DONALD TAYLOR BROWN v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: December 29, 2000; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-000196-MR
DONALD TAYLOR BROWN
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LAUREL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE RODERICK MESSER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 83-CR-00128
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, KNOPF, AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
Donald Taylor Brown appeals from an order of the
Laurel Circuit Court denying his motion to alter, vacate, or
correct a sentence brought pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Criminal
Procedure (RCr) 11.42 challenging his guilty plea.
Following a
hearing, upon remand by this Court, the trial court found that
Brown was competent and entered his guilty plea knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily.
After reviewing the record, we
agree with the trial court that Brown’s guilty plea was legally
valid.
In December 1983, Brown and his half-brother, Robert
Allen Smith, were indicted on charges of capital murder (KRS
507.020), kidnaping (KRS 509.040), and two counts of theft by
unlawful taking over $100 (KRS 514.030), in connection with the
death and abduction of an elderly car salesman and an automobile
from a car dealership.
Brown was also indicted for being a
persistent felony offender in the first degree (PFO I)(KRS
532.080).
In January 1985, the circuit court ordered a
psychological evaluation of Brown to determine his competency to
stand trial and his possible criminal responsibility for the
offenses.
In April 1985, the trial court denied Brown’s motion
for a change of venue.
The Commonwealth notified the defendant
that it would seek the death penalty.
While Brown was undergoing the psychological
evaluation, the three attorneys representing him conducted plea
negotiations with the Commonwealth.
On June 4, 1985, Brown and
his family met with one of his attorneys, George Sornberger,
about a proposed plea agreement that called for Brown’s pleading
guilty to murder and PFO I with a recommended sentence of life
without the benefit of parole for twenty-five years in exchange
for dismissal of the robbery, kidnaping, and theft charges plus
withdrawal of the request for a possible death sentence.
On June
28, 1995, Joy Barrett, another of Brown’s attorneys, sent Brown a
letter further explaining the plea offer and recommending that
Brown accept it because of the strength of the prosecution’s
case, and “a pretty strong risk that the jury would give you a
death sentence.”
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In mid-July 1985, after numerous psychological tests
and evaluations were conducted by personnel at the Kentucky
Correctional Psychiatric Center (KCPC), Dr. Phillip Johnson
issued a report concluding that Brown was both competent to stand
trial and capable of appreciating the criminality of his conduct
at the time of the incident.
On August 5, 1985, Brown entered a guilty plea to
murder and PFO I pursuant to a plea agreement with the
Commonwealth.
Under the plea agreement, the Commonwealth moved
to dismiss the kidnaping, robbery, and theft counts, and withdrew
its notice of intent to seek the death penalty.
contained, however, several unique aspects.
The agreement
First, the
Commonwealth recommended a sentence of life without the benefit
of parole for twenty-five years for murder with sentencing on the
PFO I conviction being deferred by agreement.
The sentence of
life without parole for twenty-five years was consistent with the
1984 amendment of KRS 532.0301 that added this possible sentence
for certain offenses such as murder.
Prior to the amendment,
defendants receiving a life sentence were eligible for parole
after having served twelve years.
Although the amendment did not
become effective until July 13, 1984, which was subsequent to the
date of Brown’s alleged offenses, Brown specifically consented
under the plea agreement to retrospective application of KRS
532.030 based in part on KRS 446.110, and he expressly waived any
ex post facto objection to sentencing under the new law.
Brown
also acknowledged the presence of the aggravating circumstance
1
See 1984 Ky. Acts Ch. 110, § 2 (eff. 7-13-84).
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that the murder was committed during the commission of firstdegree robbery.
The deferred sentencing on the PFO I count was
included with the understanding that a sentence on this offense
could be imposed at a later date if retrospective application of
the sentence of life without the benefit of parole for twentyfive years under the amended version of KRS 532.030 was
subsequently vacated by a court.2
The Commonwealth also agreed
to withdraw its notice of intent to seek the death penalty
against Brown’s co-defendant and half-brother, Robert Smith.3
On August 27, 1985, the trial court sentenced Brown
consistent with the plea agreement to life imprisonment without
the benefit of parole for twenty-five years for murder and
deferred sentencing on the PFO I conviction.
On February 1, 1989, Brown filed an RCr 11.42 motion
seeking to vacate his sentence.
In the motion, Brown contended
that the guilty plea was invalid for several reasons including:
(1) he was incompetent and misunderstood the terms of the plea
agreement; (2) ineffective assistance of counsel; and (3) the
sentence violated the constitutional prohibition on ex post facto
application of the law.
without a hearing.
The circuit court denied the motion
The court also denied a subsequent motion for
2
The record suggests that the prosecution desired this
term because under KRS 532.080(7), a defendant convicted of PFO I
and a Class A, B, or C felony is not eligible for parole until he
has served ten years of his sentence.
3
Robert Smith entered a guilty plea to murder, kidnaping,
and first-degree robbery on August 16, 1984. Smith agreed to
testify for the prosecution in a jury trial of Brown and
sentencing was postponed pending resolution of the case against
Brown.
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leave to supplement the original RCr 11.42 motion and a motion to
reconsider its order.
On April 10, 1998, this Court rendered an opinion
affirming the circuit court in part, vacating the order denying
the RCr 11.42 motion, and remanding the case to the trial court
for an evidentiary hearing on two issues raised in the motion.
First, we agreed with the trial court that Brown had not
demonstrated that his plea violated the prohibition on ex post
facto application of the law because he knowingly and voluntarily
waived that claim.
We also held that Brown did not receive
ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to the guilty
plea.
However, given the incomplete condition of the circuit
court record, we vacated the denial of the motion and remanded
the case for an evidentiary hearing on Brown’s claims that “he
was incompetent when he pled guilty or that he so utterly
misunderstood the significance of his plea as to render it
invalid.”
Our decision was predicated in large part on the fact
that while some documents related to the plea were in the
appellate record, no transcript of the original plea or
sentencing hearings was available.
Consistent with general
policy, the court reporter had not preserved her notes beyond the
five-year period subsequent to the proceedings and no transcript
had been previously prepared.
Following the remand, the circuit court appointed an
attorney to represent Brown on the motion.
The court conducted
an evidentiary hearing on December 15, 1998, at which the
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witnesses included Brown; George Sornberger; June Woodyard; the
court reporter at the time of Brown’s plea; and retired Judge C.
R. Luker, the trial judge who had presided over Brown’s case and
whose testimony was admitted by way of an audio-tape deposition.
Brown’s attorney acknowledged that the evaluation of Brown by
personnel at KCPC and neurological tests conducted at the
University of Louisville prior to the guilty plea indicated that
he was competent to stand trial, and he offered no evidence to
dispute that finding.
Brown, however, testified that he did not
understand the terms of the plea agreement.
He stated that he
believed that under the agreement he would receive either a
sentence of imprisonment for twenty-five years, or a life
sentence, and that he would be eligible for parole after serving
eight years.
Brown based his misunderstanding of the terms of
the plea agreement on his lack of education and very poor reading
skills.
Brown stated that he had only a second or third grade
education and although admitting that he signed the proposed plea
agreement, he had to get another person to read it to him.
On
cross-examination, however, he admitted having entered guilty
pleas in four prior felony prosecutions prior to the guilty plea
in the present case.
Sornberger testified that he had discussed the plea
offer with Brown on several occasions in meetings and through
correspondence.
Sornberger stated that he expended extra effort
to explain the plea offer and the sentence of life without the
benefit of parole under the new statute because retroactive
reliance on the new sentence under the recently enacted statute
-6-
was an unusual situation.
He stated that he had obtained
information from Department of Corrections’ personnel on their
policy for applying good time credit to the twenty-five year
parole eligibility time frame and had specifically explained it
to Brown because it was not widely known at the time given the
recent creation of that sentence in the new statute.
Sornberger
said that he believed Brown understood the plea agreement prior
to entering his guilty plea.
Judge Luker also stated in his deposition that although
he did not specifically recall Brown’s guilty plea hearing, he
regularly followed a standard procedure recommended by the
Administrative Office of the Courts from a desk reference bench
book outlining the questions and guidelines necessary to comply
with constitutional law.4
Finally, Sornberger confirmed that
Judge Luker followed his typical procedure during Brown’s guilty
plea hearing and had also specifically discussed Brown’s
competency and the report from KCPC during the proceeding.
On January 21, 1999, following the submission of legal
memoranda by Brown’s attorney and the Commonwealth’s Attorney,
the circuit court entered an opinion and order denying the RCr
11.42 motion.
The court found that Brown was competent to plead
guilty and that he had failed to show that he did not understand
the effects of the guilty plea.
It held that the plea was
entered voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently as required by
4
The Commonwealth introduced into evidence at the hearing
a copy of the sections dealing with guilty pleas and sentencing
hearings from the desk reference that was discussed by Judge
Luker in his deposition.
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Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274
(1969).
This appeal followed.
On appeal, Brown seeks to vacate his sentence arguing
that it is invalid.
First, he contends that the circuit court
lacked jurisdiction to impose the sentence because the statute
authorizing the sentence of life without the benefit of parole
for twenty-five years, KRS 532.030, was not in effect at the time
of the plea.
Second, Brown asserts that application of the
statute to his offense violates the prohibition on ex post facto
laws.
Third, he contends that the trial court incorrectly found
that he entered the plea knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily.
Where the trial court conducts an evidentiary
hearing on an RCr 11.42 motion, as in this case, “the reviewing
court must defer to the determinations of fact and witness
credibility made by the trial judge.”
Sanborn v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 975 S.W.2d 905, 909 (1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1025, 119
S. Ct. 1266, 143 L. Ed. 2d 361 (1999).
As an initial matter, we believe that Brown is
foreclosed from raising the ex post facto issue based upon the
doctrine of law of the case.
Under this rule, a final decision
by an appellate court, whether right or wrong, is conclusive of
the questions resolved therein.
Hardaway Management Co.
v.
Southerland, Ky., 977 S.W.2d 910, 915 (1998); See also Ellis v.
Jasmin, Ky., 968 S.W.2d 669, 670 (1998) and Williamson v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 767 S.W.2d 323, 325 (1989).
The prior
decision is binding on the parties and the trial court and the
parties and those issues cannot be reconsidered in a subsequent
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appeal to the same court.
S.W.2d 243, 250 (1996).
Haight v. Commonwealth, Ky., 938
In the current case, Brown raised the
issue of the ex post facto application of KRS 532.030(1) in his
initial appeal.
This Court affirmed the trial court’s rejection
of this argument in our first decision and remanded the case for
further proceedings on the other issues raised in the RCr 11.42
motion.
Consequently, this Court’s decision on appeal is binding
on the parties and may not be relitigated in this appeal.
Nevertheless, to the extent that Brown’s position
raises an issue of jurisdictional defects in his sentencing, we
still find no error.
Brown contends that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to sentence him to life without parole for twenty
five years under KRS 532.030(1) because that statute had not
become effective prior to the date he committed the offenses.
However, Brown expressly waived retroactive application of KRS
532.030(1) based in part upon KRS 446.110.
The latter statute
allows retroactive application of a statute, with the consent of
the party affected, if the new statute would act to mitigate a
penalty otherwise applicable.
Recently, in Commonwealth v. Phon, Ky. 17 S.W.3d 106
(2000), the Kentucky Supreme Court held that an amendment to the
capital sentencing range to add the sentence of life without
parole could be applied retroactively pursuant to KRS 446.110
because the addition of the new sentence served to mitigate the
possible sentence of death. Id. at 108.
Similarly, in Russell v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 992 S.W.2d 871 (1999), this Court recently
held that a trial court had the authority to sentence a defendant
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to a plea agreement in which he agreed to a retrospective
application of KRS 439.3401, which provided for a greater period
before initial parole eligibility than existed under the prior
law..
This Court found that the plea agreement informed the
appellant that the statute was being applied retroactively, and
that the new twelve year minimum was not outside the law as it
existed at the time of the offense.
Id. at 876.
In this case the plea agreement document clearly states
that although KRS 532.030 was not effective until after the
crimes were committed, Brown was agreeing to the application of
that statute and waived any ex post facto challenge to its
application.
Brown’s attorneys sought application of the statute
to Brown because it provided an alternative to a possible death
penalty.
Prior to July 15, 1986, defendants receiving a life
sentence generally were eligible for parole after serving eight
years of their sentence under administrative regulation.
This
policy merely created a minimum date for an initial review for
parole.
There was no statute prohibiting a later initial parole
review date.
Even though the sentence Brown received was not
explicitly set out in the prior statutes, it did not violate any
statute in effect at the time the offenses were committed.
Therefore, our initial decision rejecting the ex post facto
argument was justified on the merits.
See also Commonwealth v.
Phon, 17 S.W.3d at 109 (2000)(Cooper, J., concurring) (stating
defendant waived any possible ex post facto claim by seeking
retroactive application of statute adding sentence of life
without parole to capital sentencing range).
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With respect to the issues of whether Brown was
competent and entered his guilty plea knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily, we agree with the trial court that the record
indicates Brown was competent and he understood the significance
and consequences of this plea.
A criminal defendant may not
plead guilty unless he does so “competently and intelligently.”
Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396, 113 S. Ct. 2680, 2685, 125
L. Ed. 2d 321 (1993)(citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58
S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 2d 1461 (1938)); Brady v. United States,
397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970).
The issue of
a defendant’s competency, however, differs from that of whether
the defendant entered the plea knowingly and voluntarily.
The
focus of a competency inquiry is the defendant’s mental capacity
and ability to understand the proceedings.
See Drope v.
Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171, 95 S. Ct. 896, 903, 43 L. Ed. 2d 103
(1975).
On the other hand, the knowing and voluntary inquiry
involves whether the defendant actually understands the
significance and consequences of his decision and whether the
decision is uncoerced.
Ct. at 2687 n. 12.
Godinez, 509 U.S. at 401 n. 12, 113 S.
A trial court must determine both that a
defendant who seeks to plead guilty is competent, and that the
waiver of constitutional rights is “knowing and voluntary.”
Id.
at 400, 113 S. Ct. at 2687.
As to competency, Brown was evaluated at KCPC and had
neurological tests done at the University of Louisville.
Dr.
Johnson submitted a report describing the evaluation and
concluding that Brown was competent.
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George Sornberger testified
at the hearing that Judge Luker discussed the report and inquired
about Brown’s competency at the guilty plea hearing.
Brown
offered no evidence at the RCr 11.42 hearing to rebut or
discredit the trial court’s original finding that he was
competent.
Thus, Brown has not shown that the circuit court’s
finding on remand that he was competent to enter the guilty plea
was incorrect.
As to the issue of whether Brown entered the plea
knowingly and voluntarily, the test is whether it represents a
voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of
action open to a defendant.
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S.
25, 31, 91 S. Ct. 160, 164, 27 L. Ed. 2d 163 (1970); Kiser v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 829 S.W.2d 432, 434 (1992);
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 992 S.W.2d 871 (1999).
Russell v.
The validity of a
guilty plea is determined from the totality of the circumstances
surrounding it, rather than from reference to some magical
incantation recited at the time it was taken.
Commonwealth, Ky., 565 S.W.2d 445, 447 (1978);
S.W.2d at 54;
Kotas v.
Centers, 799
Sparks v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 721 S.W.3d 736,
727 (1987).
Brown’s complaint centers on the prison sentence
contained in the plea agreement.
He testified at the hearing
that he believed he would receive a sentence of twenty-five years
or a life sentence and that he would become eligible for parole
after having serving eight years.
As the circuit court noted,
however, there is extensive evidence conflicting with this
position.
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First, George Sornberger testified that he expended
extra effort to explain the proposed sentence of life without the
benefit of parole for twenty-five years to Brown through several
meetings and written correspondence because it was somewhat novel
at that time.
In a June 28, 1985, letter to Brown explaining the
plea offer, defense counsel repeatedly referred to the sentence
as twenty-five years without parole.
It states that the
prosecution wanted a guilty plea to the PFO I charge as well to
ensure that should the twenty-five years without parole provision
be declared invalid at a later date, Brown would be subject to a
ten-year parole ineligibility requirement under the PFO
conviction.
The letter also contrasts the proposed sentence to
the life sentence with parole eligibility after eight years which
Robert Smith, his co-defendant, would be subject to under his
guilty plea.
The letter also explicitly states that under the
plea agreement Brown would not meet with the Parole Board until
November 2008.
Sornberger testified that he believed that Brown
understood the terms of the plea agreement.
In addition, the proposed plea agreement document which
Brown admitted having signed explicitly states three times that
the sentence would be imprisonment for life without benefit of
parole for twenty-five years.
Although Brown asserts that he was
unable to read the document, he stated that someone read it to
him and Sornberger testified that he reviewed the document with
Brown.
We agree with the circuit court that while novel, the
sentence was not an especially difficult concept to comprehend or
understand.
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Finally, Brown was familiar with the legal system.
Prior to entering his August 1985 plea, he had pled guilty to
felony offenses on four other occasions and he had been released
on parole at the time when he committed the offenses in the
current case.
Based on the totality of the circumstances, we cannot
conclude the circuit court acted improperly in discrediting
Brown’s proffered interpretation of the sentence he would receive
under the plea agreement and in finding that he understood the
plea agreement.
Brown has failed to show that he was not
competent or that his guilty plea was not entered knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily.
Accordingly, the trial court did
not err in denying Brown’s RCr 11.42 motion.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the
Laurel Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Donald Taylor Brown, Pro Se
West Liberty, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General
William L. Daniel, II
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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