ALLEN HODGE v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED SEPTEMBER 29, 2000; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-001553-MR
ALLEN HODGE
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BULLITT CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS WALLER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 95-CR-00084
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, KNOPF, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE: Allen Hodge appeals from a judgment of the Bullitt
Circuit Court sentencing him to two years’ imprisonment following
conviction by a jury for trafficking in a controlled substance.
After reviewing the record and the arguments of counsel, we
affirm.
Between October 1994 and January 1995, the Kentucky
State Police participated in several undercover purchases of
methamphetamine during which the seller was observed going to the
residence of Allen Hodge.
On February 1, 1995, Detectives Thomas
Johnson and Harold Miller, along with ten other police officers,
executed a search warrant at Hodge’s residence.
When the police
arrived, Hodge and his wife, Joyce, plus four other persons were
in the residence.
Prior to beginning the full search, the police
advised the Hodges of their Miranda1 rights.
During a search of
the master bedroom, the police recovered a brown leather purse
under the bed that had a white wallet inside that contained
$3,000.00 in cash and two small paper squares wrapped in aluminum
foil and clear plastic wrap.
Based on their experience, the
police believed the paper squares were “hits” of LSD.
The purse
also contained various personal items with the name of Joyce
Hodge on them including a check book, bank receipts, and
government AFDC cards.
Following seizure of various items of evidence,
Detective Miller asked Joyce Hodge if the purse belonged to her,
and she responded that it did not.
At this point, Allen Hodge
stated that the two samples of suspected LSD were his.
Detective
Miller then read Hodge his Miranda rights again and continued to
question him.
Hodge again indicated the LSD belonged to him and
that he had placed it in the purse.
Hodge was placed under
arrest and charged with possession of a controlled substance.
Laboratory analysis later confirmed that the wrapped paper was
impregnated with LSD.
In April 1995, Hodge appeared in Bullitt District Court
for a probable cause hearing.
Judge John Laun waived the case to
the grand jury for further consideration.
In July 1995, the
Bullitt County grand jury indicted Hodge on one felony count of
possession of a Schedule I controlled substance (LSD), first
1
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed.
2d 694 (1966).
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offense.
KRS 218A.1415.
At some point, John Laun left the
district court bench and became employed as an Assistant
Commonwealth’s Attorney assigned to the prosecution of Allen
Hodge.
On June 3, 1999, the trial in circuit court began.
Following voir dire and opening statements, Hodge’s attorney made
an oral motion for a mistrial on the basis that the prosecuting
attorney, John Laun, had presided over the probable cause hearing
and had waived the case to the grand jury while he was serving as
a district court judge.
The trial judge denied the motion as
untimely.
During the trial, the Commonwealth called Detectives
Johnson and Miller as witnesses, who testified that Hodge stated
the LSD belonged to him.
At the end of the prosecution’s
evidence, defense counsel moved for a directed verdict and
renewed his motion for a mistrial.
motions.
The trial court denied both
The defense witnesses included Allen Hodge, his son,
two daughters, and his sister.
All of the witnesses testified
that the police had damaged the house and furnishings while
conducting the search.
They all stated that they were frightened
by the police conduct.
Hodge admitted having told the police
that the LSD was his, but he said that he did so only to protect
his wife and family.
him.
He testified that the LSD did not belong to
His son, daughter, and sister testified that Hodge had
claimed ownership of the LSD at the time of the search, but they
stated that they had never seen the appellant use drugs.
At the
conclusion of the evidence, defense counsel renewed his motions
for mistrial and directed verdict, which the trial court denied.
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The court stated that Hodge was not prejudiced by the fact that
the prosecutor had waived the case to the grand jury while
serving as district court judge.
At the end of the trial, the jury found Hodge guilty of
possession of a controlled substance, first offense, and
recommended a sentence of two years.
On June 21, 1999, the trial
court sentenced Hodge to serve two years in prison consistent
with the jury’s recommendation.
This appeal followed.
Hodge argues that the trial court erred by failing to
declare a mistrial because the prosecuting attorney had been
responsible for waiving the case to the grand jury while serving
as a district court judge.
Hodge relies on the Kentucky Rules of
Professional Conduct, Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 3.130-1.12, which
provides in pertinent part:
(a) Except as stated in paragraph (d), a
lawyer shall not represent anyone in
connection with a matter in which the lawyer
participated personally and substantially as
a judge or other adjudicative officer,
arbitrator or law clerk to such a person,
unless all parties to the proceeding consent
after disclosure.
He contends that the prosecutor’s act of waiving the case to the
grand jury, while he was a judge, represented a substantial step
in the criminal prosecution.
Therefore, he asserts that the
prosecutor should have been disqualified from participating in
the criminal prosecution in circuit court.
We disagree.
As appellant acknowledges, there are no Kentucky cases
directly on point.
However, the Commentary to Rule 1.12 states:
“the fact that a former judge exercised administrative
responsibility in a court does not prevent the former judge from
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acting as a lawyer in a matter where the judge had previously
exercised remote or incidental administrative responsibility that
did not affect the merits.”
(Emphasis added).
Laun’s act of
waiving the case to the grand jury had absolutely no effect on
the merits of the case.
Additionally, Hodge admits having
claimed ownership of the LSD at the time of the search, so there
is no dispute that probable cause existed for waiver to the grand
jury.
Hodge’s claim that Rule 1.12 creates an absolute, blanket
prohibition on subsequent participation by a former judicial
officer is contradicted by the Commentary and the language of the
rule itself.
Another factor in the present case is that it involves
a motion for mistrial made after the jury had been empaneled and
sworn.
See Couch v. Maricle, Ky., 998 S.W.2d 469, 470
(1999)(jeopardy attaches when jury is empaneled and sworn);
Commonwealth v. Ray, Ky., 982 S.W.2d 671, 673 (1998)(same).
A
trial court may declare a mistrial based on a manifest or urgent
necessity.
Skaggs v. Commonwealth, Ky., 694 S.W.2d 672, 678
(1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1130, 106 S. Ct. 1998, 90 L. Ed.
2d 678 (1986); Miller v. Commonwealth, Ky., 925 S.W.2d 449, 453
(1996).
“‘A defendant may move for a mistrial where there is a
legitimate claim of seriously prejudicial error,’ such that the
defendant is unable to obtain a fair trial.”
United States v.
Phibbs, 999 F.2d 1053, 1066 (6th Cir. 1993)(quoting United States
v. Marks, 917 F.2d 215, 220 (6th Cir. 1990)), cert. denied, 510
U.S. 1119, 114 S. Ct. 1070, 127 L. Ed. 2d 389 (1994).
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As the
Court stated in Gould v. Charlton Co., Inc., Ky., 929 S.W.2d 734,
740 (1996):
It is universally agreed that a mistrial is
an extreme remedy and should be resorted to
only when there is a fundamental defect in
the proceedings which will result in a
manifest injustice. The occurrence
complained of must be of such character and
magnitude that a litigant will be denied a
fair and impartial trial and the prejudicial
effect can be removed in no other way.
A trial court has discretion in weighing the competing interests
of society and the parties and deciding whether a particular
situation constitutes sufficient manifest necessity to justify
declaring a mistrial.
Id. at 737; Sharp v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
849 S.W.2d 542, 547 (1993); Miller, 925 S.W.2d at 453.
Hodge has demonstrated no prejudice from the fact that
the prosecutor waived his case to the grand jury while serving as
a district court judge.
He has not shown and does not even
contend that the prosecutor acquired any special or confidential
information while acting on the case in district court.
He has
failed to show that this situation negatively affected the trial
or rendered it fundamentally unfair.
As a result, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hodge’s motion for
mistrial.
Hodge also argues that the trial court erred by denying
his motions for a directed verdict.
In Commonwealth v. Benham,
Ky., 816 S.W.2d 186 (1991), the Kentucky Supreme Court delineated
the standard for handling a criminal defendant’s motion for
directed verdict as follows:
On motion for directed verdict, the
trial court must draw all fair and reasonable
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inferences from the evidence in favor of the
Commonwealth. If the evidence is sufficient
to induce a reasonable doubt that the
defendant is guilty, a directed verdict
should not be given. For the purpose of
ruling on the motion, the trial court must
assume that the evidence for the Commonwealth
is true, but reserving to the jury questions
as to the credibility and weight to be given
to such testimony.
Id. at 187 (citing Commonwealth v. Sawhill, Ky., 660 S.W.2d 3
(1983)).
See also Estep v. Commonwealth, Ky., 957 S.W.2d 191,
193 (1997).
A court must be mindful of the rule that
“[c]redibility and weight of the evidence are matters within the
exclusive province of the jury.”
Commonwealth v. Smith, Ky., 5
S.W.3d 126, 129 (1999)(citations omitted).
The standard for
appellate review of a denial of a motion for directed verdict
alleging insufficient evidence dictates that if under the
evidence as a whole it would not be clearly unreasonable for a
jury to find the defendant guilty, he is not entitled to a
directed verdict of acquital.
Benham, 816 S.W.2d at 187; Fugate
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 993 S.W.2d 931, 940 (1999).
In the current case, the police recovered two “hits” of
LSD inside a purse in Hodge’s bedroom.
Detective Miller
testified that Hodge told him that he had put the two drug items
in the purse.
Hodge argues that because the purse obviously
belonged to Joyce Hodge, it is unreasonable to believe the LSD
was his.
purse.
However, it is undisputed that Hodge had access to the
“Possession” need not be exclusive.
“Two or more persons
may be in possession of the same drug at the same time and this
possession does not necessarily have to be actual physical
possession.”
Houston v. Commonwealth, Ky., 975 S.W.2d 925, 927
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(1998)(quoting Franklin v. Commonwealth, Ky., 490 S.W.2d 148, 150
(1972).
Several defense witnesses, including Hodge himself,
confirmed that he claimed ownership of the drugs at the time of
the search.
While Hodge disavowed his earlier statements and
attempted to explain his change of positions, the jury was not
obligated to accept his explanation.
The police witnesses
disputed the defense testimony of mistreatment during the search.
The jury was free to determine the relative credibility of the
conflicting aspects of the testimony.
This Court is not entitled
to second-guess the jury’s resolution of the credibility and
weight given to the evidence.
Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to
the Commonwealth, we find that there was sufficient evidence to
support the jury’s verdict.
Consequently, the trial court did
not err in denying the appellant’s motions for directed verdict.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the
Bullitt Circuit Court.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE, CONCURS.
SCHRODER, JUDGE, DISSENTS.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Rebecca Murrell
Shepherdsville, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Fredric Friske
Shepherdsville, Kentucky
J. Hamilton Thompson
Frankfort, Kentucky
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