CITY OF PIKEVILLE V. OSCAR W. THOMPSON, JR.; WHITE WATER TRADING CO., INC., d/b/a FINISH LINE LIQUOR AND BEER V. OSCAR W. THOMPSON, JR.; JOE RAMSEY; and THE CITY OF PIKEVILLE
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RENDERED: April 21, 2000; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-000439-MR
CITY OF PIKEVILLE
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM PIKE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE EDDY COLEMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 95-CI-01269
V.
OSCAR W. THOMPSON, JR.;
and JOE RAMSEY
AND
APPELLEES
NO. 1999-CA-000572-MR
WHITE WATER TRADING CO.,
INC., d/b/a FINISH LINE
LIQUOR AND BEER
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM PIKE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE EDDY COLEMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 95-CI-01269
V.
OSCAR W. THOMPSON, JR.;
JOE RAMSEY; and THE CITY
OF PIKEVILLE
APPELLEES
OPINION REVERSING AND REMANDING AS TO
APPEAL NO. 1999-CA-000439-MR, AND VACATING AND REMANDING
AS TO APPEAL NO. 1999-CA-000572-MR
* * * * * * * *
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, Chief Judge; KNOPF and McANULTY, Judges.
GUDGEL, CHIEF JUDGE:
These are appeals from a summary judgment
granted by the Pike Circuit Court declaring an annexation
ordinance null and void.
Appellant City of Pikeville (Pikeville)
contends in Appeal No. 1999-CA-000439-MR that the trial court
erred by granting summary judgment, by making certain findings,
and by prohibiting the taking of certain depositions.
Appellant
White Water Trading Co., Inc., d/b/a Finish Line Liquor and Beer
(White Water), contends in Appeal No. 1999-CA-000572-MR that the
court erred by refusing to permit it to intervene in Pikeville's
action.
For the reasons stated hereafter, we reverse and remand
as to Pikeville’s appeal, and we vacate and remand as to White
Water’s appeal.
Pikeville enacted an ordinance in May 1990 indicating
its intent to annex an adjacent unincorporated area.
As a
petition was filed in opposition to the annexation, the proposal
was placed on the next regular election ballot.
which was cast opposed the annexation.
The single vote
However, because the
circuit court adjudged that the voter was not qualified to vote
in the annexed precincts, no qualified vote was recorded in
opposition to the annexation.
On appeal, the circuit court's
judgment was affirmed, and the annexation was effected.
Meanwhile, appellees Oscar W. Thompson, Jr. and Joe
Ramsey, nonresident owners of property within the annexed
territory, filed a complaint in the circuit court alleging that
the annexation was void as the boundaries were
arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable and
designed with no purpose other than the
gathering of revenue with no provision of
services in mind or with no other lawful
reason for those boundaries. The boundaries
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were in fact designed to attempt to create a
territory in which there were no registered
voters to vote against the annexation
ordinance.
Ramsey also filed an affidavit in January 1998, claiming that
although the annexation map generally followed the highway
right-of-way, it jutted out at a particular point so as to
include a business building and a private driveway but not the
adjacent residence.
Moreover, he claimed that elsewhere, a
voting resident was excluded from the annexed territory because
the highway right-of-way boundary was not followed, and that "the
Ordinance was designed to exclude registered voters opposing the
annexation from the coverage of the territory while taking in
revenue producing businesses."
In response, Pikeville filed an affidavit of its former
city manager, John Johnson, describing the factors involved in
drawing the annexation boundaries.
Those factors included the
fostering of economic development, the inclusion within city
limits of a newly-constructed and city-maintained bridge, the
improved routing of city emergency and law enforcement vehicles,
and the upgrading of water utility lines.
Johnson indicated that
the annexed area included only one residence, which was occupied
by at least two adults who were eligible to vote, that very few
residences were located nearby, and that the adjacent residential
property owned or occupied by Thompson's daughter was not annexed
because it was "not suitable for urban development" and because
it was situated in an isolated and elevated location which was
not accessible for purposes of receiving city services.
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Next, the attorney for Thompson and Ramsey, Lawrence R.
Webster, filed his own affidavit stating that he had examined the
county clerk's records, and that the occupants of the single
residence in the annexed area were Lloyd Charles and Patty
Charles, neither of whom was registered to vote in the annexed
area.
He further alleged that
[i]t is believed that Walter May, Mayor of
the City of Pikeville took voter registration
cards from Lloyd Charles and Patty Charles
but, in violation of the Kentucky Revised
Statutes, failed to turn those cards in to
the Pike County Court Clerk's Office, and did
so deliberately, realizing that if no
registered voters were in the precinct the
annexation would have to carry no matter how
the Charles voted.
The trial court eventually granted a summary judgment in favor of
Thompson and Ramsey, and Pikeville filed a motion to vacate the
judgment.
While that motion was pending, two additional
affidavits were filed, including an August 1998 affidavit of
Lloyd Charles and Patty Charles, who denied any knowledge of
having signed, having been requested to sign, or having given
anyone else voter registration cards which would have enabled
them to vote on the annexation issue.
no desire to vote on the issue.
They stated that they had
Further, in September 1998,
former mayor Walter May filed an affidavit stating that the
annexation was needed for urban development reasons, that the
annexation's boundaries were not intended to exclude potential
voters, and that the property of Thompson's daughter was excluded
from annexation because it was "not subject to immediate urban
development," rather than because of any potential opposition to
the annexation.
May stated that he had not given voter
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registration cards to Mr. or Mrs. Charles, and that neither he
nor anyone else to his knowledge had received such cards from
them for filing.
Finally, while the motion to vacate was still pending,
White Water sought to file an intervening complaint as an
indispensable party.
It asserted that the annexation's
revocation would irreparably harm its retail package liquor store
business by causing it to be located in the "dry" territory
outside of the "wet" city limits.
The court denied the motion
but stayed enforcement of its decision, pending the outcome of
any appeal.
These appeals followed.
First, in Appeal No. 1999-CA-000439-MR, Pikeville
contends that the trial court erred by finding that Thompson and
Ramsey were entitled to a summary judgment as a matter of law.
We agree.
It is settled in Kentucky that "[a]nnexation is purely
and simply a political act within the exclusive control of the
legislature," and that "a party has no constitutional right to
resist annexation."
Louisville Shopping Center, Inc. v. City of
St. Matthews, Ky., 635 S.W.2d 307, 310 (1982).
Moreover, a
city's
legislative body may extend the city's
boundaries to include any area:
(a) Which is adjacent or contiguous to
the city's boundaries at the time
the annexation proceeding is begun;
and
(b) Which by reason of population density,
commercial, industrial, institutional or
governmental use of land, or subdivision
of land, is urban in character or
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suitable for development for urban
purposes without unreasonable delay.
KRS 81A.410.
However, prior to any such annexation, the city's
legislative body must enact an ordinance stating its intent and
accurately describing the annexation boundaries.
KRS 81A.420(1).
If at least half of the resident voters or real property owners
within the annexation boundaries file a petition opposing the
proposed annexation, an election must be conducted.
81A.420(2).
KRS
If less than fifty-five percent of those voting in
such election oppose the annexation, the annexation shall become
effective.
KRS 81A.420(2)(b).
Here, the trial court's summary judgment specifically
addressed "only . . . the gerrymandering issue."
However, we
cannot agree with the court's conclusion that no genuine issues
of material fact exist as to that issue.
The entire record on
appeal consists of the circuit clerk's 126-page record.
Although
that record contains little in the way of probative evidence
other than the above-summarized and conflicting affidavits and a
map showing the area in controversy, and although no direct
evidence was adduced to show how registered voters in adjacent
areas would have voted if included in the annexed area, the
summary judgment order included the following statements and
conclusions:
In one particular area, the annexed area
takes in a business but stops halfway up the
driveway of Dr. Thompson's daughter, who
would have opposed annexation had her house
been annexed. At the mouth of Buckleys Creek
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is an area drawn so as to avoid one or more
houses situated at road level.
As a result of the annexation, revenue
can be gathered from that area's businesses,
but no registered voters could have voted
against the annexation because none were
within the annexed area.
. . . .
In this case, the City annexed an area
along U.S. 23. The area was drawn to include
commercial property but exclude residents who
might have opposed annexation but could not
challenge it because they were not included
in the annexed area.
Absolute and arbitrary power over
peoples' lives, liberty, and property exists
nowhere in a republic, not even in the
largest majority. Ky. Const. §2. The
annexation violates this section because of
its irregular shape and its failure to
encompass potential opposition voters, like
Dr. Thompson's daughter.
Further, we cannot agree with the court's reliance on
City of Birmingham v. Community Fire District, 336 So.2d 502, 503
(Ala. 1976), and Township of Owosso v. City of Owosso, 25 Mich.
App. 460, 467, 181 N.W.2d 541, 545 (1970), affirmed by 181 N.W.2d
541 (1970), as support for the finding that gerrymandering was
involved in the annexation process herein.
Unlike the instant
action, the annexation plan in Birmingham excluded numerous
areas, "as islands or enclaves either completely or primarily
surrounded by the annexed territory," in order to eliminate the
votes of those persons who were predetermined to be in opposition
to the annexation.
336 So.2d at 503.
Noting that "[t]he
divisions between those allowed to vote and those excluded were
sometimes a street, and sometimes merely lot lines in the same
block," id. at 504, and concluding that such gerrymandering was
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unconstitutional and unreasonable, the appellate court affirmed
the trial court's order setting aside the annexation election.
Similarly, Owosso involved an annexation of property
which was connected to the city only by a strip of land,
measuring 1,326 feet long by 280 feet wide, which was purchased
especially to secure the connection.
The strip was populated
only by two voters who favored the annexation, while the areas
between the bulk of the annexed land and the city contained some
140 qualified voters.
The court held that the requirement of
contiguity, involving "reasonable compactness and regularity of
boundary so as to insure that the annexed and annexing
territories become an unbroken mass which can function
effectively as a single unit rather than as an armed monster with
only minimally-connected appendages," had not been met.
25 Mich.
App. at 467, 181 N.W.2d at 545.
Here, Thompson and Ramsey contend that, as in
Birmingham and Owosso, the annexation boundaries were drawn to
exclude potential opponents of the annexation process, including
Thompson's daughter.
However, as noted above, the affidavit of
the former city manager specifically lists numerous city-related
reasons for the location of the annexation boundaries, and two
affidavits clearly controvert Webster's statements regarding the
registration of potential voters within the annexed area.
Moreover, the map included in the record shows that, unlike
Birmingham and Owosso, here the boundaries were "roughly
rectangular" in shape, as described in Thompson's and Ramsey's
appellate brief.
Indeed, a review of that map shows that
including the daughter's residence within the annexed area would
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have required the annexation boundary to deviate from that
rectangular shape and to incorporate, at the annexed area's
widest point, an additional oval extension into the county which
apparently would have further doubled the width of the annexed
territory in that limited area.
Based upon our review of the record, we cannot say that
it is clear, as a matter of law, that it would be impossible for
Pikeville to produce evidence at a trial which would warrant a
judgment in its favor and against Thompson and Ramsey.
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., Ky., 807
S.W.2d 476, 483 (1991).
Instead, when viewed in the light most
favorable to Pikeville, the record clearly shows that genuine
issues of material fact exist as to whether the annexation
boundaries were, as alleged by Thompson and Ramsey, arbitrary,
capricious, unreasonable, and unlawfully designed with the intent
of creating a territory unpopulated by registered voters who
could oppose the annexation ordinance.
We conclude, therefore,
that the trial court erred by granting a summary judgment to
Thompson and Ramsey.
Next, Pikeville contends that the trial court
erroneously held that Kentucky law "prohibits municipalities from
arranging the boundaries of annexation territory to include
residents who may favor annexation."
However, the court's
summary judgment order in fact focused on the specific annexation
boundaries herein, and determined that the boundaries involved
gerrymandering such as that described in Birmingham and Owosso.
Thus, the broader issue was not addressed in the summary
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judgment, and it is not properly before us on appeal.
Hence, we
decline to address it.
Next, Pikeville contends that the trial court erred by
granting Thompson and Ramsey's postjudgment motion seeking a
protective order prohibiting the taking of depositions.
The
record shows that the court specifically granted the motion on
the ground that "this case has been decided and . . . those
depositions are now improper."
Given the fact that we are
reversing the summary judgment, it follows that the court's
protective order should be set aside on the ground that the
underlying basis for it no longer exists.
Finally, White Water contends in Appeal No.
1999-CA-000572-MR that the trial court erred by denying its
motion for leave to intervene as an indispensable party, which
was filed on the same date as Pikeville's motion to vacate the
order granting summary judgment.
The court denied both motions
without specifying the reasons for its actions.
The right to intervene in a pending action is addressed
by CR 24.01(1), which states:
Upon timely application anyone shall be
permitted to intervene in an action (a) when
a statute confers an unconditional right to
intervene, or (b) when the applicant claims
an interest relating to the property or
transaction which is the subject of the
action and is so situated that the
disposition of the action may as a practical
matter impair or impede the applicant's
ability to protect that interest, unless that
interest is adequately represented by
existing parties.
Here, the requirements of the rule are satisfied because White
Water's ability to continue the operation of its liquor store in
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the annexed territory is dependent on whether that territory is
annexed to the "wet" city, or reverts to being part of the "dry"
territory outside of the city limits.
Clearly, White Water
"claims an interest relating to" the annexation, and it is "so
situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical
matter impair or impede" its "ability to protect that interest."
CR 24.01(1).
Further, the record contains nothing to suggest
that White Water's interest is "adequately represented by
existing parties."
Id.
Thus, we must assume for purposes of
this appeal that White Water's motion was denied by the court on
the ground that it was untimely.
Although it is arguable that the motion to intervene
was untimely because it was filed on the same date as the
unsuccessful motion to vacate the summary judgment, again it
follows from our reversal of the summary judgment that the
underlying basis for the court’s determination no longer exists.
Hence, the court’s order denying White Water's intervention
motion as untimely must be set aside, and the motion should be
reconsidered upon remand.
The court's summary judgment is reversed, its denial of
White Water's motion to intervene is vacated, and this matter is
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent
with our views.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS FOR CITY OF PIKEVILLE:
BRIEF FOR OSCAR W. THOMPSON,
JR.; and JOE RAMSEY:
Russell H. Davis, Jr.
Pikeville, KY
Lawrence R. Webster
Pikeville, KY
BRIEF FOR WHITE WATER TRADING
CO., INC., d/b/a FINISH LINE
LIQUOR AND BEER:
Miller Kent Carter
Pikeville, KY
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