MICHAEL BRADFORD v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
DECEMBER 22, 2000; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-001210-MR
MICHAEL BRADFORD
APPELLANT
v.
APPEAL FROM MERCER CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEPHEN M. SHEWMAKER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CR-00104
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
HUDDLESTON, McANULTY, and MILLER, Judges.
McANULTY, JUDGE:
Michael Bradford appeals from a final judgment
of the Mercer Circuit Court sentencing him to five years’
imprisonment on two counts of trafficking in a controlled
substance to be run consecutively to a five year sentence on a
prior state felony conviction.
Bradford challenges that portion
of the trial court’s judgment ordering the sentence to run
consecutive to the prior sentence and its denial of his motion to
run the above sentences concurrently.
Having concluded that
Bradford was not eligible for concurrent sentencing, we affirm.
On December 11, 1998, the Mercer County Grand Jury
indicted Bradford on one felony count of trafficking in a
controlled substance (marijuana) in the first degree within 1000
yards of a school building (KRS 218A.1411) and one felony count
of trafficking in a controlled substance (cocaine) in the first
degree (KRS 218A.1412) involving the sale of illegal drugs to a
confidential informant.
On April 16, 1999, Bradford entered a
guilty plea to the two offenses pursuant to a plea agreement.
Under the plea agreement, the Commonwealth recommended sentences
of two years’ imprisonment reduced to one year for first-degree
trafficking in a controlled substance (marijuana) within 1000
yards of a school building upon payment of $250 to the Kentucky
State Police (KSP) prior to final sentencing, and six years’
imprisonment reduced to five years for first-degree trafficking
in a controlled substance (cocaine) upon payment of $210 to the
KSP prior to final sentencing with the two sentences to run
concurrently with each other.
The trial court postponed
sentencing pending preparation of a presentence investigation
report.
On May 12, 1999, Bradford filed a motion requesting
that the trial court run the sentences concurrent with, rather
than consecutive to, a five year sentence he had received on a
prior felony conviction in Case No. 96-CR-0075.
Bradford was out
on probation from the 1996 conviction when he committed the
offenses in the current appeal.
In the motion, Bradford argued
that under the principle that when two statutes conflict the
latter enacted statute controls the earlier statute, the trial
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court had discretion under KRS 532.110(1) to order the sentence
in Case No. 98-CR-0104 run concurrently with the sentence in Case
No. 96-CR-0075, despite the existence of KRS 533.060(2), which
requires consecutive sentencing for offenses committed while on
probation.
On May 14, 1999, the trial court conducted a sentencing
hearing at which defense counsel requested concurrent sentencing
based on the argument in the motion.
The trial court denied the
motion stating that KRS 533.060(2) was applicable as the more
specific statute, thereby making Bradford ineligible for
concurrent sentencing.
The court then sentenced Bradford to
serve five years for first-degree trafficking in a controlled
substance (cocaine) and one year on first-degree trafficking in a
controlled substance (marijuana) within 1000 yards of a school
building to run concurrently with each other but consecutively to
the five year sentence in Case No. 96-CR-0075.
This appeal
followed.
Bradford argues on appeal that the trial court erred in
holding that he was not eligible for concurrent sentencing.
He
contends that KRS 533.060(2), which provides that a sentence
received for a felony conviction committed while on probation
shall not run concurrently with any other sentence, and KRS
532.110(1), which gives the trial court discretion in deciding
whether to run multiple sentences of imprisonment concurrently or
consecutively, are in direct conflict.
Given this dilemma,
Bradford asserts that under the rules of statutory construction,
the statute last enacted should prevail.
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Finally, he maintains
that KRS 532.110(1) should control because it was republished in
1998, while KRS 533.060 was last amended in 1994.
The trial
court found this argument unpersuasive and instead relied upon
another rule of statutory construction which states that the more
specific statute controls.
In the recent case of White v. Commonwealth, Ky. App.,
___ S.W.3d ___ (2000) (1998-CA-002765-MR, rendered April 28,
2000)(discretionary review denied November 15, 2000), this Court
specifically addressed the apparent conflict between KRS 532.110
and KRS 533.060(2) and the effect of various amendments to the
statutes in determining which prevails.
In White, the court
noted that the 1998 amendment to KRS 532.110 did not involve that
aspect of the statute dealing with concurrent sentencing.1
The
court referred to long standing case law holding that KRS
532.060(2) took precedence over KRS 532.110(1)2.
In discussing
the effect of amendments, the court stated:
Under section 51 of the Kentucky
Constitution, the entire statute is required
to be re-enacted even though only a portion
of the statute is amended. The re-enactment
and amendment of KRS 532.110(1) do not
evidence an intent by the Legislature to have
that statute take priority over KRS
533.060(2). As the Court stated in Butler v.
Groce, Ky., 880 S.W.2d 547 (1994):
In substantially reenacting
a statute, the legislature is
1
The July 1998 amendment added a provision to Subsection
(4)(c) by creating a 70-year limitation on the aggregate of
consecutive indetermine sentences.
2
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hunt, Ky. App., 619 S.W.2d 733
(1981); Devore v. Commonwealth, Ky., 662 S.W.2d 829 (1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 836, 105 S.Ct. 132, 83 L.Ed.2d 72 (1984); Riley
v. Parke, Ky., 740 S.W.2d 934 (1987); Handley v. Commonwealth,
Ky. App., 653 S.W.2d 165 (1983).
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well aware of the interpretation
of the existing statute and has
adopted that interpretation
unless the new law contains
language to the contrary. Brown
v. Harrodsburg, Ky., 252 S.W.2d
44 (1952). If the legislators
intended to depart from the
existing statutory
interpretation, it is incumbent
that they use "plain and
unmistakable language" which
leaves no doubt that a departure
from the prior interpretation is
intended. Long v. Smith, 281
Ky., 512, 136 S.W.2d 789 (1940).
[Id. at 549].
Long existing case law interpreting KRS
532.110 and KRS 533.060(2) has clearly
established the primacy of the latter
statute. The General Assembly has not
amended either statute with clear language
evidencing an intent to change or overrule
the courts’ interpretation of these statutes
on that issue. White’s argument that the reenactment of KRS 532.110 in 1998 allows the
trial court discretion to impose a concurrent
sentence of an offense committed while the
defendant was on probation in contravention
of KRS 533.060(2) is without merit.
___ S.W.3d at ___, slip op. at 7.
Given the decision in White rejecting the same argument now
raised by Bradford, we find that the trial court correctly
applied KRS 533.060(2) in ordering that his sentence for the
felony drug trafficking offenses committed while on probation run
consecutively to the sentences for a prior felony conviction for
which he was on probation.
The trial court properly held that
Bradford was not eligible for concurrent sentencing.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the
Mercer Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Kim Brooks
Covington, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Elizabeth A. Heilman
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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