TERRANCE LEE WHITE, SR. v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: November 3, 2000; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-000590-MR
TERRANCE LEE WHITE, SR.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GEOFFREY P. MORRIS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 95-CR-002979
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, EMBERTON, and GUIDUGLI, Judges.
COMBS, JUDGE:
This is an appeal by Terrance L. White (White)
from an order of the Jefferson Circuit Court denying his petition
for post-conviction relief.
In 1995, during the pendency of a dissolution
proceeding, White’s former wife petitioned the court for
temporary child support for their two children.
The case was
referred to a Domestic Relations Commissioner (DRC), before whom
White appeared, pro se, to answer the child support request.
At
the Commissioner’s hearing, White refused to cooperate in the
computation of his monthly earnings, and the DRC relied primarily
on the testimony of the former wife in determining the figures.
The DRC ultimately imputed gross monthly income to White of
$9,400.00 and recommended that he pay child support of $351.63
per week.
On October 12, 1995, the circuit judge entered an
order adopting the DRC’s recommendation and ordered that White
pay the recommended amount retroactive to June 29, 1995.
In the meantime, the former wife had sought and
obtained a domestic violence order against White in Jefferson
District Court.
In granting that order, the District Court
ordered temporary child support payments in the amount of $47.65
per week.
This order remained in effect from May 1995 to May
1996.
White concedes that he did not pay the child support as
required under these orders, contending that the amount of his
child support obligation as recommended by the DRC was based on
erroneous information as to his income.
It is uncontested that
as a result of his failure to comply with the support orders,
White incurred an arrearage in excess of $1,000.00.
On November 17, 1995, White was indicted for flagrant
nonsupport (KRS 530.050).
Following a jury trial, he was found
guilty as charged and was sentenced to two-years’ incarceration,
probated for five years.
White appealed, alleging:
(1) that his
conviction violated double jeopardy and (2) that the trial court
erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict.
On October
10, 1997, in Case No. 96-CA-1350, we rendered an Opinion
rejecting these claims and affirming White’s conviction.
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On April 30, 1998, White filed a hand-written, pro se,
motion to “set aside and expunge” his conviction.
1998, White filed a similar motion.
On October 8,
On November 16, 1998, the
trial court entered an order denying White’s motions.
This
appeal followed.
In both of his motions, White did not identify the
Criminal Rule (RCr) or Civil Rule (CR) upon which he relied for
post-conviction relief.
At the hearing on White’s motions, the
trial court stated that it was treating the motion as a CR 60.02
motion.
We will do the same, but we will also analyze his
contentions pursuant to RCr 11.42.
The same result flows from
application of either rule.
First, White contends that “the trial court erred in
overruling his motion for a directed verdict when the evidence
was insufficient to support any finding that appellant was
financially able to pay the amount of support ordered which
constituted the charge of flagrant non-support.”
A claim that
the trial court erred in failing to grant a directed verdict is
an issue which should be raised on direct appeal; in this case,
that issue was in fact raised on direct appeal.
Thus, both CR
60.02 and RCr 11.42 are unavailable to White as vehicles to seek
relief at this juncture.
“CR 60.02 is meant to provide relief
which is not available by direct appeal or under RCr 11.42.”
Barnett v. Commonwealth, Ky., 979 S.W.2d 98, 101 (1998) (citing
Gross v. Commonwealth, Ky., 648 S.W.2d 853, 856 (1983) and
McQueen v. Commonwealth, Ky., 948 S.W.2d 415, 416 (1997)).
(Emphasis added).
Similarly, “In an RCr 11.42 proceeding, the
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movant cannot raise issues which were raised and decided on
direct appeal.”
(1998).
Wilson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 975 S.W.2d 901, 903
(Emphasis added).
Hence, the trial court’s failure to
grant a directed verdict was not a proper issue for White’s
motion for post-conviction relief under either CR 60.02 or RCr
11.42.
Next, White contends that “the order of support entered
in this case is pendente lite and interlocutory, and it is not a
final judgment subject to execution and where support is awareed
[sic] pendente lite, it can only be enforced by contempt
proceeding[s] not by execution or procecution [sic].”
As we
understand White’s argument, he alleges that his child support
arrearage accumulated as a result of a temporary (as opposed to a
final) child support order; thus, he contends that such an
arrearage is subject to punishment only by contempt proceedings
rather than by a criminal prosecution for flagrant nonsupport.
However, as with his previous argument, this issue should have
been raised on direct appeal and is, therefore, not proper
subject matter for a CR 60.02 motion.
supra.
Barnett v. Commonwealth,
Similarly, an RCr 11.42 motion “is limited to issues
that were not and could not be raised on direct appeal.”
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 975 S.W.2d 905, 908-909 (1998).
Sanborn
Because
this issue could have been raised on direct appeal, we are not at
liberty to review it pursuant to motions involving CR 60.02 or
RCr 11.42.
Finally, White contends that:
the trial court erred in prosecuting
appellant on a pendente lite and
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interlocutory order from the Commissioner’s
Report dat[ed] 8/1/95, with no final order,
which was signed ex-parte by Judge Richard
Fitzgerald on August 11, 1995. (Reversible
Error). [And] [f]urthermore, [it] was only
after the trial date that this report was
found to be based on perjured testimony and
mistakes, newly discovered evidence,
substantial error, [and] misrepresentation.
We have already addressed White’s contention that the prosecution
was based upon a temporary child support order.
As to his
remaining issues, CR 60.02 requires that motions addressing these
allegations must be brought within one year.
Further, allegedly
perjured testimony is not a proper basis for impeaching a jury
verdict in a proceeding pursuant to RCr 11.42.
Basnight, Ky App., 770 S.W.2d 231 (1989).
Commonwealth v.
Moreover, White has
not identified with any specificity the substance of the newly
discovered evidence, substantial error, and misrepresentation;
hence, these issues are not reviewable under RCr 11.42.
(RCr
11.42(2).)
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT PRO SE:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Terrance Lee White, Sr.
Marysville, Indiana
Albert B. Chandler, III
Attorney General of Kentucky
John E. Zak
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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