CHARLES BRIAN RUSSELL v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 6, 2000; 10:00 a.m.
ORDERED NOT PUBLISHED BY KENTUCKY SUPREME COURT: APRIL 18, 2001
(2000-SC-000984-D)
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-001725-DG
CHARLES BRIAN RUSSELL
APPELLANT
ON DISCRETIONARY REVIEW FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES M. SHAKE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-XX-00053
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, BUCKINGHAM AND MILLER, JUDGES.
BARBER, JUDGE: This is an opinion affirming the Jefferson Circuit
Court’s reversal of the district court’s dismissal of terroristic
threatening charges.
Appellant Charles Brian Russell was charged with four
misdemeanors in Jefferson District Court.
The charges, which
were brought by his ex-wife and her father, alleged violation of
an EPO (Emergency Protective Order, KRS 403.740) and terroristic
threatening (KRS 508.080).
Prior to his divorce,
Russell
entered an Alford1 plea to an earlier offense, for which he was
1
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 27 L.Ed.2d. 162, 91
(continued...)
on probation.
The Commonwealth moved to revoke probation.
The
trial court conducted a lengthy hearing on the revocation motion
prior to any hearing on the district court charges.
Russell
argued before the district court that the telephone calls which
were provided as proof of violation of an EPO were actually tapes
of old telephone calls, recorded in late 1997 prior to
institution of the EPO, rather than in 1998 as claimed by
Kimberly Russell.
During the lengthy revocation proceeding, the district
court judge stated, with regard to the charges brought by
Kimberly Russell, the ex-wife, that “I have not found the
testimony regarding May 30, 1998 phone call to be persuasive that
phone calls were made on that day.
[later] phone calls.”
I’ll say the same for the
The judge ended by saying that with regard
to any phone calls to Kimberly Russell:
“I do not find credible
evidence to support the allegations, they will be denied.”
The
judge did not find that a preponderance of the evidence supported
Kimberly Russell’s claims that Charles Russell had made
threatening telephone calls to her in 1998, in violation of the
EPO.
The judge did revoke Russell’s probation for a period of
thirty days with regard to the charges brought by Dean Nevitt,
father of Kimberly Russell, who alleged that Russell made a
threatening phone call to him in 1998.
Following the district court ruling on revocation of
probation, counsel for Russell filed a motion to dismiss any
1
(...continued)
S.Ct. 160 (1970).
-2-
further prosecution on the charges made by Kimberly Russell,
claiming that further prosecution was barred on the grounds of
double jeopardy, collateral estoppel, and res judicata.
The
Commonwealth argued that the district court’s ruling in the
revocation proceeding should have no effect on the separate
criminal trial on charges of terroristic threatening.
The
criminal charges were dismissed by the district court on the
grounds argued by Russell.
The district court stated that judicial economy favored
dismissal of the charges, as the Commonwealth obviously could not
even prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Russell had
committed the wrongful acts.
The district court also held that
the principle of collateral estoppel prohibited the criminal
trial for terroristic threatening based on the evidence which had
already been discussed by the court during the revocation
proceeding.
The Commonwealth appealed the district court decision
to the Jefferson Circuit Court.
The circuit court reversed the
district court dismissal, pursuant to Commonwealth v. Burge, Ky.,
947 S.W.2d 805 (1996).
The circuit court held that the issue
litigated in the revocation hearing was whether Russell had
violated a condition of his probation, not whether he was guilty
of a statutory offense.
The circuit court stated that because
the Commonwealth was not required to provide the statutory
offense at the time the revocation hearing was held, it should
not be bound by the decision rendered therein.
The circuit court
also found that double jeopardy did not prohibit prosecution of
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the criminal complaint because a probation revocation requires
proof of different elements from those found in a criminal
prosecution for the same charges.
Brown v. Commonwealth, Ky.
App., 564 S.W.2d 21 (1977).
The circuit court correctly stated that for purposes of
a revocation hearing, it need only be shown by a preponderance of
the evidence that the offenses were committed, whereas, at a
later trial on the merits, the Commonwealth would have to prove
the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
The
Commonwealth points out that it is not necessary to obtain a
criminal conviction in order to accomplish revocation of
probation.
See Tiryung v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 717 S.W.2d
503, 504 (1986).
Russell argues that a defendant should not be
required to go through a trial on the criminal charges where a
determination as to the accusations has already been rendered by
the trial court.
The Commonwealth asserts that a revocation proceeding
and a criminal trial are separate and distinct proceedings and
that the Commonwealth should not have the same burden of proof in
a revocation hearing as it does in a criminal trial.
The United
States Supreme Court has recognized that probation revocation
hearings are not a stage in the criminal prosecution of an
individual.
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480, 33 L.Ed.2d
484, __, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2600 (1972).
The Commonwealth argues
that the state should be entitled to hold a probation revocation
hearing without worry that an adverse outcome would bar later
prosecution of criminal charges.
-4-
In the present case, the trial
court did not pass on the criminality of Russell’s conduct during
the probation revocation hearing.
Rather, the trial court found
that the proof failed to support the allegations of wrongful
conduct during the relevant time period in 1998.
This factual
finding should not be held binding upon the court during a
criminal trial of the charges brought by Kimberly Russell.
As a general rule, where a specific issue of fact has
been determined, the Commonwealth is barred from re-trying that
fact, although a re-trial of a separate issue may be permitted.
See Commonwealth v. Hillebrand, Ky., 536 S.W.2d 451 (1976).
However, this Court is required to use “. . . a common sense
analysis based on the totality of the circumstances in the
previous prosecution” to determine whether a new trial can be had
on the evidence earlier before the trial court.
Ky., 792 S.W.2d 371, 374 (1990).
Smith v. Lowe,
Future prosecutions are not
barred unless an ultimate issue of fact was determined in the
earlier proceeding.
See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 25
L.Ed.2d 469, 90 S.Ct. 1189 (1970), holding that once an ultimate
issue of fact has been resolved establishing that the defendant
could not have committed a criminal offense, collateral estoppel
and double jeopardy preclude continued prosecution of the
defendant on that issue.
Res judicata applies to prevent trial on a case where a
judgment has already been rendered between the parties.
Collateral estoppel bars re-trial of issues which have already
been decided by the same or a different court.
Russell argues
that the ruling by the trial court in the revocation proceeding
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on the issue of whether the telephone calls actually took place
in 1998 bars further prosecution with regard to that issue.
The
Commonwealth cites Gregory v. Commonwealth, Ky., 610 S.W.2d 598
(1980), as holding that a civil finding as to wrongdoing cannot
collaterally estop a criminal trial.
The Gregory decision states
that the finding in a civil proceeding does not collaterally
estop a criminal trial in the same matter where the trial court
did not judge the criminality of the act in rendering its
opinion.
Gregory also holds that the civil court determination
regarding the bad act was not essential to its determination in
the civil case, and that for this reason, the civil determination
was not binding in the later criminal prosecution.
Id.
As this issue has rarely been before the courts of
Kentucky, the Commonwealth cites foreign case law in support of
its argument that the trial court’s finding in the probation
revocation hearing should not bar prosecution in the subsequent
criminal action.
In Teague v. State, 312 S.E.2d 818 (Ga. 1983),
the court found that the exercise of discretion by the trial
court in denying a motion to revoke parole was in no way an
adjudication of the allegations sufficient to constitute an
acquittal in a criminal prosecution.
Id. at 819.
In that case
it was found that the state failed to produce evidence at the
revocation hearing sufficient to support the revocation.
In
People v. Fagan, 489 N.E.2d 222 (N.Y. 1985), the court permitted
a criminal trial of the charged offense even after a separate
court found that the defendant’s probation should not be revoked
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based upon the complaint of criminal behavior.
The Fagan court
held that:
Strong policy considerations militate against
giving issues determined in prior litigation
preclusive effect in a criminal case, and
indeed we have never done so. The correct
determination of guilt or innocence is
paramount in criminal cases, and the People’s
incentive to litigate in a felony prosecution
would presumably be stronger than in a parole
revocation proceeding.
Id. (citation to authority deleted).
We adopt this argument and
find that it would place an undue burden upon the prosecution to
require that it be bound by findings of fact in a probation
revocation proceeding in later criminal prosecutions.
The statements of one court may be mere “surplusage,”
and not binding in a second action by the same or a different
court.
Allard v. Kentucky Real Estate Commission, Ky. App., 824
S.W.2d 884, 886 (1992).
Where the initial determination was made
on other grounds, any extraneous statement by the deciding court
is merely dictum in a second action between the parties.
City of
Covington v. Board of Trustees of Policemen’s and Firefighters’
Retirement Fund of the City of Covington, Ky., 903 S.W.2d 517,
522 (1995); H.R. v. Revlett, Ky. App., 998 S.W.2d 778, 780
(1999).
The statements of the district court in the probation
revocation proceeding cannot have the force and effect of
precluding Russell’s trial for terroristic threatening.
Double jeopardy attaches when a defendant is punished
twice for the same offense.
If the charged offenses require
proof of different elements, then double jeopardy does not
attach.
See Commonwealth v. Burge, Ky., 947 S.W.2d 805 (1996),
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holding that where the defendant was sentenced to home
incarceration for violation of a domestic violence order, and
later indicted on assault for the violation of the DVO, he did
not incur double jeopardy.
The court found that he was punished
for two separate offenses, as each offense required proof of an
element which was not a part of the other.
Id., at 812.
Similarly, a judgment of civil contempt is not barred
by a judgment for the offense of flagrant non-support, even
though both convictions are based on the same behavior, that
being failure to provide support in accordance with a judgment
against the defendant.
See Commonwealth, Ex Rel. Bailey v.
Bailey, Ky. App., 970 S.W.2d 818 (1998).
The basis for these
rulings is that where each offense requires proof of a different
or additional fact than the other does not, no double jeopardy
can attach.
Taylor v. Commonwealth, Ky., 995 S.W.2d 355, 358
(1999).
We find that no double jeopardy attaches in the present
case.
The district court’s findings in the probation revocation
proceeding do not bar later criminal prosecution on the same
evidence.
No double jeopardy attaches as the standards of proof
are different in each proceeding.
The Commonwealth has an
interest in pursuing a probation violation prior to trial on new
criminal offenses that form the basis of the alleged probation
violation.
(1988).
Messer v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 754 S.W.2d 872
It would be inequitable to require the Commonwealth to
devote the time and resources to each probation revocation
proceeding required for a criminal trial.
-8-
Such a requirement
would necessarily be imposed if the determination of the judge in
a probation revocation proceeding barred later trial of the
underlying criminal offenses.
Similarly, it would be inequitable
to the defendant to bar a later criminal trial in which he could
be exonerated if the district court held that probation should be
revoked in a probation revocation proceeding.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of
the Jefferson Circuit Court.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE, CONCURS.
MILLER, JUDGE, CONCURRING BY SEPARATE OPINION: I
reluctantly concur in affirming the circuit court.
I agree with
the district court that judicial economy favors dismissal of the
charges.
I cannot conceive of the Commonwealth having
substantially better evidence at a trial than has been
demonstrated in the revocation proceeding.
It follows that the
charges should and will ultimately be dismissed.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Wallace N. Rogers
Louisville, Kentucky
Karl Price
Louisville, Kentucky
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