LINDA WARD v. WAL-MART STORES, INC.
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RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 15, 2000; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-000700-MR
LINDA WARD
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LOGAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE TYLER GILL, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CI-00188
v.
WAL-MART STORES, INC.
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, KNOPF, AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
Linda Ward appeals from a March 12, 1999, judgment
of Logan Circuit Court awarding her damages of $6,650.00 in her
negligence action against the appellee, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.1
She maintains that the award of damages, which was entered upon a
jury verdict, is inadequate and that, for the following reasons,
she is entitled to a new trial.
The trial court erred, she
asserts, first, in not directing a finding that Wal-Mart bore the
entire fault for Ward’s accident; second, in directing a verdict
against Ward’s claim for future medical expenses; and finally, in
1
The March 12 judgment amends slightly and otherwise incorporates a judgment entered
February 4, 1999.
affirming the jury’s decision not to award damages for Ward’s
future pain and suffering and for her loss of earning capacity.
Being unpersuaded that the trial court erred in any of these
ways, we affirm its judgment.
The parties do not dispute that on May 10, 1995, while
approaching a check-out lane in the appellee’s store in
Russellville, Kentucky, Ward, a woman approximately 50 years old,
slipped in a puddle of the liquid soap children use to blow
bubbles, lost her footing, and fell.
According to Ward, the fall
knocked her unconscious momentarily, but a few minutes later she
was able to complete her purchase and drive herself home.
Within
the next day or so, however, one of Ward’s ankles began to hurt,
a large bruise appeared on her hip, and she suffered from a sore
shoulder, a stiff neck, and severe headaches.
She consulted a
doctor about her ankle and was told that she had strained tendons
there and in her foot, but that with rest they would mend.
She
also, about five days after the accident, sought treatment from a
chiropractor.
He provided some temporary relief for her back and
shoulder pains, but the underlying symptoms, including now muscle
spasms in her shoulder and neck, persisted.
In April 1996, almost a year after the accident, Ward
was examined by an orthopaedic surgeon who found evidence that
Ward suffered from the early stages of degenerative disk disease
and that a cervical strain, likely the result of Ward’s fall at
Wal-Mart, had aggravated that condition.
He recommended physical
therapy for her muscle spasms and also recommended that Ward be
examined by a neurologist.
Ward has since been examined by no
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fewer than three neurosurgeons, each of whom has basically
confirmed the orthopaedist’s diagnosis, although there is
disagreement among them concerning how lasting the effects of the
fall are apt to be.2
For approximately twenty years prior to the accident at
Wal-Mart, Ward had worked on the production line at Carpenter
Company, a manufacturer of foam linings for automobiles.
As the
operator of a hot wire machine, a device for etching or cutting
grooves into pieces of foam, Ward was occasionally required to
lift as much as fifty pounds and had regularly needed to reach
above her head.
Before seeing the orthopaedist, she had missed
no time at work as a result of the accident.
She had taken some
vacation time immediately thereafter, and since then had simply
endured her pain as well as she could.
The orthopaedic surgeon
restricted her work activities to raising her arms no higher than
shoulder level and to lifting no more than 15 pounds.
Carpenter
Company moved Ward to a position within these restrictions.
As
of the time of trial, Ward had still not missed any work as a
result of the accident.
On May 8, 1996, Ward filed suit against Wal-Mart.
She
sought compensation for, among other things, lost income and the
loss of the capacity to earn income, past and future medical
expenses, and past and future pain and suffering.
2
The matter was
The orthopaedic surgeon also found evidence that Ward suffered from carpal tunnel
syndrome in both arms and eventually performed surgeries to mitigate that condition. Ward’s
initial complaint alleged that the carpal tunnel syndrome resulted from or was aggravated by the
fall at Wal-Mart, but Ward has since abandoned this claim.
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tried on January 28, 1999, with the result noted above.
It is
from that proceeding that Ward appeals.
At the appropriate times during trial, Ward moved for
a directed finding that Wal-Mart alone, through its failure to
maintain safe premises, bore responsibility for Ward’s alleged
injuries.
The trial court denied those motions and instructed
the jury to apportion fault between Ward and Wal-Mart as it saw
fit.
The jury apportioned fault equally, 50% to Ward and 50% to
Wal-Mart.
Ward maintains that there was no evidence of her
negligence, and thus that the trial court erred in not directing
a finding that Wal-Mart alone was at fault.
We disagree.
A directed verdict, or in this instance a directed
finding, is appropriate only in limited circumstances.
As our
Supreme Court has noted,
[o]n a motion for directed verdict, the trial
judge must draw all fair and reasonable
inferences from the evidence in favor of the
party opposing the motion. . . . Generally, a
trial judge cannot enter a directed verdict
unless there is a complete absence of proof
on a material issue or if no disputed issues
of fact exist upon which reasonable minds
could differ. Where there is conflicting
evidence, it is the responsibility of the
jury to determine and resolve such conflicts,
as well as matters affecting the credibility
of witnesses.
Bierman v. Klapheke, Ky., 967 S.W.2d 16, 18-19 (1998) (citing
Taylor v. Kennedy, Ky.App., 700 S.W.2d 415 (1985)).
Where, as
here, the trial court has denied the motion for directed verdict,
the role of an appellate court is limited to
determining whether the trial court erred in
failing to grant the motion . . . [A]
reviewing court must ascribe to the evidence
all reasonable inferences and deductions
which support the claim of the prevailing
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party. Meyers v. Chapman Printing Co., Inc.,
Ky., 840 S.W.2d 814 (1992). . . . The
reviewing court, upon completion of a
consideration of the evidence, must determine
whether the jury verdict was flagrantly
against the evidence so as to indicate that
it was reached as a result of passion or
prejudice. If it was not, the jury verdict
should be upheld.
Id. at 18-19 (citations omitted).
Ward insists that there was a complete absence of proof
on the issue of her negligence.
On cross-examination, however,
Ward testified that the scene of the accident was well lit.
She
also testified that, after the fall, she found herself virtually
covered with the liquid, from her hair all the way down her side
to her shoes.
The employee who first came to Ward’s assistance
testified that, even after Ward’s fall, the puddle covered two or
three full-sized floor tiles and was readily visible.
This
evidence, the trial court believed, permitted a reasonable juror
to infer that the spill was large enough for a duly cautious
shopper to see and to avoid.
We are not persuaded that the trial
court’s assessment of the evidence was erroneous, nor is the
jury’s finding that Ward was negligent so flagrantly against the
evidence as to suggest bias or prejudice.
We are obliged,
therefore, to uphold the finding.
Ward testified that she continued to experience pain in
her neck, her shoulder, and her upper back.
periodically to suffer muscle spasms.
She continued
She had been taking for
some time a prescription muscle relaxant and anticipated that she
would continue to need it.
She also anticipated that her need
for over-the-counter pain medication would continue indefinitely.
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Her pain, she said, while it had not disabled her, had made her
movements slow and prevented her from accomplishing as much
around her home and at her job as she had accomplished before the
accident.
A vocational expert testified that Ward’s restriction
to light-duty work had and would continue to cost her bonus
income at her current job and had lessened her future earning
capacity by shrinking the pool of jobs to which she would have
access were she to lose her present one.
believed, shortened Ward’s work life.
Her injury had also, he
Ward’s neurologist at the
time of trial testified that Ward had reached the state of
maximum medical improvement following her accident.
Her work
restrictions were permanent, as was likely to be her daily
experience of pain and her need for medication and occasional
treatment.
On the basis of the evidence just sketched, Ward sought
damages for future pain and suffering and for the reduction of
her capacity to earn income.
The jury awarded her no damages on
these aspects of her claim, and the trial court, upon Ward’s
motions for judgment NOV or for a new trial, upheld the jury’s
verdict.
Ward maintains that the evidence compels a verdict in
her favor and that accordingly the trial court erred by upholding
the verdict to the contrary.
CR 50.02 and CR 59.01 provide respectively for JNOV
motions and for motions for a new trial.
This Court’s task in
reviewing the application of either rule is to determine whether
the trial court abused its discretion or clearly erred.
Cooper
v. Fultz, Ky., 812 S.W.2d 497 (1991); Davis v. Graviss, Ky., 672
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S.W.2d 928 (1984).
Where, as here, the issue raised by these
motions is the adequacy of a jury’s award of damages, the trial
court’s discretion, like ours, is limited:
The amount of damages is a dispute left to
the sound discretion of the jury, and its
determination should not be set aside merely
because we would have reached a different
conclusion. If the verdict bears any
reasonable relationship to the evidence of
loss suffered, it is the duty of the trial
court and this Court not to disturb the
jury’s assessment of damages.
Hazelwood v. Beauchamp, Ky. App., 766 S.W.2d 439, 440 (1989)
(citing Davis v. Graviss, supra).
For the following reasons, we
are not persuaded that this jury’s assessment should be
disturbed.
In addition to the evidence sketched above, a third
neurosurgeon testified on behalf of Wal-Mart that, based on his
review of all the other medical findings and his examination of
Ward not long before trial, her persisting symptoms of pain and
stiffness were the result not of her fall, the effects of which
were all likely to have healed, but simply of aging.
All the
neurosurgeons testified that their tests revealed no nerve
damage, but that they did reveal degenerative changes to Ward’s
spine.
And Ward herself testified that she had lost no time from
her job, that she was earning a higher wage at the time of trial
than she had been earning at the time of the accident, and that
her then present job within her light-duty restrictions was
apparently secure.
This evidence adequately supports, we
believe, notwithstanding Ward’s evidence to the contrary, the
jury’s denial of Ward’s claim for damages for future pain and
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suffering and for lost earning capacity.
The trial court did not
abuse its discretion, therefore, by upholding that verdict.
As noted above, Ward testified that she continued to
rely on prescription muscle relaxants, non-prescription pain
medication, and occasional physical therapy for pain.
Ward’s
chiropractor and one of her neurosurgeons testified that Ward’s
condition was not likely to improve, but that she would be
reliant on those anti-pain measures, “from time to time,” for the
rest of her life.
Based on this evidence, Ward sought damages
for future medical expenses.
The trial court granted Wal-Mart’s
motion for a directed verdict on this aspect of Ward’s claim
because, it explained, Ward’s proof, while it did tend to show
that she would incur medical expenses in the future, did not tend
to establish the particular amount of those expenses with any
degree of certainty and thus would require the jury to speculate
as to the amount even if it agreed with Ward that some
compensation was due.
Juries not being permitted to speculate,
Ward’s claim, the trial court concluded, must fail.
Ward
contends that the trial court applied to her claim the wrong
legal standard.
We have already observed that
[g]enerally, a trial judge cannot enter a
directed verdict unless there is a complete
absence of proof on a material issue or if no
disputed issues of fact exist upon which
reasonable minds could differ. Where there is
conflicting evidence, it is the
responsibility of the jury to determine and
resolve such conflicts, as well as matters
affecting the credibility of witnesses.
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Bierman v. Klapheke, Ky., 967 S.W.2d 16, 18-19 (1998) (citing
Taylor v. Kennedy, Ky.App., 700 S.W.2d 415 (1985).
Plainly,
reasonable minds could differ upon Ward’s entitlement to damages
for future medical expenses and upon the extent of that
entitlement.
The trial court should not have directed a verdict,
therefore, unless Ward’s failure to establish the amount of her
claim is, in some sense, “a complete absence of proof on a
material issue.”3
We agree with the trial court that it is.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 912 (1979) provides
that
[o]ne to whom another has tortiously caused
harm is entitled to compensatory damages for
the harm if, but only if, he establishes by
proof the extent of the harm and the amount
of money representing adequate compensation
with as much certainty as the nature of the
tort and the circumstances permit.
This provision attempts to balance fundamental
interests of the plaintiff and the defendant.
On the one hand,
the defendant is liable for compensation only to the extent of
the plaintiff’s injury, which it is the plaintiff’s burden to
prove, and concerning which the jury is not permitted to
speculate.
Wiser Oil Company v. Conley, Ky., 380 S.W.2d 217
(1964); and see Veazey v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co.,
587 So.2d 5 (LA App. 1991) (applying this rule in the context of
a claim for future medical expenses).
In the context of this
case, therefore, the general rule may be expressed as follows:
3
Although she contested the point in her motion for a new trial, Ward concedes on appeal
the fact that her proof does not establish, or provide the means to establish, the amount of her
claim. She disputes only the legal effect of that shortcoming.
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claims for future expenses must include proof, as nearly as can
be realistically estimated, of both the unit cost of the goods or
services at issue and the number of units apt to be needed.
Under this rule the trial court correctly concluded that Ward’s
future-expenses claim failed because it did not estimate, as it
would realistically have been possible to do, how often Ward was
apt to need therapy sessions or prescription medication.
Ward’s
claim that she would need these treatments “from time to time”
for the rest of her life is so indefinite as to provide, in
effect, no estimate at all.
On the other hand, there are cases in which the fact of
compensable harm is well established apart from proof of the
harm’s extent.
In such cases, it may happen that the extent of
the harm defies proof or for some other reason is not proved.
Nevertheless, as the Restatement notes,4 to deny all recovery in
such a case would be unfair to the plaintiff.
See James v. Webb,
643 So.2d 424 (LA App. 1994) (remanding in such a case for
additional proof on the amount of future expenses); Jones v.
Trailor, 636 So.2d 1112 (LA App. 1994) (remanding for an award of
future expenses in whatever amount the trial court deemed to be
beyond dispute).
These cases constitute an exception to the
general rule just stated, but the exception does not apply here
because Ward’s future loss was not otherwise clearly established.
There was evidence, as noted above, that Ward’s medical needs did
not stem from her fall but rather from natural changes to her
spine.
4
Ward’s claim for future medical expenses, therefore, can
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 912 comment a (1979).
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not be assessed apart from consideration of the particular
expenses alleged.
Because Ward’s lack of proof on the latter
question would have required the jury to speculate, the trial
court did not err by concluding that the claim itself was
speculative.
Against this result Ward relies on City of Louisville
v. Maresz, Ky. App., 835 S.W.2d 889 (1992).
In that case an
award of future medical expenses was challenged as being
unsupported by the evidence.
In upholding the award, this Court
pointed to numerous items of testimony tending to show that the
plaintiff would likely require medical services in the future and
held that the award of future medical expenses was thus
adequately supported.
As Ward observes, there is no mention in
Maresz of the plaintiff’s having to itemize, as it were, his
future expenses, to prove the cost and the amount of the medical
treatment he was allegedly likely to need in the future.
Similarly, Ward insists, she should not have been required to
prove more than the likelihood of future treatment.
Ward, we believe, reads Maresz too broadly.
True, the
narrow issue addressed on appeal in that case was whether the
evidence tended adequately to show that the plaintiff was likely
to need medical treatment in the future, not which treatments he
was likely to need and their costs.
The Court’s focus on the one
issue, however, does not imply, as Ward asserts, that the other
issue was irrelevant to the plaintiff’s claim.
Rather, it
suggests that the parties simply did not raise the other issue on
appeal.
Maresz, does not, we therefore believe, address the
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question now before us and does not alter our previous analysis.5
As discussed above, unless the need for compensable future
medical treatment is beyond dispute, a claim for damages for
future medical expenses will not lie unless there is evidence
tending to establish both elements--the likelihood of the need
and its likely extent.
Ward’s need for compensable future
treatment not being beyond dispute, her failure to introduce
evidence tending to specify with reasonable certainty the extent
of her need precludes recovery on her claim.
The trial court did
not err, therefore, by so ruling.
For these reasons, we affirm the March 12, 1999,
judgment of the Logan Circuit Court.
TACKETT, JUDGE, CONCURS.
COMBS, JUDGE, DISSENTS BY SEPARATE OPINION.
COMBS, JUDGE, DISSENTING: Under the circumstances of
this case, I would remand for additional proof of the amount of
future medical expenses.
The evidence was overwhelming in this
5
In Maresz, the Court relied in part on Davis v. Graviss, Ky., 672 S.W.2d 928 (1984). It
may be well to note that our decision here does not conflict with that case either. In Davis, at
932, our Supreme Court held that a jury, when it is determining an award of damages for bodily
harm, “may consider and compensate for the increased likelihood of future complications,”
provided that there is substantial evidence of probative value justifying compensation on that
ground. Like pain and suffering, but unlike medical expenses, bodily harm is a “non-pecuniary”
harm that is not easily translated into a monetary amount. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §§
905, 906 (1979). See also Id. § 924 which distinguishes the types of damages typically at issue in
tort-based causes of action. In making that translation, juries are necessarily entrusted with a
broad discretion. Davis v. Graviss, supra. That discretion is less, however, when the question is
compensation for pecuniary harms such as medical expenses. Such harms being naturally
measured in monetary terms, the general rule, as stated in the text, is that they are compensable
only to the extent that the monetary loss is shown with reasonable certainty.
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case that Ms. Ward would continue to require treatment for her
serious injuries.
In effect, the jury penalized her for
mitigating her losses by her return to work.
I believe that its
disregard of the evidence of her injury and inevitable need for
ongoing treatment called for corrective action by the trial court
in the form of a judgment notwithstanding the clearly inadequate
verdict.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Robert A. Young
English, Lucas, Priest &
Owsley
Bowling Green Kentucky
Martha L. Brown
Farmer, Kelley, Brown and
Williams
London, Kentucky
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