BRUCE CASSIDY v. JEFF EDMONDSON
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RENDERED: AUGUST 4, 2000; 10:00 a.m
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
MODIFIED: AUGUST 18, 2000; 10:00 a.m
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-000861-MR
BRUCE CASSIDY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM L. GRAHAM, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CI-01221
v.
JEFF EDMONDSON
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, JOHNSON, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
This is an appeal from a judgment entered
pursuant to a jury verdict awarding compensatory and punitive
damages to the plaintiff in a battery action stemming from a
fight over a basketball bet.
We reject appellant’s arguments
that the judgment was in error because appellee was required to
present expert witness testimony regarding his injuries and one
of the jurors signed inconsistent verdicts.
Thus, we affirm.
On March 22, 1996, appellee, Jeff Edmondson, and
appellant, Bruce Cassidy, who were friends at the time, were at
Edmondson’s home watching the 1996 NCAA basketball tournament.
During the evening, Edmondson and Cassidy were drinking heavily
and betting on the games.
At some point, Edmondson and Cassidy
got into an argument over one of the bets and Cassidy snapped.
It is undisputed that Cassidy severely beat Edmondson about the
face, striking him numerous times.
Edmondson thereafter sought
medical treatment for his injuries.
On August 16, 1996,
Edmondson filed a battery action against Cassidy seeking payment
of his medical bills, lost wages, pain and suffering, and
punitive damages.
Prior to trial, Cassidy filed a motion in limine to
prevent Edmondson from offering any medical records into evidence
without supporting expert medical testimony to lay a foundation
and explain said records to the jury.
Edmondson argued that he
was not required to present expert medical witness testimony in
order for his medical records to be admitted into evidence.
Edmondson maintained that the medical records could be admitted
through Edmondson’s testimony.
The trial commenced on February 17, 1999.
At trial,
the court overruled Cassidy’s objections as to the medical
records and allowed them to be admitted without expert medical
testimony.
The parties did stipulate that the medical records
which were admitted were authentic and were for treatment for the
injuries Edmondson sustained on March 22, 1996, but Cassidy did
not stipulate that all treatment was medically necessary.
In
addition, the court allowed Edmondson to read from portions of
those medical records.
The records were from:
Bluegrass Regional Medical
Center emergency room where Edmondson went immediately after the
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incident; Good Samaritan Hospital where Edmondson went the next
day for tests; Central Baptist Hospital where Edmondson had
surgery on his face on April 8, 1996; and the offices of his
family doctor and other specialists.
In addition, Edmondson
introduced into evidence photographs of himself on the evening of
the beating and the day after.
These photographs graphically
show both of Edmondson’s eyes blackened and swollen almost shut.
Also, massive bruising and swelling is evident throughout the
cheek, forehead, and nasal area.
At one point, Edmondson’s counsel asked if all the
medical expenses incurred were reasonable and necessary, and
Edmondson responded in the affirmative.
Cassidy objected and the
court sustained the objection and admonished the jury to
disregard that evidence.
The jury rendered a verdict in favor of Edmondson and
awarded damages in the total amount of $43,169.30:
$8,547.30 for
medical expenses, $4,622 for lost wages, $5,000 for pain and
suffering, and $25,000 in punitive damages.
From the judgment
against Cassidy entered pursuant to this verdict, Cassidy now
appeals.
Cassidy first argues that the court should not have
allowed the medical records to be admitted without expert medical
testimony to lay a foundation therefor.
From the outset, we note
that this is not a medical malpractice action in which expert
medical testimony is required to prove liability.
Lourdes Hospital, Inc., Ky., 805 S.W.2d 122 (1991).
Baylis v.
Edmondson
contends that medical records are allowed to be admitted without
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expert medical testimony under KRS 422.300 which provides as
follows:
Medical charts or records of any hospital
licensed under KRS 216B.105 that are
susceptible to photostatic reproduction may
be proved as to foundation, identity and
authenticity without any preliminary
testimony, by use of legible and durable
copies, certified in the manner provided
herein by the employee of the hospital
charged with the responsibility of being
custodian of the originals thereof. Said
copies may be used in any trial, hearing,
deposition or any other judicial or
administrative action or proceeding, whether
civil or criminal, in lieu of the original
charts or records which, however, the
hospital shall hold available during the
pendency of the action or proceeding for
inspection and comparison by the court,
tribunal or hearing officer and by the
parties and their attorneys of record.
From our reading of KRS 422.300, we believe it
explicitly allows medical records to be admitted without
requiring a medical expert to lay a foundation therefor.
Cassidy
maintains, however, that under Young v. J.B. Hunt Transportation,
Inc., Ky., 781 S.W.2d 503 (1989), compliance with KRS 422.300
does not assure admission of medical records in all cases.
In
Young, a personal injury case, the defendant cited KRS 422.300 in
attempting to introduce voluminous hospital records with regard
to the plaintiff’s injury from a prior accident.
However, the
defendant waited until the conclusion of both parties’ evidence
before introducing this evidence.
In upholding the trial court’s
refusal to admit the evidence, the Court did state:
[KRS 422.300] is merely a convenient device
for authenticating medical records. It does
not assure their admissibility or abrogate
other rules of evidence relating to the
admission of documentary evidence.
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Young, 781 S.W.2d at 508.
In our view, however, the Court’s
decision in Young turned on the fact that the records were
introduced at the end of the parties’ evidence and the evidence
in those records was cumulative:
In the case at bar, if appellant’s voluminous
prior hospital records had been admitted in
mass without the prior treating physician or
any physician available to explain the
records, counsel would have been free to draw
whatever conclusions they wished without fear
of evidentiary contradiction. In the heat of
trial, there is probability that distortion,
confusion, or misunderstanding would have
resulted.
. . .
In addition, as the evidence in chief for
both parties was concluded at the time the
prior hospital records were offered, the
trial court was in a position to know whether
additional evidence concerning appellant’s
prior injuries would be cumulative. Our
examination of the record reveals extensive
testimony as to appellant’s prior injuries
and presumably, the trial court was well
aware of this.
Young, 781 S.W.2d at 508-509.
In the instant case, the hospital
records were offered early on in Edmondson’s case and Cassidy had
every opportunity to present testimony to rebut information in
the records and to cross-examine Edmondson as to the records.
In
fact, Cassidy did cross-examine Edmondson as to the records by
having Edmondson read certain contradictory information contained
in the records.
Further, the records were not cumulative of any
evidence admitted.
Cassidy also argues that allowing Edmondson to read
from the hospital records essentially allowed Edmondson to
testify as an expert, which violates KRE 601, KRE 701, and KRE
703.
At trial, Edmondson specifically testified that he was not
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a medical expert.
He did not attempt to interpret the medical
records; he merely read from them.
Only at one point he did
state that he sustained “broken cheeks, a broken jaw,
concussions, nerve damage, and just crushed sinuses” when asked
by his counsel on direct what his injuries were.
Cassidy cites
to North American Acc. Insurance Co. v. Caskey’s Administrator,
218 Ky. 750, 292 S.W. 297 (1927) and Sovereign Camp, W.O.W. v.
Morris, 212 Ky. 201, 278 S.W. 554 (1925), wherein it was held
that lay opinion testimony regarding diagnosis of internal
disease conditions not subject to observation must be excluded.
From our review of the photos in the record, the broken cheeks
and crushed sinuses were observable.
As to the concussions,
broken jaw and nerve damage, we cannot say it was reversible
error to allow this testimony.
Although a lay person could not
conclusively determine that Edmondson suffered concussions, a
broken jaw and nerve damage from viewing the photos, one could
certainly see that such injuries were possible.
Also, there was
evidence, albeit conflicting evidence, in the medical records
that he sustained these injuries.
Further, Cassidy did not
object when Edmondson was asked on direct what his injuries were.
See CR 46; Division of Parks, Dept. of Conservation v. Hines,
Ky., 316 S.W.2d 60 (1958).
Cassidy also argues that there were contradictions,
much technical medical language, and evidence regarding preexisting conditions in the medical records that a lay person
could not understand, which necessitated expert medical
testimony.
From our review of the records, while there was some
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technical medical language, much of the information could be
understood by a lay person.
The x-ray records from the emergency
room at Bluegrass Regional Medical Center stated:
There is no obvious fracture of the face but
there is a considerable amount of fluid in
the ethmoid air cells and both maxillary
antra. The fluid could be present from preexisting sinusitis but occult or hidden
fractures of the face could be present. . .
IMPRESSION: Ethmoid and bilateral sinusitis
versus occult fractures of the face with
bleeding.
The radiology report from Good Samaritan Medical Center stated:
The mandible appears to be intact. However,
there are identified fractures through the
maxillary sinuses. . . IMPRESSION: Multiple
fractures of the walls of the maxillary
sinuses bilaterally with compression of a
fracture fragment at the anterior aspect of
the right maxillary sinus.
The x-ray report from Central Baptist Hospital where Edmondson
had surgery stated, “HISTORY: Le Forte-I fracture of left facial
bones. . .”
The operating room record from Central Baptist
Hospital stated, “PRE-OPERATIVE DIAGNOSIS: jaw fracture. . .
OPERATIVE PROCEDURE:
closed reduction of Le Forte I Fracture;
Placement of Arch Bars.”
The consent form from Central Baptist
Hospital referred to Edmondson’s operation as “Reduction of upper
jaw fracture.”
Finally, the surgeon’s report from Central
Baptist Hospital states, “PREOPERATIVE DIAGNOSIS: Le Forte I
fracture of the maxilla.
POSTOPERATIVE DIAGNOSIS: Le Forte I
fracture of the maxilla.”
We believe that a jury could glean from the above
information that Edmondson suffered at least one facial fracture.
We also believe that a jury could see that there was disputed
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evidence as to whether Edmondson’s jaw was broken and that
Edmondson’s sinusitis (a medical condition known to most lay
persons) was a possible pre-existing condition.
It should also
be noted that, while Edmondson chose not to present expert
medical testimony to prove his case, Cassidy was free to call
such an expert to rebut Edmondson’s medical evidence, but simply
chose not to do so.
Thus, we do not believe that Cassidy was
prejudiced by the admission of the records without expert medical
testimony.
Cassidy further maintains that the admission of the
medical records without expert medical testimony denied the jury
the opportunity to determine the extent of the injuries and the
reasonableness of the treatment and medical expenses.
disagree.
We
As stated earlier, the court sustained Cassidy’s
objection to Edmondson’s testimony regarding the reasonableness
of his treatment and expenses, and admonished the jury
accordingly.
In Townsend v. Stamper, Ky., 398 S.W.2d 45 (1965),
the Court held that an itemized list of medical expenses was a
prima facie showing of the reasonableness of the medical bills.
Hence, the burden then shifted to Cassidy to prove that the
treatment and expenses were not reasonable.
Again, Cassidy
failed to present expert testimony that said treatment and
expenses were unreasonable, although he did cross-examine
Edmondson as to the reasonableness of the treatment and whether
some of the treatment was for pre-existing conditions.
The jury
was free to find that not all of the claimed expenses were
reasonable, but chose to find otherwise.
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In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
allowing the medical records to be admitted without expert
medical testimony.
There was sufficient evidence of Edmondson’s
injuries within the comprehension of the jury to support its
award of damages for medical expenses, pain and suffering, and
punitive damages.
Cassidy’s next argument is that the trial court
committed reversible error in accepting an inconsistent jury
verdict.
It is undisputed that one of the jurors who voted in
favor of Cassidy with regard to liability, was one of the nine
jurors who voted to award punitive damages to Edmondson.
In
support of his position, Cassidy cites Baxter v. Tankersley, Ky.
416 S.W.2d 737 (1967), in which the Court overturned a verdict
where certain jurors who voted to award damages had voted for the
defendant as to liability.
However, Baxter was explicitly
overruled in Young v. J.B. Hunt Transportation, Inc., Ky., 781
S.W.2d 503 (1989).
In Young, the Court held that the statutory
requirement of agreement by at least three-fourths of the jurors
could be satisfied by any of the nine jurors agreeing on any
issue separately submitted even if the vote on an issue was
inconsistent with a vote on another issue.
We further reject
Cassidy’s argument that Young can be distinguished from the case
at hand.
Accordingly, the verdict was not accepted in error.
For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the
Franklin Circuit Court is affirmed.
BARBER, JUDGE, CONCURS.
JOHNSON, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
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JOHNSON, JUDGE, DISSENTING:
I respectfully dissent.
I
believe the medical records were improperly admitted into
evidence and that Edmondson failed to meet his burden of proof as
to damages.
I would reverse the judgment and remand for the
trial court to enter a directed verdict in favor of Cassidy.
The trial court and the Majority Opinion have
misapplied KRS 422.300.
This statute “is merely a convenient
device for authenticating medical records [of a hospital].
It
does not assure their admissibility or abrogate other rules of
evidence relating to admission of documentary evidence.”
Bell v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 875 S.W.2d 882, 887 (1994) (quoting Young v.
J.B. Hunt Transportation, Inc., Ky., 781 S.W.2d 503, 508 (1989)).
Clearly, this statutory convenience is limited to eliminating the
need to call the hospital’s records custodian as a witness to
provide a foundation as to the photocopies of the records or to
identify or authenticate the copies.
It does not eliminate the
need for other qualified testimony concerning the records.
While the statute clearly states that “[s]aid copies
may be used in any trial. . .” [emphasis added], the question is
in what manner may the copies be used.
Our Supreme Court has
stated the obvious in Young and Bell: The statute does not assure
the admissibility of the records or abrogate other rules of
evidence relating to admission of documentary evidence.
Thus,
Edmondson was entitled to avoid the inconvenience of calling the
hospital’s records custodian as a witness to get the hospital
records before the court.
However, in order for these hospital
records to be properly admitted into evidence for the jury’s
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consideration, the rules of evidence had to be met.
Under KRE
702 Edmondson did not qualify as an expert witness; and
Edmondson’s testimony as a lay witness went well beyond the scope
of KRE 701.
I cannot accept the Majority’s statement that “much
of the information could be understood by a lay person.”
Rather,
I believe the text of the records quoted by the Majority clearly
supports the opposite conclusion.
Slip Op. at 8.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Steven G. Bolton
Frankfort, Kentucky
Thomas D. Bullock
Lexington, Kentucky
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