H. ELMER EDWARDS; DANIEL B. EDWARDS; WENDELL F. EDWARDS; JOYCE E. MALONE; KENNETH B. EDWARDS; DONALD R. EDWARDS; AND CAROLYN E. MARLIN v. GRACE CLARA HILL; AND ALLEN K. GAILOR, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PUBLIC ADMINISTRATOR AND SUCCESSOR PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
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RENDERED:
SEPTEMBER 1, 2000; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-001098-MR
H. ELMER EDWARDS; DANIEL B. EDWARDS;
WENDELL F. EDWARDS; JOYCE E. MALONE;
KENNETH B. EDWARDS; DONALD R. EDWARDS;
AND CAROLYN E. MARLIN
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM E. MCANULTY, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CI-007067
v.
GRACE CLARA HILL;
AND ALLEN K. GAILOR,
IN HIS CAPACITY AS PUBLIC ADMINISTRATOR
AND SUCCESSOR PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, KNOPF AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
This is an appeal from a jury verdict and judgment
by the Jefferson Circuit Court upholding the validity of a will.
We find that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial
court’s decision to submit the issue of testamentary capacity to
the jury.
Furthermore, we conclude that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in denying the appellants’ motions for a
mistrial and for a new trial based upon improper conduct by the
appellants’ trial counsel.
Lastly, we find that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in allowing the admission of certain
hearsay testimony.
Hence, we affirm.
Facts
Sulia Blanche Edwards (Sulia) was born on January 29,
1910, in Tennessee.
at the time of trial:
She had two brothers who were still living
the appellants H. Elmer Edwards (Elmer)
and Daniel P. Edwards (Daniel).
brothers who predeceased her.
In addition, she had two other
Sulia also had a sister, the
appellee Grace Clara Hill (Clara).
Approximately fifty years
ago, following her divorce Sulia moved to Louisville.
and saved money over the years.
She worked
Through frugal living, she
managed to acquire significant assets.
In particular, she owned
her own house, several apartment buildings and substantial nonrealty investments.
At the time of her death in November 1995
she left an estate worth more than $600,000.00.
In early 1993, the Adult Protective Services Division
of the Cabinet for Human Resources received a referral about
Sulia regarding self-neglect and possible exploitation.
A social
services employee of the Cabinet, B.J. Mayes, was assigned to
investigate Sulia’s living conditions and mental capacity.
Upon
investigation, Mayes found Sulia’s home to be very dirty and
disordered, with a strong urine odor.
Mayes was also concerned
that Sulia was not eating properly or maintaining personal
hygiene.
Mayes further reported that Sulia had serious short
term memory problems and that she was frequently confused.
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In
addition, Sulia was having difficulty paying her bills and
collecting rent payments from her tenants.
In May of 1993, two of Sulia’s nephews, Glen and Loys
Edwards, traveled to Louisville to visit her.
They testified
that Sulia did not recognize them and that her living conditions
were “deplorable.”
Glen testified that his aunt “did not know
what was going on”, and Loys testified that she “could not carry
on a rational conversation.”
After several phone conversations
and a visit in August 1993, Clara stated Sulia’s condition was
deteriorating.
ill.”
She described her sister as “crazy” and “mentally
Clara also noted to Mayes in August that Sulia did not
have a will and that she needed one.
On September 16, 1993, Mayes filed a “Petition to
Determine if Disabled” in the Jefferson District Court, naming
Sulia as respondent.
Pursuant to KRS 387.540, the district court
appointed an interdisciplinary team consisting of a physician, a
psychologist, and a social worker to evaluate Sulia.
In the
interdisciplinary team’s report, Dr. Walter R. Butler reported
that as of November 6, 1993, Sulia’s home remained cluttered and
there was evidence of self-neglect.
and confused.
Sulia was oriented to person and place, but she
did not know the date.
was.
She seemed easily distracted
However, she was aware of what year it
Sulia was distrustful of the doctors and social workers and
did not want to accept their help.
Sulia was concerned that her
brother was “trying to have me put away.”
Sulia further believed
that her tenants were stealing from her.
The report continued as
follows:
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Cognitive testing noted that she could not
identify the current President of the United
States or the preceding one. She was asked
to concentrate and recite the months of the
year beginning with the last month and going
backwards to the first month. She was able
to do that for four months but then became
distracted, tangential, went off subject and
was unable to return to the task. I asked
her to tell me three ways in which rivers and
lakes had things in common, expecting answers
such as “water” or “fish.” She was unable to
make any comparisons between a river and a
lake. I asked her to tell me how apples and
oranges were different, expecting her to note
“color,” taste,” or “shape.” She was unable
to make any comparisons between an apple and
an orange. She could not do simple
mathematic calculations such as tell me how
much change one would receive if a purchase
were made for $.69 cents and a $1.00 bill
tendered to the sales clerk. She could not
interpret a simple proverb such as “Don’t cry
over spilled milk.” Her judgment appeared to
be impaired and her insight was extremely
limited.
With respect to activities of daily living,
she indicated that she prepared meals for
herself, but she could not tell me how she
went to the grocery store or how she returned
groceries to her house. She denied any need
for medical care and said she was perfectly
healthy and had not seen a doctor recently.
She could not give appropriate answers as to
what one would do if, for example, her house
were on fire. She could not identify the
nature of a contract or give an example of
one, even though she said that she was a
property owner and had tenants.
“Report of Examination and Opinion by Physician Member of
Interdisciplinary Team,” 11/9/93, pp 2-3.
The psychologist who examined Sulia also concluded
that, as of November 5, 1993, she was incapable “of making any
informed decisions regarding any aspect of her current care or
needs.”
However, he did state that Sulia was aware that she
owned apartments, and that she received rental and social
security income.
He concluded that Sulia was not capable of
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managing her own affairs.
Psychological Evaluation, Paul Bock,
Ph.D. 11/03/93.
During this time, Sulia received visits from an old
friend and co-worker, Jesse Benton.
Benton and several members
of a nearby church, Third Avenue Baptist Church, regularly
checked up on her and sometimes brought her groceries.
Benton
testified that Sulia was able to reminisce about their time
working together during the 1940's.
She also indicated to him
that she resented all the people who were coming into her house
and removing her things.
Benton further recalled that Sulia
expressed great love for her sister Clara, but stated that she
did not care for her brothers.
Sulia told Rev. John Bishop (from
Third Avenue Baptist) that she loved her sister but did not care
for her nephews.
Mayes testified Sulia told her that she wanted
her house left to the church and the remainder of her estate left
to Clara.
Following conversations with and letters from Clara,
Mayes helped Sulia draft a will conforming to these wishes.1
The
will left Sulia’s house to Third Avenue Baptist, and the
remainder of Sulia’s estate was left to Clara.
On November 15,
1993, Mayes took Sulia to the bank where her principal lockbox
was located.
At the bank, Sulia cashed some bonds, and changed
the beneficiaries on others.
While at the bank, Sulia signed the
1
The evidence was conflicting concerning who prepared the will. There was testimony
that it was typed by the secretary at Third Avenue Baptist Church. Sulia’s middle name is
consistently misspelled as “Blanch” throughout the will. The will also contains no preparer’s
signature.
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will before a notary.
Mayes and another person, Debbie Roberts,
witnessed her execution of the will.
The following day, on November 16, 1993, a jury trial
was conducted in Jefferson District Court concerning Sulia’s
competency.
Based upon the medical and lay testimony presented,
the jury found Sulia to be partially disabled in managing her
personal affairs and financial resources.
Based on the jury’s
findings, the district court appointed Rev. Bishop and Jessie
Benton as Sulia’s guardians.
The district judge placed her under
all the designated legal disabilities, except as to the loss of
her right to vote.
See KRS 387.590(11).
After Sulia died on November 19, 1995, the will was
admitted to probate by the Jefferson District Court on January 4,
1996.
Immediately, the devise of Sulia’s house to Third Avenue
Baptist was challenged because Sulia owned it jointly with her
brother Elmer, with a right of survivorship.
Other ambiguities
and the circumstances surrounding the execution of the will were
also noted.
On December 6, 1996, Elmer and Daniel, along with
the children of a deceased brother,2 filed this action in
Jefferson Circuit Court to contest the will.
They asserted that
the will was ambiguous and required clarification.
They further
argued that the will was invalid because Sulia lacked
testamentary capacity at the time it was executed.
Throughout the proceedings, Elmer, Daniel, and the
other family members challenging the will (the appellants), were
2
Wendell F. Edwards, Joyce E. Malone, Kenneth B. Edwards, Donald R. Edwards and
Carolyn E. Marlin.
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represented by John David Dyche of the firm of Tauchau, Maddox,
Hovious and Dickens, PLC.
Clara was represented by James P.
Grohmann of the firm of O’Bryan, Brown and Toner.
During the
proceedings, Clara stepped down as administrator of Sulia’s will,
and the public administrator, Alan K. Gailor, was appointed.
Prior to trial, Third Avenue Baptist Church disclaimed any
interest in Sulia’s estate and was dismissed as a party.
(Hereafter, Clara and the public administrator collectively shall
be referred to as “the appellees.”)
Following extensive discovery and a number of motions
for summary judgment, the matter proceeded to trial on July 2831, 1998.
The appellants presented evidence taken during the
disability proceeding in an attempt to establish that Sulia was
not competent to make a will on November 15, 1993.
They also
presented additional medical and lay testimony to support their
argument that Sulia was not competent to make a will.
The
appellants countered Clara’s and Mayes’s assertions that Sulia
was competent through the use of letters and reports written by
Clara and Mayes prior to the disability judgment.
In response,
Clara and Mayes testified that while Sulia was not capable of
carrying on her own affairs, she demonstrated to them that she
was aware of what she owned and to whom she wanted it to go.
Mayes testified that Sulia was lucid at the time the will was
executed and was fully aware of what she was doing.
Several
witnesses testified that Sulia loved her sister dearly, but did
not care for her brothers or her nephews.
Over the strenuous
objection of the appellants, Clara and several other witnesses
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related statements allegedly made by Sulia in 1993.
According to
this testimony, Sulia accused her father and her brothers,
including Elmer, of sexually abusing her as a child.
In
addition, there was testimony that Sulia stated she believed that
her father had killed the child which was born as a result of the
alleged incest.
At the close of proof on July 31, both parties moved
unsuccessfully for a directed verdict.
Mr. Grohmann made his
closing arguments to the jury for the appellees.
It was then Mr.
Dyche’s turn to make closing arguments, but rather than doing so
he told the jury that he could not continue because he did not
believe in the appellants’ case.
Another member of Mr. Dyche’s
firm appeared and moved for a mistrial, which was denied.
The
jury returned with a verdict for the appellees less than two
hours later.
Nine of the twelve jurors found that Sulia had
testamentary capacity to execute the November 15, 1993 will.
The
legal issues regarding interpretation of the will were submitted
to the trial court for adjudication.
In an order entered on
October 9, 1998, the trial court found that misplaced punctuation
created a latent ambiguity in the will.
However, the court found
that the ambiguity was simply the result of a typographical error
and amended the will accordingly.3
3
Shortly thereafter, the
The trial court construed the will as leaving Sulia’s residence to Third Avenue Baptist
Church and the remainder of her property to Clara. However, the trial court did not address
whether Sulia had any interest in her residence which could pass by will. Furthermore, Third
Avenue Baptist had disclaimed any interest in the estate and was dismissed as a party. Since the
trial court’s judgment does not purport to grant any interest in the residence to the church, and
since the issue has not been raised on appeal, we presume that the trial court’s order merely
relates to the plain meaning of the will and not to any required disposition of the residence.
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trial court entered a final judgment in the case. Subsequently,
the trial court overruled the appellants’ motions for a new trial
or for relief from the judgment.
I.
This appeal followed.
Sufficiency of the Evidence as to Testamentary Capacity
The appellants first argue that the trial court erred
by denying their motions for a directed verdict or for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict because there was no evidence that
Sulia had the requisite testamentary capacity to make a will on
November 15, 1993.
Recently, the Kentucky Supreme Court
discussed the question of testamentary capacity in a case which
was factually similar to the present case.
Ky., 975 S.W.2d 451, (1998).
Bye v. Mattingly,
In Bye v. Mattingly, the testator,
William Louis McQuady, was diagnosed as suffering from
Alzheimer's disease.
His family members initiated disability
proceedings in district court.
There was considerable evidence
that McQuady was unable to manage his own affairs.
As in the
current case, McQuady was found to be partially disabled, and the
district court appointed a guardian for him.
Thereafter, McQuady’s family members took him to their
attorney to execute a new will.
The new will set aside a
previous will and left the bulk of McQuady’s estate to his
conservator and guardian.
After McQuady died, the beneficiary
under the prior will challenged the validity of the last will.
She argued that the district court’s judgment finding McQuady to
be partially disabled precluded a finding that he had
testamentary capacity.
The Supreme Court disagreed, stating, in
pertinent part, as follows:
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In Kentucky there is a strong
presumption in favor of a testator possessing
adequate testamentary capacity. This
presumption can only be rebutted by the
strongest showing of incapacity. Williams v.
Vollman, Ky.App., 738 S.W.2d 849 (1987);
Taylor v. Kennedy, Ky.App., 700 S.W.2d 415,
416 (1985). Testamentary capacity is only
relevant at the time of execution of a will.
New v. Creamer, Ky., 275 S.W.2d 918 (1955).
Thus any order purporting to render a person
per se unable to dispose of property by will
is void ab initio, as such a ruling on
testamentary capacity would be premature.
This is not to say that such an order is
irrelevant, but rather it is not dispositive
of the issue of testamentary capacity.
Kentucky is committed to the
doctrine of “testatorial absolutism." J.
Merritt, 1 Ky.Prac.--Probate Practice &
Procedure, § 367 (Merritt 2d ed. West 1984).
See New v. Creamer, Ky., 275 S.W.2d 918
(1955); Jackson's Ex'r v. Semones, 266 Ky.
352, 98 S.W.2d 505 (1937). The practical
effect of this doctrine is that the privilege
of the citizens of the Commonwealth to draft
wills to dispose of their property is
zealously guarded by the courts and will not
be disturbed based on remote or speculative
evidence. American National Bank & Trust Co.
v. Penner, Ky., 444 S.W.2d 751 (1969). The
degree of mental capacity required to make a
will is minimal. Nance v. Veazey, Ky., 312
S.W.2d 350, 354 (1958). The minimum level of
mental capacity required to make a will is
less than that necessary to make a deed,
Creason v. Creason, Ky., 392 S.W.2d 69
(1965), or a contract. Warnick v. Childers,
Ky., 282 S.W.2d 608 (1955).
To validly execute a will, a
testator must: (1) know the natural objects
of her bounty; (2) know her obligations to
them; (3) know the character and value of her
estate; and (4) dispose of her estate
according to her own fixed purpose. Adams v.
Calia, Ky., 433 S.W.2d 661 (1968); Waggener
v. General Ass'n of Baptists, Ky., 306 S.W.2d
271 (1957); Burke v. Burke, Ky.App., 801
S.W.2d 691 (1990); Fischer v. Heckerman,
Ky.App., 772 S.W.2d 642 (1989). Merely being
an older person, possessing a failing memory,
momentary forgetfulness, weakness of mental
powers or lack of strict coherence in
conversation does not render one incapable of
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validly executing a will. Ward v. Norton,
Ky., 385 S.W.2d 193 (1964). "Every man
possessing the requisite mental powers may
dispose of his property by will in any way he
may desire, and a jury will not be permitted
to overthrow it, and to make a will for him
to accord with their ideas of justice and
propriety." Burke v. Burke, Ky.App., 801
S.W.2d 691, 693 (1991) (citing Cecil's Ex'rs.
v. Anhier, 176 Ky. 198, 195 S.W. 837, 846
(1917)).
. . .
While a ruling of total or
partial disability certainly is evidence of a
lack of testamentary capacity, it is
certainly not dispositive of the issue. This
Court has upheld the rights of those
afflicted with a variety of illnesses to
execute valid wills. Tate v. Tate's Ex'r,
Ky., 275 S.W.2d 597 (1955) (testator suffered
deafness and retarded speech); Bush v. Lisle,
89 Ky. 393, 12 S.W. 762 (1889) (testator was
blind); In re: McDaniel's Will, 25 Ky. 331
(1829) (testator was paralyzed); Bodine v.
Bodine, 241 Ky. 706, 44 S.W.2d 840
(1932)(testator was an epileptic). We have
not disturbed the testatorial privileges of
those who believed in witchcraft [footnote
omitted], spiritualism [footnote omitted], or
atheism [footnote omitted]. While none of
these cases absolutely parallels the instant
case, we recite them here to demonstrate how
this Court has always taken the broadest
possible view of who may execute a will no
matter what their infirmity.
When a testator is suffering from a
mental illness which ebbs and flows in terms
of its effect on the testator's mental
competence, it is presumed that the testator
was mentally fit when the will was executed.
This is commonly referred to as the lucid
interval doctrine. Warnick v. Childers, Ky.,
282 S.W.2d 608, 609 (1955); Pfuelb v. Pfuelb,
275 Ky. 588, 122 S.W.2d 128 (1938). See In
re Weir's Will, 39 Ky. 434 (1840); Watts v.
Bullock, 11 Ky. 252 (1822). Alzheimer's is a
disease that is variable in its effect on a
person over time. It is precisely this type
of illness with which the lucid interval
doctrine was designed to deal. By employing
this doctrine, citizens of the Commonwealth
who suffer from a debilitating mental
condition are still able to dispose of their
property.
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The lucid interval doctrine is only
implicated when there is evidence that a
testator is suffering from a mental illness;
otherwise the normal presumption in favor of
testamentary capacity is operating. The
burden is placed upon those who seek to
overturn the will to demonstrate the lack of
capacity. Warnick, 282 S.W.2d at 609;
Pfuelb, 275 Ky. at 588, 122 S.W.2d at 128.
The presumption created is a rebuttable one,
so that evidence which demonstrates
conclusively that the testator lacked
testamentary capacity at the time of the
execution of the will results in nullifying
that will.
Bye v. Mattingly, 975 S.W.2d at 455-56.
Although there was significant evidence that McQuady
suffered from Alzheimers disease and that he was frequently
mentally incapacitated, the Supreme Court concluded that there
also was evidence to establish that McQuady also was aware of his
surroundings and circumstances at other times.
Consequently, the
Supreme Court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to
support the presumption that McQuady had a lucid interval at the
time he executed his last will.
We find that the law as set out in Bye v. Mattingly is
the controlling authority on this issue.
The appellants argue
that there was no evidence that Sulia either knew the character
and value of her estate, or that she could dispose of her estate
by her own fixed purpose.
They point to the extensive evidence
taken during the disability proceeding of Sulia’s confusion and
her inability to take care of herself.
They focus on Dr.
Butler’s report and testimony that Sulia was incapable of
appreciating the value of money only two weeks prior to the
disability judgment.
They also focus on the correspondence by
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Clara and Mayes which noted Sulia’s poor mental and physical
condition.
As a result, the appellants contend that they were
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law finding that Sulia
lacked sufficient testamentary capacity to make a will.
It is apparent that Sulia was not able either to handle
her own finances or meet her own needs on the day that she
executed her will or on the following day when the district court
found her to be partially disabled.
the disability proceeding.
This was the whole point of
However, as just noted, this is not
the standard for determining testamentary capacity.
Mattingly, supra.
Bye v.
Thus, in defending the November 15 will, it
was not necessary to prove that Sulia was always aware of every
aspect of her estate.
Furthermore, and contrary to the
appellants’ argument, the testimony that Sulia experienced lucid
intervals was relevant to the question of her testamentary
capacity.
In addition, this testimony also established that
during these lucid intervals, Sulia understood what property she
owned, who her friends and relatives were, and how she wanted to
dispose of her estate.
Any question as to the credibility of the
evidence was properly left to the jury.
As a result, the trial
court properly denied the appellants’ motions for a directed
verdict or for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
II.
Improper Statements by Appellant’s Attorney During Closing
Argument
The appellants next argue that the trial court erred in
denying their motions for a mistrial, for a new trial or for
relief from the judgment due to the improper statements by their
attorney during his closing argument.
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The sequence of events
leading up to the closing argument made by Mr. Dyche is
particularly significant in this case, and we shall set it out in
detail.
At the close of trial on Thursday, July 30, 1998, a
discussion ensued between counsel and the trial court regarding
the evidence which would be presented the following day.
Mr.
Grohmann advised the court that he intended to present the brief
testimony of three witnesses.
The trial judge observed that this
evidence could be presented entirely on Friday morning.
Mr.
Dyche agreed, stating that they could get the case to the jury by
the afternoon.
He further commented that he preferred making his
closing arguments on Friday afternoon rather than on the
following Monday because his clients were from out-of-state.
Mr. Dyche argued several substantive and procedural
motions on Thursday evening and Friday morning, giving no
indication that he doubted the validity of the case which he was
arguing.
On Friday morning, Mr. Dyche conducted a vigorous
cross-examination of several of the witnesses.
After the defense
closed its case, the parties renewed their motions for directed
verdict, which the trial court again denied.
Before the trial
court took a break for lunch, Mr. Grohmann advised the court that
the parties were attempting to reach a settlement, and he asked
for additional time during the lunch recess.4
For whatever reason, no such settlement was reached
during the recess.
The affidavits in the record by nephews
4
Mr. Grohmann’s exact statement was: “We are talking trying to get some kind of deal
constructed and if the court could give us until one. I really haven’t ... it takes a while for me to
talk to my clients, explain everything. So as far as us doing anything, I’d like til one o’clock”.
During this time, Mr. Dyche nodded his assent to what Mr. Grohmann was saying.
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Maurice and Glenn Edwards aver that Mr. Dyche expressed
confidence to them about the outcome of the case in the
appellants’ favor.5
When the trial resumed, the court finalized
the instructions and made rulings on pending motions which are
not at issue here.
Following the jury’s return to the courtroom
and the reading of
the instructions to the jury, Mr. Grohmann
commenced his closing arguments for the appellees.
At the
conclusion of Mr. Grohmann’s argument, Mr Dyche addressed the
jury as follows:
Thank you all. I’ve been complaining to my
friends all week long about how tough it is
to try a case against Mr. Grohmann. I’ve
been griping around, and a lot of them are
here, and I’ve been telling them, you know, I
get, I get sick of hearing what a nice guy
Mr. Grohmann is. Mr. Grohmann really is a
nice guy.
And I’m going to get in big trouble
in so many ways and with so many people when
I say this. And I’m going to probably be
breaking faith with a lot of people when I
say this. But I am not going to stand here
and break faith with myself.
And I can’t make this closing
argument right now. And I don’t think I want
to make this closing argument right now. I
don’t think I can stand here and advocate
something that I don’t really believe. We’ve
been here a long time and that’s why I
apologize to you and I’ll start dealing with
the repercussions of what I am doing right
now. And they’ll be serious. And I just
have to say that I can’t make this closing
right now because I don’t believe in what I
am about to argue.
At this point, Mr. Dyche and Mr. Grohmann approached
the bench.
The trial judge made a comment which is inaudible on
5
Maurice Edwards is Elmer’s son, and Glen Edwards is Daniel’s son. Although neither
of these gentlemen are parties to this action, they each hold a power of attorney for their
respective fathers.
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the tape, and Mr. Dyche responded, “Whatever you think’s
appropriate, I have no idea.”6
The trial court took a short
recess, admonished the jury not to discuss the case, and then
went off the record.
When the record resumed, Mr. Dyche’s
partner, Gregg Hovious, appeared for the appellants and moved for
a mistrial.
Mr. Grohmann objected, stating that all of the
evidence had been submitted to the jury.
The trial court denied
the motion, selected the alternate jurors, and then submitted the
case to the jury without further comment.
Prior to considering the trial court’s decision to deny
the motion for a mistrial, this Court wishes to state that we
regard Mr. Dyche’s conduct at closing arguments as entirely
improper.
We do not question his sincerity or his sense of
personal honor regarding his decision to make these remarks
during his closing argument.
However, his judgment in making
this decision was sorely deficient.
were totally unnecessary.
Further, Mr. Dyche’s actions
As noted above, Mr. Dyche had ample
opportunity to approach the court and seek either to postpone
closing arguments or to withdraw from the case.
He did neither.
Instead, he deliberately made statements in front of the jury
which were clearly calculated to prejudice his clients’
interests.
Nothing in the record discloses the reasons for Mr.
Dyche’s actions.
Nevertheless, this appeal is not about whether Mr.
Dyche should be held liable for professional negligence, or
6
Although Mr. Dyche made this statement at the bench, it is not clear that it was outside
of the hearing of the jury.
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whether he should be subject to disciplinary sanction.
The issue
before this Court is solely whether the trial court erred in
denying the appellants’ motions for a mistrial, a new trial, or
for relief from the judgment because of Mr. Dyche’s statements in
lieu of closing argument. Although there is no direct legal
authority dealing with the consequences of such actions by trial
counsel, this Court, as did the trial court, may consider the
legal issues presented by looking to the rules and the analogous
cases regarding mistrials and motions for a new trial.
From the outset, we find that CR 60.02 relief is not
available in cases such as this.
In Young v. Edward Technology
Group, Inc., Ky. App., 918 S.W.2d 229 (1995), the court stated as
follows:
The purpose of CR 60.02 is to bring
before a court errors which (1) had not been
put into issue or passed on, and (2) were
unknown and could not have been known to the
moving party by the exercise of reasonable
diligence and in time to have been otherwise
presented to the court. Davis v. Home Idem.
Co., Ky., 659 S.W.2d 185 (1983).
Id. at 231.
See also Barnett v. Commonwealth, Ky., 979 S.W.2d
98, 101 (1998); and Berry v. Cabinet for Families & Children,
Ky., 998 S.W.2d 464, 467 (1999).
Because the issue was before
the trial court and made subject to the trial court’s ruling,
relief by way of CR 60.02 was unavailable.
See also McQueen v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 948 S.W.2d 415 (1997), wherein the Kentucky
Supreme Court stated that “CR 60.02 is not a separate avenue of
appeal to be pursued in addition to other remedies, but is
available only to raise issues which cannot be raised in other
proceedings.”
Id. at 416.
Furthermore, even if CR 60.02 relief
-17-
were available, it would not be appropriate in this case due to
the absence of the relevant factors stated in Fortney v. Mahan,
Ky., 302 S.W.2d 842 (1957).7
Because CR 60.02 relief is not available to the
appellants, the remaining question is whether they are entitled
to relief due to the trial court’s denial of their mistrial and
new trial motions.
The standards of review for the trial court’s
rulings on these motions are the same: a trial court’s denial of
motions for mistrial and a new trial “cannot be disturbed absent
an abuse of discretion.”
S.W.2d 734, 741 (1996).
Gould v. Charlton Co., Inc., Ky. 929
Based upon the overwhelming weight of
authority, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in this case.
The trial court relied heavily on this Court’s opinion
in Vanhook v. Stanford-Lincoln City Rescue Squad, Ky. App., 678
S.W.2d 797 (1984), in denying the appellants’ motions for a
mistrial or for a new trial.
In Vanhook, the intervening
plaintiffs’ attorney failed to appear in court for trial.
As a
result, their complaint was dismissed at the close of the trial,
and the trial court denied their motions for a new trial pursuant
to CR 59.01(c) or for relief from the judgment pursuant to CR
60.02(a) or (f).
This Court affirmed the denial of their motions,
holding that “[n]egligence of an attorney is imputable to the
7
The court in Fortney stated that “[t]wo of the factors to be considered by the trial court
in exercising its discretion are whether the movant had a fair opportunity to present his claim at
trial on the merits and whether the granting of the relief sought would be inequitable to the other
parties.” Id. at 843.
-18-
client and is not a ground for relief under CR 59.01(c) or CR
60.02(a) or (f)”.
Id. at 799.
In reaching this conclusion, the
Vanhook court quoted from Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 370 U.S.
626, 82 S. Ct. 1386, 8 L. Ed. 2d 734 (1962), in which the United
States Supreme Court, while discussing a similar problem, stated
as follows:
There is certainly no merit to the
contention that dismissal of petitioner’s
claim because of his counsel’s unexcused
conduct imposes an unfair penalty on the
client. Petitioner voluntarily chose this
attorney as his representative and he cannot
now avoid the consequences of the acts or
omissions of this freely selected agent. Any
other notion would be wholly inconsistent
with our system of representative litigation,
in which each party is deemed bound by the
acts of his lawyer-agent.
Id. 370 U.S. at 633-34.
Furthermore, Vanhook followed a line of Kentucky cases
holding that neglect, mistake or bad advice of counsel are
imputable to the client and are not grounds for granting a new
trial.8
Consequently, even if the cases cited by the appellants
from other jurisdictions were not distinguishable, we would be
bound by the precedents established by the appellate courts of
this state.
Although the Kentucky cases previously cited deal with
negligence of an attorney rather than an intentional act such as
8
See Modern Heating & Supply Co. v. Ohio Bank Bldg. & Equipment Co., Ky., 451
S.W.2d 401 (1970); Fortney v. Mahan, supra; McKay v. McKay, Ky., 260 S.W.2d 945 (1953);
Saint Paul-Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Robertson, Ky., 313 Ky. 239, 230 S.W.2d 436 (1950);
Gorin v. Gorin, 292 Ky. 562, 167 S.W.2d 52 (1942); Douthitt v. Guardian Life Insurance
Company of America, 235 Ky. 328, 31 S.W.2d 377 (1930); and McGuire v. Mishawaka Woolen
Mills, 218 Ky. 530, 291 S.W. 747 (1927).
-19-
this case, we conclude that the same principle applies.
In Clark
v. Burden, Ky., 917 S.W.2d 574 (1996), a plaintiff in a personal
injury action sought to set aside a settlement agreement made
without authorization by her attorney.
The Supreme Court of
Kentucky acknowledged that the attorney’s conduct in accepting a
settlement offer without notifying his client was unethical.
Furthermore, the Court also noted the firm line of authority
which “holds that with respect to settlement, attorneys are
without power to bind their clients”.
Id. at 576.
Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court concluded that a client may be bound by her
attorney’s unauthorized settlement of a claim when the rights of
innocent third parties are adversely affected.
Id. at 577.
In the present case, there is not even a suggestion
that the appellees were responsible for Mr. Dyche’s statements
during his closing argument.
Were this court to set aside the
jury verdict, the appellees would suffer a substantial and unfair
prejudice.
The appellees would be required to defend against the
appellants’ claims once again, through no fault of their own and
after receiving a jury verdict in their favor.
Accordingly, the
drastic remedy of a mistrial was not appropriate in this case.
Furthermore, the appellants’ counsel’s actions were not the sort
of “surprise” contemplated by CR 59.01(c) so as to afford relief
under that rule.
Finally, we recognize that the facts of this case are
egregious, and that the appellants were seriously prejudiced by
their counsel’s statements.
However, there is no way to draw a
consistent exception to the general rule that each party is bound
-20-
by the actions of his or her attorney.
If we allow a mistrial
based upon intentional misconduct by an attorney, we would be
creating a possible appeal in nearly every civil case.
to a judgment would have finality.
No party
The alternative, a claim
against one’s own counsel, would have to be a separate action.
However, the original action would be final, and at least one
side could move on with their lives.
Therefore, we hold that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
appellants’ mistrial and new trial motions.
III. Admissibility of hearsay statements allegedly made by Sulia
The final argument raised by the appellants is that the
trial court erred in allowing hearsay testimony about statements
allegedly made by Sulia which accused her father and brothers of
incest, rape, and infanticide.
As a preliminary matter, we have
problems with the manner in which this issue is presented.
CR
76.12(4)(c)(iii) requires an appellate brief to contain:
A “STATEMENT OF THE CASE” consisting of a
chronological summary of the facts and
procedural events necessary to an
understanding of the issues presented by the
appeal, with ample references to the specific
pages of the record, or tape and digital
counter number in the case of untranscribed
tape-recordings, supporting each of the
statements narrated in the summary.
The appellants’ brief contains no reference to the
locations of the testimony at issue.
This testimony was gathered
over the course of a four-day trial and is found at widely
dispersed intervals in the video tape record.
Indeed, the
testimony of Clara Hill, about which the appellants complain the
most, was heard over the course of several hours on the morning
-21-
of July 29, 1998.
This Court has stated in the past that it will
not search a record for testimony where the proffering party
provides no reference to the transcript or to digital counter
numbers on an untranscribed tape to support his position.
Ventors v. Watts, Ky. App. 686 S.W.2d 833, 835 (1985).
We see no
need to alter that practice for this case.
Nevertheless, while a citation to the precise testimony
at issue would be helpful, it is not absolutely necessary to a
consideration of the issues presented.
This evidence was the
subject of a pre-trial motion in limine, which preserved the
issue for our review.
Furthermore, there is no dispute
concerning the testimony about which the appellants object.
As
previously noted, several witnesses recounted for the jury
statements made by Sulia in 1993 and 19949 accusing her father
and brothers of molesting her as a child.
Sulia allegedly told
these witnesses that she had become pregnant by her father, had a
child, and that the child died at the age of two months under
suspicious circumstances. Clara confirmed these accounts, both
from her conversations with Sulia and from her own recollections
as a child.
The appellants strenuously argue that this testimony
should have been excluded as unreliable hearsay.
We disagree.
Kentucky Rule of Evidence (KRE) 801(c) defines “hearsay” as:
a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or
9
This statements came in through the testimony of Alice Johnston, one of Sulia’s
caretakers in 1993 and 1994, B.J. Mayes, and Alvera Kegal, an expert witness who interviewed
Sulia as part of the disability action.
-22-
hearing, offered in evidence to prove the
truth of the matter asserted.
Clara’s statements from her own memory which support
Sulia’s allegations are not hearsay.
Moreover, the other
testimony which related to Sulia’s allegations also was not
hearsay because it was not being offered for the truth of the
matter asserted.
The appellees were not trying to prove that
Sulia’s father and brothers molested her as a child.
Rather, the
statements were being offered to prove that Sulia recognized the
natural objects of her bounty and she was able to dispose of her
estate according to her own fixed plan.
Accordingly, the
statements were properly admitted since they were being offered
for legitimate, non-hearsay purpose.
Moseley v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 960 S.W.2d 460, 461-62.
Furthermore, even if the statements were hearsay, they
were properly admitted under the exception to the hearsay rule
contained in KRE 803(3).10
The appellants contend that the
testimony regarding Sulia’s allegations of incest and infanticide
should have been excluded because it was unreliable.
10
The
KRE 803(3) includes in the list of hearsay statements
admissible "even though the declarant is available as a witness":
Then existing mental, emotional or physical
condition. A statement of the declarant’s
then existing state of mind, emotion,
sensation, or physical condition (such as
intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling,
pain and bodily health), but not including a
statement of memory or belief to prove the
fact remembered or believed unless it relates
to the execution, revocation, identification
or terms of declarant’s will. (Emphasis
added).
-23-
appellants strongly assert that the accusations allegedly made by
Sulia were false memories planted by Clara to turn Sulia against
them, or that the charges were products of Sulia’s disordered and
confused mind.
However, the appellants fail to distinguish
between the trial court’s role in determining the reliability of
the statements and the jury’s role in determining their
credibility.
All that KRE 803 contemplates is that a party
offering such evidence must lay a sufficient foundation to show
the relevance and reliability of the hearsay statements: i.e.;
that circumstances surrounding the way the statements were
elicited evinces their trustworthiness.
Ky., 833 S.W.2d 839, 841 (1992).11
Jones v. Commonwealth,
The circumstances
surrounding the declarations and the motivation behind such
declarations are primary factors in the court's determination of
reliability.
(1994).
Bell v. Commonwealth, Ky., 875 S.W.2d 882, 887
See also Hellstrom v. Commonwealth, Ky., 825 S.W.2d 612,
615 (1992).
The appellants had the opportunity to cross-examine
Clara and the other witnesses regarding the allegations.
They
raised significant issues regarding contrary statements made by
Clara and by B.J. Mayes about Sulia’s lucidity.
Nonetheless, the
record indicates that the witnesses testified to the
circumstances under which Sulia allegedly made these statements.
11
Jones v. Commonwealth, supra, considered the admissibility under KRE 803(4) of
statements made by an alleged sexual abuse victim to a physician. Although the analysis under
this rule may be somewhat different, we agree with the general principle that the party seeking to
introduce hearsay under any of the exceptions set out in KRE 803 must first lay the proper
foundation for its introduction by demonstrating its reliability and trustworthiness.
-24-
The trial court had an opportunity to determine whether the
appellants laid a proper foundation to establish the reliability
of the testimony.
The absence of specific references to the
record impedes this Court’s closer examination of the issue.
Under the circumstances, we are satisfied that the appellees laid
an adequate foundation showing indicia of reliability for the
statements which justified their admission.
The more significant issue presented in this case is
whether the evidence was so unfairly prejudicial to the
appellants as to outweigh its probative value.
We agree with the
appellants’ citation of the applicable principles as set out in
Partin v. Commonwealth, Ky., 918 S.W.2d 219 (1996):
However, the admissibility of the above
evidence must further be examined pursuant to
the guidelines outlined in KRE 401 and KRE
403. Relevant evidence, defined in KRE 401,
"means evidence having any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence."
A decision
by the trial court will not be disturbed in
the absence of an abuse of discretion. KRE
403 provides as follows: "Although relevant,
evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of undue prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence."
According to [Robert Lawson, The
Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook,] 2.10 [(3d
ed. 1993)].
The following judgments are required by
the equation formulated in KRE 403:
(i) assessment of the probative worth of
the evidence whose exclusion is sought;
(ii) assessment of the probable impact
of specified undesirable consequences
likely to flow from its admission (i.e.,
"undue prejudice, confusion of the
-25-
issues, or misleading the jury, ...
undue delay, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence");
and (iii) a determination of whether the
product of the second judgment (harmful
effects from admission) exceeds the
product of the first judgment (probative
worth of evidence.)
Id. at 56.
Partin v. Commonwealth, 918 S.W.2d at 222.
Clearly, allegations of incest and infanticide were
highly scandalous and incendiary.
However, as previously
discussed, the evidence was probative as to Sulia’s testamentary
capacity, which the appellants placed at issue.
In addition to
the medical and lay testimony regarding Sulia’s mental condition
at the time she executed the will, the appellants questioned why
Sulia would leave the bulk of her estate to a sister she rarely
saw, rather than to her two surviving brothers and their
children, with whom she had visited and corresponded over the
years.12
The appellants also presented evidence regarding
Sulia’s supposedly amicable relationship with her brothers.
The appellees were entitled to present specific reasons
to rebut that testimony.
The testimony offered detailing Sulia’s
memories of sexual abuse at the hands of her father and brothers
12
However, the appellants’ assertion that Sulia’s devise to Clara was somehow
“unnatural” is not relevant to a determination of her testamentary capacity. It is natural that a
person recognizes his relatives as the objects of his bounty unless there is some reason not to do
so. Sutton v. Combs, Ky., 419 S.W.2d 775, 776 (1967). However, there is no presumption that
certain relatives should be considered natural objects of a testator’s bounty more than others. See
Rakhman v. Zusstone, Ky., 957 S.W.2d 241 (1997). Apart from the issues of undue influence
and overreaching, there is no reason to assume that Sulia’s devise to her sister Clara would be
considered any more unnatural than would be a devise to brothers Elmer, Daniel or to her
nephews. Every person possessing the requisite mental powers may dispose of his or her
property by will in any way which he or she may desire. Bye v. Mattingly, 975 S.W.2d at 456.
Where the testator is competent to make a will and is not under any improper influence, the
reasons for any particular disposition are largely irrelevant.
-26-
(one of whom was apparently Elmer) was relevant to show the
reasons why Sulia would be disinclined to leave her estate to her
brothers.
There was also testimony that Sulia had become
disillusioned with one of her nephews and that she did care for
the others.
All of this evidence was relevant to the essential
issues of whether Sulia was able to recognize the natural objects
of her bounty and whether she was able to dispose of her estate
according to her own fixed purpose.
We are disturbed by certain aspects of the use of this
testimony.
The allegations concern events which allegedly
occurred over 70 years ago.
At this late date, there is no way
to prove or disprove such charges.
The appellees’ closing
argument, as well as their brief to this Court, directly ask the
question, “[w]hat were Sulia’s ‘natural obligations’ to a brother
who raped her as a child?”
Appellee’s brief, p. 10.
Such
statements push fair commentary on the evidence to its limits.
Nonetheless, that issue is not presented to this Court.
The question presented is whether the trial court abused its
discretion in finding that the probative value of the testimony
was not outweighed by its prejudicial effect.
The lower court
had a full opportunity to consider the evidence in context both
before and during trial.
Based on that assessment, the trial
court found that the probative value of that evidence outweighed
its prejudicial effect.
We cannot say that the trial court
abused its discretion in reaching this conclusion.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Jefferson Circuit
Court is affirmed.
-27-
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENTS FOR
APPELLEES:
David Tachau
R. Gregg Hovious
Tachau, Maddox, Hovious &
Dickens, PLC
Louisville, Kentucky
James P. Grohmann
O’Bryan, Brown & Toner
Louisville, Kentucky
John S. Reed
Trevor L. Earl
Reed, Weitkamp Schell & Vice,
PLLC
Louisville, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENTS FOR APPELLANTS:
John S. Reed
David Tachau
-28-
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