MUHAMMAD THABIT RASHAD v. DON BATTLES; PAUL FUGATI; EARL RUCKER; AND BARBARA CONLEY and MUHAMMAD THABIT RASHAD v. RHONDA B. EASTON; LT. RICHARD FULKS; W. CHRIS LACY; BARBARA CONLEY; AND GEORGE R. MILLION
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: February 4, 2000; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO. 1999-CA-001386-MR
MUHAMMAD THABIT RASHAD
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MORGAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE SAMUEL C. LONG, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CI-00065
DON BATTLES; PAUL FUGATI;
EARL RUCKER; AND BARBARA CONLEY
AND
NO. 1999-CA-001387-MR
MUHAMMAD THABIT RASHAD
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MORGAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE SAMUEL C. LONG, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CI-00053
RHONDA B. EASTON; LT. RICHARD FULKS;
W. CHRIS LACY; BARBARA CONLEY; AND
GEORGE R. MILLION
AND
APPELLEES
NO. 1999-CA-001389-MR
MUHAMMAD THABIT RASHAD
v.
APPELLEES
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MORGAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE SAMUEL C. LONG, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CI-00049
GEORGE R. MILLION; RICHARD FULK;
BARBARA CONLEY; AND DONALD FANNIN
APPELLEES
AND
NO. 1999-CA-001391-MR
MUHAMMAD THABIT RASHAD
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MORGAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE SAMUEL C. LONG, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CI-00047
GEORGE R. MILLION; RICHARD FULK;
BARBARA CONLEY; AND DONALD FANNIN
AND
NO. 1999-CA-001392-MR
MUHAMMAD THABIT RASHAD
v.
APPELLEES
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MORGAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE SAMUEL C. LONG, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CI-00044
GEORGE R. MILLION; RICHARD FULK;
BARBARA CONLEY; AND DONALD FANNIN
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: BARBER, SCHRODER, AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
SCHRODER, JUDGE: These are five consolidated appeals from orders
dismissing Muhammad Rashad's petitions for declaration of rights
regarding prison disciplinary proceedings taken against him.
Although the court should have allowed Rashad to respond to the
motion to dismiss before entering the orders, there was no
reversible error where no grounds for relief were presented in
Rashad's responses to the motions to dismiss or in the petitions
for declaration of rights.
Hence, we affirm.
-2-
Appellant, Muhammad Rashad, a prison inmate acting pro
se, was the subject of five prison disciplinary proceedings at
Eastern Correctional Complex (ECC).
In the course of these
proceedings, Rashad was found guilty by the prison adjustment
committee of:
obtaining privileges under false pretenses; using
the mail to obtain money, goods, or services by fraud; making
threatening statements; refusing to obey an order; and eluding or
resisting apprehension.
As punishment for these institutional
offenses, Rashad was given five terms of disciplinary segregation
totaling 225 days, to run consecutively with each other and with
other terms of disciplinary segregation he had previously
received, which are not the subject of this appeal.
Rashad was
also given a total of 270 days of phone restriction, to run
consecutive with other terms of phone restriction, and 180 days
of canteen restriction.
Subsequent to these institutional rulings, Rashad filed
five petitions for declaration of rights in the Morgan Circuit
Court.
In these petitions, he alleged that his due process
rights were violated by the prison disciplinary proceedings and
by the excessive punishments given.
The Commonwealth filed
motions to dismiss, claiming that Rashad was not entitled to
relief under the facts.
The court thereafter dismissed all five
petitions before Rashad filed his response to the motions to
dismiss.
From these orders of dismissal, Rashad now appeals.
In all five of Rashad’s appeals, he argues that the
court erred in dismissing his petitions without first giving him
the opportunity to file his responses to the motions to dismiss.
-3-
It has been held that a court cannot dismiss a complaint sua
sponte without notice and an opportunity to be heard.
Scroggy, Ky. App., 725 S.W.2d 867 (1987).
Gall v.
However, the orders in
the instant case were not issued sua sponte, but on motion of the
Commonwealth.
We are unaware of any case law requiring a court
to wait until the party opposing the motion has had time to file
his response before entering its order of dismissal, but we
believe this practice avoids potential due process arguments.
In
the case at bar, even if it was error for the court to dismiss
the petition before Rashad had time to file his response to the
motion to dismiss, it was harmless error since he was not
entitled to relief under the response to the motion or the
petition, as we shall discuss below.
Rashad argues in three of
his appeals that his due process rights were violated by the
prison disciplinary proceedings because the evidence against him
was unfounded and based on the lies of the reporting prison
official.
It has been held that in order to afford an inmate
minimal due process regarding a prison disciplinary proceeding,
the following is required:
advance written notice of the grounds
for the charges; an evidentiary hearing; a neutral decision
maker; an opportunity to be heard, and opportunities to present
and confront witnesses; and written findings and conclusions by
the fact finder.
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S. Ct.
2963, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1974).
It has further been held that if
some evidence supports the decision by the prison disciplinary
body, it may not be disturbed on appeal.
App., 939 S.W.2d 353 (1997).
Smith v. O’Dea, Ky.
In all of Rashad’s disciplinary
-4-
proceedings, the due process requirements of Wolff were met.
Further, upon reviewing the record, we see that there was some
evidence to support the findings in all of Rashad’s disciplinary
proceedings.
As to Rashad’s claims that the charges were
grounded in lies on the part of reporting prison officials,
Rashad fails to allege any specific facts supporting these
statements.
The final issue we shall address is Rashad’s claim in
three of the appeals that his punishment was excessive.
In
particular, Rashad maintains that his terms of disciplinary
segregation imposed a significant hardship on him, especially
since they were ordered to run consecutive with previous terms of
disciplinary segregation which totaled over 400 days.
Unlike the
loss of good time, disciplinary segregation does not deprive an
inmate of any liberty interest.
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472,
115 S. Ct. 2293, 132 L. Ed. 2d 418 (1995).
In order for
confinement to implicate constitutionally protected liberty
interests and due process protections, the confinement must
present an atypical, significant deprivation that is
substantially and fundamentally different than typical conditions
of incarceration.
Id.
In Jones v. Baker, 155 F.3d 810 (6th Cir.
1998), the Court upheld a segregation period of approximately two
and one-half years as constitutional under Sandin.
Accordingly,
we cannot say that the period of segregation fixed in Rashad’s
disciplinary proceedings (a total of approximately 500 days)
constitutes an atypical, significant deprivation which triggers
due process protections.
-5-
For the reasons stated above, the orders of the Morgan
Circuit Court are affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
NO BRIEF FOR APPELLEES
Muhammad Thabit Rashad, Pro Se
Eddyville, Kentucky
-6-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.