DONALD JAMES D/B/A SLEEP DIAGNOSTICS - LOUISVILLE, L.L.C. v. OUTDOOR SYSTEMS, INC.
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RENDERED:
DECEMBER 15, 2000; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-001404-MR
DONALD JAMES
D/B/A SLEEP DIAGNOSTICS - LOUISVILLE, L.L.C.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEVEN MERSHON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CI-006716
v.
OUTDOOR SYSTEMS, INC.
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART, AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
DYCHE, KNOPF, AND McANULTY, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Jefferson
Circuit Court which denied a motion to stay enforcement of a
foreign judgment.
We agree with the trial court that the Arizona
court had jurisdiction to enter a judgment against a dissolved
Kentucky limited liability company.
However, we also find that
the Arizona court did not have personal jurisdiction over the
president of the limited liability company in his individual
capacity.
Hence, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand
for entry of a new judgment in accord with this opinion.
The appellant, Donald James, is president of Sleep
Diagnostics of Louisville, L.L.C., a Kentucky limited liability
company whose date of organization is April 11, 1995.
However,
on November 1, 1996, Sleep Diagnostics was administratively
dissolved by the Kentucky Secretary of State for failure to file
its annual report.
Sleep Diagnostics was reinstated by the
Secretary of State as of March 4, 1999.1
The appellee, Outdoor
Systems, Inc., is a Delaware corporation with its principal
business address located in Phoenix, Arizona.
Among its business
endeavors, Outdoor Systems provides billboard advertising
throughout the country, including Kentucky.
On April 2, 1996, Sleep Diagnostics entered into a
contract with Outdoor Systems for an outdoor advertising display
located in Louisville.
The contract was signed by Sleep
Diagnostics’ marketing director, Sharon Morrison.
The agreement
provided for the creation and maintenance of a billboard
advertisement for Sleep Diagnostics for a period of twelve months
at a cost of $2,400.00 per month plus certain expenses.
Paragraph 13 of the agreement further provided:
Advertiser/Agency shall be responsible for
payment to OUTDOOR of any costs of fees,
including reasonable attorney’s fees incurred
by OUTDOOR, in enforcing its rights
hereunder, Advertiser/Agency shall pay the
same upon demand. Further, in the event any
legal action is commenced by OUTDOOR to
enforce payment of amounts owed hereunder,
Maricopa County, Arizona shall be the
1
Under KRS 275.295 (3)(c), reinstatement of a limited
liability company shall relate back to and take effect as of the
effective date of the administrative dissolution, and the limited
liability company shall resume carrying on business as if the
administrative dissolution had never occurred.
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exclusive jurisdiction and legal venue for
said action.
According to Outdoor Systems’ complaint, Sleep
Diagnostics made a number of payments under the contract, but
defaulted prior to the completion of the twelve month term.
On
April 9, 1997, Outdoor Systems brought a complaint in the
Superior Court of Maricopa County, Arizona, naming as the
defendant “Donald James, an individual, d.b.a. Sleep Diagnostics
- Louisville LLC, a purported, non-existent limited liability
company.”2
James was served on May 9, 1997, with a summons,
complaint and certificate of compulsory arbitration.
On June 11,
1997, Outdoor Systems filed an application for entry of a default
judgment against James and Sleep Diagnostics.
On June 24, 1997,
James filed a one page, pro se answer with the Arizona court.
The answer was typed on Sleep Diagnostics stationary and stated
as follows:
Comes now, Donald James, an individual, dba
Sleep Diagnostics - Louisville, LLC, and
denies that they are liable and that this
court has no jurisdiction over Sleep
Diagnostics, LLC or Donald James.
. . .
/s/Donald E. James Manager
Donald James, and individual
Although James paid the required filing fee with the
answer, he took no further part in the Arizona court proceedings.
On July 7, 1997, the Arizona court appointed an arbitrator to
hear the matter.
Outdoor Systems moved for summary judgment on
its claims on August 21, 1997, and there was no reply to the
motion.
2
Accordingly, on September 19, 1997, the Arizona
Action No. CV97-06501.
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arbitrator entered a judgment in favor of Outdoor Systems in the
amount of the unpaid balance on the contract, $16,320.00, with
interest at the rate of one and one-half percent per month from
March 1, 1997, until paid.
In addition, the Arizona judgment
awarded Outdoor Systems attorney’s fees of $671.50 and costs in
the amount of $97.25, each with interest thereupon at a rate of
ten percent per annum until paid.
On December 1, 1998, Outdoor Systems filed its Notice
and Affidavit of Foreign Judgment Registration with the Jefferson
Circuit Court, seeking enforcement of the Arizona judgment.
On
February 9, 1999, James filed a motion to stay execution of the
judgment liens and orders of garnishment.
James contested the
jurisdiction of the Arizona court over him and Sleep Diagnostics,
as well as the validity of the underlying contractual obligation.
Following briefing of the issues and a hearing, the trial court
found that the Arizona judgment is entitled to full faith and
credit.
In particular, the trial court concluded that James’s
defenses to personal liability for the debts of Sleep Diagnostics
should have been raised in the Arizona proceeding.
The trial
court further concluded that the forum selection clause in the
contract was not unreasonable, and thus the Arizona court had
personal jurisdiction over both Sleep Diagnostics and James.
This appeal followed.
Kentucky has adopted the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments Act, which states that a foreign judgment filed with
the clerk of any court of competent jurisdiction of the
Commonwealth has the same effect as a judgment rendered by a
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Kentucky court.3
Thus, a sister state's judgment is entitled to
full faith and credit and to registration if the judgment is
valid under that state's own laws.4
The essential question
presented in this action is whether the Arizona court had
personal jurisdiction to enter a judgment against Sleep
Diagnostics and James.
Arizona’s long-arm rule has been interpreted to extend
to the permissible limits of due process.5
The Due Process
Clause contained in the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution protects an individual’s liberty interest in not
being subject to the binding judgments of a forum with which he
has no meaningful contacts, ties or relations.6
Individuals must
have “fair warning” that a particular activity may subject them
to the jurisdiction of a foreign court.7
When the defendant has
purposefully directed his activities at the residents of the
forum state, and the litigation results from alleged injuries
that arise out of or relate to those activities, he cannot avoid
3
KRS 426.950.
4
Sunrise Turquoise, Inc. v. Chemical Design Co., Inc., Ky.
App., 899 S.W.2d 856, 857-58 (1995).
5
16 A.R.S. Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4.2(a); See also
Meyers v. Hamilton Corp., 143 Ariz. 249, 252, 693 P.2d 904, 907
(1984). Similarly, Kentucky’s long-arm statute also extends
personal jurisdiction over non-residents to the limits of due
process. Wright v. Sullivan Payne Co., Ky., 839 S.W.2d 250, 253
(1992).
6
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319,
66 S. Ct. 154, 160, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945).
7
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218, 53 L.Ed.2d 683, 706,
97 S.Ct. 2569 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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jurisdiction merely because he did not physically enter the
state.8
In the present case, the contract between Sleep
Diagnostics and Outdoor Systems designated Maricopa County,
Arizona as the appropriate forum in which to seek collection of
any amounts due.
Where a forum selection clause is held
enforceable, a due process analysis is unnecessary.9
Under
Arizona law, a forum selection clause that is fairly bargained
for and not the result of fraud will be enforced so long as to do
so is reasonable at the time of litigation and does not deprive
the litigant of his day in court.10
As noted by the trial
court, the contracting parties were both experienced and
knowledgeable businesses and were on an equal footing.
As a
result, we cannot find that the contract’s forum selection clause
was unreasonable.
Therefore, we find that the Arizona court had
jurisdiction to enter a judgment against Sleep Diagnostics.
However, we find that a separate issue exists as to
whether the Arizona court had personal jurisdiction over James.
The trial court correctly concluded that the issues of the
liability of Sleep Diagnostics for the debt, as well as James’s
personal liability for the debts of Sleep Diagnostics, were
8
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472, 85 L.
Ed. 2d 528, 540-41, 105 S. Ct. 2174 (1985).
9
Morgan Bank v. Wilson, 164 Ariz. 535, 537-38, 794 P.2d 959,
961-62 (Ariz. App., 1990).
10
Id. Unlike Kentucky, Arizona does not consider whether
the selected forum is a seriously inconvenient place for trial or
whether the state has more than a minimal interest in the
litigation. Id. (citing Prudential Resources Corp v. Plunkett,
Ky. App, 583 S.W.2d 97 (1979)).
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matters which should have been raised before the Arizona court
and are not subject to review now.
However, the Arizona court’s
exercise of personal jurisdiction over James is a distinct matter
which may be raised in this proceeding.
In order to find that James is personally liable for
the debts of Sleep Diagnostics, the Arizona court must have had
personal jurisdiction over him.
The contract was signed by an
agent of Sleep Diagnostics at a time when Sleep Diagnostics was
still a registered limited liability company.
Being a member of
a limited liability company is not sufficient, by itself, to
constitute transacting business within Arizona.11
Furthermore,
Outdoor Systems has not pointed to any conduct by James, in his
individual capacity, which was purposefully directed toward
Arizona.
As a result, we find that Arizona lacked the minimum
contacts with James to support the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over him.
Outdoor Systems argues that James’s answer to the
Arizona complaint constituted a general appearance which waived
any objection which he might have to personal jurisdiction in
Arizona.
We disagree.
Arizona has abolished the distinction
between general and special appearances.12
Rather, the court
must inquire whether a party, by his actions in the conduct of
the litigation, has manifested an intent to be subject to the
jurisdiction of the court even though he has raised
11
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 10-1501(B)(12).
12
16 A.R.S. Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule
-7-
12(i)(1).
jurisdictional defects.13
The extent of an appearance is always
a matter of intention and is not to be inferred, except as the
result of acts from which an intent may be properly inferred.14
If a party invokes the power of the court for his own purpose, he
will not be allowed the inconsistent objection that the forum was
personally inconvenient to him.15
In his answer, James generally denied liability, and he
asserted that the Arizona court was without jurisdiction over him
or Sleep Diagnostics.
He filed no further pleadings with the
Arizona court, and did not respond to Outdoor Systems’ motion for
summary judgment.
Given these circumstances, we cannot find that
James invoked the power of the Arizona courts for his own
purposes, or that he has consented to the Arizona court’s
jurisdiction over him.
Furthermore, the Arizona arbitrator made
no finding concerning James’s assertion of lack of personal
jurisdiction.
Consequently, the matter is not res judicata in
this proceeding.16
13
National Homes Corp. v. Totem Mobile Home Sales, Inc.,
140 Ariz. 434, 437, 682 P.2d 439, 442 (Ariz. App., 1984). See
also Ellman Land Corp. v. Maricopa County, 180 Ariz. 331, 884
P.2d 217 (Ariz. App., 1994); Aries v. Palmer Johnson, Inc., 153
Ariz. 250, 735 P.2d 1373 (Ariz. App., 1987).
14
National Homes, at 437, 682 P.2d at 442; (citing Austin
v. State ex rel. Herman, 10 Ariz. App. 474, 477 459 P.2d 753, 756
(1969)).
15
Id.
16
See Giehrl v. Royal Aloha Vacation Club, 188 Ariz. 456,
937 P.2d 378 (Ariz. App., 1997); Armstrong v. Aramco Services
Co., 155 Ariz. 345, 746 P.2d 917 (Ariz. App., 1987).
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Based upon the foregoing, we find that the judgment of
the Superior Court of Maricopa County, Arizona in Action No.
CV97-06501 is entitled to full faith and credit and enforcement
by the courts of Kentucky only insofar as it states a judgment
against Sleep Diagnostics - Louisville, L.L.C. or its successor
in interest under Kentucky law.
However, we find that the
Arizona court lacked personal jurisdiction over James in his
individual capacity, and so the judgment in that respect is not
entitled to full faith and credit in Kentucky.
Any issue of
James’s potential liability for the debts of Sleep Diagnostics
must be adjudicated in a Kentucky court.17
Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and
remand for entry of a new judgment in accord with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
William J. Walsh
Tilford, Dobbins, Alexander,
Buckaway & Black
Louisville, Kentucky
Amy Elam-Krizan
Lloyd & McDaniel, PLC
Louisville, Kentucky
17
See KRS §§ 275.150, 275.205. 275.300, 275.305.
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