JAMES A. SLAUGHTER v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: AUGUST 4, 2000; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1999-CA-000185-MR
JAMES A. SLAUGHTER
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN W. POTTER, JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO. 97-CR-002198
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, DYCHE, AND GUIDUGLI, JUDGES.
DYCHE, JUDGE:
James A. Slaughter appeals from the judgment of
the Jefferson Circuit Court sentencing him to fifteen years’
imprisonment, pursuant to a jury verdict of guilty of trafficking
in cocaine.
In September 1997, Slaughter was indicted by the
Jefferson County Grand Jury for first-degree trafficking in a
controlled substance, cocaine (Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS)
218A.1412), and/or complicity therein (KRS 502.020), and firstdegree persistent felony offender (KRS 532.080).
Michael A.
Bates and Timothy D. Miller were also named in the indictment.
The indictments stemmed from an incident which occurred
on the night of May 19, 1997, in Louisville.
According to the
Commonwealth, Louisville Police Detective Robert O’Neil, in
conjunction with a tip from a confidential informant provided to
Detective Damon Green, was observing a Floyd Street Shell station
through binoculars in anticipation of observing Slaughter engage
in a drug deal.
O’Neil first observed Bates, who appeared to be
nervous and waiting for someone.
Eventually, a van pulled into
the station lot, Slaughter got out of the van, Slaughter and
Bates approached each other, and Slaughter passed something to
Bates.
O’Neil believed he had witnessed a cocaine transaction.
The police moved in, and Slaughter, Bates, and van driver Miller
were arrested.
Bates was searched, and a bag containing
approximately two ounces of powder cocaine was found on his
person.
According to Slaughter, on the night of May 19 Bates
stole the cocaine from a street cocaine dealer.
Bates was
fleeing the area when he passed by Slaughter’s home at the same
time Slaughter and Miller happened to be leaving to go to the
Shell station to buy lottery tickets.
Bates asked for a ride,
and the three drove to the Shell station.
Slaughter exited the
van and approached the Shell station night window to purchase his
tickets.
Slaughter then realized that he needed to call someone
to obtain lottery numbers and asked Bates to bring him his cell
phone from the van.
the cell phone.
Bates exited the van and handed Slaughter
Moments later, the police apprehended Slaughter,
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Bates, and Miller, found the cocaine on Bates, and arrested them
all for trafficking in cocaine.
A joint trial was held with co-defendant Bates in
February 1998, following which Slaughter was found guilty of
cocaine trafficking and sentenced to seven years, enhanced to
fifteen years under the persistent felony offender charge.
This
appeal followed.
First, Slaughter contends that the trial court erred by
failing to declare a mistrial after it was discovered, on the
third day of trial just before closing arguments, that a juror
was the mother-in-law of an Assistant Commonwealth’s Attorney who
worked in the same office as the prosecutor trying the case.
Though Slaughter’s motion for a mistrial was denied, as a remedy,
the juror was deliberately selected as the alternate juror.
Slaughter agreed to this procedure so long as his agreement was
not deemed a waiver of his objection.
The right to a completely impartial jury
is protected by Section Eleven of the
Kentucky Constitution as well as the Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution. Paenitz v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
820 S.W.2d 480 (1991). A juror should be
disqualified when the juror has a close
relationship with a victim, a party or an
attorney, even if the juror claims to be free
from any bias. Butts v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
953 S.W.2d 943 (1997). . . . Composition of
the jury is always vital to the defendant in
a criminal prosecution and doubt about
unfairness is to be resolved in his favor.
Fugate v. Commonwealth, Ky., 993 S.W.2d 931, 939 (1999).
“[T]he
decision to grant a mistrial is within the trial judge's
discretion, and his ruling will not be disturbed absent the
showing of an abuse of that discretion.” Belt v. Commonwealth,
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Ky. App., 2 S.W.3d 790, 793 (1999) (citing Chapman v. Richardson,
Ky., 740 S.W.2d 929 (1987), and
Jones v. Commonwealth, Ky., 662
S.W.2d 483 (1983)).
We disagree with Slaughter’s contention that the juror
was culpable in failing to disclose her mother-in-law status in
voir dire.
Slaughter cites two questions that he claims elicited
her son-in-law’s relationship with the prosecutor.
First, when
the jurors were questioned regarding relatives in law enforcement
and, second, when the jurors were asked to divulge any
information that they would want to hear if they were the
attorneys trying the case.
Considering that the juror was a
layperson, both of these questions were too indirect to compel
the conclusion that the juror was dishonest in her failure to
disclose.
Further, the juror was removed as the alternate, and
there is no evidence of prejudice as a result of the juror’s not
being excused for cause.
Moreover, it is doubtful that the mere
fact that the juror was the mother-in-law of a co-worker of the
prosecutor would require her to be excused for cause.
See
Bowling v. Commonwealth, Ky., 942 S.W.2d 293, 299 (1997).
In
summary, we are not persuaded that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying a mistrial under these circumstances.
Next, Slaughter contends that he was denied a fair
trial because of the Commonwealth’s abuse of the discovery
process.
Specifically, Slaughter alleges that the Commonwealth
improperly failed to inform him that (1) immediately after his
arrest, Bates told Detective O’Neil, in sum and substance,
“That’s my dope. Why are you arresting Mr. Slaughter?
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He has
nothing to do with this”; and (2) Detective O’Neil used
binoculars to observe the drug transaction.
Slaughter first
learned of the exculpatory statement shortly before a suppression
hearing the morning of the trial; he learned of the binoculars at
the suppression hearing.
“It is clear that the government must produce evidence
that is favorable to the accused and material to the question of
his guilt and punishment.”
Eldred v. Commonwealth, Ky., 906
S.W.2d 694, 701 (1994) (citing Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S.
39, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40, (1987)).
The prosecution is
under a duty to produce exculpatory evidence in time for due
investigation.
(1979).
Silverburg v. Commonwealth, Ky., 587 S.W.2d 241
“[T]he withholding by the state of information which
‘creates a reasonable doubt that would not otherwise exist’ is a
denial of due process, regardless of good faith on the part of
the governmental authorities responsible for the suppression.”
Timmons v. Commonwealth, Ky., 555 S.W.2d 234, 239 (1977) (citing
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed. 2d 215
(1963)).
“[A] prosecutor will not have violated his or her
constitutional duty of disclosure unless his omission is of such
a significance to result in the denial of the defendant's right
to a fair trial.”
Wilson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 836 S.W.2d 872,
885 (1992), overruled on other grounds by St. Clair v. Roark,
Ky., 10 S.W.3d 482, 487 (1999).
In determining whether the delay
in disclosure of a witness statement was error, the appellate
court must look to see if the prosecution was given a more
favorable opportunity to convict.
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Epperson v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
809 S.W.2d 835, 840-841 (1990).
The question of whether there
was a discovery violation and whether because of it a continuance
or mistrial was necessary is addressed to the judgment and
discretion of the trial court. Carter v. Commonwealth, Ky., 782
S.W.2d 597, 601 (1989).
Paragraph (8) of the September 19, 1997, discovery
order provided that “[t]he Commonwealth shall disclose to the
defendant, in writing, all evidence or information that tends to
negate the guilt of the defendant . . . .”
Bates’s statement to
the effect that the cocaine was his and that Slaughter had
nothing to do with it was exculpatory evidence that should have
been disclosed under the discovery order.
However, we are not
persuaded that Slaughter was denied a fair trial because the
statement was not timely disclosed.
Slaughter’s trial counsel
learned of the statement the day of the trial.1
Further, upon
questioning by the trial court as to how earlier knowledge of the
statement would have altered his trial strategy, trial counsel
was unable to specifically identify how it would have.
The
record discloses that the Commonwealth did not learn about the
statement until the suppression hearing and that it did not
intentionally violate the discovery order.
Detective O’Neil
heard the statement and Detective Green prepared the
investigation report.
At trial, the detectives blamed the
1
Trial counsel otherwise undertook a vigorous defense of
Slaughter. It is unclear why trial counsel did not find out
about this statement much earlier by interviewing co-defendant
Bates and/or Bates’s trial counsel.
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omission of the statement from the investigation report on human
error.
In summary, the statement was exculpatory and Slaughter
was entitled to it under Brady, the discovery order, and RCr
7.24.
However, the failure to disclose was not willful,
Slaughter was not denied a fundamentally fair trial, and his
substantial rights were not affected as a result of the untimely
disclosure of the statement.
The trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying a continuance or a mistrial in connection
with the exculpatory statement.
We are not persuaded that the Commonwealth’s failure to
disclose that Detective O’Neil used binoculars while observing
the Shell station was a discovery violation.
We have reviewed
the discovery order and are unable to locate any specific
provision therein which would require the disclosure of this
information.
The order directed the Commonwealth to permit
Slaughter to inspect “tangible objects . . . material to the
preparation of his defense”; however, the binoculars do not fall
within this category.
Slaughter has failed to cite us to any
authority which would require the disclosure of the fact that
Detective O’Neil used binoculars in his surveillance duties, and
we are unable to locate supporting authority for his argument.
Moreover, Slaughter has failed to show that his defense was
prejudiced, and he did, in fact, learn about the binoculars at
the pre-trial suppression hearing.
While Slaughter does argue
that disclosure would have permitted him to test the binoculars
and evaluate its ability to define objects, such testing and
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examination are of speculative benefit.
Slaughter was not
entitled to a continuance or a mistrial in connection with the
binoculars.
Next, Slaughter contends that he was denied a fair
trial when, over his objection, the trial court permitted the
Commonwealth to introduce irrelevant evidence.
In his brief,
appellant identifies several examples of this, most of which
involve evidence relating to testimony from Detective Green and
Detective O’Neil concerning crack cocaine.
Testimony relating to
crack included the statement that Bates had the appearance of a
crack user; that crack is sold in “bindles”; and that crack is
smoked in pipes and mixed with marijuana.
Other testimony
appellant alleges was irrelevant includes testimony as to the
fair market value of cocaine; how cocaine can be diluted with
baking soda and manitol; the evils of free basing cocaine,
including how this led to the severe injury to Richard Pryor; and
how long it would take to smoke two ounces of cocaine.
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence.
KRE 401.
All relevant
evidence is, except as otherwise provided, generally admissible,
and evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.
KRE 402.
Evidence relating to crack cocaine and other means of
smoking cocaine was relevant in Slaughter’s trial.
The defense
theory was that Bates possessed the cocaine for his personal use.
Moreover, Bates did not snort powdered cocaine, he smoked cocaine
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“twenty four - seven.”
In order to evaluate whether Bates’s
story was plausible, i.e., that he possessed the cocaine for his
personal use, the jury needed to know something about smoking
cocaine.
To this end, Detectives Green and O’Neil testified as
to the various means of smoking cocaine, viz., by converting it
to crack form, by smoking it mixed in with marijuana, and by free
basing it.
As to whether Bates “had the appearance of a crack
user,” Bates admitted he was a crack user, and there was no
prejudice.
The testimony relating to the packaging of cocaine
and the street value, again, was germane as to whether Bates
possessed the cocaine for his personal use.
When the Richard
Pryor incident was brought up, the defense objected, and the
issue was quickly dropped.
The balancing of the probative value of
relevant evidence against the danger of undue
prejudice is a task properly reserved for the
sound discretion of the trial judge. The
standard of review is whether there has been
an abuse of that discretion. The test for
abuse of discretion is whether the trial
judge's decision was arbitrary, unreasonable,
unfair, or unsupported by sound legal
principles.
Commonwealth v. English, Ky., 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (1999)(internal
citations omitted).
Applying this test, we conclude that the
trial judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting the various
evidence identified by Slaughter in this argument.
Next, Slaughter contends that the prosecutor engaged in
misconduct in her closing statement by violating the trial
court’s order in limine.
In its pre-trial order, the trial court
ruled that the Commonwealth could make no mention that Detective
Green, who was staking out Slaughter’s house the night of May 19,
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had radioed Detective O’Neil that a drug deal was about to occur
at the Shell station.
However, during her closing argument, the
prosecutor mentioned the radio call.
Following Slaughter’s
objection, the trial court admonished the jury that it should
rely on its memory to remember the evidence given from the
witness stand.
“In any consideration of alleged prosecutorial
misconduct, particularly, as here, when the conduct occurred
during closing argument, we must determine whether the conduct
was of such an ‘egregious’ nature as to deny the accused his
constitutional right of due process of law.”
Commonwealth, Ky., 744 S.W.2d 407, 411 (1987).
Slaughter v.
At issue in this
matter was merely one brief utterance during the course of
closing arguments, after which the trial court properly
admonished the jury.
In considering the Commonwealth's conduct
in context and in light of the trial as a whole, we see nothing
in the prosecutor’s statement which would warrant reversal.
Brown v. Commonwealth, Ky., 934 S.W.2d 242, 248 (1996).
Finally, Slaughter contends that he was denied a fair trial
because of the cumulative effect of the preceding errors. Though
each error may be individually insufficient to require a
reversal, the cumulative effect of the errors may require
reversal.
Funk v. Commonwealth, Ky., 842 S.W.2d 476, 483 (1992).
“Our review of the entire case reveals that [Slaughter] received
a fundamentally fair trial, and that there is no cumulative
effect or error that would mandate reversal.”
Commonwealth, 942 S.W.2d at 293.
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Bowling v.
The judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Paul J. Neel, Jr.
Louisville, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Samuel J. Floyd, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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