BOOSTER LAVERNE KINSEY v. PATRICIA FIELDS KINSEY
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RENDERED: NOVEMBER 9, 2000; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-003183-MR
BOOSTER LAVERNE KINSEY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BUTLER CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE RONNIE C. DORTCH, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 96-CI-00142 & 96-CI-00144
v.
PATRICIA FIELDS KINSEY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
HUDDLESTON, JOHNSON AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE: Booster Laverne Kinsey appeals from an order of
the Butler Circuit Court denying him custody of his two
children.1
Having concluded that the trial court was correct as
a matter of law on the issue of jurisdiction and that the trial
court’s findings of fact were not clearly erroneous and that it
did not abuse its discretion as to custody, we affirm.
1
This appeal concerns issues related to custody of the
parties’ children from two separate actions that were
consolidated.
This case has a long and tortuous procedural history
that must be reviewed in some detail before we address the legal
issues.
Booster and Patricia Fields Kinsey began dating sometime
in 1990.
Their first child, Carl Fields Kinsey, was born on
March 6, 1993, and they married in Kentucky on December 25, 1993.
Their second son, Casey Fields Kinsey, was born on September 25,
1995.
The couple maintained a home in Georgia both prior to
their marriage and after the marriage.
On June 17, 1996, Patricia left Georgia with the
children and moved to Kentucky, where she had family.
After
failed attempts at reconciliation, Booster and Patricia separated
on July 1, 1996.
On September 19, 1996, Patricia filed a
petition for an Emergency Protective Order in the Butler District
Court, and an EPO was granted on that date.2
On October 4, 1996, Booster filed a complaint for
divorce in the Superior Court of Camden County, Georgia.
On
October 9, 1996, Patricia was served with a summons, and on
October 17 a hearing was held in the matter.
2
The Georgia
The EPO contained a provision granting Patricia temporary
custody of the children. However, on November 6, 1996, the
Butler District Court entered another order setting aside this
temporary custody order, stating “that this Court does not have
jurisdiction to enter a child custody order under the Uniform
Child Custody [A]ct as contained in the Kentucky Revised
Statutes. The children have not resided in Butler County,
Kentucky for six months, nor is there any other basis for
jurisdiction. Georgia, which has been the marital residence,
appears to be the home state of the children for the entry of
orders under the U.C.C.J.A.” While the District Court’s ruling
is of no consequence to our ruling, for the record we note that
under KRS 403.420(1)(c) and 403.725 a District Court has
jurisdiction to protect children in an emergency situation.
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Superior Court entered a temporary order on October 31, 1996, and
an amended temporary order on November 14, 1996, granting
temporary custody to Booster.
Patricia filed her own petition for custody on November
14, 1996, in Kentucky in the Butler Circuit Court (96-CI-00142).
On November 19, 1996, Booster filed a separate complaint in the
Butler Circuit Court (96-CI-00144), seeking to register the
Georgia amended temporary order that had awarded him custody.
The Butler Circuit Court entered an order on January 27, 1997,
denying Booster’s motion to dismiss Patricia’s petition for
custody.
This interlocutory, non-final order also included a
ruling that Butler Circuit Court had jurisdiction over the case.
On April 9, 1997, the two Butler Circuit Court actions were
consolidated.
On September 16, 1997, the Georgia Superior Court
entered an order summarizing the case to that date.
The order,
which was signed by Judge E. M. Wilkes, III, indicated that
Georgia Superior Court Judge Robert L. Scoggin had spoken with
Judge Ronnie C. Dortch of the Butler Circuit Court concerning the
jurisdiction question.
In that order Judge Wilkes ruled that it
was in the children’s best interests to have the custody case
tried in Kentucky.
The order vacated the Georgia court’s
previous custody order in favor of Booster and stayed the
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litigation in Georgia pending the results of the litigation in
Kentucky.3
On October 6, 1997, the Butler Circuit Court entered a
supplemental order which pursuant to KRS 403.420(1)(b) and (c)
asserted jurisdiction in the custody dispute and denied Booster’s
motion to register and enforce the Georgia custody order.4
On
March 26, 1998, the Butler Circuit Court entered an order
approving and adopting as its own the recommendations from the
Domestic Relations Commissioner’s Report as to the issue of
custody.
The order granted the parties joint custody, with
Patricia as residential custodian.5
On August 31, 1998, an
“amended order” was entered by the Butler Circuit Court which
held Patricia in contempt for failing to comply with the court’s
visitation order and which denied Booster’s “Motion for Change of
Custody.”
This order contained language that it “is a final and
3
The Georgia Superior Court noted that Booster’s attempt to
obtain a writ of prohibition in Kentucky against Judge Dortch had
been denied by the Court of Appeals (1997-CA-000261)(petition
denied on April 14, 1997).
4
This order was appealed to this Court in 1997-CA-002634-MR,
but the appeal was dismissed on December 22, 1997, as being from
a non-final order that was not appealable.
5
The order1 contained the following language that misstated
the relationship between the Circuit Court and the Commissioner:
“This Court cannot find that the Commissioner abused his
discretion in his Report nor was he clearly erroneous in his
findings.” See Eiland v. Ferrell, Ky., 937 S.W.2d 713, 716
(1997).
1
Booster filed an appeal from this order on April 24,
1998 in this Court. (1998-CA-001039-MR). This appeal
was dismissed on June 17, 1998 as being from a nonfinal order that was not appealable.
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appealable order and there is no just reason for delay.”
Booster
timely filed a CR6 59 motion to alter, amend or vacate on
September 10, 1998.
On December 2, 1998, the Circuit Court
entered a final order denying the CR 59 motion and ruling on
other pending motions concerning visitation and payment of a
medical bill.
This appeal followed.
Booster sets forth his three arguments on appeal as
follows: (1) “The Butler Circuit Court denied appellant his
constitutional rights under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of
the United States Constitution and the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act”; (2) “The Commissioner failed to give equal
consideration to both parents and failed to consider the harm the
mother’s actions have caused the children”; and (3) “The trial
court erred and abused its discretion in not awarding residential
custody to the father after the mother denied him visitation and
fled with the children; the trial court did not apply the correct
legal standard.”
We will first address the issue concerning
jurisdiction.
Booster argues that since he had a custody
proceeding in process in Georgia when Patricia filed for custody
in Kentucky, the Butler Circuit Court erred in not giving the
proper constitutionally required recognition to the Georgia
proceeding and in asserting jurisdiction in Kentucky.
6
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
-5-
The United States Constitution, Article IV, Section
One, the Full Faith and Credit Clause, provides:
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in
each State to the public Acts, Records, and
judicial Proceedings of every other State.
And the Congress may by general laws
prescribe the Manner in which such Acts,
Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and
the Effect thereof.
Simply put, each state is required by the Constitution to
recognize a sister state’s judicial proceedings.
Kentucky has codified the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act at KRS 403.400-403.620.
KRS 403.420(1)(d) reads
in pertinent part as follows:
A court of this state which is competent
to decide child custody matters has
jurisdiction to make a child custody
determination by initial or modification
decree if: . . .
It appears that . . . another state has
declined to exercise jurisdiction on the
ground that this state is the more
appropriate forum to determine the custody of
the child, and it is in the best interest of
the child that this court assume
jurisdiction.
KRS 403.450 addresses the appropriate action that a
Kentucky court should take when there is a simultaneous
proceeding in another state:
A court of this state shall not exercise
its jurisdiction under KRS 403.420 to 403.620
if at the time of filing the petition a
proceeding concerning the custody of the
child was pending in a court of another state
exercising jurisdiction substantially in
conformity with KRS 403.420 to 403.620,
unless the proceeding is stayed by the court
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of the other state because this state is a
more appropriate forum or for other reasons.
In the case sub judice, the Georgia custody order that
Booster sought to have registered in Kentucky was from a Georgia
proceeding that was in process at the time Patricia filed her
custody petition in the Butler Circuit Court.
Pursuant to KRS
403.450, the judge of the Butler Circuit Court conferred with the
judge of the Georgia Superior Court concerning the question of
jurisdiction.
In the Georgia Superior Court order dated
September 16, 1997, Judge Wilkes stated:
Under the Act, when Courts in more than
one state are attempting to exercise
jurisdiction in a custody dispute, the proper
procedure is for the presiding Judges to
communicate and exchange information relevant
to that issue. O.C.G.A. §19-9-47(d). The
Order entered by the Judge in the Kentucky
Circuit Court action noted the jurisdictional
dispute had been discussed by telephone with
Judge Robert L. Scoggin, who had entered the
aforementioned amended Temporary Order
herein. The Kentucky Order stated that Judge
Scoggin had not objected to relinquishing
jurisdiction to the Kentucky courts. The
undersigned has consulted Judge Scoggin, who
confirms that is what occurred during his
telephone conference with the Judge of the
Kentucky Circuit Court. . . . Pursuant to
Judge Scoggin’s determination Kentucky is a
more appropriate forum to litigate the issue
of custody, the amended Temporary Order
entered on October 31, 1996, is VACATED, and
proceedings herein are STAYED pending the
outcome of the litigation between the parties
in the state [emphasis added].
It is clear from the above that after the judges from
the two states conferred, the judge from Georgia believed that
Kentucky was the more appropriate of the two states to hear this
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action.
Thus, the Georgia Superior Court stayed the action
before it and vacated the temporary order it had previously
entered.
The Butler Circuit Court unquestionably has general
jurisdiction to hear child custody cases; and more specifically,
had jurisdiction to hear this case by the authority of KRS
403.420(1)(d), since the Georgia Superior Court declined
jurisdiction in light of Kentucky being the more appropriate
forum.
Furthermore, the simultaneous proceedings rule was not
violated since the Butler Circuit Court acted in the case after
the out-of-state court proceedings had been stayed pending the
Kentucky litigation.
The judges in both states followed the
Act’s purpose of exchanging information and promoting cooperation
between the courts.7
Since the Butler Circuit Court acted in
conformity with the U.C.C.J.A., we find nothing to support
Booster’s claim that his constitutional rights were compromised.
The Butler Circuit Court refused to give full faith and credit to
the Georgia Superior Court order only after the order had been
vacated and after the Georgia court had stayed its proceedings
and declined to exercise jurisdiction over the matter.
Having concluded that jurisdiction properly lies in the
Butler Circuit Court, we will now address the adequacy of the
Circuit Court’s findings of fact and whether it abused its
discretion.
7
Kentucky law affords the circuit court broad
KRS 403.400(1)(h).
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discretion in deciding matters pertaining to child custody.8
In
large part this is so because decisions related to child custody
often turn on the determination of subtle, complex facts, and, of
course, the circuit court is the fact-finder.9
In general,
findings of fact of a trial court shall not be set aside unless
they are clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to view the credibility of the
witnesses.10
In reviewing the decision of a trial court, the
test is not whether the appellate court would have decided
differently, but whether the findings of a trial court were
clearly erroneous or whether it abused its discretion.11
The following quote from Dudgeon v. Dudgeon,12
appropriately expresses our empathy for trial judges faced with
the responsibility of deciding custody cases: “[C]ourts, both
trial and appellate, are presented with no problem of greater
complexity than the delicate and awesome responsibility of
adjudicating the custody of children.”
Further, Dudgeon clearly
expresses the limitations of our appellate review:
The (custody) issue must be resolved by
careful and conscientious trial judges who
8
KRS 403.270; Squires v. Squires, Ky., 854 S.W.2d 765
(1993).
9
CR 52.01.
10
Reichle, supra at 444; CR 52.01.
11
Cherry v. Cherry, Ky., 634 S.W.2d 423, 425 (1982) (citing
Eviston v. Eviston, Ky., 507 S.W.2d 153 (1974)).
12
Ky., 458 S.W.2d 159, 160 (1970).
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weigh all relevant factors; make a difficult
decision; then are available and vigilant to
supervise the result. This is simply the
best we can do with the means available.
Appellate review must confine itself in
changing determination of the custody of
infants in divorce cases to those situations
where there is a clear and substantial
showing that the manifest error was
committed.13
In rendering child custody decisions the trial court is
bound by the “best interests” standard set out in KRS 403.270(1):
The court shall determine custody in
accordance with the best interests of the
child and equal consideration shall be given
to each parent. The court shall consider all
relevant factors including:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
The wishes of the child’s parent or
parents as to his custody;
The wishes of the child as to his
custodian;
The interaction and interrelationship of
the child with his parent or parents,
his siblings, and any other person who
may significantly affect the child’s
best interests;
The child’s adjustment to his home,
school, and community;
The mental and physical health of all
individuals involved; and
Information, records, and evidence of
domestic violence as defined in KRS
403.720.
“In child custody cases, the trial court must consider
all relevant factors including those specifically enumerated in
KRS 403.270(1) in determining the best ‘interests of the child.’
In so doing, it is mandatory under CR 52.01 that the facts be so
13
Id. at 162.
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found specifically” [emphasis original].14
However, the
appellate court may look to the entire record to determine
whether the factual findings are clearly erroneous or the trial
judge abused his discretion.15
Booster claims that either he should have been granted
sole custody, or if joint custody is to be awarded, then he
should be the resident custodian.
The following excerpts from
Booster’s brief summarize his argument:
The Commissioner’s ultimate conclusion
that the parties share joint custody, with
Patricia Fields-Kinsey as primary custodian,
is an abuse of discretion and evidences he
did not give equal consideration to each
party as required by K.R.S. 403.270. The
Kentucky Legislature abolished the tender
years presumption in 1978 to include the
language that “equal consideration shall be
given to each parent”, K.R.S. 403.270(1).
Patricia Fields-Kinsey is the party that took
these children from Georgia and their father
and travelled with them to Kentucky. She
misused the Court process, the social
workers, made allegations of false physical
and sexual abuse, and deprived the children
of contact with their father. These were
emotionally damaging to the children because
they were deprived of contact with their
father. The Court awarded the instigator of
the abuse to be [sic] the residential
custodian.
. . .
The Commissioner found that Patricia
Kinsey’s accusations [that Booster looked
into her apartment window] were false. He
found that the Respondent was a “devoted and
loving father”. The Commissioner found that
14
McFarland v. McFarland, Ky.App., 804 S.W.2d 17 (1991).
15
Cherry, supra at 425.
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Patricia Kinsey was overly protective of her
son, Carl, and suspects everyone of abusing
him [citation to record omitted][emphasis
original]. In light of all factors, it is
Patricia Fields-Kinsey who has caused harm to
these two children by depriving them of
contact with their father, living in numerous
residences without adequate necessities, and
subjecting Carl to numerous psychological and
physical examinations in a thinly-veiled
attempt to “document’ sexual abuse by Booster
Kinsey.
. . .
Patricia Kinsey has misused the Butler
Circuit Court and has duped the Social
Services system. The two children, Carl and
Casey, have been subjected to emotional
damage based upon Mrs. Kinsey’s false
accusations. The Commissioner did not give
equal consideration between Booster and
Patricia as to who would be the better
parent; notwithstanding that during the
approximate year and one-half that this case
has been pending, Booster’s only contact with
his children has been through supervised
visitation.
Based upon the above, Booster Kinsey
would submit that the trial court erred based
upon the finding that he is a loving father
and the finding that the accusations of abuse
are false, that Booster Kinsey should be
designated as the primary custodian of the
children, or be granted sole custody.
Booster also argues as a separate issue that “[t]he
trial court did not apply the correct legal standard” in denying
his motion to modify custody.
In his brief, he stated:
It is without question that the
Appellant met the standards set forth in
Mennemeyer v. Mennemeyer, Ky. App., 887
S.W.2d 555 (1994), by proving that the
parties have been unable to cooperate or have
in bad faith refused to cooperate in making
decisions regarding the children. The Court
should have applied a “de novo” determination
-12-
under K.R.S. 403.270. See Jacobs v.
Edelstein, Ky. App., 959 S.W.2d 781 (1998).
By placing complete emphasis upon the
mother’s refusal to follow the visitation
Orders, the Court failed to follow the
statutory criteria and case law, which would
require a “de novo” hearing [emphasis
original]. The other factors which should
have been considered included: the mother’s
mental status of being paranoid and showing
neurotic thinking, unsanitary living
conditions, the poor economic conditions to
which the mother had exposed her children,
the mother’s false accusations against the
father in regard to the abuse of the
children, the great number of mental health
practitioners that have seen the children,
the attempts to block telephone visitation,
the dangerousness of the attempt to flee, and
other evidence presented to the Court.
The flaw in Booster’s “modification” argument is that
the trial court’s previous custody orders were interlocutory and
not final.
Thus, there was no final order that was subject to
the modification requirements.
Accordingly, our review of the
trial court’s final custody order concerns the trial court’s
initial award of custody, not a modification of custody.
This case is confusing in part because there are
multiple interlocutory orders addressing custody.
Since the
order appealed from relates back to and incorporates the previous
interlocutory orders, our review of the adequacy of the trial
court’s findings and its exercise of its discretion must involve
consideration of all of these orders collectively.
Patricia’s
argument in support of the trial court’s ruling is represented by
the following discussion from her brief:
Patricia respectfully submits that
Booster has misconstrued the Commissioner’s
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comments, and that he has also failed to
demonstrate that the trial court committed
error, reversible or otherwise. First of
all, Booster fails to recognize that the
Commissioner’s favorable comments regarding
his relationship with the children is not a
criticism of Patricia. To the contrary, the
Commissioner found that Patricia was very
protective of the boys. Furthermore, the
Commissioner prefaced his favorable comments
of Booster by using the word “likewise”,
confirming that he found the same favorable
attributes in Patricia’s relationship with
the children.
Unfortunately, Patricia’s brief also addresses
Booster’s third argument concerning the legal standard the trial
court applied in denying Booster’s motion to change custody as a
question of the appropriate legal standard for a “modification.”
As stated previously, the previous custody orders were
interlocutory and not final.
Thus, the final order appealed from
was the initial custody order and not a ruling on a motion for
modification of a previous final order.
We will now address the merits of that custody
determination.
It appears from the record that the Domestic
Relations Commissioner heard considerable evidence before he made
his recommendations to the trial judge.
The Commissioner’s
Report filed on November 10, 1997, consisted of approximately six
pages and discussed the procedural history of the case and
evaluated the evidence presented by the parties.
We believe the
following excerpts are significant in addressing the adequacy of
the trial court’s findings:
Through five (5) days of hearings in
this case, the Commissioner finds that both
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parties have made judgments and taken actions
which could certainly have been improved
upon. The testimony in the case indicates
that the Respondent, Booster Laverne Kinsey,
had attempted suicide in 1990 and again at
the time of separation in June of 1996. Each
party convinced the Commissioner that the
other had experimented with drugs or
marijuana or both during their marriage.
[Booster] demonstrated poor judgment in
mailing out a packet including some
explicitly vivid sexual activity on behalf of
[Patricia] to everyone he could think of, the
list consisting of about three (3) pages
single-spaced. [Patricia] accused [Booster]
of sexually abusing the older boy, but no
evidence was demonstrated to back this up
except a counselor in Bowling Green that
engaged in play therapy to reach her
conclusions.
. . .
[The Counselor’s conclusions] seem[ ] to
be completely ridiculous conclusions to
indicate any sexual abuse.
. . .
The Commissioner finds that [Patricia]
is overly protective of the son, Carl, and
suspects everyone of abusing him.
The Commissioner likewise finds that
[Booster] is a very devoted and loving
father, demonstrating this in videos of
playing with the children, as well as his
visits with the children. The Commissioner
also finds [Booster] as somewhat paranoid as
questioning the supervision that went into
his visits from one of the supervisors.
Both parties filed exceptions to the Commissioner’s
Report.
However, with the exception of a matter related to
Booster’s summer visitation rights, the trial court entered an
order on March 26, 1998, wherein it approved and adopted the
report as its own.
However, the order approving the report did
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not include finality language, and the parties continued to file
motions litigating matters related to custody and visitation.
On July 9, 1998, Booster filed a motion for sole
custody, wherein he alleged that the children “had been placed
in physical, mental, and emotional danger” by Patricia.
Apparently, Patricia had moved with the children from Butler
County to Louisville without notifying Booster or the trial curt
of her whereabouts.
The trial court, without referring the
matter back to the Commissioner, heard additional evidence on
this motion.
In an order entered on August 31, 1998, the trial
court ruled that joint custody should continue with Patricia as
the resident custodian and with Booster receiving additional
visitation.
The trial court stated:
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that
this court finds that both parties are good
and caring parents and love their children.
Both have exercised poor judgment at times
when dealing with each other concerning the
children. But for the incident on June 27,
1998, the motion for change of custody would
not have been filed or considered. That is
the only substantial fact or change in
circumstance that was brought before the
court since the last hearing and ruling in
October 1997. Therefore, standing alone,
that incident is nonsufficient to warrant a
change of custody. In other words, the best
interest of the children will not be advanced
by awarding Mr. Kinsey sole custody or the
primary residential custodianship of the
children. Therefore, the Motion for Change
of Custody is DENIED and the visitation with
the father is altered as outlined above.
-16-
This is a final and appealable order and
there is no just reason for delay.16
As discussed previously, the final order awarding
custody in this matter that was entered on August 31, 1998, also
incorporated previous interlocutory orders of the trial court.
While we believe the trial court’s orders regarding child custody
could have made more direct reference to the elements of KRS
403.270, we also believe that the trial court’s findings
previously set forth herein properly addressed the issue of the
best interests of the children.
The trial court found that while
both parents had made mistakes, they both loved and cared for the
children and were fit to have custody.
Most importantly, the
trial court awarded joint custody with Patricia as the resident
custodian based on what it determined to be in the best interests
of the children.
Even though the trial court could have better observed
the elements of KRS 403.270, the various relevant findings of
fact that were set forth above are supported by the evidence of
record, and thus, we cannot hold them to be clearly erroneous;
and the joint custody award with Patricia as the resident
custodian was not an abuse of the trial court’s discretion.17
16
Following the entry of this final order, Booster filed a
CR 59 motion to alter, amend or vacate. On December 2, 1998, the
trial court denied Booster’s CR 59 motion as to the custody
issue, but altered the previous orders as to visitation.
17
In Kuprion v. Fitzgerald, Ky., 888 S.W.2d 679, 684 (1994),
our Supreme Court stated that an abuse of discretion “implies
arbitrary or capricious disposition under the circumstances, at
(continued...)
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Accordingly, the judgment of the Butler Circuit Court is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Pamela C. Bratcher
Bowling Green, KY
Steven O. Thornton
Kenneth P. O’Brien
Bowling Green, KY
17
(...continued)
least an unreasonable and unfair decision.”
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