MARK E. MCPEEK AND MCPEEK MINING, INC. v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION CABINET
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RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 1, 2000; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-001398-MR
MARK E. MCPEEK AND
MCPEEK MINING, INC.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM L. GRAHAM, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 95-CI-01449
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
NATURAL RESOURCES AND
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION CABINET
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
DYCHE, EMBERTON, AND MILLER, JUDGES.
MILLER, JUDGE:
Mark E. McPeek and McPeek Mining, Inc. bring this
appeal from an April 22, 1999, judgment of the Franklin Circuit
Court.
We affirm.
In July, 1985, officials of the Natural Resources and
Environmental Protection Cabinet (Cabinet) issued a Notice of
Non-Compliance for mining without a permit (wildcat mining) to
appellants, Mark E. McPeek, individually, and McPeek Mining, Inc.
The matter languished in the administrative arena through August,
1995.
Activity was interrupted by numerous periods of repose
variously by one party then the other.
On August 31, 1995, the
Secretary of the Cabinet accepted, in part, a recommendation of a
Hearing Officer and imposed a monetary penalty upon McPeek and
McPeek Mining, Inc., jointly and severally, for violation of
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 350.060.
Pursuant to KRS 350.032(2), McPeek and McPeek Mining,
Inc. appealed to the Franklin Circuit Court on September 29,
1995.
The issue presented was whether the Cabinet would be
barred by the statute of limitations or laches from collecting
the penalties.
Holding the Cabinet was not barred, the court
entered an April 22, 1999, order dismissing the petition, thus
precipitating this appeal.
The issue before us is whether the Cabinet's
enforcement action to collect the monetary penalty is barred by
either the statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches.
We view the applicable statute of limitations as five
years pursuant to KRS 413.120(3).
There is no other statutory
provisions prescribing a time in which an action for recovery of
penalties or forfeitures may be commenced.
It appears the
parties are in agreement with the applicability of this statute.
The dispute arises over the commencement of the running
of the statute.
Appellants would have us hold that the statute
begins to run at the time the notice of violation is first
issued.
We are not inclined to so hold.
If this were the case,
long administrative procedures would exhaust the statute and
result in a fruitless gain in the event penalties were imposed.
The penalties would then be uncollectible.
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In any event, we
think the cases of Couch v. Natural Resources and Environmental
Protection Cabinet, Ky., 986 S.W.2d 158 (1999), and Vanhoose v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 995 S.W.2d 389 (1999), are dispositive.
As such, we hold that the statute of limitations for the
collection of penalties and forfeitures begins to run at the time
the final administrative process is exhausted, to wit, when the
Commissioner issues his order imposing the obligation.
We conclude, therefore, the enforcement proceedings
were not barred by limitations.
We are further of the opinion
that except in rare cases, an applicable statute of limitations,
as is the case here, sub-plants laches as a bar to an action.
Cf. Karami v. Roberts, Ky. App., 706 S.W.2d 843 (1986).
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Franklin
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
J. Bradford Derifield
Frankfort, Kentucky
Greg Higgins
Frankfort, Kentucky
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