JAMES C. THOMPSON, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF ASHLEE N. THOMPSON v. JAMES ROSS HARDY, JR., INDIVIDUALLY AND AS EXECUTOR OF THE LEISA M. FISHER ESTATE; AND SABRINA HARDY
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RENDERED: October 20, 2000; 2:00 p.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-001654-MR
JAMES C. THOMPSON, INDIVIDUALLY
AND AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE
OF ASHLEE N. THOMPSON
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM EDMONSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE RONNIE C. DORTCH, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CI-00131
JAMES ROSS HARDY, JR., INDIVIDUALLY
AND AS EXECUTOR OF THE LEISA M.
FISHER ESTATE; AND SABRINA HARDY
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, JOHNSON AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE: James C. Thompson, individually and as the
administrator of the estate of Ashlee N. Thompson, appeals from
the judgment of the Edmonson Circuit Court entered upon a jury
verdict in a will contest case upholding the validity of the
purported lost will of Leisa M. Fisher.
Since we believe that
there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding
that the will was duly executed and attested as required by law,
we hold that the trial court erred in failing to grant Thompson’s
motion for a directed verdict.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand.
Thompson was formerly married to Fisher.
had one child, Ashlee, who was born in 1983.
The couple
Thompson and Fisher
were divorced in 1986, and the couple shared joint custody of
Ashlee.
On November 9, 1996, Fisher and Ashlee sustained fatal
injuries when the automobile Fisher was driving collided with a
vehicle operated by a person who was intoxicated and driving on
the wrong side of the highway.
crash.
Fisher died at the scene of the
Ashlee died a few hours later.
the administrator of Ashlee’s estate.
Thompson was appointed as
Fisher’s mother, Regina
Hardy, and her brother, James Ross Hardy, Jr., (Ross), were
appointed as co-administrator’s of her estate.
On November 19, 1997, several months after the
appointment of the co-administrators of Fisher’s estate, Ross
petitioned the court to probate a document purported to be a copy
of Fisher’s lost will.
The typewritten document, dated March 17,
1996, was apparently signed by Fisher, but it did not contain the
attesting witnesses’ signatures.
The copy of the purported lost
will reads as follows:
I, Leisa M. Fisher do state that this is my
last will and testament.
It is my will that in the event of my death,
my brother Ross Hardy Jr. be the
administrator of my estate.
I want Ross and Sabrina Hardy to become the
legal guardians of Ashlee.
All of my worldly goods and monies are to go
[to] Ross and Sabrina Hardy.
Social Security, V.A.Benefits and other
benefits Ashlee may be entitled to also go to
Ross and Sabrina Hardy for I know in my heart
that they will do the right thing.
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I love my whole family with all my heart and
soul, Especially MOMMA.
Ashlee remember that your momma loves you
with all her heart and soul.
Be a good girl.
Signed:x/Leisa M. Fisher
Witness:____________________
Witness:____________________
On January 23, 1998, the Edmonson District Court
ordered that the will be admitted to probate as the last will of
Fisher and that Ross be appointed as the executor of Fisher’s
estate.
Thompson filed an action in the Edmonson Circuit Court
disputing the validity of the will and seeking a declaration that
it was invalid under the provisions of KRS1 394.040.
Ross and
his wife, Sabrina Hardy, answered the complaint and filed a
counterclaim against Thompson on behalf of Fisher’s estate for
back child support.
Thompson moved for summary judgment alleging that there
was no proof that the purported will had been executed as
required by KRS 394.040.
In its order of January 19, 1999, the
trial court denied the motion since discovery had not yet been
undertaken.
Thompson renewed his motion for summary judgment two
months prior to the scheduled trial date and after answers to
interrogatories propounded to the appellees indicated that the
identity of the attesting witnesses remained unknown.
Thompson
again pointed to the absence of any evidence on the issue of the
will’s execution in the manner prescribed by statute and the
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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inability of the Hardys to produce such evidence at trial.
The
renewed motion was apparently denied on the morning of trial.
When the case was tried before a jury in June 1999, the
Hardys called several witnesses who testified that they had seen
Fisher’s will and that the copy offered for probate was identical
to the will they had seen with the exception that the original
will contained two signatures on the lines provided for the
attesting witnesses.
Although the many trial witnesses, all
family members or close friends, testified that Fisher’s will had
contained the signatures of two witnesses, and although many of
these trial witnesses could identify the contents of the copy as
being the same as the will they had seen, none could recall the
names of either of the alleged attesting witnesses.
Furthermore,
there was no witness who testified that he had seen Fisher or the
attesting witnesses sign the will, much less execute it in the
presence of each other.
Despite these evidentiary gaps, the trial court denied
Thompson’s motions for a directed verdict and allowed the jury to
determine whether the will was “[d]uly executed,” defined in the
trial court’s instruction as one having been “signed by [Fisher]
and [ ] attested by two or more competent witnesses subscribing
their name[s] in her presence.”
A unanimous jury determined
that the will had been duly executed.
Although the jury had
heard proof on the counterclaim for child support, that claim was
bifurcated from the issue of the validity of the lost will.
A
final and appealable judgment was entered on June 14, 1999, in
which the trial court ruled that the document offered for probate
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was the last will and testament of Fisher and that the will
should be admitted to probate and “have full force and effect
under the laws of the Commonwealth of Kentucky.”
This appeal
followed.
Thompson continues to argue that the document offered
for probate is invalid as it fails to meet the statutory
requisites prescribed in KRS 394.040, which reads as follows:
No will is valid unless it is in writing
with the name of the testator subscribed
thereto by himself, or by some other person
in his presence and by his direction. If the
will is not wholly written by the testator,
the subscription shall be made or the will
acknowledged by him in the presence of at
least two (2) credible witnesses, who shall
subscribe the will with their names in the
presence of the testator, and in the presence
of each other.
Thompson insists that the trial court erred in allowing the jury
to render a verdict in the absence of any proof to satisfy the
formalities required by this statute.
We agree.
Our standard of review of a trial court’s denial of a
motion for a directed verdict is set forth in Lewis v. Bledsoe
Surface Mining Co.,2 as follows:
Upon review of the evidence supporting a
judgment entered upon a jury verdict, the
role of an appellate court is limited to
determining whether the trial court erred
in failing to grant the motion for
directed verdict. All evidence which
favors the prevailing party must be taken
as true and the reviewing court is not at
liberty to determine credibility or the
weight which should be given to the
evidence, these being functions reserved
to the trier of fact. The prevailing
2
Ky., 798 S.W.2d 459, 461-462 (1990); see also Taylor v.
Kennedy, Ky.App., 700 S.W.2d 415, 416 (1985).
-5-
party is entitled to all reasonable
inferences which may be drawn from the
evidence. Upon completion of such an
evidentiary review, the appellate court
must determine whether the verdict
rendered is “‘palpably or flagrantly’
against the evidence so as ‘to indicate
that it was reached as a result of passion
or prejudice.’” If the reviewing court
concludes that such is the case, it is at
liberty to reverse the judgment on the
grounds that the trial court erred in
failing to sustain the motion for directed
verdict. Otherwise, the judgment must be
affirmed [citations omitted].
In addition, we are guided in our review by settled
principles concerning wills and the formalities attendant to
their execution.
“It is elementary that the power to dispose of
one’s property by will and the manner in which a will may be
executed are statutory.”3
“The making of a will is not a natural
right, but is a statutory privilege conferred by legislative
grant.”4
“The law governing the execution and revocation of
wills in Kentucky is fully and minutely set forth in the
statutes, and to be effectual the execution . . . of a will must
substantially conform to the provision of the statute.”5
Clearly, the Legislature has the right “to impose and has imposed
upon the makers of wills” certain technicalities which must be
3
Miller’s Ex’r v. Shannon, Ky., 299 S.W.2d 103,
(unsigned holographic will placed in sealed envelope
contained the signature of the testatrix held not to
the statutory requirement that the will be signed at
close of the writing”).
105 (1957)
that
comply with
the “end or
4
Nelson v. Nelson, 235 Ky. 189, 30 S.W.2d 893, 894 (1930).
5
Miller v. Harrell, 175 Ky. 578, 194 S.W. 782, 783 (1917).
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observed in order for a will to be valid.6
The proof necessary to establish the validity of a lost
will is no less stringent than that required if the will had not
been lost.7
There is no question that the Hardys, as the
proponents of the lost will, had the burden to prove “by clear,
satisfactory and convincing testimony (1) the due execution of
the instrument; (2) its contents; (3) that it has been lost and
cannot be found; and (4) the continued existence of the will
unrevoked by the testator.”8
The substance of the evidence at
trial is being questioned only on the issue of the due execution
of the will.
The Hardys insist that it was proper for the trial
court to allow the jury to infer from the testimony of witnesses
who stated that they observed signatures on the lines reserved
for the attesting witnesses that the formalities of the statute
had been satisfied.
However, the Hardys have not cited a single
case from this, or any other, jurisdiction that suggests that it
is reasonable to allow a jury to infer compliance with formal,
technical, statutory requirements merely by observation of a
signature.9
6
The Hardys also contend, again without reference to
Miller’s Ex’r, supra.
7
White v. Brennan’s Adm’r, 307 Ky. 776, 778, 212 S.W.2d 299,
302 (1948).
8
Clemens v. Richards, 304 Ky. 154, 155, 200 S.W.2d 156, 157
(1947).
9
Further, their reliance on KRS 394.235 is misplaced as that
statute, which provides an alternate method for proving a will
when the subscribing witnesses are “unavailable,” clearly
contemplates the existence of a will that is valid on its face,
(continued...)
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any legal authority, that the jury’s unanimous verdict
establishes “the fact that the evidence was clear and
convincing.”
Obviously, unanimity of the jury’s verdict does not
resolve the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence to support
the verdict.10
Generally, proof of due execution of a will is provided
by one, or both, of the subscribing, or attesting, witnesses.11
That is, after all, the purpose for having attesting witnesses in
the first instance.12
However, persons who were present during
the executing of a will, but who did not serve as attesting
witnesses, may offer sufficient evidence to establish due
execution.13
In White, due execution was convincingly
established by the attorney who had retained a carbon copy of the
testator’s will which had been lost.
He testified that he had
prepared the will, that he was familiar with the requirements for
9
(...continued)
that is attested to by two witnesses whose names and identities
are ascertainable. The statute has no application to the
situation in the case sub judice where the only reason the
witnesses are unavailable is because they are unknown to the
proponents of the will.
10
The fact that the jury rendered a unanimous verdict could
just as easily reflect the degree of sympathy the Hardys’ counsel
was able to engender for Fisher’s family and the prejudice
created against Thompson. For example, the trial court allowed
the Hardys, over Thompson’s objection, to question Thompson about
his 1989 indictment for flagrant nonsupport and his failure to
keep current on his support obligations.
11
See KRS 394.210(3) and Shoup v. Ketron, Ky., 528 S.W.2d
731 (1975); see also Birch v. Jefferson County Court, 244 Ky.
425, 426, 51 S.W.2d 258, 259-60 (1932). Of course, KRS 394.225
allows for a self-proved will, but that is not involved here.
12
See Bennett v. Craycraft, Ky., 290 S.W.2d 615 (1956).
13
White, supra.
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a valid will, that he remembered the execution ceremony of the
particular will in question, and that he had observed the signing
of the will by the two witnesses.
However, White does not hold
that due execution can be established without the testimony of at
least one person, either an attesting witness or person who
witnessed the formal will-signing ceremony contemplated by the
statute.
In the case sub judice, it is apparent that the will
was not prepared by an attorney, but was probably prepared by
Fisher herself.
From the lines prepared for the signature of two
witnesses, the jury could reasonably infer that Fisher was aware
of the need to obtain such signatures.
There was evidence that
the documents contained Fisher’s signature and the signatures of
two other persons.
However, there was no attestation clause or
any other proof that Fisher was aware of the manner in which KRS
394.040 mandates those signatures be obtained.14
Further, there
is a complete absence of proof on the critical issues of whether
Fisher acknowledged the document to the unknown witnesses as her
will, or whether the attesting witnesses signed the document in
Fisher’s presence or in the presence of each other, or even
whether the unknown witnesses were competent.
Without testimony
that these formalities were followed, formalities designed to
prevent fraud on the estate of the deceased, the jury could only
have found that the will was duly executed by resorting to
14
Unfortunately, this case is a reminder of the need and
importance of having a will properly prepared to insure that the
estate will be probated in accordance with the wishes of the
decedent.
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speculation and conjecture.
Under the circumstances of this
case, it is certainly understandable that a jury would favor the
Hardys’ position.
However, it is the duty of the trial court, as
the gatekeeper, to follow the requirements of the law and to
enter a directed verdict when required.
We certainly take no
pleasure in reversing this judgment, but our role, our purpose as
the appellate court requires no less.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Edmonson Circuit Court
is reversed and the matter is remanded for entry of a judgment
consistent with this Opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE:
Frank Hampton Moore, Jr.
Stefan Richard Hughes
Bowling Green, KY
W. Currie Milliken
Bowling Green, KY
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE:
Stefan Richard Hughes
Bowling Green, KY
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