HOUSING AUTHORITY OF MIDDLESBOROUGH v. JACK STANDIFER; CHARLES SMITH; AND EDDIE HARRELL
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RENDERED:
AUGUST 25, 2000; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-000765-MR
HOUSING AUTHORITY OF MIDDLESBOROUGH
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BELL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE FARMER H. HELTON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CI-00027
JACK STANDIFER;
CHARLES SMITH; AND
EDDIE HARRELL
APPELLEES
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE; KNOPF AND McANULTY, JUDGES.
McANULTY, JUDGE: This is an appeal by the Housing Authority of
Middlesborough (the Housing Authority) from an order of the Bell
Circuit Court granting summary judgment to appellees Jack
Standifer, Charles Smith, and Eddie Harrell.
In the suit, the
appellees sought backpay for time that they were allegedly “on
call” maintenance employees during the period of January 1991
through May 1997.
The Housing Authority also appeals the trial
court’s order awarding damages for backpay.
The Housing Authority
is a public housing authority
which operates various public housing projects in the City of
Middlesborough, Kentucky.
Standifer was employed by the Housing
Authority as a maintenance worker from September of 1992, until
May of 1997; Smith began as a maintenance worker in 1989, and was
still an employee at the time of the circuit court proceedings;
Harrell worked as a maintenance worker from October 16, 1984,
until June 13, 1996.
The record, viewed in the light most favorable to the
Housing Authority, discloses the facts to be as follows. On
January 17, 1991, the Housing Authority amended its personnel
policy to add Section 6 d.
Section 6 d. created an off-duty
classification referred to as “subject to call” employees.
Following the amendment, Housing Authority Executive Director
June Rowlett held a meeting with the maintenance employees and
informed them that, in the future, in their off-duty hours,
maintenance employees would no longer be classified as “on call”
employees but, rather, would be classified as “subject to call
employees.”
The “subject to call” category was added to the
personnel policy upon the advice of the United States Department
for Housing and Urban Development.
Following the adoption of
Section 6 d., the Housing Authority placed no restrictions or
requirements on the appellees during their off-hours.
They were
free to come and go as they pleased, were not required to stay at
home to take maintenance calls, were not required to carry a
pager, and were not disciplined if they were not available to
take a call.
Following the adoption of the policy, the appellees
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did not object to being classified as “subject to call”
employees, and the only restriction was that, if a maintenance
employee was going to be out of town, he had to get another
maintenance employee to “cover” for him.
Whether the appellees were “on call” employees or
“subject to call” employees from January 1991, through May 1997,
is the gravamen of this case.
Pursuant to the relevant Housing
Authority’s personnel policy, “on call” employees were entitled
to compensation for the restrictions on their time, whereas
“subject to call” employees were not.
Consistent with the new
policy announced following the adoption of Section 6 d.,
maintenance employees, including the appellees, who did not live
in a Housing Authority dwelling unit did not thereafter receive
“on call” compensation.
However, maintenance employees who lived
in a Housing Authority dwelling unit continued to receive a
discount in their rent, apparently for the sole reason that they
were “on call.”
The reason for this disparate treatment is not
clear from the record.
On January 20, 1998, the appellees filed a complaint in
Bell Circuit Court alleging that the Housing Authority owed them
backpay for time that they were “on call” during their employment
at the Housing Authority during the period beginning September
17, 1991, and ending May 28, 1997.
In support of their claim,
the appellees relied on Section 6 of the personnel policy in
effect during this period, which provided, in relevant part, as
follows:
c. “ON CALL” EMPLOYEES. An “On Call”
employee is an employee working for the
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Housing Authority on a regular shift and is
then required to be available to meet work
requirements which arise outside the
employee’s normal duty hours.
“On Call” maintenance employees who are
provided a dwelling unit at reduced rent for
restriction of time, shall be paid one and
one-half times their basic hourly rate for
all hours worked in excess of eight.
Maintenance employees who are not furnished a
dwelling unit at reduced rents, and are
required to be available after their normal
duty hours, shall be paid for their
restriction of time and the equivalent of one
hour at one and one-half times the basic
hourly rate for each day they are required to
be “On Call.” In addition, these employees
shall be paid at the rate of one and one-half
times their basic hourly rate for all hours
worked in excess of eight.
d. “Subject to Call” Employees. “Subject to
Call” employee is an employee who may be
called by the Public Housing Authority (PHA).
The employee is not required to be available
to the PHA. All maintenance employees not
“On Call” are considered “Subject to Call.”
These employees shall be paid at the rate of
one and one-half times their basic hourly
rate for hours actually worked in excess of
40 hours per week. (Part-time employees may,
at the option of the PHA, be paid one and
one-half times their basic hourly rate for
hours actually worked in excess of their
normal work week.)1
The Housing Authority filed its answer, denying
liability; discovery followed.
Both sides eventually filed
motions for summary judgment.
On December 4, 1998, the trial
court entered an order granting the appellees motion for summary
1
While the record is not entirely clear on this point,
apparently, prior to the addition of Section 6 d. all maintenance
employees were categorized as “on call” employees and received
“on call” compensation pursuant to Section 6 c.
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judgment as to the issue of the Housing Authority’s liability for
backpay.
The trial court concluded that the terms of the
parties’ employment was governed by the personnel policy; that
the appellees were “on call” employees as defined in the policy;
and that the appellees were entitled to backpay equal to one and
one-half times the basic hourly rate for each day they were
required to be “on call.”
be resolved at trial.
The issue of damages was reserved to
On the issue of damages, on March 19,
1999, the trial court entered an order awarding Standifer
$23,956.42; Smith $28,665.70; and Harrell $11,308.26.
The trial
court also required that additional payments be made into the
appellees’ respective retirement funds to reflect the additional
earnings.
In calculating damages, the trial court determined
that each appellee was “on call” each day he was an employee for
the Housing Authority during the period of September 17, 1991,
through May 28, 1997, including sick days, vacation days, and
weekends.
In order to qualify for summary judgment, the movant
must “show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law."
CR 56.03.
On appeal, the standard of review of a
summary judgment is whether the trial court correctly found that
there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The
record must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party
opposing the motion for summary judgment and all doubts are to be
resolved in his favor."
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service
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Center, Inc., Ky., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (1991).
Summary judgment
should only be used when, as matter of law, it appears that it
would be impossible for the respondent to produce evidence at
trial warranting a judgment in his favor and against the movant."
Id. at 483 (citing Paintsville Hospital Co. v. Rose, Ky., 683
S.W.2d 255 (1985)).
The Housing Authority contends that the trial court
erred in granting summary judgment as to the issue of whether,
following the adoption of Section 6 d., the appellees were “on
call” employees.
More specifically, the Housing Authority argues
that the appellees were not “on call” because, after the adoption
of Section 6 d., there were no restrictions on the appellees offduty time, they were free to engage in personal activities after
they had completed their shifts, and the appellees were
specifically advised that they were no longer “on call” employees
but, rather, in the future would be classified as “subject to
call” employees.
The Housing Authority also contends that
summary judgment was improper because, by their silence, the
Appellees agreed to the new policy, and because the Kentucky
Labor Cabinet investigated the appellees allegation and
determined that the Housing Authority was not in violation of any
overtime requirements.
In summary, it is the position of the Housing Authority
that maintenance employees “were not required to be available to
meet work requirements which arise outside the employee’s normal
duty hours,” and, consequently, were not “on call” employees.
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Upon viewing the record, as we must, in the light most
favorable to the Housing Authority, we are persuaded that the
trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the appellees
because there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
the appellees were “on call” employees or “subject to call”
employees.
Whether the employees were “on call” or “subject to
call” is an issue of fact to be decided by the fact-finder, and
not a matter of law to be decided by the trial court.
See
Spellman v. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County, Ky. App., 574
S.W.2d 342 (1978).
The Housing Authority’s position is supported,
primarily, by the sworn deposition testimony of June Rowlett, who
served as the executive director of the Housing Authority during
most of the period at issue.
Rowlett’s unequivocal testimony is
that the appellees were not “on call” employees, and that there
were no restrictions placed upon their off-duty hours.
Considering Rowlett’s deposition testimony, we are not persuaded
that it would be impossible for the Housing Authority to produce
evidence at trial warranting a judgment in its favor.
A jury may
choose to accept Rowlett’s testimony that there were no
restrictions on the appellees’ time, and that the appellees were
not, therefore, “on call” employees but, rather, were “subject to
call” employees.2
2
The relevance and weight to be given to the fact that
maintenance employees who lived in Housing Authority dwelling
unit continued to receive discounted rent is likewise an issue
for the jury. If there were otherwise no differences in the offduty obligations of on-site and off-site maintenance employees,
the jury may well decide that, contrary to the Housing
(continued...)
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We vacate the trial court’s order granting summary
judgment to the appellees.
The trial court’s March 19, 1999
order awarding damages was based upon the summary judgment order,
and we likewise vacate that order.
In this appeal, the Housing
Authority contends that the trial court’s decision to award the
appellees backpay for each day of employment between September
16, 1991, and May 28, 1997, was erroneous.
Because, upon remand,
the Housing Authority may again be found liable for backpay, we
will address the damages issues raised by the Housing Authority
in this appeal.
For purposes of determining damages, the parties agreed
to a bench trial.
In its calculation of damages, the trial court
credited each appellee as being “on call” each and every day
during the period at issue, including those days when the
appellees were either sick or on vacation leave.
The three
appellees testified at the damages hearing that regardless of
whether they were sick or on vacation, they were “on call” and
could be called to go out on a maintenance job.
They further
testified that they had actually gone out and performed jobs on
days that they were absent from work because of vacation leave or
sick leave.
In short, there was testimony to support the
decision of the trial court to award damages for sick days and
vacation days, and if, upon remand, the Housing Authority is
again found liable for backpay, if the testimony is the same
regarding vacation days and sick days, backpay may be awarded for
2
(...continued)
Authority’s position, this fact proves that the appellees were
“on call.”
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those days.
However, the testimony also disclosed that each of
the appellees, on occasion, was out of town and, it follows, not
available to take maintenance calls.
We are persuaded that the
personnel policy cannot be interpreted to entitle the appellees
to compensation under Section 6 for those days that they were out
of town and unable to take maintenance calls.
On remand, if
damages are again awarded, no damages should be awarded to an
appellee for those days that the appellee was out of town and
therefore unable to make a maintenance call.
For the foregoing reasons, the December 4, 1998, and
the March 19, 1999 orders of the Bell Circuit Court are vacated,
and the case is remanded for additional proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Donald Duff
Frankfort, Kentucky
Bradley C. Freeman
Todd K. Childers
Freeman, Copeland & Jorjani
Corbin, Kentucky
Glenn L. Greene, Jr.
Harlan, Kentucky
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