THOMAS HENSLEY v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: May 5, 2000; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-001694-MR
THOMAS HENSLEY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LAUREL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE RODERICK MESSER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 92-CR-00011
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, EMBERTON, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Laurel
Circuit Court denying appellant's motion to vacate judgment
pursuant to RCr 11.42.
Because appellant did not receive
ineffective assistance of counsel and the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in denying appellant a continuance for his
evidentiary hearing, we affirm.
On December 31, 1991, Snowden Baker, Jr. (Baker) and
Jeffrey Payne (Payne) were shot while at the residence of
appellant, Thomas Hensley.
Baker died as a result of his wounds.
Payne was seriously injured, but recovered.
On February 21,
1992, appellant was indicted for murder, assault in the first
degree, and persistent felony offender in the second degree.
Appellant's trial commenced on January 19, 1993.
At trial, Payne
testified that he and Baker had gone to the residence to purchase
Xanax from appellant.
Payne testified that while the three men
were talking, appellant, who had been drinking, pulled a gun out
of a wastebasket and shot Baker and Payne for no reason.
Appellant was represented by retained counsel, and testified in
his own defense.
Appellant denied that he shot Baker and Payne,
rather, he asserted that another man, Billy Parker, entered his
residence, pulled a gun on appellant, and as they struggled for
the gun, it went off, shooting Baker and Payne.
The jury
received instructions on murder, first-degree manslaughter,
second-degree manslaughter, reckless homicide, first-degree
assault, second-degree assault, intentional fourth-degree
assault, reckless fourth-degree assault, and self-protection.
The jury found appellant guilty of murder and first-degree
assault.
On February 12, 1993, appellant was sentenced in
accordance with the jury's recommendation, to 50 years for murder
and 20 years for first-degree assault, with the sentences to run
consecutively.
Appellant's conviction was affirmed by the
Kentucky Supreme Court on February 25, 1994.
On September 30, 1997, appellant filed a motion to
vacate judgment pursuant to RCr 11.42, requesting appointed
counsel and an evidentiary hearing.
The Office of Public
Advocacy was ordered to represent appellant.
On December 31,
1997, the court reporter for the Laurel Circuit Court filed
notice that the audiotapes of appellant's trial proceedings had
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been filed in the record.
On October 26, 1998, appellant
indicated that he would require the services of an audiotape
expert, as he was alleging that the trial transcript and trial
audiotapes had been altered.
Appellant therefore requested that
the evidentiary hearing be set in the spring of 1999 in order to
allow the expert time to analyze the tapes.
On December 18,
1998, in accordance with appellant's request, the court set the
evidentiary hearing for April 15, 1999.
On April 13, 1999,
appellant's counsel filed a motion requesting a continuance of
the hearing, on the grounds that he was still working with the
audiotape analyst, and also because he had a trial scheduled for
April 15, 1999.
The motion was denied, and the evidentiary
hearing was held on April 15, 1999.
Appellant called no
witnesses at the hearing, except for Snowden Baker's wife, Wendy
Baker, who had not been subpoenaed but was present at the
hearing.
On May 20, 1999, the Laurel Circuit Court denied
appellant's RCr 11.42 motion, issuing a lengthy written order
addressing all of appellant's claims.
Appellant filed a motion
for reconsideration, requesting the court to reconsider its
denial of appellant's motion for a continuance and requesting a
second evidentiary hearing.
the motion.
On May 25, 1999, the court denied
This appeal followed.
Appellant first argues that the trial court abused its
discretion by failing to grant a continuance for his evidentiary
hearing.
Appellant contends that the continuance was necessary
in order to present evidence from the audiotape expert concerning
appellant's allegations that the audiotapes of his trial had been
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altered.
Appellant argues that he needed the extra time as he
was in the process of attempting to refine the amount of work to
be done to reduce the expense.
Appellant alleges that the reason
his counsel didn't subpoena any witnesses for the evidentiary
hearing was because he believed the continuance would be granted,
and therefore, did not prepare.
As such, appellant contends he
was denied the right to a meaningful hearing.
A motion for a continuance is directed to the sound
discretion of the trial court and the action of the court will
not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion.
Eldred v. Commonwealth, Ky., 906 S.W.2d 694 (1995), cert. denied,
516 U.S. 1154, 116 S. Ct. 1034, 134 L. Ed. 2d 111 (1996);
Snodgrass v. Commonwealth, Ky., 814 S.W.2d 579 (1991); Rosenzweig
v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 705 S.W.2d 956 (1986).
The Kentucky
Supreme Court has set forth the following factors which a trial
court should consider in exercising its discretion to grant or
deny a continuance:
1) length of delay; 2) previous
continuances; 3) inconvenience to litigants, witnesses, counsel,
and the court; 4) whether the delay is purposeful or is caused by
the accused; 5) availability of other competent counsel; 6)
complexity of the case; and 6) whether denying the continuance
will lead to identifiable prejudice.
Snodgrass, 814 S.W.2d at
581.
We do not believe the trial court abused its discretion
in denying the continuance.
The evidentiary hearing had been set
in accordance with appellant's specific request for a spring
hearing.
Appellant had four months to prepare for the
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evidentiary hearing, and did not move for the continuance until
two days prior.
Further, we find no identifiable prejudice
resulting to appellant from the denial of the continuance.
Appellant contends that he needed the continuance to have more
time to work with the audiotape expert.
However, the trial court
believed that appellant's claim of alterations in the trial
record should have been raised on direct appeal, and was not
appropriate for the RCr 11.42 proceeding.
The trial court,
nevertheless, considered each of appellant's 19 claims of
discrepancies in the transcript, and concluded that, even if
appellant's version of what occurred at trial was true, it would
not rise to the level of a constitutional due process violation
justifying relief.
Commonwealth v. Basnight, Ky. App., 770
S.W.2d 231, 237 (1989).
Accordingly, the trial court did not err
in denying appellant a continuance.
Appellant next argues that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel at trial.
In order to establish
ineffective assistance of counsel, a person must satisfy a
two-part test showing that counsel's performance was deficient
and that the deficiency resulted in actual prejudice affecting
the outcome.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct.
2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).
The burden is on the appellant to
overcome the strong presumption that trial counsel's assistance
was constitutionally sufficient.
Jordan v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
445 S.W.2d 878, 879 (1969); McKinney v. Commonwealth, Ky., 445
S.W.2d 874, 878 (1969).
“In the absence of a showing that some
alternative action by counsel would have compelled a mistrial or
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a dismissal . . . ineffective assistance will rarely be shown."
Robbins v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 719 S.W.2d 742, 743 (1986).
Appellant first argues that counsel was ineffective for
failing to raise issues of appellant's competency at the time of
the trial and at the time of the offense.
Appellant asserts that
at the time of the offense, he was without mental competence to
understand right or wrong, and that at the time of trial he was
without the mental capacity to participate in his defense.
Appellant offers no other evidence that he was mentally ill other
than his own allegations.
"RCr 11.42(2) requires that the motion
state specific grounds for relief and facts supporting those
grounds".
(1990).
Skaggs v. Commonwealth, Ky., 803 S.W.2d 573, 576
Further, according to the trial court, appellant offered
no proof whatsoever at the evidentiary hearing to support his
claim of incompetency.
Accordingly, counsel was not deficient in
choosing not to pursue an insanity defense.
Appellant next argues that counsel was ineffective for
failing to carefully investigate his case and prepare for trial.
Appellant's brief sets forth only a general allegation, but
refers to eighteen specific errors by counsel listed in his RCr
11.42 motion.
Upon review of the record, we adjudge appellant's
list of eighteen errors to be without merit.
Twelve of these
alleged errors involve actions appellant contends counsel should
have taken to impeach eyewitness Payne.
However, contrary to
appellant's allegations, the record shows that counsel made a
substantial effort to impeach Payne.
Counsel's cross-examination
of the medical examiner elicited testimony which contradicted
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Payne's version of events.
The jury was aware of Payne's prior
drug use, prior felony conviction, and his prior inconsistent
statements as to why he went to appellant's house on the night of
the crime.
The record indicates that counsel questioned Payne in
detail as to the location in the room of Payne, Baker, and
appellant at the time of the shooting, and Payne's actions after
the shooting.
As such, we conclude appellant's claims that
counsel's performance was deficient with regard to Payne to be
without merit.
Appellant also contends that counsel was deficient in
not interviewing Parker before trial.
However, the record shows
that counsel called Parker as a witness and questioned him
thoroughly as to his whereabouts on the night of the murder, and
his hostile relationship with appellant.
Appellant fails to
specify how counsel's interviewing Parker prior to trial would
have led to a different outcome of the case.
There is a
presumption that counsel's actions were a part of sound trial
strategy and within the wide range of reasonable, professional
assistance.
Robbins v. Commonwealth, 719 S.W.2d at 743.
Appellant further contends that counsel was deficient for not
calling other defense witnesses, who he claims would have also
refuted Payne's testimony.
However appellant fails to state with
any specificity what these witnesses would have testified.
the absence of an allegation that the testimony would have
compelled an acquittal, the mere failure to produce defense
witnesses does not amount to ineffective assistance.
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Id.
In
Two of the 18 errors concerned alleged failures by
counsel concerning a bullet found in the kitchen wall of
appellant's residence nine days after the shooting.
This issue
was raised on direct appeal, with the Supreme Court upholding the
trial court's ruling that this bullet was inadmissible.
RCr
11.42 does not permit a convicted defendant to retry issues
previously raised on direct appeal.
Thacker v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 476 S.W.2d 838, 839 (1972).
The remainder of the list of eighteen errors are either
refuted by the record, or were very general and speculative.
In
seeking post-conviction relief, the movant must aver facts with
sufficient specificity to generate a basis for relief.
Commonwealth, Ky., 465 S.W.2d 267, 268 (1971).
Lucas v.
Further, the
trial court noted in its May 20, 1999 order that appellant
"offered absolutely no proof" at the evidentiary hearing to
support these eighteen claims.
Effective assistance of counsel
does not deny counsel the freedom of discretion in determining
the means of presenting his client's case.
Hibbs v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 570 S.W.2d 642, 644 (1978).
The record
indicates that appellant's counsel was well-prepared and provided
competent representation.
We choose not to retry the case and
second guess the trial counsel as to what he should have or
should not have done at the time.
433 S.W.2d 117 (1968).
Dorton v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
Hibbs, 570 S.W.2d at 644.
Appellant next argues that counsel was ineffective for
failing to call up to 25 witnesses that could have testified on
his behalf at the sentencing.
However, as the trial court
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correctly stated, as appellant was not facing the death penalty,
KRS 532.055 applied to his sentencing.
At the time appellant was
tried, in 1993, KRS 532.055(2)(b) provided that the only evidence
he could introduce in mitigation at his sentencing hearing would
be evidence that he had no significant history of criminal
activity.
As the record shows appellant had prior convictions of
first-degree manslaughter and first-degree assault, there was
nothing that these witnesses could have testified to in
mitigation.
Accordingly, there was no deficiency on the part of
counsel for not calling these witnesses, nor any prejudice
resulting to appellant.
Appellant next argues that he was denied proper
appellate review as a result of his allegation that the record on
appeal was altered.
1993.
Appellant was sentenced on February 12,
The Department of Public Advocacy was appointed to
represent appellant on appeal, and appellant's notice of appeal
to the Kentucky Supreme Court was filed on February 17, 1993.
On
February 18, 1993, appellant's appointed counsel requested a
transcript of the proceedings.
The record shows that on May 27,
1993 the transcript of the proceedings was filed and the record
on appeal was certified by the Laurel Circuit Court Clerk.
75.08 states:
. . . if any difference arises as to
whether the record truly discloses what
occurred in the trial court, the difference
shall be submitted to and settled by that
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CR
court and the record made to conform to the
truth.
If anything material to either party
is omitted from the record on appeal by error
or accident or is misstated therein, the
parties by stipulation, or the trial court,
either before or after the record is
transmitted to the appellate court, or the
appellate court, on a proper suggestion or of
its own initiative, may direct that the
omission or misstatement shall be corrected.
Appellant filed several motions in late 1993 in the Laurel
Circuit Court attempting to obtain copies of tapes of the trial
proceedings, but was unsuccessful.
The Supreme Court affirmed
appellant's conviction on February 25, 1994.
Appellant's claim
of inaccuracies in the transcript should have been raised on
direct appeal and is not appropriate for RCr 11.42 relief.
An
appellant is not permitted to raise issues in RCr 11.42
proceedings that could have or should have been raised in the
original proceedings or on direct appeal.
Ky., 599 S.W.2d 456 (1980).
direct appeal are waived.
Commonwealth v. Ivey,
Assignments of error not raised on
Williamson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 767
S.W.2d 323 (1989).
Appellant argues that it was the duty of defense
counsel to have the trial court settle the matter of
discrepancies in the record pursuant to CR 75.08.
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The trial
court stated that appellant "made no claim that he and his
appellate counsel ever sought to take advantage of the procedures
allowed by CR 75" which sets out procedures appellant could have
followed pursuant to his claim of inaccuracies in the transcript.
Appellant made no motion to correct or modify the record pursuant
to CR 75.08.
880 (1987).
See Campbell v. Commonwealth, Ky., 732 S.W.2d 878,
However, as the trial court noted, appellant was
represented by appellate counsel when the trial record was
certified and a copy provided to him.
An RCr 11.42 motion is not
the appropriate method to seek relief based on the ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel.
Vunetich v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
847 S.W.2d 51 (1990); Hicks v. Commonwealth, Ky., 825 S.W.2d 280
(1992).
Appellant's final argument is that the cumulative
effect of trial counsel's errors constituted ineffective
assistance.
Having determined that the individual allegations
have no merit, they can have no cumulative value.
McQueen v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 721 S.W.2d 694, 701 (1986).
The judgment of the Laurel Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Kim Brooks
Covington, Kentucky
A. B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Paul D. Gilbert
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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