DONNA CIRILLO v. DONALD R. STAMBAUGH and MATTIE JANE STAMBAUGH
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RENDERED: April 14, 2000; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-001033-MR
DONNA CIRILLO
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BOYD CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE C. DAVID HAGERMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CI-00277
v.
DONALD R. STAMBAUGH and
MATTIE JANE STAMBAUGH
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
DYCHE, GUIDUGLI AND MILLER, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE.
Donna Cirillo (Cirillo) appeals from an order
of the Boyd Circuit Court dismissing with prejudice her complaint
as time barred by the provision of Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 413.140(1)(a).
We affirm.
Cirillo filed her complaint against her parents, Donald
R. Stambaugh and Mattie Jane Stambaugh on March 31, 1999.
At the
time of the filing of her complaint, Cirillo was thirty-four (34)
years old.
In her complaint she alleges that her father sexually
abused her from the time she was approximately five years old
until the age of 13 years old.
She also alleges that her mother
was aware of these events but did nothing to stop them and failed
to report the abuse as required by law.
She sought damages for
physical, mental and emotional injuries, as well as for pain and
suffering and destruction of her ability to earn an adequate
living.
Immediately after receiving service of the complaint,
the Stambaughs, through counsel, filed a motion to seal the
record and a motion to dismiss.
The motion to seal the record
was granted ex parte on the same day (April 2, 1999).
In their
motion to dismiss, the Stambaughs attached a letter from Cirillo
dated March 25, 1999, in which she requested that her parents
issue a cashier’s check made payable to her in the sum of seven
hundred fifty thousand ($750,000) dollars.
She also indicated
that she would be seeking an additional dollar amount as punitive
damages.
The Stambaughs sought dismissal of the complaint
alleging that KRS 413.140(1)(a), setting forth a one (1) year
statute of limitations for personal injuries, clearly barred her
claim as untimely.
On April 7, 1999, William G. Platz, M.D. of the Saint
Joseph Behavioral Medicine Network in Lexington, Kentucky,
provided a note which is part of the court record (though not
filed stamped) which stated, “Ms. Cirillo was seen today.
At the
time I do not feel she is able to attend court proceedings on
4/9/99.”
Also in the file but not filed stamped is a letter
addressed to the Boyd Circuit Judge from Kit Andrews, MSW, a
licensed clinical social worker in Frankfort, Kentucky, which
sets forth in relevant part, the following:
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Donna started therapy with me July 16, 1998.
Her presenting problem was that she was
feeling seriously depressed and anxious due
to the events in her childhood she had
started to remember a few months ago. Donna
alledges (sic) that she experienced sexual
abuse from her father from the age of 5 or 6
until the age of 13 as well as physical and
emotional abuse from both parents. In the
course of therapy, Donna has recalled more
traumatic events and, in my opinion, she had
(sic) repressed many memories of abuse.
Cirillo did not appear at the April 9, 1999 hearing.1
That same
day, the trial court dismissed the complaint as time barred based
on KRS 413.140(1)(a).
This appeal followed.
On appeal, Cirillo contends that the statute of
limitations should have been tolled.
She claims that she had
repressed the memory of the sexual abuse and did not discover her
injury until April, 1998, which would be within the one year
statute of limitations.
She further alleges that her parents’
actions (the sexual and emotional abuse, and the failure to
notify authorities) constitutes concealment and/or obstructive
conduct thus tolling the statute as provided for in KRS
413.190(2).
Though Cirillo makes a compelling argument that in
cases of sexual abuse the statute of limitations should be tolled
until discovered, the statutory and case law of this state does
not support her position.
As to the statutory law, the General Assembly has not
provided for such an exception as of this date.
Although the
Legislature has made other statutory exceptions (see KRS
413.140(2),(3), (4) and (5)), it has taken no action in this area
1
There is nothing in the original record or the appellate
record regarding the April 9, 1999 hearing.
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though it has addressed many other areas of the law involving
sexual abuse and domestic violence.
As to the case law, the
cases of Rigazio v. Archdiocese of Louisville, Ky. App., 853
S.W.2d 295 (1993) and Roman Catholic Diocese v. Secter, Ky. App.,
966 S.W.2d 286 (1998), cited by each party, supports the
Stambaughs’ position and not Cirillo’s contentions.
In Sexton, supra, the trial court held that the one (1)
year statute of limitation in KRS 413.140(1)(a) did apply as to
the sexual abuser.
The suit against the abuser was dismissed as
time-barred and that issue was not appealed.
However, on appeal
this Court did affirm the trial court’s determination that the
statute was tolled as to the Roman Catholic Diocese because of
the Church’s concealment of relevant information.
In Sexton,
supra, at 287, the Diocese, after being court ordered, produced
the “Canon 489" files or secret archive files, which contained
information of a sensitive or scandalous nature.
It was based
upon the Diocese’s knowledge of the accused’s pedophilia
behavior,
its failure to act to protect the victims and its
concealment of its knowledge and failure to act that tolled the
statute of limitations as to the Diocese, but not as to the
alleged abuser himself.
The Secter case is clearly
distinguishable from this case, but even so, it followed the one
year statute of limitation as to the alleged abuser.
The other case relied upon by the parties hereto,
Rigazio, supra, is factually more similar to the case before us,
and specifically refuses to extend the statute of limitations to
cases when one alleges he suffers from an unsound mind or has
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repressed memory.
In refusing to extend the “discovery rule” to
sexual abuse cases, the Court held:
The appellants also assert that the
statutes of limitations did not begin to run
until Donald “discovered” his injury, and
Donald did not discover his injury until
after his suicide attempt in September 1987,
at which time he claims he first recalled the
abuse. The discovery rule, adopted in
Kentucky in Tomlinson v. Siehl, Ky., 459
S.W.2d 166 (1970), and Hackworth v. Hart,
Ky., 474 S.W.2d 377 (1971), at first applied
only to claims arising from medical
malpractice. In 1979, the Supreme Court
extended the rule “to tort actions for injury
resulting from a latent disease caused by
exposure to a harmful substance.” Louisville
Trust Co. V. Johns-Manville Products Corp.,
Ky., 580 S.W.2d 497, 499 (1979). In 1980 KRS
413.245 was enacted applying a discovery rule
to all claims of professional malpractice.
Neither the Supreme Court nor the General
Assembly has further extended the discovery
rule. It should again be noted that at the
time Donald’s cause of action accrued, and
for sometime thereafter, he was both aware of
the abuse and past the age of reason. The
fact that his memory of these events was
thereafter suppressed, only to return years
later, would not seem to present a
circumstance falling within the discovery
rule which relates to injuries which cannot
be discovered with reasonable diligence.
Rigazio, 966 S.W.2d at 297.
Though the facts as alleged by Cirillo, if true, would
be devastating to her, cause her severe psychological and
emotional problems, have an unimaginable detrimental impact on
her daily life, and be subject to recovery of untold compensatory
and punitive damages, we believe the trial court ruled properly
in dismissing her complaint based upon the law as exists today.
Therefore, we affirm the order of the Boyd Circuit Court
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dismissing Cirillo’s complaint as time barred by the provisions
of KRS 413.140(1)(a).
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT PRO SE:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Donna Cirillo
Frankfort, KY
C. David Mussetter
Ashland, KY
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