no sworn complaint
was ever filed with the Commission, her
separate action in circuit court was not
barred:
The absence of a written sworn complaint is a
jurisdictional defect which precludes the
assertion that the Kentucky agency had
undertaken any authority in this regard.
[citation omitted].
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Founder, id., at 223-224.
case sub judice.
Founder is distinguishable from the
Founder filed a complaint with the KCHR, after
he had filed a charge with the EEOC; further, Founder filed a
complaint in circuit court, before the KCHR issued a withdrawal
order. Thus, KRS 344.270 clearly prohibited the circuit court
from taking jurisdiction, because Founder still had a claim
seeking relief for the same grievance pending before the
commission.
By contrast, Critcheloe did not file a complaint
with the KCHR, nor did Critcheloe have a claim pending before the
KCHR when he filed a civil action in the Hardin Circuit Court.
In determining whether the EEOC’s deferral of a charge
to the KCHR constitutes an election of remedies on Critcheloe’s
part, we first must examine that doctrine.
Combs v. USA, 768 F.
Supp. 584, 594 (E. D. Ky. 1991) provides a review of Kentucky law
on the subject:
As generally defined, “the doctrine simply
means that when a person has at his disposal
two modes of redress, which are contradictory
and inconsistent with each other, his
deliberate and settled choice and pursuit of
one will preclude his later choice and
pursuit of the other.” Collings v. Scheen,
415 S.W.2d 589, 591 (Ky. 1967). The doctrine
is not a rule of substantive law but rather
is a technical rule of procedure or judicial
administration. NE Coal Co. v. Blevins, 277
S.W.2d 45, 48 (Ky. 1955); 25 Am. Jur. 2d
Election of Remedies § 1 (1966). The rule is
equitable in nature and is regarded
essentially as an application of the law of
estoppel. Id. at §§ 1, 2. The rule is
considered a “harsh one” that “should not be
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lightly enforced” nor “unduly extended,” and
“it must be strictly confined within its
reason and spirit.” Id. at § 3 (footnotes
omitted). The doctrine does not apply where
the available remedies are consistently
concurrent or cumulative. Id. at § 12.
The filing of a suit is considered in some
jurisdictions, including Kentucky, as an act
of election, id. at § 16; Reynolds Metals Co.
v. Liberty Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 294 S.W.2d
921, 923 (Ky. 1956), although a suit which is
abandoned or dismissed without a
pronouncement on the merits is not considered
to be an election. Joseph Goldberger Iron Co.
v. Cincinnati Iron & Steel Co., 153 Ky. 20,
25, 154 S.W. 374 (1913); 25 Am. Jur. 2d
Election of Remedies § 19. However, “the
commencement of a suit in a court which had
no jurisdiction of the subject matter has
been held not to be a conclusive election.”
Id. at § 17. (emphasis added).
We cannot construe the EEOC’s deferral of a charge to
the KCHR to be a “deliberate and settled” choice of state
administrative relief on Critcheloe’s part.
An important
purpose of KRS Chapter 344 is to “safeguard all individuals
within the state from discrimination, . . . to protect their
interest in personal dignity and freedom from humiliation, . . .
and to further the interest, rights and privilege of individuals
within the state[.]”
KRS 344.020(1)(b).
KRS 446.080 mandates
that “[a]ll statutes of this state shall be liberally construed
with a view to promote their objects and carry out the intent of
the legislature, . . . .”
KRS 344.450 provides that any person injured in
violation of this chapter “shall have a civil cause of action in
-9-
Circuit court.”
KRS 344.270 is entitled “Commission or court not
to take jurisdiction over claim for unlawful practice while claim
pending before the other body—Final determination exclusive.”
The statute provides that
“A final determination by a state
court or final order of the commission of a claim alleging an
unlawful practice under KRS 344.450 shall exclude any other
administrative action or proceeding brought in accordance with
KRS Chapter 13B by the same person based on the same grievance.”
That statute has been interpreted to mean that there are
alternative avenues of relief
-- once an avenue of relief is
chosen, or a complaint filed, an election of remedies has been
made.
The statute speaks in terms of excluding any other action
or proceeding when brought by the same person.
not bring an action before the KCHR.
Critcheloe did
Thus, the statutory
exclusion does not apply to bar his circuit court action.
We
hold that where the aggrieved individual does not file a
complaint with the KCHR (or local commission), the EEOC’s
automatic deferral to the KCHR is not an “election” of remedies
which would preclude an action for state judicial relief in
circuit court under KRS 344.450.
Accordingly,
we reverse that
portion of the circuit court’s order dismissing Critcheloe’s KRS
Chapter 344 disability discrimination claim and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Critcheloe also contends that the trial court erred in
dismissing his claim for intentional infliction of emotional
-10-
distress.
We cannot improve upon the discussion of the law on
this issue in Lococo v. Barger, 958 F. Supp. 290, 297-98 (E.D.Ky.
1997):
In recognizing a claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress, otherwise
known as the tort of outrage, Kentucky has
adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts §
46. Comment d states, “Generally the case is
one in which the recitation of facts to an
average member of the community would arouse
resentment against the actor, and lead him to
exclaim, ‘Outrageous!’ The liability clearly
does not extend to mere insults, indignities,
threats, annoyances, petty oppression, or
other trivialities....” Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 46.
. . .
Since the seminal case of Craft v. Rice , 671
S.W.2d 247 (Ky. 1984), which recognized
thetort, Kentucky courts have taken a
restrictive view towards this tort, granting
summary judgments for defendants in many
cases. In these cases the courts have found
that the defendants’ acts did not rise to the
level of outrageous conduct needed to sustain
a claim for this tort.
. . .
Moreover, recently revisiting this tort in
the case, Kroger Co. v. Willgruber, 920
S.W.2d 61 (Ky. 1996), the Kentucky Supreme
Court . . . [emphasized] that Kentucky still
takes a restrictive/limited approach to this
tort.
. . .
Examining the relevant Kentucky case law, it
becomes clear that the conduct alleged is not
extreme and outrageous. The conduct here is
nowhere near that of a nurse shouting “shut
up” to a woman who had delivered her still
born child, unassisted, into a bedpan, or a
husband who had committed adultery spending
the proceeds of checks and other assets
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during divorce proceedings and then
threatening his soon to be ex-wife to achieve
a favorable settlement. Kentucky Courts ruled
that the conduct described above did not
constitute outrageous conduct under Kentucky
law. [citations omitted].
Although discharging an employee on the basis
of gender may be illegal and reprehensible, a
great deal more is required to approach
outrageous conduct. Such conduct is bad
conduct, but it is not outrageous and
intolerable conduct, as defined in Kentucky
case law. The record contains nothing which
would support a finding of outrageous and
intolerable behavior in this matter.
Comment on the Restatement states,
It is for the court to determine, on the
first instance, whether the Defendant’s
conduct may reasonably be regarded as so
extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery,
or whether it is necessarily so. Where
reasonable men may differ, it is for the
jury, subject to the control of the court, to
determine whether, in the particular case,
the conduct has been sufficiently extreme and
outrageous to result in liability.
Applying this analysis to the case sub judice, we do
not believe that the trial court committed reversible error in
granting the motion to dismiss the intentional infliction of
emotion distress as it failed to state a claim.
Having so
decided, we need not address the remaining issues.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
David Calhoun
J. Michael Brown
Mitzi D. Wyrick
Louisville, KY
James D. Cockrum
David L. Hoskins
Louisville, KY
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