JOYCE A. WALKER v. JOHN H. WALKER, MANUEL MULLINS, AND VIRGINIA MULLINS JOYCE A. WALKER v. JOHN H. WALKER
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RENDERED: November 3, 2000; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-000871-MR
JOYCE A. WALKER
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PATRICIA M. SUMME, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CI-01459
v.
JOHN H. WALKER, MANUEL MULLINS,
AND VIRGINIA MULLINS
AND
APPELLEES
1999-CA-000872-MR
JOYCE A. WALKER
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PATRICIA M. SUMME, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 94-CI-01868
v.
JOHN H. WALKER
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, KNOPF, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE: Joyce Walker appeals from an order of the Kenton
Circuit Court denying her motion to reopen the decree dissolving
her marriage to John Walker to divide their interest in certain
real property according to the provisions of an Illinois decree.
She also appeals from a separate judgment by the same court
dismissing her claims involving the same real property against
John Walker, Manuel Mullins, and Virginia Mullins for unjust
enrichment, trespass, and conversion.
With regard to the former
order, we find that the trial court was not obligated to accord
full faith and credit to the Illinois decree insofar as it
purported to dispose of real property in Kentucky over which the
trial court has previously exercised in rem jurisdiction.
With
regard to the latter judgment, we agree with the trial court that
Joyce failed to state facts establishing viable claims for unjust
enrichment, trespass, and conversion.
Hence, we affirm the trial
court’s order and judgment in both appeals.
Given the various issues involved, an extensive
discussion of the facts and procedural history of both cases is
necessary.
Joyce and John were married in 1985 and separated in
October 1994.
During their marriage, the couple maintained two
residences, one in O’Fallon, Illinois, and another in Lakeside
Park, Kentucky.
Joyce was employed as a teacher and stayed
primarily in Illinois; she came to Kentucky on several weekends
and during the summer.
Meanwhile, John worked and lived
primarily in Kentucky with occasional stays in the parties’
residence in Illinois.
The couple jointly owned the Kentucky
residence with a mortgage procured through a Kentucky bank.
On November 10, 1994, John filed a petition for
dissolution of marriage in the Kenton Circuit Court.
Service of
process was attempted through certified mail to Joyce in Illinois
on November 12, 18, and 27, but it was not effectuated because
she refused to accept service.
On November 30, 1994, Joyce filed
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a divorce petition in the Circuit Court of St. Clair County,
Illinois.
Service of process in the Illinois divorce action was
effectuated on John when he personally accepted service by a
detective in Kentucky on December 1, 1994.
John subsequently
filed a response to the petition in the Illinois court.
On
December 1 and 10, 1994, Joyce met with John at the Lakeside
residence and attempted to persuade him to dismiss the Kentucky
lawsuit.
Following an altercation which occured during the
December 10 meeting, Joyce filed a petition for a Domestic
Violence Order in the Kenton District Court.
In that petition,
she averred that she had been a resident of Kentucky for six
years.
On December 16, 1994, the Kenton Circuit Court
appointed a warning order attorney for Joyce based on an
affidavit filed by John.
See CR 4.06 and CR 4.07.
On December
20, 1994, the warning order attorney sent a certified letter to
Joyce at the parties’ Illinois residence explaining the divorce
petition along with the court documents filed in the case.
On
January 11, 1994, Joyce’s attorney, who is licensed in Kentucky,
contacted the warning order attorney by letter challenging the
Kentucky proceeding and stating a divorce action had been filed
by Joyce in Illinois.
On January 18, 1994, the letter sent by
the warning order attorney to Joyce was returned as unclaimed.
On February 2, 1995, the warning order attorney filed a report
with the Kenton Circuit Court questioning whether the court had
personal jurisdiction over Joyce, but stating her belief that
Joyce had received notice of the Kentucky action.
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See CR 4.07.
On January 23, 1995, the trial court conducted a
hearing on John’s motion to set a trial date.
Joyce’s attorney
appeared at the hearing for the limited purpose of denying that
the Kentucky court had personal jurisdiction over Joyce.
At that
time, the court delayed setting a trial date and asked the
parties to file memoranda on the issue of the court’s
jurisdiction over Joyce.
On April 20, 1995, the trial court
entered a memorandum and order holding that it had jurisdiction
to dissolve the marriage and to decide issues relating to the
division of property located within this state.
The court stated
that Joyce had been adequately served pursuant to CR 4.06 to
invoke its jurisdiction.
On June 13, 1995, the trial court conducted a final
dissolution hearing to determine property distribution.
Joyce
was not present, but her attorney appeared and participated on a
limited basis.
At the beginning of the hearing, Joyce’s attorney
objected to the court’s assertion of jurisdiction and noted that
the Illinois court had issued a preliminary injunction
prohibiting John from proceeding in the Kentucky court and from
transferring, encumbering, or otherwise disposing of the Kentucky
realty.
Joyce’s counsel argued that the Illinois court was the
proper forum to handle the divorce action because it had personal
jurisdiction over both parties.
The court delayed further action
in order to facilitate Joyce’s collection of future social
security benefits.
Following the June hearing, John sought a buyer for the
couple’s Kentucky residence.
On July 9, 1995, in response to
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John’s advertisement, Manuel and Virginia Mullins signed a
contract to purchase the Kentucky property.
John told the
Mullinses that he had authority to act on behalf of Joyce and
that she would eventually sign the documents necessary to
transfer ownership to them.
At that time, John did not tell them
that he was involved in a contested divorce action and had been
ordered not to sell the property by the Illinois court.
The
Mullinses had already arranged to sell their prior residence, so
John allowed them to move into the Kentucky house in September
1995 under an agreement whereby they were to pay $800.00 per
month in rent to be applied toward the purchase price.
On August 8, 1995, the Kenton Circuit Court held a
final hearing solely on the issues pertaining to dissolution of
the marriage and division of the Kentucky real-property asset.
Joyce was not present but her attorney appeared and challenged
John’s offer of proof.
During the hearing, John testified that
the balance of the mortgage was approximately $91,000.00, that
his mother had contributed $25,000.00 toward the down payment,
that the realty was appraised at approximately $160,000.00, and
that the monthly mortgage payment was $1,039.48.
The court
excluded all evidence concerning property located outside of
Kentucky.
On September 8, 1995, the Kenton Circuit Court entered
a decree of dissolution and judgment containing findings of fact
and conclusions of law.
The court awarded John ownership of
various personal items and a truck located in Kentucky as his
nonmarital property.
It also assigned John a $25,000.00 equity
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interest in the house, finding that the loan from John’s mother
was a nonmarital contribution to the purchase of the house.
The
court ordered the sale of the Kentucky residence and payment of
the mortgage from the proceeds with the division of any remaining
equity to be determined at a later date pending assignment of
other debts and assets by the Illinois court.
The trial court
declined to address Joyce’s alleged personal debts due to its
lack of personal jurisdiction over her.
On September 18, 1995,
Joyce filed a CR 59.01 motion for a new trial on the ground that
John had failed to prove his claimed $25,000.00 non-marital
interest in the Kentucky realty.
On September 21, 1995, following entry of the circuit
court’s judgment, John and the Mullinses executed a new contract,
for the sale of the house for $159.500.
On September 27, 1995,
John moved for an order requiring Joyce to sign the purchase
contract.
Later, John moved for an order allowing sale of the
house by the Master Commissioner.
On November 6, 1995, the court held a hearing on John’s
motions during which his attorney asked the court to reconsider
its decision that the court had only limited jurisdiction.
The
court denied the motion to reconsider stating that it did not
believe it had personal jurisdiction over Joyce but that it could
exercise in rem jurisdiction with respect to the realty in
Kentucky.
On November 15, 1995, the court ordered the sale of
the realty by the Master Commissioner, with the proceeds to be
held in escrow.
On November 20, 1995, Joyce moved for an order
granting her possession of the Kentucky realty on the ground that
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she had been making the mortgage payments.
At the same time,
Joyce moved pursuant to CR 60.02 for relief from the order of
sale.
On December 4, 1995, the court granted this latter motion
and temporarily postponed the forced sale of the property.
At a
hearing on December 18, 1995, the trial court indicated that it
would allow the sale of the house and asked the attorneys to
submit an appropriate order.
While the court waited for the
attorneys to respond, the Illinois court, on January 4, 1996,
issued an order enjoining either party from selling the Kentucky
realty, allowing Joyce to make an offer to purchase the property,
and requiring John to account for and turn over to Joyce all
rental payments made by the Mullinses.
On January 19, 1996, the trial court entered an order
denying Joyce’s September 18, 1995, motion for a new trial.
The
court also agreed to withhold entry of an order of the sale
pending further proceedings in Illinois.
On February 9, 1996,
Joyce filed a notice of appeal of the court’s September 8, 1995,
divorce decree.
However, Joyce did not post a supersedeas bond
to stay enforcement of the circuit court judgment.
On August 1, 1996, Joyce filed a civil action against
John and the Mullinses based on unjust enrichment, conversion,
and trespass.
Joyce alleged that the rental payments paid by the
Mullinses were unreasonably low and that she had asked them to
vacate the premises as early as October 1995.
The Mullinses
filed an answer, a cross-claim against John, and a counter-claim
against Joyce stating that their occupancy of the house was
pursuant to permission from John and a belief that Joyce would
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consent to the sale.
John filed an answer to the complaint, an
answer to the cross-claim, and a counter-claim alleging that
Joyce had led him to believe she would permit the sale to the
Following a hearing,1 on September 10, 1996, the
Mullinses.
court ordered John to pay the insurance, taxes, and monthly
mortgage payments and denied Joyce’s motion for immediate
possession of the house.
Shortly thereafter, the Mullinses asked
the court to exercise its equitable power to order a sale of the
house to them.
On December 16, 1996, the Illinois court entered a
judgment of dissolution of marriage, which, inter alia, ordered
sale of the Kentucky residence with Joyce having the right to
purchase the home.
That court also ordered that the equity in
the house be divided equally; that John pay the entire bill of
the Kentucky Master Commissioner of $3,352.30 (later amended to
$2,066.30); that John bear sole responsibility for the $25,000.00
loan from his mother; and that the Mullinses’ rent payments which
were being held in escrow in the amount of $12,000.00 be awarded
to Joyce.
On April 2, 1997, the Illinois court issued an amended
dissolution judgment dividing equally the $12,000.00 escrowed
rental payments, and ordered that Joyce be reimbursed in the
amount of $15,592.20 for mortgage payments and $1,111.05 in tax
payments.
On April 28, 1997, the Illinois court entered an order
clarifying the previous judgment by awarding Joyce an additional
1
During the hearing, Joyce’s attorney stated he did not
challenge the court’s authority to exercise in rem jurisdiction
and that the appeal of the dissolution judgment in Case No. 94CI-1868 was based on forum non conveniens.
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$6,000.00 from the escrowed rental payments as a sanction for
John’s
failure to divide the funds as directed earlier.2
Joyce
appealed the Illinois court judgment, but as with the Kentucky
appeal, she did not post a supersedeas bond.
On September 29,
1997, the Kenton Circuit Court entered an order abating further
action on both the dissolution action (No. 94-CI-1868) and the
civil suit (No. 96-CI-1459) until resolution of the then pending
appeals in both Kentucky and Illinois.
In October 1997, Joyce moved to dismiss her appeal of
the Illinois judgment.
The Illinois Appellate Court granted the
motion to dismiss on October 15, 1997, and that dismissal became
final as of November 10, 1997.
On November 13, 1997, Joyce filed
in the Kenton Circuit Court a notice of entry of final foreign
judgment seeking recognition of the Illinois judgment by the
Kentucky court under Article IV, Section 1 of the United States
Constitution, (the Full Faith and Credit Clause), and the Uniform
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, KRS 426.950 et seq.
In December 1997, Joyce filed a pro se motion to
dismiss her Kentucky appeal stating it had become moot given the
finality of the Illinois circuit court judgment, and the
principles of full faith and credit, and KRS 426.955.
On January
14, 1998, this Court granted the motion and dismissed the
Kentucky appeal.
2
The court also found that the parties had approximately
$86,000.00 in equity in the Kentucky property. The ultimate
distribution resulted in Joyce being entitled to $63,103.25 and
John being entitled to $10,396.75.
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On February 20, 1998, John filed a motion to strike the
notice of entry of a final foreign judgment, arguing the Illinois
judgment was not entitled to full faith and credit because the
Kentucky divorce action had been filed first.
On January 22,
1999, the Kenton Circuit Court entered a judgment with findings
of fact and conclusions of law holding that it was not required
to defer to the Illinois court.
The court noted that it had
attempted to coordinate its actions with the Illinois court but
that the judge had refused to cooperate.
The court ordered sale
of the Kentucky residence giving Joyce the right to purchase it
within 60 days, and ordered reimbursement to the parties of
various tax and insurance payments made by each.
The court also
held that John had a $25,000.00 nonmarital interest and that both
the amount of the rental payments held in escrow and the costs of
the Master Commissioner were to be shared equally.
The court
awarded Joyce 70% and John 30% of all remaining equity from the
sale of the property.
On February 2, 1999, John filed a motion to amend the
judgment in the dissolution action pursuant to CR 52.02 and CR
59.05 in which he sought revision of the court’s finding on the
reimbursement of insurance payments made by each of the parties.
On March 11, 1999, the circuit court granted John’s motion to
amend the January 22, 1999, judgment.
On March 12, 1999, Joyce
filed a motion for relief from the judgment pursuant to CR
60.02(d) alleging John had committed fraud in the
proceedings by
testifying falsely concerning his alleged $25,000.00 nonmarital
interest in the Kentucky residence.
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Following a response by
John, the court denied the CR 60.02 motion on March 24, 1999,
based on a lack of proof to support the allegations in the
motion.
On April 12, 1999, Joyce filed an appeal from the
circuit court’s amended January 22, 1999, judgment.
Meanwhile, on June 3, 1998, the Kenton Circuit Court
conducted a bench trial on Joyce’s civil complaint against John
and the Mullinses.
The witnesses included Joyce, John, the
Mullinses, and Joyce’s expert on the rental value of the Kentucky
realty.
On November 25, 1998, the trial court entered a judgment
holding that Joyce had no direct cause of action against the
Mullinses and that John had acted fraudulently in his dealings
with the Mullinses.
The court dismissed Joyce’s complaint
against the Mullinses and awarded them a total of $6,800.00 in
compensatory and punitive damages against John.3
Joyce filed
motions pursuant to CR 52.02 and CR 59.05 to alter, amend, or
vacate the judgment.
On January 26, 1999, the trial court issued an amended
judgment in the civil action finding that Joyce could not
establish the elements of trespass or conversion.
The court
indicated that any claim for damages by Joyce was solely against
John and not the Mullinses.
On March 11, 1999, the trial court
entered a second amended judgment with amended findings of fact
and conclusions of law.
This judgment reaffirmed the prior
holdings that Joyce had no valid cause of action against the
Mullinses, nor a basis for claims of trespass or conversion
3
John has not appealed the circuit court’s judgment.
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against John.
On April 12, 1999, Joyce filed an appeal from the
final judgment.
Thus we arrive at the two appeals now before us: one
from the January 22, 1999, order denying Joyce’s motion to reopen
the dissolution decree; and one from the March 11, 1999, amended
judgment dismissing her claims for damages against John and the
Mullinses.
Although these two proceedings are distinct, the
issues they raise are intertwined, as will be seen below.
The
trial court relied on the interplay between the two actions in
its judgment in the civil action with respect to resolving the
equities between Joyce and John.
First, however, we consider Joyce’s motion to reopen
the decree.
The principal issue raised by Joyce in the appeal of
the dissolution action is whether the trial court erred in
failing to give full faith and credit to the judgments of the
Illinois court.
She contends that Illinois was the proper forum
for resolving all of the dissolution issues because only that
court had in personam jurisdiction over both parties.
She
maintains that because the Illinois court entered a final
judgment with personal jurisdiction over both parties, the
Kentucky court was required to accord it full faith and credit
and res judicata effect.
She states that the Kenton Circuit
Court could not proceed without obtaining personal service over
Joyce and that the finality and registration of the Illinois
judgment absolutely foreclosed any decision on the dissolution
matters in Kentucky.
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Joyce’s position relies in large part on the alleged
absence of personal service on her.
The trial court appointed a
warning order attorney pursuant to CR 4.05 and CR 4.06.
Service
through a warning order attorney constitutes constructive
service.
While constructive service is not sufficient for in
personam jurisdiction, see KRS 454.165, it is sufficient to
confer in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction.
Ky. App., 675 S.W.2d 3, 5 (1983);
192 S.W.2d 821 (1946).
See Fields v. Evans,
Gayle v. Gayle, 301 Ky. 613,
Throughout the proceedings, the trial
court acted under the belief that it had in rem jurisdiction to
grant the divorce and to deal with Joyce’s and John’s interest in
the residence or realty in Kentucky.
In fact, Joyce’s attorney
conceded throughout the proceeding that the Kentucky court had in
rem jurisdiction.
Joyce had actual notice of the Kentucky action
and her attorney participated at every stage, albeit for a
limited purpose without conceding personal jurisdiction.
Joyce’s
argument before this Court is premised on the requirements for
the exercise of in personam jurisdiction.
Since the trial court
dealt solely with the couple’s interest in the Kentucky realty
under the exercise of its in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction,
Joyce’s complaint that the court did not obtain jurisdiction
because of the lack of personal service is without merit.4
4
We note that Joyce has not argued that she did not have
sufficient minimum contacts to justify quasi in rem jurisdiction.
See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 97 S. Ct. 2569, 53 L. Ed.2d
683 (1977). Nevertheless, we believe that Joyce’s purchase of
realty, use of the Kentucky courts to obtain a domestic violence
order, and cohabitation with John in Kentucky over several years
constituted sufficient minimum contacts to satisfy due process.
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Moreover, the trial court was not obligated to extend
full faith and credit to the Illinois court judgment.
It is
well-established that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not
require a state court to apply a judgment from a sister state
that affects the title to land in the former state.
Fall v.
Eastin, 215 U.S. 1, 30 S. Ct. 3, 54 L.Ed. 65 (1909); Gaskins v.
Gaskins, 311 Ky. 59, 223 S.W.2d 374 (1949); Arthur v. Arthur, Ky.
App., 625 S.W.2d 592, 594 (1981).
A judgment from a court
without jurisdiction is not entitled to full faith and credit.
Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 65 S. Ct. 1092, 89 L.
Ed.2d 1577 (1945);
Hanshew v. Mullins, Ky., 385 S.W.2d 186, 188
(1964); Sunrise Turquoise, Inc. v. Chemical Design, Ky. App., 899
S.W.2d 856 (1995).
While the Illinois court had jurisdiction to
issue orders to John concerning the Kentucky realty, see Fall v.
Eastin, supra, the Kentucky court was not obligated to recognize
the Illinois injunctions.
See Brooks Erection Co. v. William R.
Montgomery & Associates, Inc., Ky. App., 576 S.W.2d 273 (1979);
Meenach v. General Motors, Ky., 891 S.W.2d 398, 402 (1995)(“when
an action in law is pending in a Kentucky court, neither Full
Faith and Credit Clause nor rules of comity require compulsory
recognition of an injunction issued in another jurisdiction”).
The Illinois judgment was in the nature of an in rem judgment
because it ordered the sale of the Kentucky property.
Because
the Illinois court did not have in rem jurisdiction over the
Kentucky realty, the trial court was not required to give the
Illinois judgment full faith and credit or recognition under
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comity to the extent that it attempted to affect the title to the
Kentucky realty.
See Arthur, supra.
Joyce’s res judicata argument also fails on similar
grounds.
Res judicata bars relitigation of matters finally
decided by a court of competent jurisdiction in the same or any
other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction.
See Yeoman
v. Commonwealth Health Policy Bd., 983 S.W.2d 459, 464 (1998).
Likewise, collateral estoppel or issue preclusion requires a
final judgment involving an issue decided on the merits.
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 954 S.W.2d 317, 319 (1997).
Moore
“Finality of
decision is a prerequisite to the defense of res judicata and
collateral estoppel.”
Cartnell v. Urban Renewal and Community
Dev. Agency, Ky., 419 S.W.2d 719, 721 (1967).
In the current case, the trial court entered its order
finding that it had jurisdiction in April 1995.
The court
subsequently entered a judgment determining the couple’s rights
in the Kentucky realty and ordering sale of the property in
September 1995, and it denied Joyce’s new trial motion on January
19, 1996.
Although the Illinois court issued its first
injunction in May 1995, it did not render a judgment on the
merits assessing the couple’s equities and ordering sale of the
Kentucky realty until December 1996 with subsequent amendments in
April 1997.
Joyce argues that the Illinois judgment became final
before the Kentucky judgment did because of the effect of the
appeals in both cases.
The pendency of an appeal, however, does
not affect the finality of a judgment for purposes of res
judicata or collateral estoppel.
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See Roberts v. Wilcox, Ky.
App., 805 S.W.2d 152, 153 (1991); Stemler v. City of Florence,
126 F.3d 856, 871 (6th Cir. 1997).
The trial court’s judgment of September 1995 became
final for purposes of res judicata in January 1996, prior to the
Illinois judgment.
The circuit court’s January 1999 judgment was
merely an enforcement of the prior judgment.
See, e.g.,
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 13 cmt. b (1982).
We note
that Joyce alone appealed the judgments in both the Kentucky and
Illinois actions and voluntarily moved to dismiss the Kentucky
appeal only after her motion to dismiss the Illinois appeal had
been granted.
The Illinois judgment was not entitled to
preclusive effect based on res judicata because the Illinois
court did not have jurisdiction over the Kentucky realty and
because its judgment was not final prior to the rendition of the
Kentucky judgment.
Joyce’s challenges to the trial court’s dismissal of
her civil action are more easily resolved.
The trial court held
that the Mullinses were not liable for trespass because they took
possession of the residence with the permission of John Walker.
KRS 381.231 sets forth certain requirements for trespass.
states:
(1)
A “trespasser” means any person who
enters or goes upon the real estate of
another without any right, lawful
authority or invitation, either
expressed or implied, but does not
include persons who come within the
scope of the “attractive nuisance”
doctrine.
(2)
An owner of real estate means any
person who possesses any interest in
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It
real estate or any lawful occupant of
real estate. (Emphasis added).
Trespass is a tort involving an intentional or willful entry onto
the owner’s land without consent or privilege.
Every trespass is
presumed to be willful with the trespasser bearing the burden of
proving it was innocent.
(1965).
Lebow v. Cameron, Ky., 394 S.W.2d 773
As the court stated in Church and Mullins Corp. v.
Bethlehem Minerals Co., Ky., 887 S.W.2d 321 (1992), cert. denied,
514 U.S. 1110, 115 S. Ct. 1962, 131 L. Ed. 2d 853 (1995):
The test of willfulness is whether a trespass
was perpetrated in a spirit of
wrongdoing, with the knowledge that it
was wrong, or whether it was done
under a bona fide dispute, as where
the circumstances were calculated to
induce or justify the reasonably
prudent man, acting with the proper
sense of the rights of others, to go
in and to continue along the way.
Id. at 323 (quoting Swiss Oil Corp. v. Hupp, 253 Ky. 552, 69
S.W.2d 1037, 1041 (1934)).
Whether a trespass was willful or
innocent is a question of fact.
Id. at 324.
The appropriate
standard of review is whether the trial court’s finding was
clearly erroneous or an abuse of discretion.
Id. at 323.
In the current case, the trial court found that the
Mullinses took possession of the residence with the consent of
John Walker under an agreement to pay monthly rent.
It also
found that they continued in possession in contemplation of
purchasing the residence and with the assurances of John that
Joyce would eventually agree to the sale.
The Mullinses placed
the rental payments in a separate bank account intending to apply
the money to the purchase price.
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As a joint owner of the
property, John had at least the apparent authority to consent to
the Mullinses’ possession despite Joyce’s notification to them of
her objections.
Given these circumstances, the trial court’s
findings that the Mullinses’ actions were innocent were not
clearly erroneous or an abuse of discretion.
Thus, the court did
not err in holding that Joyce failed to establish an action for
trespass.
As for the conversion claim, this is a tort cause of
action applicable only to personal property.
Jur. 2d § 19 (2d ed. 1985);
See, e.g., 18 Am.
Weinberg v. Wallace, 314 S.C. 183,
442 S.E.2d 211 (1994)(no claim for conversion of good will of
business);
Rowe v. Burrup, 95 Idaho 747, 518 P.2d 1386 (1974).
See also Batson v. Clark, Ky. App., 980 S.W.2d 566 (1998).
The
tort of conversion is in effect the counterpart of trespass with
respect to personal property in that it concerns the exercise of
dominion and control over personal property of another.
State
Auto Mut. Ins. Co. v. Chrysler, Ky. App., 792 S.W.2d 626, 627
(1990).
Joyce attempts to transform her complaint into one
involving personal property by arguing that the defendants
converted the key to the residence.
This attempt fails, however,
because the gravamen of Joyce’s complaint remains the alleged
interference with her possession of the house.
The key to the
residence has no intrinsic value apart from its relationship to
the realty.
We find Joyce’s argument unpersuasive and hold that
the trial court properly rejected her claim for conversion.
Joyce also asserted a claim for unjust enrichment
against John and the Mullinses.
Unjust enrichment is an
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equitable doctrine that creates an implied contract entitling a
party to recover restitution for a benefit received by a person
under circumstances that make it enequitable for that person to
retain the benefit.
Haeberle v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins.
Co., Ky. App., 769 S.W.2d 64, 67 (1989).
unjust enrichment claim include:
The elements of an
(1) a benefit conferred upon
the defendant at the plaintiff’s expense; (2) a resulting
appreciation of the benefit by the defendant; and (3) an
inequitable retention of the benefit without payment for its
value.
Id.
Joyce contends John reaped the benefit of receiving the
rental money paid by the Mullinses without sharing it with her
and that he enjoyed the use of the realty without having to make
the mortgage and tax payments.
She also contends the Mullinses
enjoyed the benefits of renting a house for $800.00 per month
when the fair market rental value was $1,400.00.
The trial
court, Joyce complains, failed to adequately address this issue
in its March 11, 1999, amended judgment, stating only that this
issue was between John and Joyce, rather than Joyce and the
Mullinses.
While we agree with Joyce that the trial court’s findings
in its judgment in the civil action with respect to this claim
are lacking, the reason for the sparse findings, we believe, is
that the court had already addressed this issue in its judgment
in the dissolution action.
There the court found that both John
and Joyce were responsible for the delay in selling the
residence.
In fact, the court ordered that Joyce receive
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reimbursement for the payments she made on the taxes and
insurance on the Kentucky house, that she receive an equal share
of the rental payments made by the Mullinses, and that Joyce
receive 70% of the remaining equity in the house after
distribution of certain debts.
In addition, the Mullinses made
the rental payments pursuant to their oral agreement with John,
for an amount which was recognized and approved of by the court.
In other words, the trial court had already adjusted the equities
between Joyce and John with respect to the rental of their
Kentucky residence.
The trial court did not clearly err,
therefore, by ruling that neither the Mullinses nor John had been
unjustly enriched.
In these circumstances, we conclude that the
trial court’s findings on these issues were adequate.
In conclusion, the trial court was not obligated to
extend full faith and credit or give preclusive effect because of
res judicata to the Illinois judgment with respect to the real
property located in Kentucky.
In addition, the court did not err
in dismissing Joyce’s causes of action for trespass, conversion,
and unjust enrichment.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgments of
the Kenton Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE
JOHN H. WALKER:
Donald J. Ruberg
Covington, Kentucky
Deanna L. Dennison
Covington, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES
MANUEL E. MULLINS AND
VIRGINIA L. MULLINS:
Leonard G. Rowekamp
Covington, Kentucky
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