RUSSELL J. HENNING v. RHONDA ANNE HENNING
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RENDERED:
SEPTEMBER 1, 2000; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-001459-MR
RUSSELL J. HENNING
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE PATRICIA WALKER-FITZGERALD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 90-CI-007110
v.
RHONDA ANNE HENNING
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
* * * * * * * * * *
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, KNOPF, and SCHRODER, Judges.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE.
This is a domestic relations matter wherein
Russell Henning appeals from a decision of the Jefferson Family
Court ordering that he pay 62% of all work-related child care
expenses resulting from the after-school care of his two minor
children.
We conclude the trial court did not abuse its
discretion, and we therefore affirm.
The marriage of Russell and Rhonda Anne Henning was
dissolved by order entered October 14, 1991.
Incorporated
therein was their previously executed settlement agreement which
provided that Rhonda receive sole custody of the parties’ two
minor children, Annie, born February 25, 1982, and Maggie, born
June 30, 1987.
In January 1997, Rhonda filed a petition seeking an
order requiring Russell to pay his share of work-related child
care costs she incurs due to her employment.
These costs are
principally derived from the costs associated with the
substantial care required by Annie, who is confined to a
wheelchair due to cerebral palsy.
The parties conceded the base
amount of child support conformed with the child support
guidelines.
The matter was heard by a domestic relations
commissioner who, on May 22, 1997, entered her report determining
that the child care costs were more akin to “disability-related”
expenses rather than “work-related” expenses.
The commissioner
therefore held that the costs should be borne by a guardianship
account set up for Annie’s benefit rather than by Russell.
Rhonda filed exceptions thereto, and on May 21, 1999, the court
rendered its opinion and ordered that Russell be responsible for
his share of the work-related child care costs.1
This appeal
ensued.
1
The proportionate amounts are derived from the respective
proportions of the parties’ combined adjusted gross incomes;
i.e., 62% is borne by Russell and the remainder by Rhonda.
-2-
Russell raises the same arguments before this Court as
those presented before the lower court.
The essence of his
reasoning remains that the funds received on Annie’s behalf
through the settlement agreement of a medical malpractice action
provide ample independent financial resources from which her
additional care requirements can be satisfied.2
Russell contends
that but for Annie’s disability she would not require the afterschool “sitters” and, as such, this expense is of a nature that
is more suitably payable by the guardianship account.
He bases
his argument on the provisions of KRS 403.211 delineating the
extraordinary circumstances wherein the court may deviate from
the statutory child support guidelines.
Specifically, Russell
relies on the following subsections:
(3) A written finding or specific finding on
the record that the application of the
guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate
in a particular case shall be sufficient to
rebut the presumption and allow for an
appropriate adjustment of the guideline award
if based upon one (1) or more of the
following criteria:
. . . .
(d) The independent financial resources, if
any, of the child or children;
. . . .
2
The record reflects receipt of $431,422.10 on Annie’s
behalf in September 1992 from the proceeds of a medical
malpractice action. The funds are held in a guardianship account
of which Rhonda is the guardian, and the fund apparently held
more than $500,000 at the time this matter was before the trial
court.
-3-
(g) Any similar factor of an extraordinary
nature specifically identified by the court
which would make application of the
guidelines inappropriate.
KRS 403.211(3)(d) and (g).
Russell contends the case of
Rainwater v. Williams, Ky. App., 930 S.W.2d 405 (1996), supports
his position that these statutory considerations control this
case.
We disagree.
In Rainwater, the lower court denied Joe Rainwater’s
motion to either reduce or vacate his child support of $85.00 per
month, following his son’s receipt of approximately $13 million
in an award resulting from a products liability lawsuit.
On
appeal, this court held that the trial court abused its
discretion by failing to consider any evidence as to whether
extraordinary circumstances, including those contained in KRS
430.211(3), existed to justify a deviation from the child support
guidelines.
Id. at 408.
Specifically, the lower court refused
to hear any proof of the child’s independent financial
resources.3
Id.
Such is not the case herein.
Here, the issue before
the court was not modification or deviation from the child
support guidelines.
Rather, the court was addressing the
appropriate source from which Annie’s work-related child care
3
Prior to the child in Rainwater reaching the age of
majority, he was to receive $5,000 per month from 1994-1997,
$6,000 per month from 1997-2000, and $7,500 per month from 20002004, in addition to lump-sum payments during that time of
$50,000 on November 1, 1997, and $75,000 on November 2, 2000.
Rainwater, 930 S.W.2d at 406.
-4-
costs should be derived; i.e., the guardianship account or her
parents.
KRS 403.212 defines income and other sums generally
associated with child support and further sets forth the
statutory guidelines regarding the amount of child support
required, given the parties’ combined adjusted gross monthly
income.
In tandem therewith, KRS 403.211(3) addresses some of
the extraordinary factors to be considered by the court in
ordering a deviation from the guidelines in KRS 403.211(2).
KRS
403.211(3), however, does not list factors to be considered in
the assignment of “child care” costs.
Rather, KRS 403.211(6)
sets forth that
[t]he court shall allocate between the
parents, in proportion to their adjusted
gross income, reasonable and necessary child
care costs incurred due to employment, job
search, or education leading to employment,
in addition to the amount ordered under the
child support guidelines.
Id.(emphasis added).
There is no dispute that Annie’s “sitter” costs are
incurred while Rhonda is working.
Russell’s reliance upon
KRS 403.211(3) and our opinion in Rainwater as grounds for
absolving him from his proportionate share of the work-related
child care expenses is therefore misplaced.
Rather, the court
was under neither the obligation nor the duty to consider Annie’s
independent financial resources in allocating the payment of her
child care costs.
Moreover, KRS 387.065(6) instructs that “[a]
guardian shall not provide for the support, care, or education of
-5-
a ward which a parent of the ward is legally obligated and
financially able to provide.”
The record reflects that Russell
is capable of providing his proportionate share of Annie’s
requisite support and care.
With regard to the support and maintenance of children,
the trial court retains broad discretion, provided it operates
within the confines of the statutory parameters.
v. Smith, Ky. App., 14 S.W.3d 569, 572 (2000).
See Van Meter
We conclude that,
with respect to the instant matter, the trial court carefully
enunciated its consideration of the parties’ financial abilities,
in addition to the independent resources available to Annie,
albeit it was under no statutory directive to do so.
In finding
Annie’s disability would require that she receive life-long
assistance and the guardianship account’s resources were not that
substantial in view of this fact, we believe the trial court’s
discretion was properly exercised in rendering its order.
In accordance with the foregoing discussion, the order
of the Jefferson Family Court is affirmed.
KNOPF, JUDGE, CONCURS.
SCHRODER, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
SCHRODER, JUDGE, DISSENTING.
I believe that portion of
the work-related child care costs which are attributed to the
disability of Annie should be paid out of the disability-related
settlement.
etc.
The settlement was for damages for extra medicals,
I agree that Rainwater v. Williams, Ky. App., 930 S.W.2d
405 (1996) is applicable.
Any modification of Russell’s child
-6-
support necessarily effects the source for the balance of Annie’s
work-related child care costs.
I believe the majority opinion is
making a distinction without a difference.
I would vacate and
remand to consider using some of the guardianship account.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
A. Thomas Johnson
Louisville, Kentucky
Stephen M. George
Louisville, Kentucky
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