ESTATE OF RUBY LEE, MARY ELLIS, VENITA HARRIS, ELAINE POOLE, Co-Administrators and Individually; ADRIAN LEE; DEBBIE DEVINE; and REVENA BILBREY V. LEON BRITT; LOIS BRITT; TIM L. AULBACH; TERESA D. AULBACH; BILLY HUDSON; JUDY HUDSON; and LOGAN COUNTY, KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: April 7, 2000; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO. 1999-CA-000746-MR
ESTATE OF RUBY LEE,
MARY ELLIS, VENITA HARRIS,
ELAINE POOLE, Co-Administrators
and Individually;
ADRIAN LEE; DEBBIE DEVINE; and
REVENA BILBREY
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM LOGAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE TYLER L. GILL, JUDGE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 98-CI-00339
LEON BRITT; LOIS BRITT;
TIM L. AULBACH; TERESA D. AULBACH;
BILLY HUDSON; JUDY HUDSON; and
LOGAN COUNTY, KENTUCKY
APPELLEES
** ** ** ** **
NO. 1999-CA-000838-MR
LEON BRITT; LOIS BRITT;
TIM L. AULBACH; TERESA D. AULBACH;
BILLY HUDSON; and JUDY HUDSON
v.
CROSS-APPELLANTS
CROSS-APPEAL FROM LOGAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE TYLER L. GILL, JUDGE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 98-CI-00339
ESTATE OF RUBY LEE,
MARY ELLIS, VENITA HARRIS,
ELAINE POOLE, Co-Administrators
and Individually;
ADRIAN LEE; DEBBIE DEVINE; and
REVENA BILBREY
CROSS-APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
HUDDLESTON, JOHNSON and KNOPF, Judges.
HUDDLESTON, Judge:
In No. 1999-CA-000746-MR, the Estate of Ruby
Lee, Mary Ellis, Venita Harris, Elaine Poole, co-administrators and
individually, and Adrian Lee, Debbie Devine and Revena Bilbrey
appeal from Logan Circuit Court orders finding, inter alia, that
Lee Road is a public road.
In No. 1999-CA-00838-MR, the appellees
in the first case — Leon Britt, Lois Britt, Tim L. Aulbach, Terea
D. Aulbach, Billy Hudson, and Judy Hudson — have filed a crossappeal against the appellants. The issues presented in these cases
are:
(1) whether the trial court erred in finding Lee Road is a
public road, or in the alternative, that Lee Road is not a county
road; (2) whether the trial court erred in placing the burden for
proving that Lee Road is a private road on the appellants; (3)
whether the trial court erred in applying Kentucky Revised Statute
(KRS) 178.040, which requires right-of-ways of no less than thirty
feet for county roads, because the trial court determined that Lee
Road is a public road but not a county road; and (4) whether the
trial court erred in determining the property line between the
Aulbach/Hudson/Britt property and the Lee property.
I.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
-2-
These cases involve disputes between adjoining property
owners in Logan County.
Leon Britt, Lois Britt, Tim L. Aulbach,
Teresa D. Aulbach, Billy Hudson and Judy Hudson filed a civil
action against the Estate of Ruby Lee and her six children and
Logan County.
Some of the plaintiffs alleged that they had title
to unspecified portions of property that contains the family
residence formerly occupied by the Lee family near Lee Road, a 0.2mile road that extends westerly from Kentucky Highway 1038.
The
plaintiffs also averred that Lee Road is a county road, a public
road or a private passway, which they could use to access their
property.
The
plaintiffs
alleged
that
they
had
a
right
to
construct an access road along a former logging road on their
property to Lee Road.
In response, the defendants raised various defenses. The
defendants alleged that Lee Road was neither a county road nor a
public road extending beyond a gate located at Jimmy Bilbrey’s
corner, approximately five hundred feet from Highway 1038.
The
defendants
the
claimed
that
the
plaintiffs
trespassed
onto
defendants’ property when the plaintiffs constructed a road between
Lee Road and the plaintiffs’ property.
The defendants believed
that this road, referred to as Mud Road, was not a public road or
a private pass way.
A bench trial was conducted during which the judge
visited the disputed roads and property with the parties.
On
January 4, 1999, the court found that Logan County had failed to
comply with the statutory requirements of KRS 178.115 in accepting
Lee Road as a county road in 1988.
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Specifically, the court found
that the County had neither posted a copy of the resolution
adopting the road on the courthouse door nor posted a copy along
Lee Road, as required by statute.
The court also ruled on the
boundary line dispute, finding for the defendants.
The court
determined the location of the boundary line by considering the
evidence
and
testimony
of
registered
land
surveyor
Gary
Lee
Dunning. It found that the plaintiffs could not have access across
a parcel of ground at the old logging road where the plaintiffs
installed drain tile and a new road.
The court determined that the
parcel is owned by the defendants.
Thus, the court ordered the
removal of the tile.
The trial court held further proceedings before deciding
whether Lee Road is a public road or private passway and whether
the defendants could be estopped from claiming otherwise.
On
February 18, 1999, the court found that Mud Road clearly connected
with Lee Road and that both were public roads or passways which the
residents of the area used to reach their homes.
The owners of the
Aulbach/Hudson property used both roads for access to the back
portion of the land.
Although Lee Road had been used less often as
nearby residences were abandoned, the court found that the road has
been used at least annually.
Despite the fact that Logan County failed to properly
adopt Lee Road as a county road, the court found that the County
maintained the road throughout the 1960s and most of the 1970s.
The County may have discontinued regular maintenance in the 1980s,
but around 1992, Adrian Lee requested that the County place gravel
and grade the road surface.
In 1993, someone placed a gate across
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the road a few hundred feet from the main highway, just past the
Bilbrey house.
In December 1993, the County rejected Ruby Lee’s
request to remove Lee Road from the County’s road system and
ordered the removal of the gate.
The court found that attempts were made to block Lee Road
beginning in the mid to late 1980s.
However, the court determined
that the road’s obstruction did not occur for “a substantial
continuous period of time.”
According to the court, Lee Road was
never blocked for any continuous period exceeding a year.
The
County
the
continued
maintaining
the
road
until
1996,
when
plaintiffs filed this lawsuit. Thus, the court found that both Mud
Road and Lee Road are public roads or passways.
The court considered whether the change in the use of the
roads altered their status.
The court concluded that the roads
were not abandoned and that the Lee heirs were unable to establish
title to the road by adverse possession because the elements had
not been met.
Applying its equitable power, the court determined
that the defendants should be estopped from denying that Lee Road
is a public road because the defendants encouraged the County to
spend tax dollars to maintain the road.
Using KRS 178.040 for
guidance, the trial court concluded that Lee Road should have a
thirty-foot right-of-way extending 0.2 miles from Highway 1038.
The court also ruled that conveyance of land between Riley Yonts,
grantor, and Tim L. Aulbach, Teresa D. Aulbach, Billy Hudson and
Judy Hudson, grantees, was void.
-5-
Following the defendants’ motion to alter, amend or
vacate the final judgment and the plaintiffs’ similar motion, the
court denied the motions on March 17, 1999, but supplemented its
findings of fact as follows:
The Court finds that the physical graveled or traveled
surface of the Lee Road, is approximately 10 feet in
width along the entire length of the disputed road.
The
Court is unable to determine from the evidence the
precise width of a right of way, beyond the 10 foot
graveled or traveled portion, which could be applied to
the entire length of the disputed road.
From this
Court’s observations, the width of the shoulder of the
roadway and the distance from the center of the road to
ditches,
fences
or
other
visible
boundaries
varies
substantially along the length of the road and precise
measurements of these distances are not in evidence.
This appeal and cross-appeal followed.
II.
STATUS OF LEE ROAD
The appellants aver that the trial court erred in finding
that Lee Road is a public road.
They argue that Lee Road has been
abandoned or that in the alternative, the appellants have acquired
the property by adverse possession.
Under Kentucky law, a road can become a public road when
it is acquired by prescription.
However, the road can be acquired
by prescription only if there has been both “(1) fifteen years
public
use
and
(2)
a
like
number
-6-
of
years
of
control
and
maintenance
by
the
government.”1
The
trial
court
correctly
determined that both requirements had been met for Lee Road.2
In a non-jury trial, the trial court serves as the fact
finder, and its findings of fact will not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous.3
Here, the trial court’s findings of fact are
supported by substantial, although not undisputed, evidence.
In determining that Lee Road is a public road, the trial
court found that Lee Road had been used as a public road for many
years but not extensively since the 1960s.
As area residents
abandoned their homes, fewer people used the road.
The owners of
the Aulbach/Hudson tract of land used the roads to access the back
portion of their land.
testimony
credible
The trial court found Paul Glenn Kincaid’s
when
he
stated
approximately twenty times per year.
that
he
used
Lee
Road
Other people used the road
less frequently, but the court concluded that the road has been
continually used at least annually.
The court also noted that
1
Watson v. Crittendon County Fiscal Court, Ky. App., 771
S.W.2d 47, 48 (1989).
2
The record is silent on the issue of whether Lee Road was
formally dedicated as a public road. Because we have no indication
that Lee Road was, our analysis focuses on acquiring a public road
by prescription. If the road had been dedicated, KRS 178.025 would
apply. That statute creates a presumption that a dedicated road
that has been used by the general public without restrictions for
five years is a public road. The evidence clearly establishes that
the public has used Lee Road for more than fifteen years.
3
Ky. R. Civ. Proc. 52.01.
See also Black Motor Co. v.
Greene, Ky., 385 S.W.2d 954, 956 (1964) (“Th[e] Court cannot set
aside a finding of fact unless it is clearly erroneous.
If
supported by substantial evidence, the court’s finding of fact is
not clearly erroneous.”) (citations omitted); Whilden v. Compton,
Ky. App., 555 S.W.2d 272, 274 (1977) (noting that the finding of
that trial court — that a road was a public road — would not be set
aside unless the finding was clearly erroneous).
-7-
Adrian and Ruby Lee lived on the Lee farm until about 1979.
The
homestead on the property burnt down in 1976, and someone placed a
mobile home on the property, which was last used at some point
between 1982 and 1985.
Logan County maintained Lee Road throughout the 1960s and
most of the 1970s.
The County applied gravel one time per year and
graded the road surface.
The court found that regular maintenance
was probably discontinued in the 1980s.
However, Adrian Lee
requested that the County grade and place gravel on the road in
1992.
Someone placed a gate across the road in 1993, but the
County ordered its removal.
The trial court concluded that Lee
Road was never successfully obstructed for a substantial period of
time — always less than one year.
that
the
County
maintained
the
In fact, the trial court stated
road
until
1996,
when
this
litigation began.
According to the Supreme Court, “[a] public road that is
not a ‘county road’ can be abandoned without formal action.
When
the public has acquired the free use of a roadway by user, . . . it
may abandon that right by a long period of nonuser.”4
The trial
court specifically found that Lee Road had not been abandoned for
a significant period.
There was evidence that the public has used
Lee Road since at least the 1960s, thus more than fifteen years.
Because the court’s findings of fact are supported by substantial
evidence, the trial court did not err in finding Lee Road to be a
public road that had not been abandoned.
4
Sarver v. Allen County, Ky., 582 S.W.2d 40, 42 (1979)
(citations omitted).
-8-
If Lee Road has been used continually, the only way the
appellants could have obtained title to the road was by adverse
possession.
In order to acquire property by adverse possession,
five elements must be met:
“1) possession must be hostile and
under a claim of right, 2) it must be actual, 3) it must be
exclusive, 4) it must be continuous, and 5) it must be open and
notorious.”5
The adverse possessor must be in possession of the
real property for the appropriate statutory period of fifteen
years.6
In order to adversely possess a public road, there is an
additional requirement.
KRS 413.050(2) provides:
[The statute of limitation] shall not begin to run in
favor of any person in the possession of any part of any
public road until written notice is given to the county
judge/executive of the county in which the road is
situated that the possession is adverse to the right of
the public to the use of the road.
In Salyers v. Tackett,7 Kentucky’s highest court interpreted the
words “public road” in KRS 413.050.
In addressing whether a
platted street that had not been accepted by the County could be
adversely possessed, the Court noted:
5
Appalachian Reg’l Healthcare, Inc. v. Royal Crown Bottling
Co., Ky., 824 S.W.2d 878, 880 (1992) (citing Tartar v. Tucker, Ky.,
280 S.W.2d 150, 152 (1955)).
6
Ky. Rev. Stat. (KRS) 413.010.
7
Ky., 322 S.W.2d 707 (1958).
-9-
A way dedicated in the manner in which the so-called
street to which this case relates was dedicated to public
use cannot be regarded as a ‘public road’ in the sense
that it became part of the county’s system of roads which
must be maintained within the meaning of the statute, for
the way was never legally accepted or established as
such.
But it was and is a public road in the sense that
the dedication inured to the benefit of the public, and
the public, particularly contiguous property owners, had
a right to use it.
This right cannot be destroyed by
mere encroachment by the owner of abutting property.8
The statute does not distinguish between roads established by
dedication and roads established by adverse possession.
While the
language of KRS 413.050(2) has changed slightly since Salyers, the
intent of the statute is the same:
a party must give the county
notice prior to adversely possessing a public road. The appellants
have not provided proof that they properly notified the Logan
County Judge/Executive in accordance with KRS 413.050(2).9
Thus,
we find that the appellants could not have acquired the property by
adverse possession.
In response, the appellees argue that the trial court
erred in not finding Lee Road to be a county road.
8
However, we
Id. at 709 (citations omitted).
9
See id. at 710 (“[T]he right to obstruct a public way or
road cannot be acquired by prescription, although the obstructions
have been long maintained unless this statute has been complied
with.”) (citing Mack v. Leavill, 243 Ky. 275, 47 S.W.2d 1067
(1932)).
-10-
believe the trial court correctly concluded that Lee Road is not a
county road.
KRS
178.115
requires
a
county
formalities to declare a road a county road.
to
follow
certain
While Logan County
did hold a hearing on April 12, 1988, as required by the statute,
the County failed to post a certified copy of the resolution making
Lee Road a county road at the courthouse door and along Lee Road.
As the trial court noted:
The testimony of the County Judge Executive and the
County Attorney at the time the road hearing was held,
together with the testimony of the present County Judge
Executive reveals that at no time was a certified copy of
the resolution posted at the courthouse door within five
(5) days after the adoption of a resolution, nor was a
certified copy of the resolution posted by the county
road engineer along the Lee Road within five (5) days
after its adoption.
The court properly construed KRS 178.115 in concluding that Logan
County failed to follow the statutory requirements to designate Lee
Road as a county road.
III.
BURDEN OF PROOF
Appellants insist that the trial court erred in shifting
the burden of proof to them.
However, the appellants misconstrue
the court’s order.
Appellants claimed that they acquired Lee Road by adverse
possession, and by so claiming, they have the burden of proving
-11-
that they adversely possessed the land for the statutory period.10
In considering the evidence presented, the court concluded that the
appellants
failed
property.
to
prove
they
had
adversely
possessed
the
Although this argument has no merit in view of the fact
that the appellants did not adversely possess the property, we
conclude that the court properly placed the burden of proof on the
appellants.
IV.
APPLICATION OF KRS 178.040
Finally, the appellants argue that the trial court erred
in applying KRS 178.040 because Lee Road, while it might be a
public road, is not a county road.
KRS 178.010(1)(b), in part,
defines county roads as “public roads which have been accepted by
the fiscal court of the county as part of the county road system
after July 1, 1914 or private roads, streets, or highways which
have been acquired by the county pursuant to KRS 178.405 to
178.425.”
KRS 178.040(2), in part, provides that “[a]ll county
roads hereafter established shall occupy a right of way not less
than thirty (30) feet wide, but the fiscal court may order it to be
a greater width.”
The court found that Lee Road is a public road but not a
county road.
From the language of KRS 178.040 and the way that a
county road is defined in KRS 178.010, it is clear that the road
width
requirements
do
not
apply
to
Lee
Road.
However,
in
determining the width of the road and necessary right-of-way, the
court
drew
an
analogy
by
using
10
the
statute
as
a
basis
for
Vorhes v. Dennison, 300 Ky. 427, 189 S.W.2d 269 (1945);
Melton v. Sparks, 263 Ky. 591, 92 S.W.2d 737 (1936).
-12-
determining that Lee Road is ten feet wide within a thirty-foot
right-of-way.
As the court acknowledged in its order denying the
post-judgment
motions,
determine
the
while
right-of-way
it
of
was
Lee
extremely
Road,
the
difficult
to
right-of-way
necessarily included distance to ditches, fences, etc.
We agree
that the right-of-way for a road must include areas like the
natural drainage ways, which are inherently part of the road.
Thus, we find that the court did not err.
V.
BOUNDARY LINE BETWEEN THE PARTIES
In their cross-appeal, the appellees claim that the trial
court erred in determining the boundary line of the Aulbach/Hudson
tract.
They argue that their witnesses clearly established that
the boundary line is different than the court concluded.
As fact finder, the trial court may accept some evidence
and reject other evidence because it is the role of the trier of
fact to determine the credibility and weight that is to be given to
the evidence.11
In this case, the court specifically relied on the
testimony of Gary Lee Dunning, a registered land surveyor.
The
court noted that the appellees disputed Dunning’s survey but found
that the appellees had failed to “suggest any other definite line
which could be established as a more correct boundary.”
chose to believe one witness over others.
The court
Because the court’s
decision on this issue is supported by substantial evidence, the
court did not err.
11
Calloway v. Calloway, Ky. App., 832 S.W.2d 890, 893 (1992)
(“It is axiomatic that the findings of fact of the lower court
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the
credibility of witnesses”).
-13-
VI.
CONCLUSION
The orders from which this appeal and cross-appeal are
prosecuted are affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS IN NO.
1999-CA-000746 AND CROSSAPPELLEES IN 1999-CA-000838:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES IN NO.
1999-CA-000746 AND CROSSAPPELLANTS IN 1999-CA-000838:
Jesse L. Riley
Russellville, Kentucky
Charles R. Orange
Russellville, Kentucky
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